Rating: 
Summary: Hitler on the dissecting table
Review: Not surprisingly, this is a splendid follow up to Ian Kershaw's biography of the younger Hitler to 1936. The author has not set out to provide a new thesis, still less a revisionist stance, but provides a meticulously researched account of Hitler's successes followed by his slide into total defeat. He has used recently available source material, especially Goebbels, and livens up his narrative by pertinent statements of ordinary Germans who lived through the second world war. Kershaw's judgments are always sane. We learn that the British escape at Dunkirk was Hitler's military blunder, not some halfbaked attempt to encourage the peacemakers in London. The author is rightly suspicious that the Russians found and performed an autopsy on the Fuhrer's corpse. What comes across strongly in this book is Hitler's obsession with secrecy which probably explains why massacres and atrocities were rarely debated in Hitler's presence. At the end, Hitler was totally obsessed by treason and betrayal. Even Goebbels, it appears, tried to persuade him to make peace with Stalin. The index to the book is excellent and makes specific inquiries that much easier to track down. Some of the lesser known photographs appear to be stills from Die Deutsche Wochenshau. This volume is a thorough and up to date investigation of what made Hitler tick and how and why he ultimately failed to achieve his military goals.
Rating: 
Summary: Very detailed but despite this an outstanding account!
Review: One of my presents to my eighteen's Birthday last year was the book "Hitler 1939-1945: Nemesis" written by Ian Kershaw. Although I'm very interested in this period of time and already read a lot concerning this subject, I was shocked when I saw this book for the first time - sincerely: because of over 1000 pages of real text with only a few pictures. In Addition there are 194 pages of footnotes and 37 pages of bibliography to prove its authenticity. Despite this first impression I started reading the book in November of the last year and finished in the last Easter holidays: Ian Kershaw, an English historian and academic, has written the second volume of his biography of the Nazi-dictator. Unfortunately it is hard to see what this book adds to our knowledge of Hitler that was not already presented in previous accounts by Bullock, Fest or other authors scrutinizing the Nazi-era. Kershaw's accounts are based heavily on Josef Goebbel's diary and the post-war accounts of others close to Hitler - unfortunately their self-serving statements often seem to be biased. However the biggest mistake - in my personal and impartial opinion - of this account is the screeping but dominant bias through the author's descriptions. Kershaw starts the book by stating that he detests Hitler because of his actions and his ideology but is obviously fascinated by his career. Later on he paints a portrait of Hitler almost as a self-destructive fool who was incapable of seeing reality. Not only Hitler, but the Third Reich, the "Wehrmacht" itself, most of the generals and even the German population seem pretty incapable and fatalistic here. But nowhere in this book Kershaw's accounts are more biased than in his descriptions of "wartime-operations". German successes are minimized, the battles in Poland, France, Norway and the Balkans only require one page or less each. This phenomenon also reflects in single details: He ascertains that the cruiser "Blucher" was sunk by a single shell from an old canon. In comparison to other books it seems queer and odd that there's the statement that battleship was hit by two 11", thirteen 6", thirty 57mm shells and two torpedoes. Moreover the Germans were still able to take the city of Oslo. On the other hand Allied disasters are nearly totally ignored. Later in the war he notes that there were uncountable bombings that the Luftwaffe was powerless to prevent while ignoring the fact that the Luftwaffe in fact achieved some remarkable successes against the Royal Air Force (RAF) night bombers until 1944. Eventually the disaster of the operation "Marketgarden" (It is also very interesting to see the film "Die Brücke von Arnheim" starring Sean Connery) is only described as heavy fighting, no mention of the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division. Additionally the Ardennes Offensive in the year 1944 is merely described in negative terms, no mention of the surrender of almost a full US-division. To consider the results I have to ascertain that despite some signs of bias this is a masterful and marvelous biography. Overwhelmed by what a good job Mr. Kershaw has done, I was more satisfied reading the book than while studying texts concerning his life before 1936 because more bad things happen to Hitler and nobody can glorify this person any longer after having read this book.Johannes Weiß 2/5/01
Rating:
Summary: And now you know...
Review: Right smack in the middle of the second volume is perhaps the most important revelation of all, the one all logical-thinking readers should take to heart. Kershaw writes that Hitler hated Christianity, that he wanted to wage war on the Christian churches once living space in the east had been taken from the Soviets. In a single paragraph, Kershaw shows the chilling similarity between Hitler and the modern left: Hitler banned religious symbols and prayer from public German schools.
