Rating: 
Summary: Polemic not wisdom from this update of
Review: A serious scholar using a reputation as an historian to write polemic rather than provide some wisdom is unfortunate. To do this about a politically sensitive subject where attitudes contribute to deaths is worse. However after 9-11 the book will sell, especially to those looking for quick answers.Taking advantage of the general ignorance, fear, and bias, of the public using one's reputation to provide a misleading appearance of objectivity and balance is fundamentally dishonest. It is truer to Lewis's own biases than his facts. Too harsh on Lewis? Two things suggest that I'm not too harsh at all. First, this work is an opportunistic post 9-11 update on his 1990 article in the New Yorker about "Muslim Rage". Second, his bizarre claims about Jerusalem are inexcusable given his knowledge of the Middle East. "Anger" is possibly reasoned, circumstantial, particular to a number of individuals. But Lewis chose to write about "Muslim Rage" irrational, endemic, violent, unjustified, innate in a whole people. Nonsense! Yet lapped up then, quoted as authoritative by the likes of Samuel Huntington as an example of the "Clash of Civilizations", and continuing to serve as generalized, simplistic, unfair, and misleading - it has been satisfying for those wanting a 'quick fix' answer. This is Gresham's Law applied to the public discourse rather than the economy. It allows denial of real causes and reasons, political, economic, social, and military. The particular bizarre pro Israeli (and not even all Israelis would agree) discussion of Jerusalem is damning. Describing Al Aqsa Mosque with its monotheistic quotations from the Qur'an on its exterior as anti-Christian propaganda, Lewis promotes Jerusalem as a Jewish and Christian city not holy to Muslims. He ignores (what he certainly knows) that Muslims first prayed towards Jerusalem as the primordial center of Abrahamic faiths. He also ignores that the most celebrated nights of the year commemorates the Miraj when Muhammad traveled from Mecca to the site of Al Aqsa to ascend to the heavens and the presence of Allah (literally or as metaphor). The impression one gets is that Muslims are mostly all like a small minority of radical extremists who rage against the West and that this is innate in Islam. (The morality of terrorism of the powerless versus mass killing by the more efficient airborne military is another subject entirely.) The fact that terrorists are few, that their causes are usually particular and political, that they are not widely supported is appreciated in the epithet "unholy" terror, but the analysis goes little beyond simplistic notions about an anti modern backward people humiliated by Western superiority and jealous of its position. This allows a state of denial rejecting that much is anger, not rage, and based on legitimate grievances using the methods of the weak against overwhelmingly superior military power. Particulars of quoting bin Laden or describing the Wahabis do little to diminish the mass condemnation of Islam in this book. Most Muslims don't feel morally inferior because the West is materially better off and militarily strong. They are not jealous of the materialistic extremes of the West. For most a return to fundamentals is renewal of Faith and self purification, a personal and patient quest. (This is the "greater Jihad" not warfare which is the "lesser Jihad.") Muslims call, ask, others to see the wisdom of their faith and don't in theory or practice command violent world conquest as suggested by Lewis. One reverts to Islam as the primordial Faith with the same God and many Prophets shared with Christians and Jews who may, with righteous and God fearing lives be saved. (Neither of these Faiths allows this for Muslims.) Both times the Muslims took Jerusalem they were far more tolerant and less violent than the Crusaders. The image of violent conquest and forced conversions is outrageous given what we know of history - but it always underlies the attempts to paint Islam as innately violent. ( "Modern" Christians the 20th century have been far more warlike and perpetrated mass genocide and slaughter on a scale unknown even to the (pre-Muslim) Mongols.) Muslims don't draw the conclusion that this is the very nature of Christianity however. Until historically recent times Islam was more tolerant than the (now secular) West. Even now tolerance continues to be fragile and racism common in the West. Islam has continued to be doctrinally and to a considerable degree in practice, less racist, color conscious, and elitist than the West. It had none of the problems with science, having earth as less than the center of the universe, etc. that held back the West. The current problems and anger are not so much as innate to Arabs or Islam as a product of historical experience. They are not innate to Islam. Lewis reinforces bigotry but adds no understanding for anyone with meaningful knowledge of Islam or the Middle East. In a vacuum he seems profound, some with an agenda will like the book. Real understanding, balance, something closer to truth all lose out. He certainly does nothing to understand 9-11 or avoid further terrorism.
