Lost Victories

Rating:
Summary: Manstein's Views on the various incidents of WWII
Review: Field Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein's (born Lewinski,) credentials as the most successful Axis Commander and strategist of World War II and are impeccable: as Chief of Staff of Army of Group South in the Polish invasion in 1939, he directed the decisive German Armies in the first blitzkrieg. The Manstein Plan was the Battle of France in 1940, resulting in the 6 weeks' defeat of France, and the banishment of Manstein to the command of an Infantry Corps, for his forceful advocacy (of the plan). As commander of the 56th Panzer Corps he led the dash to Leningrad in the Russian invasion of 1941, consistently outrunning more powerful neighbouring formations. Made commander of 11th Army in the Crimea later that year, he was promoted to Field Marshal after successfully concluding this campaign in 1942. 11th Army was then moved north to Leningrad at the very time of the main German offensive in the south in 1942.

After the Stalingrad encirclement of November 1! ! 942, Manstein was again moved south to command Army Group Don, and would have been successful in relieving the encircled Sixth Army, had Hitler allowed it to meet its rescuers halfway! After the disaster, Manstein held open the escape route for Army Group A, which was almost trapped in the Caucasus, and whose destruction would have led to an early German defeat. He counterattacked around Kharkov in spring 1943, regaining that major Soviet city and stabilizing the long Southern front. As Commander of Army Group South, which formed the Southern Pincer in the gigantic armoured battle of Kursk in summer 1943, Manstein reached most of his objectives while the northern pincer faltered. Hitler again lost his nerve when the Allies invaded Sicily, calling off the attack when Manstein said victory was at hand. The initiative in Russia was ceded to the Soviets after Kursk, with Manstein destined to fight defensive battles until relieved by Hitler in 1944.

A critic of the dictat! ! or's military views, even in his presence, Manstein's pers! istent urging of Hitler to appoint a military commander in the East finally led to his downfall. This book reveals Hitler's military shortcomings from the very beginning of the war: 1-The successful Polish campaign was devoid of interference by Hitler. 2-The successful invasion of Norway in 1940 was Admiral Raeder's idea, not Hitler's. 3-The original plan for the French campaign in 1940 was aborted by the allies' capture of the original German plan; Manstein seized the opportunity to present his own plan to Hitler, which became the instrument of victory in the stunning 6 weeks-defeat of France and Britain. At Dunkirk, Hitler deliberately halted the panzers and allowed the British Army to evacuate. 4-The Battle of Britain: lost because of not having a plan. Even after the failure to win the air battle, an invasion of the island presented a high probability for a war-ending victory; conversely a German defeat would not have been decisive. 5-Barbarbarosa: the 1941 Inva! ! sion Plan in Russia was without decisive military objectives. The delay caused by Mussolini's invasion of Greece with the consequent Yugoslav campaign, cost the Germans time and resources. The push to Moscow was repeatedly delayed by Hitler's pursuit of less decisive targets. 6-The 1942 Summer German Offensive had divergent objectives: Stalingrad and the Caucasus; the first political, the latter economics; neither decisive; Germany had not the strength for both. 7-Stalingrad: Hitler insisted on no retreat, even though the military means to hold the city did not exist, and after the encirclement would not allow the trapped 6th army to fight its way out.8-Post-Stalingrad: Manstein, the master of deception, saw the seeds of victory in the defeat itself. He postulated drawing the attacking Russians into the very trap that they visualized for the Germans: a feigned retreat followed by a riposte, driving them against the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov into a modern battle of! ! Cannae. 9-Kursk: the Summer 1943' largest armored clash o! f the war: Hitler called off the attack in the middle of the decisive battle because of the invasion of Sicily, to transfer forces there, even though timely intervention was impossible. 10-Post-Kursk: Manstein advocated drawing on the unusually large occupation forces in France and Norway to fight a decisive battle in Russia, before the opening of the second front. Hitler again refused, violating the principle of concentrating decisive forces in favor of "being strong everywhere".

IN SUMMATION: Hitler consistently refused to utilize Germany's strengths and consistently played into its weaknesses. After World War I's trench warfare, the only participant to benefit from that failure and paralysis was Germany. Its well-trained army together with an unusually large number of commanders who had mastered the tactics of operational mobility, was the weapon which allowed it to win such stunning early victories against larger opponents. These early victories were ! ! free of Hitler's interference. Far from being a world conqueror, Hitler is revealed as a shortsighted petty tyrant rather than another Napoleon or Alexander.

After the Invasion of Russia, Hitler took over personal command of the Army. Time and again, Hitler made the greatly outnumbered German army fight static defensive battles, in the depths of Russia, where the vast expanses of conquered territory could have been used in battles of manoeuvere where the German Army had no peer. The German manpower disadvantage was worsened by Hitler's insistence on forming new divisions, Luftwaffe Divisions and SS Divisions rather than using them as replacements for seasoned Army formations, where experienced leadership would have greatly mitigated casualties.

Germany was also at a great disadvantage industrially, with Russia alone able to out-produce it several times over. Contrary to popular myth, the Reich began the war at a materiel disadvantage, in quantity and quantity;! ! not until the war was almost lost did they produce that su! perior weaponry which became the stuff of legend.

