Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and for All

Rating:
Summary: Good read quite disturbing
Review: At the end of the second gulf war, Iraq signed a treaty with the UN. This book goes ove the struggles involved in policing this treaty. In the end the weapon inspectors failed.

Although I doubt that his solution of dealing in the future, with Saddam will work I found it very readable and absorbing.

Rating:
Summary: Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem - Once and for All.
Review: At UNSCOM, the United Nations group tasked with defanging Iraq, Ritter led the U.N.'s Concealment Investigation Unit to unearth Iraqi efforts to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He resigned in a blaze of glory from in August 1998. Ritter makes his quite specific purpose clear right at the start in this well-organized and well-written account: to establish the correct policy for stopping Saddam Husayn. He builds toward this goal with three steps.

First, he tells the story of what he calls the one Iraqi constant since 1988-the ceaseless quest to build weapons of mass destruction. In the process, Ritter reliably presents a history of Iraqi high politics over the past decade. Second, Endgame recounts Ritter's personal experiences and memories during his many years on the UNSCOM team. He reveals a good deal of insider information-headline stuff like the CIA infiltration of UNSCOM as well as details about Russian-Iraqi collusion and what Iraqi defectors revealed to UNSCOM. Third, he critiques the Clinton Administration for a "shallow understanding" of the obstacles to disarming Iraq and its "appalling lack of leadership." He faults the administration for its "uninspired no-endgame strategy of containment through economic sanctions of indefinite duration." These preliminaries done, Ritter offers his own ideas for "solving the Iraq problem - once and for all," as his subtitle puts it. He sketches out two alternatives to the present policy of containment, one military and the other diplomatic. The military option revives the "Road to Baghdad" plan of 1991: send 250,000 American soldiers to the Persian Gulf, overthrow the Saddam regime, and rebuild Iraq in America's image. But he pushes this option aside and instead a U.S.-Iraqi deal: Saddam recognizes Kuwait, forswears weapons of mass destruction, gives the Kurds autonomy, ends the state of war with Israel, and works things out with the Iraqi opposition forces. In return, the U.S. government ends economic sanctions, funds the reconstruction of Iraq, rebuilds the Iraqi military, and permits peaceful nuclear research.

In other words, Ritter is prepared to take Saddam at his word,- something the historical record suggests is completely unwarranted - and to make this the basis of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Ritter advocates a course of appeasement and defeatism; give Saddam what he wants and hope for the best. This totally appalling policy recommendation suggests the author should be back to dismantling weapons, not opining on foreign policy.

Middle East Quarterly, September 1999

Rating:
Summary: Everything Old is New Again
Review: Good to read now while inpsectors are packing their bags to head to Iraq yet again. One cannot dispute this author's success in at least one area: Scott Ritter has been an extremely effective lightning rod for controversy for almost as many years as he was an inspector! No matter where you are on the spectrum of opinion regarding the man himself, it is useful and enlightening to read this record of what happened while he was at UNSCOM. The writing does bog down at times as the author attempts to make the mostly tedious task of arms control inspection seem more action-packed -- for every trigger-happy Iraqi soldier with a gun in your face or fleet-footed chase through a laboratory there are pages and pages of exposition. Overall though Mr. Ritter blends the exposition to build his case well and it rings as true today as it did four years ago; international political committment to the process of inspection is the safest path to effective disarmament of Iraq. This is not a question of loyalty, patriotism,or personalities -- it is a simple commitment to what works best and costs least.

Rating:
Summary: End Game: Diplomatic Engagement
Review: I am at pains to try and figure out which Scott Ritter book Mr. Barron actually read: the real one, or the one seen through Mr. Barron's myopic view of the world. Indeed, even a cursory examination reveals that Ritter's proposed solution to the Iraq problem is the exact opposite of what Mr. Barron contends: Ritter advocates -- in light of certain moral, political, and strategic realities -- a route of diplomatic engagement with Saddam Hussein's regime, a stance which once again has made him the target of various segments of the foreign policy elite.

As for the book itself, readers will be surprised to learn that this is not a "kiss and tell" book consumed with CIA manipulations, insider accounts of derring-do and so forth. True, a good part of that story is here -- in particular, a well-written account of a dangerous attempt to inspect Iraq's Special Security Organization. More importantly, however, Ritter provides a much needed and incisive chronicle of how Iraq really works, from tribal feuds to nearly unspeakable violence, doing so with a scholar's attention to detail and decisive moments. Agree with his conclusions or not, he paints a sophisticated picture of Iraq and how, perhaps, we might bring the country and its people back into the family of nations.

