Lost Victories: The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson

Rating:
Summary: How technology is related to strategy
Review: The key to understanding the Civil War is the technology. The Civil War was the first to make universal use of the rifle (compared to the age old musket). This increased the effective range from about 50 yards to 400 yards, thus eliminating the key defensive weapon--the cannon--which had a range of about 100 yards. The result was that virtually every offensive action in the Civil War, by either side, lost.

The much maligned Union generals (McClellan, Meade, Burnside, and Hooker) all reacted to one degree or another by hesitating to make any movement whatsoever.

The underlying hypothesis of "Lost Victories" is that Jackson is the one general in the war who figured out that the only way to win is to use the South's vast advantage in manueverability to gain positions which required the Union onto the attack.\

The detailed descriptions of the many battles leading up to Chancelorsville (recounted elsewhere endlessly) are here used to demonstrate the truth of the hypothesis that frontal attacks were always suicidal.

Less successful is the author's attempt to demonstrate that Jackson had figured out the answer. the only time he was permitted to try (Chancelorsville), he was killed (by friendly fire) before the battle was over. While there is an argument (well made here) that the battle would have been won by the South had Lee only continued with Jackson's battle plan. Nonetheless, the fact is it was not.

The epilogue consists of a lengthy speculation as to whether Jackson could have repeated his early success at Chancelorsville, and ultimately avoided Gettysburg and won the war.

A good argument, but the author completely ignores the western (Mississippi) front, the overwhelming Union advantage in manpower, and the ultimately decisive imbalance of material resources (wouldn't Jackson have run out of food, clothing and bullets, just like Lee, regardless of his strategic brilliance).

In sum, this is the best book I have read on the interplay between technology and strategy in the Civil War. Otherwise it is an interesting, but ultimately unconvincing, speculation on whether the South could have won had Jackson been in charge.

Rating:
Summary: How technology is related to strategy
Review: The key to understanding the Civil War is the technology. The Civil War was the first to make universal use of the rifle (compared to the age old musket). This increased the effective range from about 50 yards to 400 yards, thus eliminating the key defensive weapon--the cannon--which had a range of about 100 yards. The result was that virtually every offensive action in the Civil War, by either side, lost.

The much maligned Union generals (McClellan, Meade, Burnside, and Hooker) all reacted to one degree or another by hesitating to make any movement whatsoever.

The underlying hypothesis of "Lost Victories" is that Jackson is the one general in the war who figured out that the only way to win is to use the South's vast advantage in manueverability to gain positions which required the Union onto the attack.\

The detailed descriptions of the many battles leading up to Chancelorsville (recounted elsewhere endlessly) are here used to demonstrate the truth of the hypothesis that frontal attacks were always suicidal.

Less successful is the author's attempt to demonstrate that Jackson had figured out the answer. the only time he was permitted to try (Chancelorsville), he was killed (by friendly fire) before the battle was over. While there is an argument (well made here) that the battle would have been won by the South had Lee only continued with Jackson's battle plan. Nonetheless, the fact is it was not.

The epilogue consists of a lengthy speculation as to whether Jackson could have repeated his early success at Chancelorsville, and ultimately avoided Gettysburg and won the war.

A good argument, but the author completely ignores the western (Mississippi) front, the overwhelming Union advantage in manpower, and the ultimately decisive imbalance of material resources (wouldn't Jackson have run out of food, clothing and bullets, just like Lee, regardless of his strategic brilliance).

In sum, this is the best book I have read on the interplay between technology and strategy in the Civil War. Otherwise it is an interesting, but ultimately unconvincing, speculation on whether the South could have won had Jackson been in charge.

Rating:
Summary: Superb
Review: This book clearly and accurately details the genius of Stonewall Jackson. Alexander's conclusions are not really all that mind-bending, and quite resonable when further examination is done. He is hard on Lee, but only as pertaining to Jackson. All-in-all, a book that is anything but conventional, but remarkable in it's logic.

Rating:
Summary: Jackson attacking is brilliant; Lee doing same is stupid
Review: This book is another revisionist attack on the reputation of General Robert E Lee. It suggests that Lee missed opportunities to defeat Northern armies most significantly at the battle of Chancellorsville. It further suggests that Stonewall Jackson had developed a greater tactical skill than Lee and had developed a "plan" which would have allowed the South to defeat the North.

That plan was a recognition that due to the invention of the rifled musket frontal attacks on defended positions would lead to defeat. For the south to win it was necessary for them to invade the north, but not to seek a military victory by attacking a northern army. Rather it would be necessary to move north and to force a defensive battle on terms that favor the confederacy.

The central argument has some interest. It would seem clear that Lee's career was aided by facing in the main not just timorous but incompetent opponents. One wonders in his various successful battles such as the Seven Days and Antiem what sort of disaster would have befallen him if his opponent had not run away at the point when they could have achieved victory.

The suggestion that another general could have done better is harder to believe. The Federal government had large numbers of troops that were generally dispersed. The dispersal of the armies assisted the confederates in fighting battles in which they were not overwhelmed. A move to Washington however would have seen a concentration of such force it is hard to believe the southern armies could have been victorious.

