Rating: 
Summary: An Excellent Account of Hitler's successor.
Review:
Ten Years and Twenty Days is a direct reference to the time Karl Doenitz spent in Spandau Jail having been convicted of War Crimes.
As an English boy growing up in a post-war Britain (I was born in 1950), we would play games where the Germans always lost - just like the Cowboys always won and the Indians always lost. Much later in life, I began to research various ships and shipwrecks through my scuba diving and the name of Karl Doenitz came up time and again. Over many years I came to respect this man for the way in which he conducted both himself and his branch of the war with Britain. I consider him to have been an honourable enemy of my country.
Having read so many accounts of this once great Admiral before reading his own memoirs, I have reached the conclusion that he was convicted of no more a crime than "being one of the enemy" and it was for that he served his ten years and twenty days. Others, of course, were directly responsible for the great human atrocities of WW2 and it was they who were either sentenced to death of life imprisonment.
I am sure there are those who will disagree with my assessment of this man - and, indeed, their own assessment may be more accurate. Nevertheless, this book is a great work and one which should be read by all those with an interest in Karl Doenitz the German Naval Officer and Karl Doenitz - the last Fuhrer who's first task on succeeding Hitler was to seek peace.
NM
Rating: 
Summary: A Revealing Book Regarding the U-boat War
Review: "Memoirs: Ten Years and 20 Days" is the autobiography of Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, who commanded the German U-boat fleet from 1935 to 1945 (for ten years and 20 days - hence the title). Winston Churchill said that Doenitz's U-boats in the Atlantic were the only military threat that ever had him really worried, and this is an inside look at the man behind it. Doenitz, a U-boat commander in WWI, was captured and became a POW. He rose slowly in the peacetime navy, and then became commander of all U-boats just as Hitler's re-armament went into high gear. Still Doenitz describes how he had to struggle against the land mentality of the German military and Hitler (the navy never got more than 5% of German war production), and a woefully small U-boat fleet in the first few years of the war. Then allied countermeasures became so strong that after May 1943 the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic had clearly turned against the U-boats, their effectiveness dropping each month in tandem with their increasing casualties. The vast majority of his crews died in battle - a higher percentage than any other field of service. Yet his crews never faltered in their volunteer service, despite the suicidal losses. That he could inspire such loyalty is a tribute to his leadership skill and style, which he discusses in detail. Considered a war criminal and submarine warfare considered piracy by the allies, he was tried and convicted at Nuremberg, where one of his chief defense witnesses was US Admiral Nimitz, whose submarine war in the Pacific against Japan was, if anything, even more ruthless. The book contains many interesting insights and details from a man who, by all accounts, was a principled warrior devoid of Nazi beliefs or political ambition - an apolitical approach to command that won respect and trust from an unusual corner: Hitler. Doenitz ended up succeeding Hitler as Fuhrer, during which, among other things, he fired Himmler (Doenitz conducted the actual surrender to the allies). The book is well written, and a good insight into 'the other side'. He is clearly defensive about being a convicted war criminal, and makes and interesting and impassioned case that the US was grossly violating neutrality long before its entry into WWII (most historians agree). He was also unaware of how totally compromised his radio traffic was ('Ultra' was still secret when he wrote his memoirs), so there is no reflection on how his gabby, tightly centralized (and therefore radio traffic intensive) command style contributed to his defeat both through decrypts and radio direction finding. Like any commander's memoirs, this is not the balanced history a 'first timer' in the subject should read, but it is an interesting and important read for anyone interested in either WWII sub warfare or the dynamics of command, as long as one already has some background in the subject.
Rating:
Summary: Essential reading for people interested in U-boat war.
