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Rating: 
Summary: Too one-sided
Review: As another reviewer said, this book makes some good points, but ultimately is too one-sided. Phil Sheridan's image may be more untarnished than it should be, but if the author wanted to bring it into proper perspective, he could've accomplished that simply by giving us an honest, reasonable portrait, pointing out the shortcomings that others have tended to gloss over. Instead he has given us a diatribe. The author is an attorney, and I happen to be a judge. When a lawyer refuses to admit that his opponent has ANY evidence or legal authority in his favor, when it is obvious that he does have some, I tend to look more askance at that lawyer's entire argument. I had the same reaction reading this book. Instead of being content to bring Sheridan's lofty reputation back down to earth where it belongs, he "trashes" him, and thereby weakens the force of his argument. Had Wittenberg simply argued that Sheridan was not as good - even not nearly as good - a general as he is commonly thought to have been, one might be readily inclined to agree. But he essentially argues that Sheridan was a bad general, and the evidence does not support that argument. Those who like so-called "advocacy history" may enjoy this book; those who believe that historians should simply attempt to present what they believe to be the truth, without having an axe to grind, will likely not.
Rating: 
Summary: If you enjoy being challenged...
Review: As stated in other reviews of this work, this book by noted cavalry historian Eric J. Wittenberg will challenge both established history as well as the preconceived notions of the reader. It is heavy-handed at times in criticism of Sheridan, but perhaps that is as it should be. For far too long, Sheridan's so-called "accomplishments" have gone down in history as unquestioned. Scholars will learn little of the truth of an operation or engagement by reading his official reports, and his Memoirs provide some of the best fictional reading the Civil War has to offer.
It is about time that a skillful researcher has balanced "accepted" history concerning this man with arguments of such a critical nature. Perhaps the true history lies somewhere in between - but one fact remains, and that is that Mr. Wittenberg is truly the first modern writer to take on the teflon persona of a man who, inarguably, crafted his own career out of the dust left from ruining others'. Several fine
American Civil War officers went to their deathbeds under the crushing defeats by Sheridan - not on the battlefield where they belonged - but within interpersonal relationships. Sheridan destroyed careers for no reason other than his own desire to capture the glory won by others. It is high time that he be taken to task for his shortcomings and ineptitude.
Sheridan certainly had a great deal of assistance, as well. He didn't have the power to accomplish his aims alone, and Wittenberg deftly exposes this as well. For anyone who is unchallenged by today's "coffee-table" type works that espouse the traditional legends surrounding those who made such an impact on the history of this country, and desire instead to be forced to both re-think and reevaluate those notions, this work will be a treasure to them. Wittenberg's book is no less than an in-your-face attorney's arguments against these notions. As with any lawyer worth his salt, all he or she asks is that you have been impressed enough by the presentation of evidence to intelligently form your own opinion. And ask yourself if what you've believed all along is your own opinion or that of another. In causing the reader to think that deeply, Mr. Wittenberg has accomplished his aims in the way they are known to be honorable - with the credit due to none other than himself.
Read this book. It will train you to ask the deeper questions and explore for yourself how history should remember those who shape it.
Rating:
Summary: If you enjoy being challenged...
Review: As stated in other reviews of this work, this book by noted cavalry historian Eric J. Wittenberg will challenge both established history as well as the preconceived notions of the reader. It is heavy-handed at times in criticism of Sheridan, but perhaps that is as it should be. For far too long, Sheridan's so-called "accomplishments" have gone down in history as unquestioned. Scholars will learn little of the truth of an operation or engagement by reading his official reports, and his Memoirs provide some of the best fictional reading the Civil War has to offer.
It is about time that a skillful researcher has balanced "accepted" history concerning this man with arguments of such a critical nature. Perhaps the true history lies somewhere in between - but one fact remains, and that is that Mr. Wittenberg is truly the first modern writer to take on the teflon persona of a man who, inarguably, crafted his own career out of the dust left from ruining others'. Several fine
American Civil War officers went to their deathbeds under the crushing defeats by Sheridan - not on the battlefield where they belonged - but within interpersonal relationships. Sheridan destroyed careers for no reason other than his own desire to capture the glory won by others. It is high time that he be taken to task for his shortcomings and ineptitude.