Rating: 
Summary: An astute insight into Islam
Review: As a retired Army officer and student of political philosophy I find that professor Lewis has a keen insight into Islam and the problem the West faces in dealing with Islamic terrorists. In this book professor Lewis goes on a short historical journey of Islam. Islam's predominance starts to decline in 1683 with the Ottoman Empires loss in its battle for Vienna. Modern Middle Eastern history starts with Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798. This conquest dealt a bitter blow to the prestige of Islam. Islam ceases to grow at the same pace as the west militarily, politically or economically. Professor Lewis points out that Islam suffers a debilitating decline that continues to the present. Professor Lewis throughout the book explains that Islamic fundamentalists see the U.S. as the "great Satan" for several reasons such as; its support of corrupt regimes in the Middle East, economic exploitation because of its thirst for oil, support for the State of Israel's existence. Hatred of the U.S. by Islamic fundamentalists was enabled by the Nazi support given to Arab leaders during WWII and then the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In 1948 one of these fundamentalists Sayyid Qutb, from Egypt was sent to the U.S. to study for two years. His view of the country and its people was of moral bankruptcy and weakness. Qutb wrote a book about his perceptions that became the definitive view of the U.S. among Islamic fundamentalists. It is this view why terrorists like Osama Bin Laden have declared war on the United States. He sees himself as the man who brought down the mighty Soviet superpower in Afghanistan and can with more ease bring the weak and morally repugnant United States to its knees. I think this book will give the general reader a greater appreciation for the long war ahead we face. I highly recommend this book and Professor Lewis' book "What Went Wrong?"
Rating: 
Summary: What's Going Wrong Right Now?
Review: What is modern Islam? This, perhaps, is a less provocative title than The Crisis of Islam, the actual title of Bernard Lewis's recent book, but I think it goes more to the point. In some sense, The Crisis of Islam picks up where his popular What Went Wrong leaves off. While the older book refers to the twentieth century only in a few pages near the end, The Crisis of Islam only covers earlier times briefly in the introduction and early parts. And unlike What Went Wrong, it is easy to see why some readers might be turned off by this book. It is critical, highly so, in fact, of the modern Islamic world. By critical I do not mean that it condemns Islam as evil. For that, look elsewhere. Rather, Lewis has presented a present day overview of the grave problems facing the Islamic world, and although he explains that these problems are often blamed on the West, it is clear that the Muslims have themselves to blame. Islam is a unified - religiously and politically - entity, that is analogous to the words Christianity and Christendom. Its goal is to fight, or struggle if one prefers, against all threats to itself. This is done by warfare, sometimes known as jihad. The warmaking aspect of the word jihad is the predominant meaning over the last fourteen hundred years. The inner struggle against temptation, or whatever, is a rather recent, and it would seem, dishonest use of the word, though it did exist historically as well. Something to keep in mind when watching Sunday morning talk shows. This is the statement of the first two chapters. Two Arabic words: Dar al-Islam, and Dar al-Harb, house of Islam and house of war. This kind of says it all. You can't have a house within a house. From there Lewis refers to what I think is one of the two root claims presented as the cause of Islamic hatred of the West (the other being our "excessive" liberalism). Starting with the Crusades, a European response to five hundred years of military losses against Islamic jihadists (and which produced almost no non-local Islamic concern at the time), and continuing through the nineteenth century imperialists, the Islamic world had to confront an infidel people capable of defeating Muslims. They haven't forgiven us since. Eventually this anger was transferred to America, a country that the Muslim world barely noticed for a long time. Ironically, despite the Russian and Soviet heavy handed rule over tens of millions of Muslims and even after the Afghanistan invasion, since Russia was only peripherally involved in the imperialist era, the Muslim world was happy to align with the Soviets (after the Arab states' previous allies, the Nazis, lost) because the Soviets were anti-Western. These themes make up the next three chapters. The next two chapters, entitled Double Standards and A Failure of Modernity are, I believe, related, though I'm not certain Lewis intended that to be the case. Simply put, the Arab countries have failed by any measurable standard. They produce virtually nothing (the oil was already there). This includes industrial and intellectual output. Many facts and demographics are presented in the second of these chapters. The West simply deals with the situation presented when dealing with these countries. If we "prop up" their dictators, it's because those dictators are what we are presented with. Aside from Turkey (which has some serious troubles of its own), the Islamic countries of that part of the world have only successfully imported one Western style of government, the single-party dictatorship. Even in the much-mentioned example of Iran, the CIA did not install the Shah, it re-installed