Five Days in London: May 1940

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Summary: Five days that changed the world
Review: Many Americans think that world War II began on December 8, 1941. Lukacs' neat, short work shows that not only did the war begin in earnest more than two years earlier, he shows that a few old white males meeting in London in May 1940 set the course of the war and the world simply by sticking to their guns during England's darkest, finest hours.

Lukacs shows how close England came to considering some form of capitulation. Using detailed notes and diaries and marvelous studies of English morale by means of quite-modern market research done in real time, Lukacs paints five incredible days.

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Summary: give us more
Review: Mr. Lukas writes a short and generally engrossing book about five days that may have changed history. Until relatively recently, I was one of the many who believed that Winston Churchill ascended to be Prime Minister through some sort of general acclamation. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. Despite history's general portrayal of Neville Chamberlain as a idealistic dupe who was not fit for leadership, at that time, he was a formiddible politcal force. Chamberlain was the leader of a substantial majority in the House of Commons and was highly respected. Churchill, on the other hand, had limited political backing and was considered too untrustworthy or mercurial to succeed for long. In fact, many people expected Chamberlain to return to power.

Lukas traces the day by day, hour by hour interactions between Churchill, Chamberlain and Lord Halifax (the Foreign Secretary and the person originally expected to succeed Chamberlain). The text portrays the transformation of Churchill from an uncertain leader, treading softly, to a leader who energized the Government and the Country. By the end of the book, Churchill was ready to contradict both Chamberlain and Halifax(to one degree or another) and to unambiguously state that Britain would fight on, come what may.

The text is derived from government documents and other firsthand accounts, supported by "Mass Observation Reports"(basically measurements of public opinion -- much like polling today). While this is very well done, the book lacks something; namely, context and depth. In one footnote, the author says something like "The daily history of that month is known to all who can read." In an era when many Americans cannot even identify the Axis powers, this is a gross overstatement. It shows, however, the author's view. You need historical context to appreciate this book. The author provides some context but not enough, certainly not for a first time WWII reader.

It also seems like the same sources are quoted repeatedly. This may be be because there were not more than a handful of people involved in these events and those participants who survived recorded their versions with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight. Distasteful portions of history were obviously purged by Halifax, Churchill and others. Nevertheless, upon completion, I felt there should be more detail to the story. Perhaps, additional accounts of the comings and goings of ancillary players, or more detailed quotation from the government documents would have left me better sated. Perhaps, I expect more than the available resorces can give.

The book is highly recommended if you have already done reading or study about the Spring of 1940. For others, you probably will want background material first. Try Martin Gilbert's Churchill biography or William Manchester's Last Lion for starters.

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Summary: A short but fascinating and enjoyable book
Review: This is a short book but one I predict you may want to reread.We all know the story of how Winston Churchill rallied the British people in their darkest hour when they stood alone against nazi tyranny.What we did''nt know was how close it all came to falling apart, untilnow.John Lukacs one of the best Historians of the world war II era has by using recently released British archives shown us how the most crucial five days in the history of western civilization occured between May 24-29 1940 when the ''men of Munich''the defeatists in Churchill's cabinet began pressuring Him to seek a negotiated settlement with Hitler. This book is the story of how Churchill by the sheer force of His will and personality resisted them and finally won the inner cabinet struggle to continue the war. Had anyone else been Prime Minister it is highly unlikely that they could have pulled this one off. And the world of today would be one that none of us could scarcely imagine. A great book.

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Summary: Not a holiday weekend
Review: The period in question is the five days beginning Friday, May 24th 1940 through to Tuesday, May 28th. It started with France in rout and ended with Churchill deciding to resolutely fight on. In between there was a weight of implications considered, matters pondered and many people were consulted. What was so significant about "Churchill's weekend of courage and remarkable self confidence," as Lukacs calls it?

Let's look at the preceeding few days to put things into context and to get a better perspective of the issues facing Churchill. The matters were domestic and foreign, political and strategic, life and death.

May 10th - Churchill is appointed Prime Minister after the House of Commons revolts and ousts Neville Chamberlain as leader. The Germans overwhelm Dutch and Belgian defences; the huge Belgian border fort of Eben Emael is captured; the conquest of both Holland and Belgium is underway.

May 13th - Churchill speaks to the House of Commons delivering his 'victory at all costs speech'. A speech that from this vantage point in time, seems stirring. "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat...You ask what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.' The speech fell flat. Churchill was received coldly by fellow parliamentarians and he didn't stir them at all. Chamberlain, in contrast, was given a rousing welcome on entering Parliament.

May 15th - Germany invades France. Churchill learns that German tanks are pouring through the Sedan gap. The French premier tells Churchill that he fears all is lost. May 21st - Lord Gort, the head of the 300,000+ British Expeditionary Force (BEF), begins a strategic pull back of his forces towards the French coast near a little port town called Dunkirk.

