Intelligence in War : Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Quaeda

Rating:
Summary: Eloquently -written history making an unnecessary point.
Review: As usual John Keegan provides a highly readable, well-detailed and thought-out study in military history. Unfortunately, the overarching point of the book is that intelligence alone can be used well or used poorly, but, in the end, can't win a battle or war by itself. This theme is unfortunate because no professional intelligence or military historian has ever claimed otherwise. Only a few hard-core Tom Clancy or Ian Flemming fans would suggest intelligence can determine a battle's outcome ahead of time.

This book is still recommended for its analysis of military history and is worth having on one's bookshelf. Too bad someone of Keegan's stature demeaned himself by hammering home such an easy, obvious point. I half expect his next book to (oh my god!) claim that someone who brings a knife to a gunfight will be at a disadvantage!!!

Rating:
Summary: Point of the book
Review: John Keegan is a well known military historian, and the defence editor for a major UK newspaper. In this particular book, he tackles the broad topic of intelligence and war. He uses case studies to help illustrate his points. (These include the 1942 Midway campaign, Nelson's pursuit of the French fleet leading to the Battle of the Nile, and Jackson's Shenandoah valley campaign). As some of the other reviewers have noted, these examples are not new, and some of the points he makes may be quite familiar. But I think in fairness, it should be remembered that while his work may be used to comment upon current policy, the roots of the work is as a history. It is not meant to be a polemic about how defence budgets may be better spent or the ultimate folly of war. While he does offer insights - and perhaps the best observation is that even if one has a great intelligence advantage, that advantage to be decisive must still be converted in some concrete way. The US knowing that the target was Midway was a great intelligence coup, but it still needed a big break when the Enterprise and Hornet's dive bombers managed to find the Japanese carriers while they were in the midst of re-arming. Of note in the later battles, the Japanese were able to determine US intentions (Phillipine Sea, Leyte Invasion) but the disparity in carriers and battle fleets was so great that the insight was almost irrelevant. Intelligence because it often has a short 'shelf life' unless it is acted upon or can be converted into some other tangible advantage can be transient and illusory. A very interesting work, and worth a read - more aimed at history buffs and not for ultra serious academics (who want more details) nor for policy pundits and mavens who are looking for historical 'evidence' to support their particular political and policy positions.

Rating:
Summary: Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to
Review: Noted military historian Keegan (The Face of Battle; The Mask of Command) examines several military campaigns to show how intelligence affected the outcome. Admiral Nelson had to chase Napoleon to Egypt with few intelligence resources yet achieved a great naval victory. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's local knowledge enabled him to beat superior Union forces consistently in the Shenandoah valley. At Midway the U.S. Navy had the intelligence advantage, but the outcome still depended on chance. Use of human resources proved most important in the Allied campaign against Hitler's vengeance weapons. The British defeat at Crete and the Falklands War are also analyzed. As Keegan persuasively shows, the keystone to victory was not formal military intelligence but the human factor. Intelligence organizations are now dominated by huge technical systems with lots of expensive equipment, but timeliness, completeness, effective evaluation of the material, and proper use of the knowledge gained are always vital. Only the application of sufficient force, not the quantity of intelligence data, can lead to success. Suitable for all military history collections.

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Summary: Foremost Military Historian Critiques Role of Intelligence
Review: Sir John Keegan, the world's foremost living military historian, has written a book which thoroughly examines the role of intelligence in warfare, reaching a conclusion that is sure to tick off the intelligence community: even the best military intelligence on an enemy's forces and plans is secondary to having adequate military forces and planning with which to defeat the enemy. Keegan gives a number of case studies, including the World War II submarine Battle of the Atlantic, Stonewall Jackson's 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign, Admiral Nelson's hunt for the French fleet in the Mediterranean, and the battle of Crete, to show the effect of various degrees of knowledge of the enemy's forces and plans on the outcome of battle. The battle of Crete contributes most to Keegan's conclusion on the usefulness of military intelligence: the commander had a high degree of knowledge of German forces and plans for the batttle, so much so that when the first German paratroopers began to land while he was eating breakfast, he looked up and said: "they're on time." Yet the British lost this battle despite this high degree of foreknowledge of the German invasion plans. Keegan would not deny the importance of military intelligence in future military operations. With the satellite intelligence and codebreaking available today, much can be learned about enemy forces. However despite this foreknowledge, the intention of the potential enemy's command structure can still be unknown: witness the beginning of the first Iraq War, when Iraqi forces were massing on the Kuwait border, yet U.S. intelligence did not believe Saddam would cross the border and invade Kuwait. Technological intelligence capabilities have been overemphasized by the U.S. intelligence community since Carter's Stansfield Turner headed the CIA, to the detriment of even more valuable human intelligence. Keegan's book, as all his books, reaches a reasoned balance: good intelligence is vital, but ultimately the outcome of military conflicts is determined by the skillful deployment of superior military forces--superior not necessarily in numbers, but in training, tactics, weaponry, and most of all, fighting spirit and leadership. Keegan has produced another masterpiece, which all military historians and commanders, and historians of the mysterious arts of espionage, must read--and heed, to their peril if they do not.

Rating:
Summary: Well reasoned explanation
Review: This history is well timed in the sense that it appeared at a time when certain people were attempting to spread a myth that the United States should have been able to avoid the tragedy of 9/11. Keegan, a military historian of the first tier, examines the full scope of military intelligence and its ramifications.

He convincingly demonstrates that accurate intelligence has almost always been unavailable - and even in the few instances it was available, its impact has not been the decisive element.

Keegan examine Lord Nelson's 73 day quest for the French fleet, relying upon merchants, captured sailors, ambassadors and just about everyone else for information. In the end, it was Nelson's experience and intuition that brought his fleet to battle with the French.

Perhaps his most telling example concerns the Battle of Midway. The Americans had exceptional intelligence and yet, as Keegan shows, the American victory resolved itself to four minutes of good fortune. So it goes in war.

Yes, some governments spend millions and billions on gathering intelligence. No, it is very rare for that intelligence gathering process to produce sucessful results as a norm. War is a business where secrets are not given up easily and are difficult to ferret out.

Keegan maintains that in the end, intelligence isn't a handmaiden to victory in battle, but perhaps a cousin once removed.

Jerry

Rating:
Summary: Good Case Studies but a Weak Structure
Review: With "Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda" John Keegan steps into the dark and mysterious world of military intelligence. Keegan attempts to discern the level of importance that intelligence operations have on the outcome of battle. Keegan's final assessment appears to be: not much.

Keegan uses seven case studies from history to back up his point. In each case, intelligence played a major preliminary role to the battle but offered little to know help during the course of it.

This certainly fits with Keegan's assessment that battles are won on the field not in the intelligence lair. Keegan seems to believe that our fascination with covert operations has more to do with popular literature than with real world experiences.

While I mostly agree with Keegan's findings, I do not agree with the structure of his book. Using case studies is fine when discussing a topic that is viewed almost entirely one way; but, using them for such a controversial topic as this is not a good way to do it. An equally skilled historian could very well pick seven different historical episodes and prove his point that intelligence networks are as important to winning as fighting is.

The weakness of the case study method aside though, each case that Keegan has selected for his book is an interesting historical story in its own right. There in lies the contradiction of "Intelligence in War". Keegan's chosen method of proving his point is fundamentally flawed; however, he imbues each case study with enough life to make them readable on their own merits.

But, since this is a book that is supposed to prove the overemphasis that intelligence activities have been given over the years, I have to say that "Intelligence in War" is a less than average book.