Sheridan certainly had a great deal of assistance, as well. He didn't have the power to accomplish his aims alone, and Wittenberg deftly exposes this as well. For anyone who is unchallenged by today's "coffee-table" type works that espouse the traditional legends surrounding those who made such an impact on the history of this country, and desire instead to be forced to both re-think and reevaluate those notions, this work will be a treasure to them. Wittenberg's book is no less than an in-your-face attorney's arguments against these notions. As with any lawyer worth his salt, all he or she asks is that you have been impressed enough by the presentation of evidence to intelligently form your own opinion. And ask yourself if what you've believed all along is your own opinion or that of another. In causing the reader to think that deeply, Mr. Wittenberg has accomplished his aims in the way they are known to be honorable - with the credit due to none other than himself.
Read this book. It will train you to ask the deeper questions and explore for yourself how history should remember those who shape it.
Rating:
Summary: A thought-provoking reassessment of a renowned general
Review: At the close of the Civil War, by wide acclaim the three top Union generals were Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan. Although the reputations of Grant and Sherman have fallen and risen again a number of times, Sheridan's standing as a great general has gone almost unchallenged. Until now. Eric Wittenberg is a recognized authority on Union cavalry operations in the Eastern Theater and, based upon his earlier studies, he concluded that Sheridan's high reputation was undeserved, being a product more of Grant's blind faith in his subordinate (and Sheridan's own blatant self-promotion) than anything "Little Phil" actually did. Wittenberg by profession is a trial attorney and, as he openly acknowledges in his preface, this book is essentially a legal brief, setting forth his thesis that Sheridan has been over-rated and presenting the evidence in support of that thesis. He also states that he anticipates that some will not agree with him and that he looks forward to the debate to come. Sheridan's career is described in four chapters, one dealing with the antebellum period and the first three years of the war, and then one each for his service as commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac during the Overland Campaign and the early weeks at Petersburg, for his independent command in the Shenandoah Valley against Jubal Early's forces, and finally for his conduct of the pursuit of Lee's army to Appomattox. (For the Overland and Shenandoah periods, Wittenberg awards poor marks to Sheridan, but gives him a high grade for the Appomattox Campaign.) Together, these four chapters comprise a succinct but comprehensive history of Sheridan's Civil War operations. In addition, special chapters are devoted to Sheridan's harsh treatment of subordinates (George Crook, William Averell, and Gouveneur K. Warren), his frequent disobedience of orders, and the conspicuous distance between truth and what Sheridan wrote in his official reports and memoirs. There is also a final summary of Sheridan's flaws as well as his virtues. And Wittenberg does not deny that Sheridan was superb at motivating his men for a maximum effort and in building their confidence, recognizing that "Little Phil" did indeed make important contributions to ultimate Union victory, even if not as substantial contributions as traditional history has contended. Readers familiar with standard assessments of Federal cavalry operations in the Eastern Theater during the final year of the Civil War (Stephen Z. Starr's history of the Union cavalry comes to mind) may be startled by Wittenberg's quite negative appraisal of that activity. Disputing Sheridan's claim of nearly unbroken success against the forces of Stuart and Hampton during the summer of 1864, Wittenberg contends that only Yellow Tavern can be counted as a Union victory. And Wittenberg concludes that Sheridan was consistently outgeneraled in the Shenandoah and that only his overwhelming superiority in numbers and material overcame Confederate opposition. Such a depiction of nearly total failure on the part of Sheridan's cavalry presents a paradox when it is recognized, as Wittenberg grants, that in this same period the morale and confidence of Union cavalry forces grew. Wittenberg believes the answer to this seemingly illogical inconsistency lies in Sheridan's remarkable ability to motivate his troops by the sheer force of his personality. I suspect that it is in this puzzle that Wittenberg may be most strongly challenged by Sheridan's modern admirers. Could a general convince his men that they were winning when they were consistently failing? Unlike some other books of "advocacy history" which I have read, Wittenberg's book seems to me to be honestly written and honestly presented, maintaining a genuine air of fairness to its subject despite sharply critical conclusions. Too often, "revisionist history" is used as a derogatory label by those who do not understand the historical process. Eric Wittenberg's new book is an example of "revisionist history" at its best. The writing is clear and persuasive, and the argument presented inescapably leads the reader to re-examine the basis for old, comfortable assumptions. "Little Phil" does not pretend to supply the final answer, but it does offer thought-provoking questions that can lead to a better understanding of the closing year of the American Civil War.