The book however is well written and in approaching the topic from the way it does it forces the reader to think and learn more about the American Civil War than most straight chronological narratives.

Rating:
Summary: My Review
Review: This is a great book from a different perspective on the Civil War on a little known general whom made big news and is in my opion the greatest tactician of his time. Alexander did a great job with this book.
This is one of my favorite books, too.

Rating:
Summary: My Review
Review: This is a great book from a different perspective on the Civil War on a little known general whom made big news and is in my opion the greatest tactician of his time. Alexander did a great job with this book.
This is one of my favorite books, too.

Rating:
Summary: Lee Bashing
Review: To hear Bevin Alexander tell it, Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson was the only general in the Army of Northern Virginia who knew which end was up. All the others were incompetent.

Further, not only was 'Stonewall' better than any of them, he had the infallible secret of Southern victory in his head. If only Lee and Davis had _listened_, he would have ended the war in 1862 or '63, with the Confederacy triumphant.

These are strong claims. Does Alexander establish them? No.

Alexander goes over Jackson's career in the Civil War Between the States, recounting what happened at various times and giving some of Jackson's ideas on how to fight and what targets to attack. He also claims that many of the ideas that are commonly asserted about Jackson are just wrong: e.g., that Jackson failed to perform during the Seven Days Battles. (Bevin gives evidence that it was A. P. Hill's impatience, and Lee's mistaken estimate of Union intentions that kept the Army of the Potomac from disaster).

This is very interesting stuff, and earns the book three stars. I recommend it to all students of the War for Northern Independence of Southern Aggression. But he provides no arguments for his larger points.

Alexander confuses his own visions with evidence. He'll present one of Jackson's ideas (invade Maryland, manuver north of Washington, cut the rail lines from the capital to Baltimore). Then he'll speculate about what would happen (Washington DC starves, loses the will to fight the war, and surrenders). Then he treats the speculation as a certainty. Repeat endlessly, and you have the substance of the book's claims.

So this book is worth reading, but can't be taken too seriously.

Rating:
Summary: Lee Bashing
Review: To hear Bevin Alexander tell it, Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson was the only general in the Army of Northern Virginia who knew which end was up. All the others were incompetent.

Further, not only was 'Stonewall' better than any of them, he had the infallible secret of Southern victory in his head. If only Lee and Davis had _listened_, he would have ended the war in 1862 or '63, with the Confederacy triumphant.

These are strong claims. Does Alexander establish them? No.

Alexander goes over Jackson's career in the Civil War Between the States, recounting what happened at various times and giving some of Jackson's ideas on how to fight and what targets to attack. He also claims that many of the ideas that are commonly asserted about Jackson are just wrong: e.g., that Jackson failed to perform during the Seven Days Battles. (Bevin gives evidence that it was A. P. Hill's impatience, and Lee's mistaken estimate of Union intentions that kept the Army of the Potomac from disaster).

This is very interesting stuff, and earns the book three stars. I recommend it to all students of the War for Northern Independence of Southern Aggression. But he provides no arguments for his larger points.

Alexander confuses his own visions with evidence. He'll present one of Jackson's ideas (invade Maryland, manuver north of Washington, cut the rail lines from the capital to Baltimore). Then he'll speculate about what would happen (Washington DC starves, loses the will to fight the war, and surrenders). Then he treats the speculation as a certainty. Repeat endlessly, and you have the substance of the book's claims.

So this book is worth reading, but can't be taken too seriously.

Rating:
Summary: Lee Bashing
Review: To hear Bevin Alexander tell it, Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson was the only general in the Army of Northern Virginia who knew which end was up. All the others were incompetent.

Further, not only was 'Stonewall' better than any of them, he had the infallible secret of Southern victory in his head. If only Lee and Davis had _listened_, he would have ended the war in 1862 or '63, with the Confederacy triumphant.

These are strong claims. Does Alexander establish them? No.

Alexander goes over Jackson's career in the Civil War Between the States, recounting what happened at various times and giving some of Jackson's ideas on how to fight and what targets to attack. He also claims that many of the ideas that are commonly asserted about Jackson are just wrong: e.g., that Jackson failed to perform during the Seven Days Battles. (Bevin gives evidence that it was A. P. Hill's impatience, and Lee's mistaken estimate of Union intentions that kept the Army of the Potomac from disaster).

This is very interesting stuff, and earns the book three stars. I recommend it to all students of the War for Northern Independence of Southern Aggression. But he provides no arguments for his larger points.

Alexander confuses his own visions with evidence. He'll present one of Jackson's ideas (invade Maryland, manuver north of Washington, cut the rail lines from the capital to Baltimore). Then he'll speculate about what would happen (Washington DC starves, loses the will to fight the war, and surrenders). Then he treats the speculation as a certainty. Repeat endlessly, and you have the substance of the book's claims.

So this book is worth reading, but can't be taken too seriously.