him. And since Iran has spent the last twenty-four years enjoying the benefits of Shah-free rule by Mullahs, they can't complain that we're now supporting their thugs in power. The final two chapters are also related; the Wahhabis and terrorism are covered. The Wahhabis are true Muslims, just as much as any other sect. They cannot be dismissed as a cult or an aberration, they've been around too long and there are too many of them. They are also a puritanical horror show. Lewis offers an analogy of Wahhabi control of worldwide Islamic educational control. If the KKK achieved complete control of Texas, and used its oil wealth to spread its version of Christianity through the world, the result would be almost as disturbing as the current situation with the Wahhabis. Even worse, in this example they would have to compete with other public educational systems, but Wahhabi schools in the West have no such competition. Sound frightening? This is a major source of terrorist ideology. This is the sort of thinking that produced Bin Laden. And despite centuries of Islamic jurisprudence that would condemn such events as the world witnessed on September 11, the reaction in many quarters of the Islamic world was barely contained elation. In a nutshell, with space constrained omissions, this is The Crisis of Islam. I wish Lewis would write longer books, but this small volume nicely encapsulates a political and cultural snapshot of Islam today. If you've noticed a harsh attitude in this writing, you are perceptive. I'm perhaps a bit harsher in my attitude than Bernard Lewis, but he pulls no punches that I am aware of in his analysis. Whether terrorism is popular is Islam or not, it is clear that the Islamic world is teetering on the edge of its own collapse. It is in desperate need of reform and change, from within because they'll probably never really except it from outside. In Lewis's own closing words, "If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam."
Rating:
Summary: An Eye Opener
Review: For anyone that has ever pondered why it seems that people who follow the religion of Islam hate Americans, this book is the answer to your conundrum. I read this book as a supplement to a survey course in World History, during the Islam unit. Although this book does not get into the advanced study of historical facts, figures, beliefs, etc. about Islam, it does a formidable job of explaining the case for Islam and the origins of their hate towards Americans. It also paints a great picture of the origins of the religion, how is it closer to Christianity that the lay person thinks it is, and why America is branded as the "enemy" in their culture. If you have ever wondered, this book is the answer.
Rating:
Summary: A CRISIS OF COMMAS
Review: Slipshod writing is often a symptom of shoddy thinking. Several reviewers with distinguished academic credentials have savaged the thought content of THE CRISIS OF ISLAM. The slapdash form of the book leads me to believe they are right. The introduction reads as if it had been directly transcribed from a tape -- without revision by either author or editor. It contains a plethora of long sentences, each containing multiple clauses hooked together by a dizzying array of punctuation. Page XX has one about the naming of Middle-Eastern countries that contains 75 words, 1 colon, 1 semicolon, three dashes, and 5 commas! There are even longer sentences on the pages that follow. The body of the book is somewhat better, having passed through the editorial machinery of the NEW YORKER. Numerous compound and run-on sentences, however, have survived. See, for example, page 4 where Lewis strings 54 words together with 3 dashes and four commas or page 87, where two different ideas are cobbled together in 55 words, a semicolon and 3 commas. In a single sentence on page 104 one must struggle through a "there", two "their"s, and two "them"s in search of meaning. As another reviewer has pointed out, Lewis uses "Arab" and "Muslim" interchangeably, even though not all Arabs are Muslim and not all Muslims are Arab. Lewis whinges in his introduction that Muslims are "keenly aware" of history while "the general level of historical knowledge in American society is abysmally low". He quickly converts that apparent compliment into a criticism: that present-day Muslim demagogues, like Bin Laden and Saddam, have used their followers' historical awareness to manipulate them. In his chapter "Discovering America", Lewis is guilty of the same thing. In attempting to explain "why they hate us" he offers historical analysis i.e. "it's the Nazi's fault" almost as warped as any of Saddam's. He traces the origins of Muslim anti-Americanism to "certain intellectual influences coming from Europe" -- spcifically German writers like Rilke, Spengler, and Heidegger. He says in the 1930's German education philosophy "enjoyed a considerable vogue". So Lewis wants us to believe that the Arab street became anti-American from reading German philosophy and embracing the kindergartern movement? The Nazis, according to Lewis, continued the process of spreading "German ideologies" during WWII -- especially in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. He offers no proof that those "ideologies" motivated Muslim anti-Americanism even there. The fascist Falangists in Lebanon were Arab Christians, not Arab Muslims. The Muslim countries which have spawned the most anti-American terrorists -- Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen -- were not in the German orbit, and Trukey, which was, is staunchly pro-American. Talk about using historical hot-buttons to manipulate your audience!
