Law and Public Choice : A Critical Introduction

Rating:
Summary: Lacks Aim
Review: This book purports to be a introduction to public choice theory as it interacts with the law. Public choice theory is a framework that analyzes the behavior of public structures under the assumption that all relevant actors try to maximize their self-interest. This book uses public choice theory to analyze (i.) interest groups, (ii.) the democratic process, (iii.) economic regulation, (iv.) statutory interpretation and (v.) public law.

While readable and engaging, Farber and Frickey's text suffers from several defects. The defects are representative of its lacking as an introductory text. First, while this book packs a lot of information into roughly 150 pages, it is not comprehensive by any stretch of the imagination. Topics in areas such as torts, and law and economics are saliently missing.

Second, this book aims to be a "critical introduction," which means that it is a biased introduction. Clear and intentional bias defeats the purpose of an introductory text, which is presumably geared towards promoting understanding rather than agenda. The authors obviously have qualms with public choice theory's widespread application in libertarian thought, and thus they try argue against mainstream public choice arguments for the textualist readings of statutes, criticism of democracy and the inefficiency of economic regulation. What irked me about this was not the criticisms per se, but the excessive straw-man-building employed by the authors. The political nature of this book is quite simply: to make the reader realize that mainstream public choice theorists' skepticism of governmental inefficiency is badly misguided, if not false.

Thus, this book lacks comprehensiveness, objectivity, and an introductory feel. With that said, however, I learned quite a bit once I got past the political posturing. Lucidly written, the book demonstrates public choice theory's flexibility in handling complicated theoretical issues in political science and law. This book might serve a better purpose as a complement to a more general introduction to public choice theory.