Military Intelligence Blunders

Rating:
Summary: Interesting Read
Review: Although this book would not rank among the unputdownables, it was interesting enough for me to read it from cover to cover over several days. The author has struck a balance between riveting story telling and details of who-did-what-when.

The title is a bit misleading as it was often not military intelligence per se that led to the blunders but the failure to appreciate or act on useful intelligence.

Rating:
Summary: A wealth of info in a small space...
Review: An excellent series of case studies by retired Colonel John Hughes-Wilson. He definitely did his homework, as he has a wealth of accurate information on each of his studies. There are a few of his conclusions that I would disagree with, but that is just differing opinions. In some instances, however, he does not clearly distinguish between intelligence blunders and errors of command decision, which are not the same. This may lead the uninformed reader astray. Nonetheless, this is a well-written, easy to read book that provides an excellent review of intelligence practices that have had historic impact in our world. This has become a permanent addition to my library for future reference. Well done.

Rating:
Summary: A wealth of info in a small space...
Review: An excellent series of case studies by retired Colonel John Hughes-Wilson. He definitely did his homework, as he has a wealth of accurate information on each of his studies. There are a few of his conclusions that I would disagree with, but that is just differing opinions. In some instances, however, he does not clearly distinguish between intelligence blunders and errors of command decision, which are not the same. This may lead the uninformed reader astray. Nonetheless, this is a well-written, easy to read book that provides an excellent review of intelligence practices that have had historic impact in our world. This has become a permanent addition to my library for future reference. Well done.

Rating:
Summary: Fascinating, and detailed
Review: Apparently Colonel John Hughes-Wilson was in British Military Intelligence for a decade, and made a study of the profession and practice while he was there. When he left, he set out to write a book on the history of the art, using various historical examples to show why things work out the way they do, and why certain practices should be followed or avoided.

The book follows a simple format. The first chapter is an introduction to the subject, explaining the objective of Military Intelligence and the means of obtaining, evaluating, and disseminating the information involved. The rest of the chapters (save a short conclusion) discuss individual events from the past sixty years where an army or nation was surprised or somehow failed by intelligence. There's a brief discussion of the overall course of the battle and the parameters of what the author wishes to discuss, and then a critical analysis of the intelligence that was available, how it was handled, and what was made of it by the end-users. Usually, of course, the end-user ignored or misused the intelligence, and the result was a disaster.

The one minor quibble I had with the book was the selection of the various anecdotes involved. I felt that a couple were badly selected (notably the one on Malaya in 1942) mostly because the battles involved were British, and of course the author is a Brit. That having been noted, it doesn't detract much from the overall impact of the book, and there actually is some worthwhile information even in that chapter. I would have preferred, however, if he'd used something like the Japanese failure at the Battle of Midway, where their signal intelligence basically lost them the battle.

That all being said, this is a very worthwhile and intelligent book, and I would recommend it to anyone interested in the subject.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent book on blunders and successes
Review: I'm not sure the title of this book is a very good description of what it addresses, though military intelligence activities (both in true intelligence work, but also quite a bit of counter-intelligence stuff) are discussed quite a bit. Whatever the title, it is a very interesting and worthwhile book.
Even if you've read dozens of books discussing the conflicts covered here (five chapters of various aspects of World War II and then one each on Vietnam, '73 Arab-Israeli War, Falklands War, Gulf War) you'll see quite a bit of new material and insight here.
The author's got a good narrative style, though he does jump around a bit. In addition to intelligence work, he covers political, military, and diplomatic activities that have substantial impacts on the campaigns discussed. He also discusses the campaigns themselves.
This book fills a real gap, in my estimation, in understanding much that is never reported and seldom discussed about why wars and battles go the way they do. Overall a very good assessment of intel activities and the pol-mil considerations that go into why a particular campaign was successful or not (at least at the outset).