Rating: 
Summary: Stick to Law Mr Wittenberg
Review: I found lawyer Eric Wittenberg's book on General Sheridan entitled "Little Phil" just appalling and frightening, that this book was even published and author is considered a noteworthy Civil War historian. Once again we have a non-military historian or professional trying to view the profession of arms through some ridiculous method or process, this time applying law as in a legal case. As a three-decade veteran of the military, I was shocked by the lack of general military knowledge, which is such a current fade of historians who are not in the same class as "SLAM" Marshall, John S. D. Eisenhower, Trevor DuPuy or even Stephen Ambrose, who got things wrong and crossed the integrity line, but most of his books are doctrinally accurate. Wittenberg's understanding of combat, war, the dynamics of changing tactical application, the levels of war and so much more, is dreadful. Saying that according to Dennis Hart Mahan that cavalry operations should be conducted by some military tactical manual and not change and adapt with the real-world fact of combat is so ignoramus that it would haunt any combat veteran. To say that cavalry was not to "fight battles" is so absurd, because, guess what? It was happening! They were fighting cavalry against cavalry battles as nations had since the Crusades and Ghenus Kahn and Napoleon. Mahan, according to Wittenberg, should run out at Haw's Shop and announce, "Stop! This is not in my book, you are not following my manual."
The author needs to stick with law, because he is no historian and lacks the training. To measure Sheridan like he was a race horse with a tally sheet is pathetic. What Wittenberg fails to see, that through Sheridan's aggressive operations, win or lose, he ripped the initiative from the Confederate cavalry and they had to fight him on his terms. There has never been a military leader who has not exaggerated or misused his reports to a degree, made tactical or operational mistakes, including Washington and Frederick the Great, and though winning the battle as Sheridan did at 3rd Winchester, the execution was flawed. Mr. Wittenberg's concept of war is to be a clean, gentleman's contest with no hurt feelings, fair rules and clear winners. Who cares if Sheridan fires a couple of officers in the heat of battle. He is the commander and lives are at stake. War is not a popularity context.
There are so many errors, flaws and ignorant comments, one-sided bias and just immature criticisms of Sheridan in this book that I could not finish it; the first time in my reading career. One example, in Wittenberg's assessment of the Overland Campaign he faults Sheridan for failing to link up with General David Hunter at Charlottesville and escort Hunter's army to join General Meade. This did not happen of course, but in Wittenberg's litany of Sheridan's failures he fails to address the fact that Hunter was defeated at Lynchburg and retreated west back into the Shenandoah Valley. Even if Sheridan would have gained Charlottesville, Hunter never made it. This is extremely prejudicial history for even a lawyer.
The scholarship is so bad, that Mr. Roy Morris and other biographers should share in the royalties of the dozen of so books sold. Where does one go to claim a refund?
Rating:
Summary: Guess the author wouldn't like Patton either.