Review: Admiral Karl Doenitz the architect of U- boat campaign in World War II which nearly brought Allied powers to the brink of a defeat.Britain particularly vulnerable to this form of war since London depended on overseas colonies for much of her economic sustenance.Battle of Atlantic unarguably the most bitter ,protracted campaign of World War II where fortunes of rival navies fluctuated widely.This was a campaign whose outcome to a large extent determined by technical innovations.In the opening chapters of the book Doenitz recounts his experiences as a U-boat commanderin the Mediterrenean theatre in World War I.This made him evolve wolf-pack tactics for assailing Allied merchant shipping which sailed in convoys.Belated introduction of convoy took the sting out of U-boat offensive in World War I.Independent sailing of ships offered U-boats plenty of targets.Now number of targets shrank with large expanses of water virtually robbed of shipping.So Doenitz spread the U-boats out across probable path of a convoy.Once a U-boat is able to sight a convoy it got in touch with shore HQs which inturn vectored other U-boats in the neighbourhood towards the target.This formed an effective tactical riposte to the convoy:concentration of merchant shipping defending escort forces with corresponding concentration of attacking forces.Remarkable strides in the field of wireless telegraphy made this possible.British remained complacent about U-boat menace.Development of Asdic,convoy ,Prize rules governing the conduct of war at sea account for British optimism.But Doenitz employing U-boats on the surface enmasse during nights to deliver concentrated attacks rendered Asdic impotent. Despite establishing patrol lines Atlantic ocean offered still sufficent room for convoys to evade contact.Occasionally convoys slipped through U-boat cordon.Here radio intelligence helped the U-boat Command.BAMS code no 3 directing convoy traffic was broken by xb-dienst the cryptanalytical branch of of German naval intelligence .As a result Doenitz could exactly plot the course taken by the convoys.Thus during the outbreak of hostilities U-boat command had an edge over Allied A/S measures.By spring of 1941 U-boats had taken a dreadful toll of British shipping with over 400 ships sunk which represented a rate of sinking twice that of new construction.Admiralty now took measures to curb U-boat menace.Despite all the damage wreaked by U-boats it was by no means invincible.Actually U-boat was not a submarine but a submersible since it operated mostly on the surface ,diving only to escape destruction.This gave scope for ship or airborne radar detection.Then U-boat while co-ordinating manoeuvres for launching massed assault generated thick volume of signal traffic.This was picked up HF-DF aboard convoy escorts.Soon a U-boat will find a destroyer streaking towards it forcing it to submerge thus losing contact with the convoy.This frequent chatter turned out to be achilles heel of Doenitz wolf-pack tactics.By mid-1941 British succesfully penetrated German naval Enigma cipher directing the deployment of U-boats.Allies now knew where Doenitz was sending his boats to form patrol lines.More and more convoys were steered away from waiting U-boat packs ; precious shipping thus saved.Doenitz dwelts extensively in his memoirs about the problem of interception calling for more U-boats for combing Atlantic wastes.Little did he know at that time that break into the German naval cipher helped Allies to outwit U-boat command.Ultra was closely guarded secret of World War II.Its revelation has led to a re-appraisal of Battle of Atlantic.For a long time after the war Germans believed allied use of short wave ASV radar,HF-DF betrayed U-boat positions.After word at the end of the book by German naval historian Jurgen Rohwer has given a fresh perspective on the campaign.By mid-1943 the U-boat offensive was in ruins defeated by a combination of special intelligence,HF-DF ,ASV,escort carriers,superior escorting techniques and improved depth charges.Here lay ,I believe Doenitz failure as a commander.According to his biographer Peter Padfield,he saw only his goals;ignored obstacles probable reaction of others.Though Doenitz speaks about new U-boats-TypeXXI,XXIII,Walter-they never appeared on time in sufficent numbers to influence the outcome of the struggle.Other topics of interest in this book:Doenitz indictment of Prize regulations,torpedo failures which plagued the Norway campaign,German version of Laconia tragedy,his interaction with the top leaders of Nazi Reich.Finally this was a book which I wanted to read desperately.For many months it featured in my Amazon.com wish list.
Rating:
Summary: A fantastic book!
Review: As a student of history, I found this book to be an excellent source for WWII history. Not only does he discuss the battles and the commanders, he also discussed the realities of war, and dealing with Hitler. A must read for anyone interested in WWII.
Rating:
Summary: A fantastic book!
Review: As a student of history, I found this book to be an excellent source for WWII history. Not only does he discuss the battles and the commanders, he also discussed the realities of war, and dealing with Hitler. A must read for anyone interested in WWII.