Had Hitler appointed Manstein Commander-in-Chief, as many in the German Army wanted, the outcome of the war in Europe would almost certainly have been different.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent autobiography even if its slightly bias......
Review: I found Eric von Manstein's autobiography to be highly enlightening and insightful in its presentation. Eric von Manstein is considered by anyone who knows anything about World War II as one of the war's finest military commanders, on par with history's great captains. Von Manstein's accomplishments easily put - Patton's for example, to sad shame. As much as our American egos get ruffled at such statement, its pretty clear that von Manstein was the brain behind many of the greatest German military accomplishments in that war. It was therefore, quite interesting to have his take on how he developed the "sickle" plan which led to the fall of France in 1940, or his Crimean campaign and his effort to restored the Eastern Front after Stalingrad. His concept of mobile defensive warfare often ran countered to Hitler's rather entrenched warfare mode. The difference led to the dismissal of the field marshal.

I would say that only thing that held this book back was the usual old trap that most authors fall into when they write about their own career. The bias memory kicks in from time to time even for the great von Manstein as some of his errors were gross over and even acts that got him in trouble at Nuremberg war crime trials were overlooked.

But in retrospect, the book proves to be interesting, informative and well written by one of World War II's greatest military commanders who is almost totally unknown in our nation.

Rating:
Summary: A good read
Review: This book is Manstein's version of WWII. Manstein obeyed Hitler during the war but after the war was critical. Rommel in contrast rebelled against Hitler and paid for his rebellion with his life. Manstein himself went into comfortable retirement.

Hitler and his generals all believed that the losses they had inflicted on the Soviets had to be crippling. Their underestimation of Soviet strength was what led to Stalingrad. The time for the generals to oppose Hitler was before Operation Blue, not afterwards.

Rating:
Summary: A good firsthand account from an important general
Review: This book will be valuable to a military historian and possibly even to officers in the current military. What I found most interesting was Mansteins firsthand accounts of the decision-making process that Hitler and the commanders of the Wehrmacht went through; their urgency to invade France in 1939. If you're interested in the personal experiences during the way, Manstein talks about places he stayed in France during the offensive of 1940, experiences with the people on his staff, and conditions he himself endured in Russia.
Also interesting is the conflict he depicts between hitler and the army chief of staff. He does much to argue how the outcome of the war could have been much different had Hitler left military decisions up to his generals.
All in all, for me, there were parts with so much tactical detail I got a bit bored and skipped ahead, but if that is what you are looking for, this book is excelent for you.

Rating:
Summary: A good firsthand account from an important general
Review: This book will be valuable to a military historian and possibly even to officers in the current military. What I found most interesting was Mansteins firsthand accounts of the decision-making process that Hitler and the commanders of the Wehrmacht went through; their urgency to invade France in 1939. If you're interested in the personal experiences during the way, Manstein talks about places he stayed in France during the offensive of 1940, experiences with the people on his staff, and conditions he himself endured in Russia.
Also interesting is the conflict he depicts between hitler and the army chief of staff. He does much to argue how the outcome of the war could have been much different had Hitler left military decisions up to his generals.
All in all, for me, there were parts with so much tactical detail I got a bit bored and skipped ahead, but if that is what you are looking for, this book is excelent for you.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent First Person Account
Review: This is a good read and there is alot of interesting information in this book. But also get: "Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments", which has a rebuttal of a large part of this book by a Stalingrad survivor.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent First Person Account
Review: This is a good read and there is alot of interesting information in this book. But also get: "Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments", which has a rebuttal of a large part of this book by a Stalingrad survivor.

Rating:
Summary: Manstein Magic
Review: Upon reading this book it would appear Manstein not only had a talent with the sword but also the pen. Manstein's book is a very readable account of his war time experiences. Included in his book is the demise of the OKH ( General Staff of the Army) through its lack of decisiveness in making a military decision.The formulation, acceptance and implementation of the "Mainstein Plan" which was adopted for the offensive in the West as other plans would NOT acheive total victory. Mainstein shares his simplistic but interesting views on how the Battle of Britain should have been fought.

He then takes us through his brillant victories in the Crimea which were acheived againsnt overwhelming numbers and where his successes were largely acheived through having a free hand and no interference from Hitler. Mainstein devotes a chapter on Hitler as Supreme Commander and analyses Hitlers strengths and many weaknesses.

There is a fascinating detailed account of the German tragedy at Stalingrad and how the beleaguered Sixth Army had the opportunity to break out towards Mainstein's relief forces. However the opportunity was lost due to the Army's hesitation and Hitlers insistence Stalingrad must be held. The sacrifice of the Sixth Army however gave time for other Army Groups to leap frog back to safety and deal a counter blow at Kharkov.

One diappointing feature of the book is the short chapter devoted to operation "Citadel" ( or the battle of Kursk). This is because the translators of the book have taken a much shorter translation than what was orginally contributed by the author. I would be most interested in obtaining the orginal full length translation.

Mainsteins views on how operations should be fought subsequent to Kursk were constantly at odds with Hitlers views on holding onto everything. This along with some other top Nazi Party members insistence that Manstein was a defeatist guaranteed his dimissal in April 1944.

This book is a MUST READ and indispensable to anyone with an interest in the Second World War.