Review: OK, to believe this "reassessment" of Phil Sheridan, we must believe that the general fooled Union leaders Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Halleck, and Civil War writers from Bruce Catton and Fletcher Pratt to James McPherson and Shelby Foote (as well as British military authors such as Jackson's biograper, G.F.R. Henderson). Not to mention scores of non-coms who fought under Sheridan."It might be worth making a fight if Grant were their commander. But not against this man". So was the report of Napoleon III's troops after Sheridan led a movement after the war along the Rio Grande to block French forces occupying Mexico. Bismarck also praised Sheridan upon the latter's counsel in the Franco-Prussian war.You do not need to dislike an unadmiring book to be shocked how author Eric Wittenberg relies selectively and heavily on prejudiced and "hurt" sources, as well as taking exclusively critical but minor remarks from favorable Sheridan biographers.For example, sources for Wittenberg's "reassessment" include rebel General Jubal Early and guerilla Colonel Mosby, and Union General George Crook (whose claim to credit for the decisive move at Fishers Hill on his own came AFTER a falling-out with Sheridan over American Indian policies AND after Crook was heavily criticized for the Union near-loss at Cedar Creek.) Wittenberg fails also to remember that commanders base their decision partly on the input of lieutenants. Whatever Crook's contribution to victory was at Fisher's Hill, it was Sheridan's decision after meeting with his division leaders. Wittenberg even tries to deny Sheridan his widely-received credit for his amazing victory at Missionary Ridge by favoring another Brigadier's claim of capturing the enemy's cannons. Yet Sheridan was seen celebrating his charge by straddling one of the cannons in victory before continuing on as the only commander to pursue the retreating enemy. Wittenberg does not note that Sheridan was in this pursuit when he said the guns were "recaptured". And although most historians credit Sheridan for this win (including those mentioned above), Wittenberg is only able to footnote one magazine article.But in many matters like these, Wittenberg outrageously resorts to calling Sheridan a liar even when he does no better than show them to be one man's word vs. another.But it is obvious from the number of pages on Sheridan's supposed insubordination and harshness that these are Wittenberg's biggest criteria for generalship. Insubordination? Harshness? Hmmm... sounds like another general. His name was PATTON. One must wonder than how Blood-n-Guts would fare in a Wittenberg "reassessment."Regarding Wittenberg's biggest Sheridan victim, Governeur Warren, the latter General had let down both Grant and Meade and was previously considered for dismissal. Mainly, he was Sheridan's opposite in personal leadership and drive and played second-guesser at critical moments. He was not seen by Sheridan on the field at crucial moments ("By God, THAT's what I want to see! General officers at the front!" he cried, seeing Joshua Chamberlin.). As Bruce Catton observed, the real mistake was that other men lacking Sheridan's leadership were not cashiered earlier. In comparison to the ink spent on these subjects, Wittenberg greatly understates Sheridan's victories early in the war, mentioning Booneville without obererving that Sheridan clinched victory over the rebels forces with a 90-man rear charge. And though Sheridan outnumbered the rebels in the Shenandoah Valley, he bested the military maxim that attacks on an entrenched foe should be with a 3:1 advantage. His masterly use of combined arms is cited by the US Chief Military History office.INCREDIBLY, Wittenberg faults Sheridan's use of cavalry as a separate fighting arm, yet many consider it to have been the precedent for freewheeling armored strikes. Again Sheridan was like Patton, who wrote: "Good tactics can save even the worst strategy."
Rating: 
Summary: Thought-provoking, if overstated
Review: The author is an attorney, and as he admits, this book is written like a legal brief. A lawyer's job is to present one-sided arguments, and that is what Wittenberg has done here. The result is a book that raises some valid points, but which overstates its case. It essentially is a compendium of every attack ever made on Sheridan, from his personality to his generalship.
While many of Sheridan's flaws and errors have been recognized both by his contemporaries and by historians, it is of some value to lay them out in a single book as a corrective to his largely untarnished image among casual Civil War buffs.
This could have been accomplished, however, without exaggerating Sheridan's shortcomings. Wittenberg, for example, tends to credit Sheridan's every detractor, no matter how biased they themselves might have been. At one point, he even quotes Southern newspaper reports from late in the war, which clearly smack of propaganda meant to reassure their readers that the CSA was in no danger of falling, to support his argument that one of Sheridan's cavalry raids was a failure. Likewise, he quotes Confederate leaders' postwar comments to the effect to the effect that they were unimpressed by Sheridan, without questioning whether their judgments were honestly made, or whether they were colored by resentment over the ultimate outcome of their encounters with Little Phil and his men.
Every success is chalked up to Sheridan's subordinates or colleagues, while every failure is laid at his feet, until one is left wondering how such an incompetent general could have inspired the unwavering confidence of both his commanding officer, Grant, and of his troops. A chapter near the end that recognizes Sheridan's achievements during the final campaign against Lee is so inconsistent with the rest of the book that it seems jarring to find it in the same volume.
As stated, though, Sheridan was far from perfect, and this book is not without some value for reminding us of his flaws. I can recommend it, however, only for readers with a solid background in Sheridan's Civil War career, who will be able to assess Wittenberg's arguments with a properly critical eye, much the same way that a judge would read an attorney's brief.
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