Rating: 
Summary: a topnotch book by my favorite military historian
Review: This is a superbly written book by my favorite military history writer. Alexander writes in a very readable style. Additionally, the maps and charts are easy to understand and complement each chapter. Of particular note are the chapters on Hannibal and then Scipio Africanus (the Roman General who beat him) and Lee (or how General Lee should have fought the Battle of Gettysburg).
Rating: 
Summary: Rehash of a great
Review: This is basically a rehash of the concepts given in B.H. Liddell Hart's Strategy. The examples are different, for the most part, but the conclusions are exactly the same - almost word for word. Strategy is much better for the money.
Rating:
Summary: Very readible
Review: This is the best written compilation of short histories of many pivotal battles in world history that I have ever read. The chapters on the Civil War and Hannibal are outstanding. I appreciated the maps with each chapter, but many geographic points the author thought were important enough to put in the narrative were not put on the maps, such as Sherman's multiple column routes through the Southern states (some shaded or dotted map arrows would have added to the story).
Rating:
Summary: Very readible
Review: This is the best written compilation of short histories of many pivotal battles in world history that I have ever read. The chapters on the Civil War and Hannibal are outstanding. I appreciated the maps with each chapter, but many geographic points the author thought were important enough to put in the narrative were not put on the maps, such as Sherman's multiple column routes through the Southern states (some shaded or dotted map arrows would have added to the story).
Rating:
Summary: A Readable but Amateurishly written Title.
Review: While Mr. Alexander writes in an colorful and gripping style, and the book is an enjoyable read, the few new insights he offers are often on the based on the most frivoulous ground, or simply untrue. For example: hie posit that a naval blockade was what ultimately defeated Germany in WW I is patently false. Germany had for centuries been the 'land power' of Europe - free of any need for supply from precious colonies - while Britain was Europes 'Sea Power.' Even before Bismarck unified Germany, she was quite self-sufficient in the vital raw materials that kept her war machine alive, (albeit vulnerably dependent upon weak allied states for some of these materials,) and in no way shared Britain's vulnerabilty to naval 'strangulation'. It was no accident that the overpopulated Island had long maintained the World's most Powerful Navy, or, that Kaiser Wilhelm II's rash attempt to challenge Britains dominance of the seas was a major contributing factor in Britain's entry into the War. Yet Mr. Alexander mentions 'naval stangulation' as the principle cause of Germany's defeat in WWI, in a short footnote in a chapter detailing Britains ultimately successful campaign against the Turks in Paalestine!Sherman is his choice for the Unions best General - he is derisive in his treatment of Grant - yet he fails to recognize that the strategy that sent Sherman plunging deep into the South and destroying her capacity to wage war was one formulated by both Grant and Sherman, or, that Johnston's smaller and much more easily outflanked army, was hardly comparable to Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, nor that Grant largely followed same strategy of outmaneuvering his outnumbered opponent, until he had forced Lee to retreat to the Gates of Richmond. Also, with John Bell Hood appointed as the Confederate Commander in the South and Johnston relieved - as Sherman assembled before Atlanta - Sherman faced a rash General that destroyed large parts of his Army in repeated, blundering assaults. One might mention Grant's foolhardy and costly assault at Cold Harbor, yet Grant learned from this mistake - and with Lee Penned within the Richmond/Petersburg defenses - he skillfully expanded his breastworks around Peterburg until the smaller Confederate force was forced to retreat, leading durectly to Union victory. Sherman - while a brilliant General - faced no such tactical genius as Lee, and took Atlanta with comparative ease... Such is the nature of the book: Mr. Alexander makes passing points - which are enormously debatable or simply false, (i.e., Britains naval blockade of Germany as what ultimately won WW I for the Allies,) or he simply rehashes famous military campaigns. All in all a work of mediocrity.
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