Precious Unborn Human Persons

Rating:
Summary: The quality of argument is reflected in the price
Review:

Koukl's booklet is clearly written, but his arguments are implausible and philosophically inept. Following are some of the flaws.

Koukl writes: "You can never answer the question 'Can I kill this?' unless you've answered a prior question: _What is it?_" (p.7). This assertion begs the question against bodily-rights defenses of abortion, which deny precisely that assertion. The assertion is also inconsistent with Koukl's admission (p.10) that the foetus, even if it is a person, may be killed in self-defense.

To establish that the foetus is a member of the human species, Koukl appeals to the fictional "Law of Biogenesis": "_each being reproduces after its own kind_" (p.23). If "kind" here means "species", then the "Law" is false, for there have been many observed instances of speciation (see the talk.origins FAQ). If "kind" means something other than "species", then the fact that the foetus has parents who belong to our species does not guarantee that the foetus itself belongs to our species; merely that it belongs to our "kind" (which by hypothesis is not the same thing). While I agree the foetus is a member of the human species, Koukl's reasoning to that conclusion is flawed.

Like Francis Beckwith (_Politically Correct Death_, 1993), Koukl consistently fails to distinguish among various distinct meanings of terms such as "full humanity" (p.23), "fully human" (p.43), "human being" (pp.24-5 and elsewhere), etc. Are such terms used descriptively (i.e., in a purely biological sense) or normatively (i.e., in a moral sense)? Does "human being", for example, mean "individual member of the species _Homo sapiens_" or "being with a right to life"? Koukl never makes it clear. This is sloppy, and suggests his argument is based on equivocation.

Koukl's case for the foetus's right to life boils down to the repeated assertion that "as long as you are alive..._you are still yourself_" (p.30). In other words, foetuses must have a right to life because each of *us* was once a foetus (pp. 45, 47). But this is a mistake. From the fact (if it is one) that we were once foetuses, it *does not follow* that we had a *right to life* when we were foetuses. To make that conclusion follow, one must assume that the right to life is an essential (rather than accidental) property of those that possess it. Since pro-choicers deny this assumption, Koukl -- by simply taking it for granted -- has begged the question.

Koukl wants to argue that, since our physical bodies are always changing, what sustains our identity over time (and, somehow, what gives us a right to life) is an immaterial soul. He asserts: "If you change _all_ of [a thing's] physical parts, there can be no question that you now have something completely different" (p.37). So (he continues), since all the molecules in our bodies get changed every seven years or so, the body I have now can *at most* be seven years old; and, since *I* am plainly *more* than seven years old, I cannot be identical to my body. Rather, I must be identical with an immaterial soul (pp.37-8).

The problem here is with the claim that changing all a thing's physical parts necessarily creates a new thing. Koukl tries to support this claim with a story in which the parts of a deck (at the back of his house) are all gradually replaced -- the result, he thinks, is a new deck (pp. 35-7). Perhaps that is so (though many metaphysicians would disagree); but at most it shows that changing all of an *artefact's* parts creates a new thing. Biological organisms, unlike artefacts, actively guide and regulate their own growth and development. This self-regulated activity very plausibly allows organisms (unlike artefacts) to retain their identity despite a complete change of parts. So it is just a mistake to assume, as Koukl does, that the identity conditions for artefacts must also apply to organisms.

Of course, Koukl doesn't really believe his own arguments about souls. (1) He admits that "_our physical bodies...grow old_" (p.38); this contradicts his claim (p.38) that our bodies are at most seven years old. (2) We know some animals and trees are, say, 20 years old (cf. p.23), despite the fact that they -- like us -- presumably change all their molecules every few years. It would follow, on Koukl's argument, that trees must have immaterial souls that sustain their identity throughout this change of parts (otherwise the tree could never come to be 20 years old). But I doubt Koukl really believes trees have souls! (3) Trying to prove we are something more than our bodies, he writes: "If you *have* a body, then you are not the same thing as the physical body you possess, or else you wouldn't be able to make this claim" (p.38, my emphasis). But this is self-refuting, for by the same argument we cannot be souls: "If you have a soul," we can say, "then you are not the same thing as the immaterial soul you possess, or else you wouldn't be able to make this claim."

So Koukl has not shown we are immaterial souls. And even if he had, foetal personhood (contrary to what he thinks) wouldn't follow. Since on his view trees (and presumably animals) must have souls, and since trees and animals lack a right to life, therefore the mere fact that a being has a soul does not show it has a right to life. Perhaps Koukl would say it is having a _human_ soul that makes a difference, that gives something a right to life. But why? Why should the mere fact that a soul is *human* give it a right to life? I see no answer to this; nor does Koukl provide one.

In sum, _Precious Unborn Human Persons_ is a clear enough expression of what many pro-lifers seem to believe. Think of it as a statement of faith -- a crisp condensation of the pro-life position, useful to pro-lifers in much the same way that a dogmatic tract or the Apostle's Creed is useful to the pious. But for strong arguments that really "stand to reason" and put the pro-life position on "solid ground", this booklet doesn't cut it.

Rating:
Summary: Right to the point
Review: This book gets right to the point "what is the unborn" and after reading this book there is no doubt that the unborn are fully human persons. The arguments are compeling and to the point. Anyone who doubts the personhood of the unborn, is simply blind to the hard core facts, because to to admit to the facts and the personhood of the unborn would destroy all pro-abortion arguments. I used to be Pro-abortion at on time, after reading books like this, the facts and the logic caused me to change my mind, I could no longer lie to myself on this issue and ignore the simply facts. Thanks Greg for your book.