Regional experts, military professionals and even those with a passing interest in today's headlines should read this book (and believe me, you'll wind up saying, "This Marine can really write!"). Scott Ritter has once again done something that is so lacking in today's society: he has told it as he saw it.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent story and analysis
Review: Instead of watching the news coverage of the war that is currently going on in Iraq I have spent some of my spare time reading this excellent work by someone who deserves attention. The behind the scenes account of political intrigues in Iraq, the US, and the UN is very telling and informative and puts a lot of events into their proper perspective. After I got half way through the book I was sort of surprised that Ritter has opposed the war, but in the closing chapters he makes his case (I think too briefly) and says that too much is made of the problems around weapons inspections, and not enough is made of the great successes that have been achieved (his own book seems to also have something of this problem.) I found the accounts of Richard Butler helped a lot to resolve my impression of the man as being very oddly political in his role in the UN. I never found him to be credible and Ritter's book backs up my impression somewhat.

Anyway - if you are at all interesting into how the situation in Iraq got to where it is today I highly recommend this book.

Rating:
Summary: ...from one who knows the score
Review: It isn't often that we get a "I was there" book which truly focuses on what happened "there" more than on the conflicts between the author and others - if someone thinks that the press gave him or her short shrift during a war or other intense, highly publicized endeavor, a book usually results. But Scott Ritter troubles to walk us through the labyrinthine maze of Iraqi power politics, with special attention to how Saddam Hussein got to be sole ruler of Iraq, and how Saddam manages to stay astride that tiger today. Most of "Endgame" is an extremely erudite discussion of Saddam Hussein's rise to power up to and during the UNSCOM weapons inspections of which Ritter was a part.

And Ritter succeeds in making his case, that decision makers in Washington and New York (the UN) were simply dropping the ball, failing to act resolutely when it was needed and only applying pressure when it would have a minimal effect on Iraqi leadership.

I'm more than a little puzzled at the sniping at Ritter from other Amazon.com reviewers - certainly if Ritter was pursuing a self-serving agenda while at UNSCOM, the thing for him to do would be to not rock the Clinton administration's boat on Iraqi policy, to play the game along with everyone else in hopes of getting Richard Butler's job down the line. Simply nodding stupidly and not pushing the Iraqis into allowing real inspections would have been easier than what Ritter actually did, as would relying on inadequate intelligence instead of working out deals with the Israelis for better overheads and human source intel (one of the major criticisms leveled at Ritter was that he was too "cozy" with the Israelis and did not clear his contacts with them with Washington - here, the critics conveniently forget that Scott Ritter was NOT an American officer but an employee of the United Nations. Also, the evidence, not just in Ritter's book but in other well-researched accounts of the UNSCOM work, indicates that Ritter acted well within his duties).

Ritter, in my opinion, not only vindicated himself but in his book did so in a way that allows the reader to judge intelligently whether or not to agree with Ritter and leaves the reader much better informed about the entire issue of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction than if the reader relied on reports from television or the popular news magazines.

I have some problems with Ritter's final chapter, specifically with the course of action he recommends that we take to deal with Saddam - but I certainly agree with him that the sanctions do nothing but starve and kill children and cement Saddam's status with his people, and should be stopped as soon as possible.

I recommend Ritter's book as essential to a complete understanding of UNSCOM - together, of course, with other readings such as Andrew and Patrick Cockburn's "From the Ashes," an unsparingly critical but intensively detailed look at Saddam's survival of what should have been an ignimonious and crushing defeat in 1991, and all that has passed since then in that part of the world.

Rating:
Summary: ...from one who knows the score
Review: It isn't often that we get a "I was there" book which truly focuses on what happened "there" more than on the conflicts between the author and others - if someone thinks that the press gave him or her short shrift during a war or other intense, highly publicized endeavor, a book usually results. But Scott Ritter troubles to walk us through the labyrinthine maze of Iraqi power politics, with special attention to how Saddam Hussein got to be sole ruler of Iraq, and how Saddam manages to stay astride that tiger today. Most of "Endgame" is an extremely erudite discussion of Saddam Hussein's rise to power up to and during the UNSCOM weapons inspections of which Ritter was a part.

And Ritter succeeds in making his case, that decision makers in Washington and New York (the UN) were simply dropping the ball, failing to act resolutely when it was needed and only applying pressure when it would have a minimal effect on Iraqi leadership.

I'm more than a little puzzled at the sniping at Ritter from other Amazon.com reviewers - certainly if Ritter was pursuing a self-serving agenda while at UNSCOM, the thing for him to do would be to not rock the Clinton administration's boat on Iraqi policy, to play the game along with everyone else in hopes of getting Richard Butler's job down the line. Simply nodding stupidly and not pushing the Iraqis into allowing real inspections would have been easier than what Ritter actually did, as would relying on inadequate intelligence instead of working out deals with the Israelis for better overheads and human source intel (one of the major criticisms leveled at Ritter was that he was too "cozy" with the Israelis and did not clear his contacts with them with Washington - here, the critics conveniently forget that Scott Ritter was NOT an American officer but an employee of the United Nations. Also, the evidence, not just in Ritter's book but in other well-researched accounts of the UNSCOM work, indicates that Ritter acted well within his duties).

