Hitler's Economy: Nazi Work Creation Programs, 1933-1936

Rating:
Summary: Another Nazi Myth Bites the Dust
Review: According to conventional wisdom, as a result of military expenditures, Hitler's economy went from 34%unemployment when he entered office in early 1933 to virtually full employmenr by 1936. Professor Silverman argues, as a result of impressive research in Nazi archives, that it was work creation programs that account for this "miracle" and it was the 4-year Plan announced in 1936 that represented an emphasis on autarky and arms and a seller's market.It is surprising how conservative Hitler's initial plans were since they relied on the expertise of Hjalmar Schacht, who was replaced by Walther Funk after the announcement of the 4-year plan.by Goebbles. The early years represented continuity with the Bruning policy, particularly the Todt plans for motorization and the famous autobahns, one of the positive legacies of Hitler. Silverman's account of sharp regional differences is also interesting with East Prussia getting back to full employment at an early dater and Aachen lagging. It is natural to compare Hitler's achievements with FDR's New Deal which initially had to deal with only 25% unemployment. Generally speaking, Hitler was the more successful, particularly in view of FDR's attempt to balance the budget in 1937 thereby producing the Roosevelt recession and the rise of unemployment from 14% to 19%. While Currie and Eccles managed to achieve the Keynesian euthanasia of the rentier in the late thirties, Roosevelt was overall a timid Keynesian until Wprld War II and was plagued by double-digit unemployment until 1941.FDR devalued the dollar in 1933 by about the same percentage as Britain in 1931 but Hitler and Schachr ruled out currency devaluation because of fears that it would be inflationary. Policies under Bruning had been brutally deflationary with workers taking a 10% wage cut, but thr 1923 hyperinflation (and Schacht's role in stopping it) was still fresh in policy-makers' minds. Workers in voluntary labor camps which absorbed unemployment were paid very low wages and lost their unemployment compensation which helped maintain price stability. Strangely Silverman hardly mention the USSR as a source of ideas in the Hitler years lthough the 4-year Plan itself was inspired by the Soviet FYP, the second of which was being completed by the time Goebbels began administering the German equivalent. Earlier (February,1935) Soviet-type "work books" necessary for employment were introduced. Ther Russian economy today would seem to have more to learn from the German experience after 7 years of Yeltsin's brutally deflationary monetarist policy than from FRD's fiscal bungling. The non-payment of wage and pension arrears is a historic low in the application of the neo-classical notion that attrbutes recessionary unemployment to exhorbitant wages.

Rating:
Summary: Another Nazi Myth Bites the Dust
Review: According to conventional wisdom, as a result of military expenditures, Hitler's economy went from 34%unemployment when he entered office in early 1933 to virtually full employmenr by 1936. Professor Silverman argues, as a result of impressive research in Nazi archives, that it was work creation programs that account for this "miracle" and it was the 4-year Plan announced in 1936 that represented an emphasis on autarky and arms and a seller's market.It is surprising how conservative Hitler's initial plans were since they relied on the expertise of Hjalmar Schacht, who was replaced by Walther Funk after the announcement of the 4-year plan.by Goebbles. The early years represented continuity with the Bruning policy, particularly the Todt plans for motorization and the famous autobahns, one of the positive legacies of Hitler. Silverman's account of sharp regional differences is also interesting with East Prussia getting back to full employment at an early dater and Aachen lagging. It is natural to compare Hitler's achievements with FDR's New Deal which initially had to deal with only 25% unemployment. Generally speaking, Hitler was the more successful, particularly in view of FDR's attempt to balance the budget in 1937 thereby producing the Roosevelt recession and the rise of unemployment from 14% to 19%. While Currie and Eccles managed to achieve the Keynesian euthanasia of the rentier in the late thirties, Roosevelt was overall a timid Keynesian until Wprld War II and was plagued by double-digit unemployment until 1941.FDR devalued the dollar in 1933 by about the same percentage as Britain in 1931 but Hitler and Schachr ruled out currency devaluation because of fears that it would be inflationary. Policies under Bruning had been brutally deflationary with workers taking a 10% wage cut, but thr 1923 hyperinflation (and Schacht's role in stopping it) was still fresh in policy-makers' minds. Workers in voluntary labor camps which absorbed unemployment were paid very low wages and lost their unemployment compensation which helped maintain price stability. Strangely Silverman hardly mention the USSR as a source of ideas in the Hitler years lthough the 4-year Plan itself was inspired by the Soviet FYP, the second of which was being completed by the time Goebbels began administering the German equivalent. Earlier (February,1935) Soviet-type "work books" necessary for employment were introduced. Ther Russian economy today would seem to have more to learn from the German experience after 7 years of Yeltsin's brutally deflationary monetarist policy than from FRD's fiscal bungling. The non-payment of wage and pension arrears is a historic low in the application of the neo-classical notion that attrbutes recessionary unemployment to exhorbitant wages.

Rating:
Summary: PhD's heres a book for you!
Review: I may not be the best person to review this book because it is too sophisticated for even me, a student in economics. It is more of a book for someone who already knows something about the economy of that period and would like to go in more depth. However, I still managed to learn from this book a good deal. The author focuses on the main Nazi work creation programs like motorization, Autobahn, emergency relief, and rearmament. He stresses on the fact that most work creation from the period 1933-1936 was not a result of rearmament rather a fierce attack on employment through some of the methods mentioned above. In addition, the growing control of the Nazi party over all aspects of the economy is clearly identified in every chapter as this control grows. The book is loaded with information and probably is a great book for research. The book is well and professionally written and is worth the money; especially that it is one of the few books on this subject. However, if you are looking for something far more basic The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-1938, is very good.