Rating: 
Summary: Disapointing
Review: As a once an admirer of Bernard Lewis, I find this book oversimplistic in it's nature. It seems it was written to misinform the public which is a departure from Mr Lewis's previous work.
Rating:
Summary: Good popular information about Islamic nations
Review: Lewis is one of the leading scholars on Islamic history and politics in the US. In this book he brings scholarship down to earth and presents Islamic history and politics in an accessible and understandable manner. We learn that, for example, no Islamic nation even shows up on a ranking of countries buying the most books. We learn a little of what went wrong and why it hasn't gotten any better. There is a great need for good knowledge about Islam and Arab nations by all who are concerned by terrorists, war, and politics. Lewis does a commendable job of writing an easy to understand and comfortable length book for the public.
Rating:
Summary: Review of "The Crisis of Islam," by Bernard Lewis
Review: This articulate and well-written analysis of the crisis of Islam and the Arab / Muslim world is an outstanding work of remarkable lucidity. No other work, to my knowledge, so clearly and succinctly delineates the reasons for the Muslim world's view that the U.S.A. is the "Great Satan" and Israel "the Little Satan." Lewis is not heavy-handed with historical data yet knows which leaders, events, dates, and philosophies to expound upon to make his point. This book has helped me to understand the Middle East in an incremental, development-by-development approach. Bernard Lewis is a master at his craft; his book reads smoothly like a novel. I will read this book more than once!
Rating:
Summary: Unintentionally Revealing
Review: "The Crisis of Islam" expands upon the author's award-winning November 2001 article (titled "The Revolt of Islam") for the New Yorker. In brief, the book (as well as the original article) attempts to provide an accessible, yet thorough, historical background to the contemporary rise of Islamic terrorism. While the book is fascinating on its own terms, what this writer found particularly interesting is what Prof. Lewis' scholarly integrity forces him to reveal: the basic, intrinsic radicalism and violence of Islam. Bernard Lewis is generally considered to be one of the foremost Western experts on the Middle East and Islam. He is clearly a mainstream - even "liberal" - academic. As such, he strives mightily in "The Crisis of Islam" to demonstrate that Osama bin Laden's (and Yasser Arafat's) version of Islam is not "true" Islam. In other words, he attempts to sell the current politically-correct line that Islam is really "a religion of peace," etc., etc. However, the only real deviance from "true" Islam that Lewis is able to substantiate is the use of suicide killings against innocent civilians. In all other respects, as the early chapters of "Crisis" demonstrate, bin Laden's basic worldview is as old as Islam itself - i.e. that all non-Muslims are infidels who must eventually be converted or destroyed, that any submission of Muslims to non-Muslim political leadership is sacrilege, and that Christianity is Islam's foremost rival. Only the leadership of the infidels has changed - in earlier centuries, the "House of War" was led by Spain, Russia, and the Holy Roman Empire. Today, the only infidel (i.e. "Christian") power left is America. Many people - Prof. Lewis included - would very much like to believe that our current crisis is with a ... perversion of "true" Islam. However, as Lewis' own masterful history shows, the true "Crisis" is much older and much deeper.
Rating:
Summary: The ivory tower and the minaret
Review: In spite of its brevity, this little book is packed with information. It traces resentment of the West to the interaction between various interpretations of Islam and various political developments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and shows how the roots of the current confrontations go far beyond Usama bin Ladin, Sadam Hussein, or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and stretch over many centuries and many thousands of miles. The book is admirably well written - it suffers neither from the sloppiness of journalistic opportunism nor from the dryness of academic writing. It is, indeed, 'popular science' in the best sense of the word: an admirable attempt by a leading scholar to bring academic knowledge to a much wider audience. Unfortunately, as seems to happen with any book even remotely related to the Middle East, it will have its critics who don't like the RELATIVE emphasis on one aspect, and the RELATIVE neglect of another, which happens to be their favorite. This book neither criticizes nor praises; it analyzes, and that, of course, is what makes it irritating to those who prefer the simplicity of slogans. For most of us, on the contrary, this book will be most informative and most enjoyable. Strongly recommended for busy people who want decent background information on current events.
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