There is much more information in the second volume than this, of course. The war years, with explanations of what the Jews went through during the Holocaust, are filled with much important information, notably how Hitler fired one general after another as the end rapidly drew to a close, in a last desperate attempt to blame Germany's ruin on anyone other than himself. But this volume, taken with the first, should leave no doubt in the mind of the reader as to the true nature of the left.
It could be argued, I think, that a move too far to the right would result in one of two unacceptable choices: chaos, or mob rule. A move too far to the left, however, always results in a singe unacceptable option, which is of course the only option left other than revolt: totalitarianism. The essential problem with Hitler, it turns out, is the same with any leftist ruler: he thought he knew what was best, and asserted his will by force. With Kershaw's excellent writing, it should be clear by the final chapter of the second volume why it is never a good idea to abandon representative government, backed by the willful self-governance of the people.
Hitler is exposed for what he was: a leftist, an anti-Christian, a collectivist, and a eugenecist. These two volumes are indispensable to anyone who cares about the republic in which they live.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent,readable rendering of familiar history
Review: Taken together, this two volume set is easily the best-ever Hitler bio, and a great WWII overview as well. One thing I always fear with works like this is that the scholarship will be excellent, but the prose impenetrable. Not so here--it's hard to put down if you are interested in the subject matter. I did like Hubris better, too, as some other readers have suggested, but I think they are too hard on this work. The reality is that Hubris treads ground that is not as familiar. Nemesis treads ground that everyone knows from every sketcy book, movie and newspaper retrospective. It is harder to make it new and thrilling. I think it succeeds in its focus nonetheless, spending more time with Hitler than ordinary WWII books, and more time with WWII than ordinary bios. It is a bit churlish to criticize any aspect of this well done duo.
Rating:
Summary: "When You Lose, You Lose Alone"
Review: The Fall: In this second of two volumes, historian Ian Kershaw shows how Hitler after his initial stunning successes in the 1930s finally over-reached himself, became responsible for the deaths of millions of people, and eventually destroyed a country, his movement, and himself. Again, as in the first volume, the prose is workmanlike, without emotion or flash. The annotations are extensive. The story is cautionary.
Rating:
Summary: less the life of Hitler and more WWII
Review: The first book is better than this because is all about Hitler, in this book (and is imposible to blame the author) Hitler's life mix and get confused with facts of world war II. The book is still great, and very easy reading, even being so "fat", but the 1st part is a lot more fun and interesting.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent combination of institutionalism and biography
Review: The key to getting the most out of this book is to understand that it further develops the themes identified in the first book. Kershaw is by training an institutionalist, which as an academic approach focuses on the workings of organizations (political parties, government bureaucracies) rather than the great man approach to history. Yet, Kershaw acknowledges, one cannot understand the Third Reich absent Hitler. The point of the book, then, is understanding how the use and abuse of institutions accompanied the rise of the Nazis and the utter defeat of Germany in 1945. The primary themes developed in the first book were that the rise of the Nazis was based on their growing appeal in the collapse of the Weimar Republic, based within broader Volkische and elite attitudes that were anti-democratic. Once Hitler became Reichs Chancellor, he was able to use the Reichstag and the governments of the Lander to consolidate social control. Kershaw makes a compelling case that consistently in both domestic and diplomatic issues, manufactured crises presented "unavoidable" choices, and that once organizations were under control, they were essentially abandoned to their own devices under the control of party loyalists that wanted to "work towards the Fuhrer." With that basis, the second book details how ongoing crises and the inability of Hitler and party leadership to set a centrally controlled agenda, but rather depend on ad hoc solutions from multiple actors with overlapping responsibilities and ambitions, meant that all behavior was planned only to the point where it failed. At that point, all reactions became ad hoc. So, this leads Kershaw to identify the existence of genocidal anti-Semitism from the early days in Munich and the institutionalization of anti-Semitism in the first book, and then to demonstrate that the death camps of the Final Solution were an evolution based on the failure of relocation plans to remove Jews from Germany and crises of Jewish deportees arriving in Poland faster than they could be accommodated or conventionally massacred. Similarly, military collapses on the eastern front were attributable by leadership through instinct and reaction to crises -- precisely the wrong way to deal with a defensive war. In essence, the book is an explanation of the following: how Hitler, having achieved control of the German state, managed to use it to completely destroy itself. Crisis based leadership and limited abilities to plan, combined with ideological filth that had nothing to do with observable conditions, meant that Germany's ascendance and decline were tied together by Hitler and his failings as a leader (rather than as a demagogue). As a closing thought, I'd propose that the reviewers who carp on about detail issues with the conduct of the war, make accusations of editorial bias, or who somehow read this volume as an apologia for Nazi-led genocide, fundamentally missed the point of the book. This books demonstrates that Hitler could achieve his goals when circumstances matched his skills, but that his inability to meaningfully direct organizations and deal with adverse outcomes were the basis of his (and by extension Germany's) downfall. Further, Hitler set in motion forces that translated his atrocious policies into action, in accordance with and inseparable from his conduct of war and repression. There is a normative overlay to the intellectual discussion, and there should be. (Refer to the introduction of "The Black Book of Communism" for an excellent and concise view of the role of normative sentiment in academic analysis.) One may not agree with the institutionalist perspective with which Kershaw tackled his analysis, but it is, within itself, masterful.