Rating:
Summary: A good discussion of the human element of warfare
Review: This book is one of few that I have read that explains the human element of warfare, specifically when it comes to warning of war. Even with a complete intelligence picture or at least enough of it to take the correct actions, nations are still "surprised". Surprised is not the right word, but is the one used be most people. I say this because failure to correctly counter the enemy is blamed most often on surprise. The book clearly points several other reasons than simply surprise. Mostly it is the human tendency to hear only what you want to hear and thereby ignore the warning which is the real fault for "surprise" attacks. And there are other reasons layed out in the book, like wrong "mind-set".

I always take exception to the phrase intelligence failure and in this book the author reveals the falsehood of that phrase. For example, the author writes that the initial advantage of the arabs as they attacked across the Suez was nothing more than the government of Israel not wanting the attack to happen and therefore did not take the correct counter action steps, like calling up the reserves.

The author does get into the war story telling mode a bit much, but that makes the book readable. I would say overall the book is a good read and a solid effort that contributes to the warning of war field of study. Read and enjoy!

Rating:
Summary: Reads like a lousy textbook
Review: This book is so boring that I fell asleep several times while reading it. The author dumped too many incidents, dates and personalities into each chapter. Is there really a need to go to such a level of details? The reader can easily get overwhelmed and lose sight of the big picture. In intelligence jargon, there is too much "noise". The contents also appear disorganised and disjointed. Much can be done to make this piece of work more readable.

Rating:
Summary: Different perspective of some modern military battles
Review: This is a book about modern military campaigns and the military intelligence or lack there of involved. I enjoyed this book, it gives a often overlooked perspective on military battles and campaigns. It also tells some of the pitfalls of modern military intelligence and where they have triumphed and failed. There are examples from WWII, the Falkland Wars and the Gulf War plus a few more. Not all of the results can lay at the feet of military intelligence but it does give a good perspective of what didn't happen as far as intelligence was concerned and what happened because of that lack. For a different perspective and insight into well known modern wars and the often overlooked and not talked about intelligence and the mistakes they make. I give it an A.

Rating:
Summary: Very detailed and interesting look at history
Review: This is one the best books about military intelligence that I have read. Having spent many years working in the area, I find that most other books on the subject are written by outsiders who never quite fully understand what they are writing about, no matter how bright or well intentioned they may be. Few outsiders appreciate, for example, the details of the intelligence cycle, the multiple layers of intelligence collectors, the rivalries among collection agencies, the correct technical jargon, the practical effects on intelligence analysis of inter-agency battles for bigger budgets, etc.

Hughes-Wilson utilizes a case study approach. He analyzes nine different events or conflicts from World War II to the present. Having read about many of the conflicts before, I did not expect to learn much that was new. However, the author presented many new factual details about the events involving the Brits, in particular, that were fascinating. He was clearly a very informed observer and/or possible participant in many of the conflicts. His analysis of the American failure in Tet 1968 is one of the most incisive and dispassionate that I have read. He is no fan of official histories. He is blunt in his criticisms. His comments (actually a very minor part of his Pearl Harbor story)about the FBI's handling of Japanese and German espionage in WW II makes one seriously question the FBI's competence to work effectively as an intelligence organization at that time. But, then has anything really gotten better at the FBI?

Bottom line: As one other reviewer has commented, Hughes-Wilson's real message is that political considerations - whether those of a totalitarian regime or a democracy - often lead to what are called "intelligence blunders." His call for truly objective and independent intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination should be heeded, but it will probably be ignored. We will see more such blunders again.

Rating:
Summary: Nine vignettes with a consistent message
Review: This very engrossing book covers nine intelligence failures, from Stalin's misuse of his intelligence assets in 1941 to the failures that preceded the 1991 Gulf War. All nine carry a similar message: The raw intelligence was available to avert a blunder, but the analysis was in some way flawed; Stalin, for example, chose to be his own intelligence analyst, and he turned out to be a very poor one. Another message comes through, as well: In all nine examples, the defender's intelligence failed. The attacker, if he can maintain surprise, has the intelligence advantage.