Democracy and Decision : The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference

Rating:
Summary: A Major Advance
Review: This book changed fundamentally the way I think about democracy. The authors convincingly argue that, because no single vote in a democratic election is likely to determine the outcome of the election, each voter is free to vote according to his or her ideological lights -- that is, each voter is likely to elevate ideological considerations over material ones. Insofar as ideological considerations run counter to a voter's material interests, the Brennan-Lomasky insight is that we cannot predict the outcome of elections merely by identifying the dominant material interest shared by a majority of voters.

This insight is often interpreted as rejecting the public-choice assumption that people behave self-interestedly. But it does no such thing. When it is realized that each voter's vote is inconsequential (as far as the outcome of the election goes), each voter is free to "consume" ideology. As I see it, the Brennan-Lomasky thesis conforms more fully with public-choice fundamentals than does the previous notion that voters always (or typically) vote their narrow material interests.

This book is one of the most important works in political science, and public-choice, published during the past quarter century.

Rating:
Summary: A Major Advance
Review: This book changed fundamentally the way I think about democracy. The authors convincingly argue that, because no single vote in a democratic election is likely to determine the outcome of the election, each voter is free to vote according to his or her ideological lights -- that is, each voter is likely to elevate ideological considerations over material ones. Insofar as ideological considerations run counter to a voter's material interests, the Brennan-Lomasky insight is that we cannot predict the outcome of elections merely by identifying the dominant material interest shared by a majority of voters.

This insight is often interpreted as rejecting the public-choice assumption that people behave self-interestedly. But it does no such thing. When it is realized that each voter's vote is inconsequential (as far as the outcome of the election goes), each voter is free to "consume" ideology. As I see it, the Brennan-Lomasky thesis conforms more fully with public-choice fundamentals than does the previous notion that voters always (or typically) vote their narrow material interests.

This book is one of the most important works in political science, and public-choice, published during the past quarter century.