Rating:
Summary: Magisterial, a model biography
Review: The second volume of Kershaw's biography of Hitler cements his reputation as one of the finest historians of modern Germany. Throrough and definitive on every topic, scrupulously and fulsomely annotated, with many brilliant passages, Kershaw's life is not simply the definitive account of a dictator, but of the society that created him and the world he ravaged. Most biographies simply concentrate on the man and elide the background that made him possible. Kershaw's book, by contrast, is superb in noting both the extent to which he influenced Germany and the way larger trends and forces affected his actions. Particuarly valuable is Kershaw's concept of "working towards the Fuhrer," and the idea of cumulative radicalization. With full acknowledgements to his scholarly mentors and colleagues Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen, Kershaw notes how Hitler systematically undermined the normal structures of German government. The cabinet did not meet after 1938, the bureaucratic structures lost their authority, and months would go by as Hitler ignored vital issues and instead let competing factions fight it out among themselves. As a result crucial questions like the move towards a war economy in 1937 occurred not by design but as a result of this chaotic regime. The result was that Nazi Germany, apparently the heir to the cruel efficiency of Prussian bureaucracy, had an amazingly flawed bureaucratic regime. The victory of America, Britain and Russia over Italy, Japan and Germany was as much a victory of superior bureaucracy as it was of armies. Kershaw notes how Nazi officials squabbles among themselves and how they spent six months inconclusively debating whether to ban horse racing. Germany did not even try to solve its critical labor shortages by getting rid of domestic servants until the last few months of war, and by then vested interests made sure that it would be largely ineffective. The consequence was to encourage the most radical groups among the Nazis and those who supported the most vicious alternatives. It was radicals who took the initiative in the anti-Church struggle and it was their momentum which led to Krystallnacht, the ghettoization and Poland, and ultimately the Holocaust. This is not to say that Hitler did not order or encourage the Holocaust. On this issue he was the most radical of the radicals, even if it was Heydrich who was crucial to putting it into practice. "It had consisted of authorizing more than directing." says Kershaw. But his account of how the genocide combined a dialectic of local initiative, central authority and wide government consensus, as we move from the euthanasia program to the first Polish atrocities, to the abandonment of the Madagascar Plan to the Einzatzgruppen and the setting up of the extermination camps, provides an account that makes horrible, yet scholarly impeccable reading. One area where Hitler did have a large amount of authority was on military strategy, and Kershaw provides a nuanced account of Hitler's skill as a military leader. As a military leader Hitler's intuitiions were no worse than Stalin's and Churchill's. On questions like the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the attack on Czechoslovakia and the successful war against France Hitler was successful despite the opposition of much of the military. In his largest single mistake, the attack on the Soviet Union, the military shared his dangerous over-optimism. What hampered Hitler as a military leader was not so much his flaws but an ideological fanaticism that prevented him from taking other people's advice and from delegating authority. Even worse than this was a hatred of the Soviet Union which led Hitler to start a war that would have been extremely difficult for him to win. After he started losing his belligerent refusals to retreat may have hastened German defeat. But after Stalingrad and definitely after Kursk he could not have possibly have won and the major problem with his military strategy is that any negotiated peace would have required his removal. For obvious reasons this was not an option for Hitler. And so we go to the final pages as Kershaw details how Germany was bombed into rubble while Hitler continued his Wagnerian rantings. Gradually the area under his control slips away and his followers fall away or are cut off and we see the final pathetic man behind the hideously empty solipsist. Hitler, Kershaw properly reminds us, was not insane. This makes his death at least, somewhat more satisfying.