Ritter, in my opinion, not only vindicated himself but in his book did so in a way that allows the reader to judge intelligently whether or not to agree with Ritter and leaves the reader much better informed about the entire issue of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction than if the reader relied on reports from television or the popular news magazines.

I have some problems with Ritter's final chapter, specifically with the course of action he recommends that we take to deal with Saddam - but I certainly agree with him that the sanctions do nothing but starve and kill children and cement Saddam's status with his people, and should be stopped as soon as possible.

I recommend Ritter's book as essential to a complete understanding of UNSCOM - together, of course, with other readings such as Andrew and Patrick Cockburn's "From the Ashes," an unsparingly critical but intensively detailed look at Saddam's survival of what should have been an ignimonious and crushing defeat in 1991, and all that has passed since then in that part of the world.

Rating:
Summary: If we had only done it right the first time.
Review: Ritter's analyses of the failed Clinton policies is good reading for anyone who wants to learn from history.

Rating:
Summary: Here We Go Again
Review: The one emotion all readers will come away from with this book is a sense of frustration. Not only because of the roadblocks and shell games that Iraq was doing but also that the U.S. was and is in the position that we have to do this monitoring in the first place. The author of this book was the lead weapons inspector for the U.S. group during the mid 90's until Iraq throw him out for spying. He divides his book into two main sections, the hinting for the weapons and what should be done moving forward.

The details of the weapons systems they were looking for and the methods the Iraqi went to in order to hind them was very interesting. There is even humor in the book when the author talks about how inept the Iraqi's were with many of the attempts to hide information. I especially liked the military commander that was told to move all the machines used in nuclear experimentation but he left all the diagrams, test plans and results and the machine operating manuals there because they only told him to move the equipment. The author even finds a few ways to detail some genocide in the book just we do not forget what Saddam uses these weapons for.

The second part of the book is the authors plan to solve this problem. I will not ruin the book for you, but it is interesting. This is a good book that is interesting to read. The author is a very confident and somewhat brash man and that comes through in the writing. He does a very good job of not bogging the reader down in too much detail about the fine points of the chemical processes or laundry lists of ingredients. The book is worth the time to read if for no other reason to prep you for what may start happening all over again.

Rating:
Summary: Controversial author's narrative strong, thesis weak
Review: The United Nations' recent "inspection" of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program makes it painfully clear little has changed since Scott Ritter resigned from UNSCOM in 1998. The UN and the United States seem stuck in a time warp, which Ritter predicted in Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem--Once and for All.

The weakest aspect of Endgame, ironically, is Ritter's envisioned endgame; his proposed detente seems unrealistic and contradictory. Even so the book makes for a good and relevant read. The author isn't anyone to be taken lightly on the subjects of Iraq, disarmament, Saddam Hussein, and war and peace. Given the recent demonization of Ritter because of his anti-war stance, it is good to remember this retired Marine intelligence officer almost lost his life while he served as an arms inspector (in fact, the passage where an Iraqi soldier prepares to shoot Ritter is stunning). Ritter's proposed solution to the Iraq question is flawed but this is a man of unquestioned patriotism, humanity and integrity. His opinions obviously were shaped by first-hand observations of the suffering of the Iraqi people under both Saddam and the UN sanctions. Ritter also seems to have been nauseated by several U.N. and U.S. officials, particularly former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The author does acknowledge the heroes who managed to emerge. Among these brave souls are former United States ambassaor to the UN Bill Richardson, who recently was elected governor of New Mexico. Another admirable character is former UNSCOM head Richard Butler, who has reached completely different conclusions from Ritter about how to deal with Iraq.

Ritter provides great insight into the tribalism and rank gangsterism that propelled Saddam to power and keeps him there. He paints a damning portrait of a dictator who uses rape as a weapon of mass personal destruction. In one particularly memorable scene, an angry Saddam torches his son's garage and 12 sports cars. Iraq's concealment policy seems a logical extension of such insanity although, as Ritter notes, the inspectors mostly found incriminating documents but few prohibited weapons.

Given the fraud and deceit Ritter details it is inexplicable that the author recommends dropping economic sanctions if Saddam promises not to develop weapons of mass destruction. Further, Ritter's suggestion that Iraq be allowed to develop a peaceful nuclear program borders on the bizarre. The author never explains why a regime with a history of compulsive lying should be trusted. Yet Ritter also makes a compelling case that war will not solve anything in Iraq, and the ultimate goal there should be disarmament. Saddam truly is just one part of the Iraq problem.

A word of caution is in order to the reader: Ritter has a military man's love of acronyms and there is no glossary for quick reference to all the letters strung together. On the other hand, he predictably likes maps and these prove useful. Another strong point is that the author manages to keep his personal role proportional to what happened.

As war drums once again sound along the Potomac, this is a good book to read. Ritter's proposed solutions clearly will not work, but he explains why war won't, either.