Rating:
Summary: From behind the scenes
Review: Do you know Doenitz? Are you a WWII enthusiast? A historian? A submariner? Then, this book is a MUST HAVE. There are lots of books about the WWII submarine campaign, from both sides, many of them better written. So what's special? No other book provides that specific background knowledge and information. Why didn't Germany build more submarines than it did in the crucial early years? How did the wolf pack tactics evolve? What measures did the German Naval High Command take after discovering their torpedo crisis? How did they counter Allied scientific breakthroughs? Why didn't they devine Enigma was being broken? Finally, you will hear the German opinion about Roosevelt's "Short of War" strategy - nowaday's United Nations would be in turmoil...Second, if you can read between the lines, this book will reveal the personality of one of the mightiest leaders of WWII. Was he a war criminal? Maybe, but certainly his biggest crime was to be a soldier (with very limited horizon apart from his daily duty) who happened to fight on the wrong side. Bad luck, for both sides... This book certainly doesn't replace other narratives about the "Atlantic War", but it supplements all of them. Only here, you can find the background story. If you're looking for more WWII memoirs, try Doenitz' superior, Raeder, and DON'T OVERLOOK Churchill, as he was the greatest writer among all of them. If you still have no idea as to who Doenitz might have been, then try to read Lothar Guenther Buchheim's vivid picture about how the submariners themselves felt, instead; that is indeed great war literature.
Rating: 
Summary: Missed the big picture
Review: Doenitz clearly speaks with authority, given his role in WWII. However, he missed the big picture of what was happening and how some of his own decisions (e.g. constant radio contact) contributed to Germany's ultimate defeat. I found this book very difficult to read. You should either be well-rested or stock up on caffeine before tackling this tome. (hence, the two star rating)
Rating:
Summary: Missed the big picture
Review: Doenitz clearly speaks with authority, given his role in WWII. However, he missed the big picture of what was happening and how some of his own decisions (e.g. constant radio contact) contributed to Germany's ultimate defeat. I found this book very difficult to read. You should either be well-rested or stock up on caffeine before tackling this tome. (hence, the two star rating)
Rating:
Summary: I am just correcting the page on the Web
Review: I would like to get the book, which I have not read. The authors name is mis-spelled in the page It should read Karl Doenitz vs. Deonitz. The book is available in paperback reprint from Da Capo Press, 1997, New York, 520 pages. Robert Murphy
Rating:
Summary: An insight into naval command
Review: Karl Doenitz was the mastermind of the German U-Boat Campaign in the battle of the Atlantic. He was a fanatical Nazi and his loyalty to Hitler led to him being named his successor and he rang what was left of Germany for a few days prior to surrender. His memoirs are well written interesting and clearly the work of an intelligent man. Doenitz was a officer on U-Boats in the first world war. In that war the convoy system had defeated the U-Boats. Anti submarine techniques were ineffectual but the concentration of merchant ships in conveys emptied the seas of ships and meant that most U-Boats were unable to find targets. In the inter war period the British developed ASDIC a sonar system which enabled them to locate submarines under water. The invention of ASDIC made the British confident and as a result the naval agreements negotiated with Germany in the thirties allowed Germany to construct submarines. Despite this Germany decided to give only a small priority to submarine construction favoring the development of a battleship fleet. At the outbreak of war there were only some 30 submarines in service. Germany's naval construction had been predicated on a war in 1942. As a result the surface navy was small and it only had 4 battleships by 1941. It became clear quickly that the U-Boat was a potent weapon. Doenitz who had risen to command the U-Boat arm worked out the strategy to make the U-Boat a success. His strategy was to have the U-Boat used as a surface weapon at night. U-Boats were difficult to see and could slip past escorts and sink ships before they were detected. He further developed a tactic which set up a patrol of boats which acted as a picket line and allowed him to direct boats to intercept conveys as they were found. The book is fascinating as it reveals the development of U-Boat tactics and the miniature of the process of running the U-Boat war. Doenitz describes the training process, how many boats he had to have for those purposes, the design of the optimal boat, problems with torpedoes and the ebb and flow of war. The problem with the book is that it only gives one side of the campaign. Doenitz himself never really learnt the reason for his defeat. Technology was one of the big reasons for the German defeat. By 1942 the Allies had started to employ radar which allowed them detect U-Boats shadowing conveys and in conveys. As the Germans developed techniques to detect radar the Allies developed tighter band radar to avoid detection. Radio detection techniques also allowed them to locate U-Boats to avoid them or to sink them. The use of Ultra allowed the penetration of the U-Boat cipher and allowed re-routing of conveys. In addition there was a continual development of weapons technology with the development of hedgehog depth charge systems, Very Lights and Contact fuses. The best book on the U-Boat campaign is Clay Blair's magnificent two-volume study. Despite that this book is a fascinating portrait of one of the more important German commanders in the war. It is also a good picture of the mechanics of naval command.
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