Rating:
Summary: Outstanding writing
Review: The skill needed to transform events into a good read whilst maintaining perspective and providing a balanced judgement from the evidence now available to scholars is clearly one of Professor Kershaw's strengths. This is an excellent biographical history to read in conjunction with social, economical and military histories of Germany in the 20th Century. I am a general reader and found this more than a worthy companion to the first, unfolding as it does, like some great Wagnerian Opera yet, full of telling detail to make the events sickenly vivid and memorable. In brief, I recommend it because:
* it is brilliantly written
* it had access to diaries previously unavailable
* it provides perspective regarding the significance of events - Dunkirk was strategically much more important than I otherwise knew - the Battle of Britain less so - the Russian campaign seminally important
* it provides strategic analysis
* it provides vivid detail - a local enthusiast in Lithuania clubbed to death 50 Jews in 45 minutes then hopped up on to the pile of corpses and played his accordian (p.464)
* it reminds us of events such as Babi-Yar where 33,771 (mainly)women and children were butchered
* it shows why Hitler did not destroy Athens
* it shows how Stalin's deportation East of one million German-Volgas helped to galvanize action regarding the final solution.
Rating:
Summary: Springtime for Hitler 2
Review: The two part Ian Kershaw's biography of Adolph Hitler are separate but equal portions of the life of Adolph Hitler, not the most popular, attractive or marketable of personages to dedicate a two volume biography. Though each volume is capable of standing on its own, both should be read in sequence. The first volume, Hubris 1889-1936, deals with Hitler's origins, various incarnations, and initial rise to power in 1936. This volume ends with Hitler's controversial invasion of the Rhineland. The second volume, Nemesis: 1936-1945, immediately picks up where the first leaves off, and takes us through the escalating war to its inevitable conclusion just outside a bunker in Berlin within range of the Soviet's artillery. Throughout both, we walk uncomfortably close to Adolph Hitler, and his minions. The overall work takes us through Hitler's full life in astonishing and carefully researched detail, clarifying and confirming what we knew, but more importantly debunking myths and leaving open to speculation events still without a definitive resolution. Where the author doesn't know and is forced to guess based upon what he does know, the reader is clearly informed. This is not often the case in many biographies and is a credit to this work. Throughout, the reader will come away with a sense of the "history as close-call," as Hitler approaches total failure and obscurity several times only to move on to what will become his fateful destiny for both himself and the world. Like a good novel the author allows us to speculate on our own on what might have been if for example, Hitler had been admitted to the school of architecture in Vienna. The author builds suspense and drama throughout. The second longer volume is a quicker and easier read, despite the occasionally gruesome subject matter. Nemesis takes us methodically through World War II. We are there for every decision, every triumph, and every failure. The slow unfolding of the war and the eventual turn of the tide against Germany is developed again with a keen sense of drama. The author develops the narrative as if we don't know what's going to happen next or how it will all end and does a fine job of it. As one might expect, both volumes require a large emotional investment. But it is worth it if you are to understand much about where we are today and how we got here. If you were to ask yourself before you read these works and after, what shaped the twentieth century, you might very well arrive at two very different answers. It is often interesting to speculate on how the world would look today if there had been no Hitler. Fortunately the author spares us that speculation. Many biographies to detriment stray from the subject matter to dwell on the peripheral matters with only remote ties to the subject matter. Not so here, the author rarely cuts way from his Hitler himself and even then only briefly. Very quickly we are back at Hitler's side watching over his shoulder or through the eyes of those around him. The author binds us to Hitler throughout making it clear that it is not always comfortable or safe to be in the room when Hitler loses his temper. The Kershaw freely admits it was never his intent to write a biography of Hitler, and he is not enamoured of his subject. He takes an odious subject and brings it to life. This makes for an interesting well written, but ultimately disturbing biography of the man of the century.
|