Certainly, neither Gort nor Churchill had any notion at this time of the coming near-disaster-turned-miracle that Dunkirk would come to represent. The rout had not yet begun and the last men would be lifted off French soil in the first week of June. Churchill was attending to problems elsewhere; in England, in Parliament, and right there in his own War Cabinet. Besides Churchill, other members of the War Cabinet were Chamberlain, foreign secretary Lord Halifax, Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood; the latter two as leaders of the Labour Party, were there in the interest of national unity. Lukacs' book is focused on Churchill's relationship with this small group of men, specifically Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. To say there was a cabal at work would be overstating it, but only because nothing came to fruition. Lord Halifax's attempts at pursuing possible peace initiatives, and the positioning for places in a government of occupied England, can only be described as Machiavellian. Churchill was faced with pessimists inside his party and in the wider conservative minded upper echelons of British society. The only support for his views were to be found in the general populace. How could he sway important opinion makers to his way of thinking? How could he do this with a minimal support base in his own party? The majority of the conservative members of parliament felt that if not Chamberlain as Prime Minister, then Halifax. Lukacs excells in showing how, first Churchill, and then Chamberlain, began to work to unite party and then people around the cause. Chamberlain's conversion from the appeasor is well developed. His realization and insight into the true nature of Hitler was almost a 'scales falling from the eyes' experience and once achieved, he became an active supporter of Churchill. Ironically, he was motivated by his absolute conviction that if halifax were made PM, he would immediately seek peace. Many historians have speculated on what would have happened had Halifax replaced Churchill or had Churchill himself succumbed. Churchill wrote President Roosevelt on May 15th saying, "As you are no doubt aware, the scene has darkened swiftly..." He was seeking US material assistance for England but he could just as easily have been talking about the pressure he was under when he concludes ..."and the weight may be more than we can bear".

This is an excellent exposition of the inner workings of the War Cabinet and of the men who were it's principals. The book highlights the subtlety of history. Small moments in time are often significant but get lost in the momentous occassions that surround them. Lukacs has made these few days in 1940 come alive.

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Summary: LESSONS ABOUT LEADERSHIP IN A CRISIS
Review: This book provides a marvelous lesson in leadership during an existential crisis of a nation. It has been stated that Churchill did not create the spirit of defiance that motivated Britain in 1940 when she stood alone against the Nazi menace but simply expressed it forcefully and eloquently. The book illustrates Churchill's genius in assuming the Prime Minister's office at the worst possible time and coping with military disaster in France where the BEF faced annihilation and serious doubts about his own leadership abilities at home, even among people in his own Conservative party. Churchill's success came from his ability to form bonds of trust with people like Chamberlain who had previously been a bitter opponent over the policy of appeasement and others like Attlee and Greenwood who were in the opposition Labor Party and also to somehow win over Halifax who wanted to negiotiate with Hitler. I learned from this book that a great leader is not an aloof figure who projects an "I know it all" aura, but rather one who works closely with other people, even those who oppose him, shows consideration for their feelings and also knows how to communicate with the people of his nation (who, as is shown in the book, seem to have been blissfully unware of the true dimensions of the catastrophe that was occurring on the Continent) and, at the same time, bring out their best qualities.

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Summary: Boring
Review: The subject of the book 5 days in May 1940 is one of the key swing points in WW2. Lukacs book is boring, difficult to read and lacks sufficient support material to warrant the length of the work. It seems that the author had some facts and then spent the greater part of the book padding them out.

There is for me no coherent form to the book as it zig zags from one subject to the next with no continuity in the process.

The book could have been better structured and the language simplified to make it a much more readable piece of work which would have appealed to greater audience.

The one point that the book was enlightening on the reasons put forward as to why Hitler held his advancing forces in check.

One, he was not aware of the disarray in the French and British ranks and second, that a humiliated Britain would prove more formidable.

The subject is worthy of an in depth treatment but this book fails to deliver in an interesting or entertaining way and I do believe that books should be both.

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Summary: Great Man, Great Book
Review: Lukacs is writing about Winston Churchill and the British government during an early, crucial week of World War Two. Lukacs essential point is this: Churchill had to fight men (specifically Lord Halifax) in his cabinet in order to continue the war againsed Nazi Germany. Because he did, the allies were able to win the war.

But FIVE DAYS IN LONDON is about much more than that. It is about how one man can effect and change the course of history, how decisions made by a single person can reverberate for half a century. His admirers, includeding myself, would offer that Winston Churchill is a great man. Lukacs, with this wonderful book, makes a fine case for the "great man" theory of history; that, in the end, individuals still matter.

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Summary: Terrific Snapshot of Pivotal Moment in History
Review: This is a very concise, readable account of a critical week in 1940 when the British government was faced with the choice of suing for peace or continuing the fight with Germany. Using declassified records of cabinet discussions and detailed day-by-day opinion polls the author gives you and almost minute to minute feel of the changing mood of the country as the news of the disasters in France come in.

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Summary: Heroic Twilight
Review: A invaluable corrective to recent English revisionism that Britain should have 'cut a deal' with Hitler in 1940, thereby allowing the Empire to survive. Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed this is usually posed as the choice: second fiddle to the USA, or equal terms with Germany? As an Irishman I can only thank my lucky stars that Churchill was PM in 1940 - a world where German Fascists and diehard British Imperialists ruled much of the globe could only be a nasty, violent and racist one. A world far more nasty and violent that the one we have, which at least holds out hope of improvement. As if Hitler would have kept a deal with the British! In the companion volume, 'The Duel', Luckacs points out that Hitler never spelled out his peace terms beyond the bland generality not to interfere with the British Empire. I am reminded of a story that the staff of the Nazi Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop (architect of the Nazi-Soviet Pact), made their boss a present of a bound volume of all the treaties that had been made by him. Only afterwards was it realised that every single treaty had been broken. When Hitler heard the story, he literally wept with laughter. Can anyone seriously believe that the British should have 'cut a deal' with such people? Lukacs argues that these five days were (in Churchill;s phrase) the 'hinge of fate' on which the subsequent history of the war turned. Stalin once brutishly allocated war services as follows:'The British gave time, the American gave money, and the Russians gave blood'. Stalin was wrong - the British bankrupted themselves , and also saved invaluable space in giving a platform where American power could leverage against Hitler. Lukacs seems to me to be correct in this thesis - my negatives about the book is a lack of sense of place and atmosphere, though he does try by quoting contemporary diaries as much as he can. Perhaps I am wrong in wishing for a more urgent backdrop - during these days the prevailing mood seems to be uncertainty. Read this book to fortify yourself that in 1940 the British did 'the right thing' and are to be praised for it.

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Summary: England didn't win WWII, but Churchill didn't allow its loss
Review: Churchill had been Prime Minister of England a few weeks, and there was a decided "lack of enthusiasm" for his diehard stance against appeasement. He was unpopular with some powerful members of the political structure in place. They had deserted Neville Chamberlain but had not conferred their full allegiance on Churchill. Churchill's principle opponent was not Chamberlain, but Lord Halifax and the man who had his ear, the rich "consummate intriguer and wire-puller", R.A. Butler.

In 1938 Butler, aware of the German anger at some British newspapers, devised a plan to influence the press, to "(a) see that our case [of appeasing Germany] is well represented, (b) see that the correspondence columns everywhere are well-stacked with arguments written by our friends, (c) see that our speeches are better heard and known to our opponents' or semi-opponents', e.g. Winston's campaign should be watched."

Fortunately, during the decisive four days chronicled in this book, Butler -- whose voice of appeasement was so strident that he was losing ears willing to listen to it -- would not be an important player. I mention Undersecretary of State Butler only because his views were shared by an important minority of British politicians and citizens horrified by the prospects of an all-out war with Germany.

A half-million British soldiers of the British Expeditionary Forces, which included some French as well, were stranded at Dunkirk, Belgium. A decisive blow by Hitler could have annihilated them, causing England the greatest military defeat in centuries. (There is still considerable wonderment why they weren't, why England was allowed to to pursue unmolested the massive effort to evacuate them.)

The United States was sitting on her hands, unwilling to take a stance on the British side.

France was about to (and soon did) capitulate, to enter into an agreement with Hitler to end hostilities.

Some English ministers talked about evacuating the government, something Churchill was adamantly opposed to.

In May of 1940, things could hardly have looked bleaker for England. Churchill's task was daunting: to keep the political branch of England steady on the course of resistance, resistance to the last if it came to that, and here's how Lucas described the critical debates:

"The Prime Minister said it was impossible to imagine that Herr Hitler would be so foolish as to allow [a capitulated England] to continue our re-armament. In effect, his terms would put us completely at his mercy. We should get no worse terms if we went on fighting, even if we were beaten, than were open to us now. If, however, we continued the war and Germany attacked us, no doubt we would suffer some damage, but they would also suffer severe losses ... A time might come when we felt that we had to put an end to the struggle, but the terms would not then be more mortal than those offered to us now.

"The Foreign Secretary said that he still did not see what there was in the French suggestion of trying out the possibilities of mediation which the Prime Minister felt so wrong.

"The Prime Minister said that the nations which went down fighting rose again, but those which surrendered tamely were finished.

"The Foreign Secretary said that nothing in his suggestion could even remotely be described as ultimate capitulation.

"The Prime Minister thought that the chances of decent terms being offered to us at the present were a thousand to one."

This exchange took place before the five-man War Cabinet on May 28th. Churchill asked for a temporary adjournment to address the larger Outer Cabinet. To those members, he admitted that it was his duty to consider negotiations with Hitler. But, he concluded, "it was idle to think that, if we tried to make peace now, we should get better terms from Germany than if we went on and fought it out. The Germans would demand our fleet -- that would be called 'disarmament' -- our naval bases, and much else. We should become a slave state, though a British government which would be Hitler's puppet would be set up -- under Mosely or some such person. And where would we be at the end of all that?"

Later in the discussion, when Churchill was winning the day, Halifax revived a suggestion that England appeal to President Roosevelt.

"Churchill thought that an appeal to the United States at the present time would be altogether premature. 'If we made a bold stand against Germany, that would command their admiration and respect; but a groveling appeal, if made now, would have the worst possible effect.'"

"That was the end of it, as Andrew Roberts properly wrote: 'Churchill's instincts proved correct. Halifax had attempted to bring logic and reason to a problem long since devoid of either ...