Rating: 
Summary: Interesting but flawed
Review: This book is not a history of World War I but rather a series of essays on certain aspects of the conflict. Ferguson likes to deal in counterfactuals and here he takes issue with much of the conventional wisdom surrounding the war. For example, he argues that Germany was not a militaristic nation, contrary to almost universal belief. He also attempts to refute the common perception that the nations of Europe went to war enthusiastically. These chapters were somewhat persuasive. The chapters dealing with prisoner taking and the cost of killing enemy soldiers were quite interesting and were issues I'd not seen discussed in other histories. The essays on war finance and postwar economics were rather rambling and unfocused, however. The most controversial conclusion was that the world would have been better off if Germany had won the war. He argues that a German-dominated Europe would be similar to the EU of today and no more threatening. Thus, the defining catastrophic event of the 20th century was Britain's decision to enter the war, thus thwarting the German victory. Therefore, the great Nemesis of modern civilization was not Hitler or Lenin but Sir Edward Gray! On this point he was less than persuasive. I would have liked to read more details about the German war aims and less about John Maynard Keynes.
Rating: 
Summary: The pity of this book
Review: This book meanders all over the place, from some history and literary critique to economics. Ferguson indulges in long tracts with endless figures to reach highly doubtful conclusions. Mostly, he likes to shoot down other people's theories with a mass of facts and figures, yet his own conclusions are based on extremely sketchy evidence. Some examples of his conclusions: the Kaiser was not responsible for leading Germany into war and the war went on because men weren't tired of fighting. I think I can pretty much guarantee that given a choice, 99.99% would've voted to go home.
Rating:
Summary: Deliberate Attempt at Revisionism
Review: This interesting volume is a series of related essays on the First World War (WWI). The author sets forward a number of questions/propositions about WWI and then proceeds to explore them in a series of well written chapters. This book is not based on any original research but is rather an attempt to use the extensive literature on WWI as the substrate for rigorous analysis. Much of the analysis reflects Ferguson's background as an economic historian. This book has structural flaws. While Ferguson intends clearly for this book to read by broad audience, it is best read by someone with a good knowledge of WWI, the preceding events, and optimally some knowledge of the historiography of WWI. Another flaw is that Ferguson describes his questions/propositions in the introductory and concluding chapters but not explicitly in any of the chapters actually discussing the questions. Putting the questions into the chapter headings would improve the continuity of the book. Much of Ferguson's analysis is based largely on the experience of the Western Front. This is not entirely Ferguson's fault; in the large library of the university where I work, there are only a handful of books on the Eastern Front. The literature on the Eastern Front is limited and this imposes some distortions into Ferguson's arguments. This book is written well and Ferguson's arguments, even when flawed, are based on thoughtful analysis and impressive knowledge of the literature. The real test of this book is how well he answers the questions/propositions he sets out in the introduction of the book. This rsults are mixed. One of Ferguson's problems is that some of his analyses are correct but either too narrow or close to being irrelevant. For example, he argues convincingly that WWI was not inevitable. True in the sense that this specific war at this specific time, and perhaps with this specific set of consequences, was avoidable. His own analysis, however, and reading of other histories of the pre-war period leads to the conclusion that some kind of general european conflict was highly likely. The really interesting question is why the European state system came to be so inflammatory. Ferguson expends considerable effort discussing the bases for Axis success in WWI. Despite considerable economic handicaps, the Axis powers came close to winning. Ferguson concludes that the Axis powers were more successful and that the basis for their success was that they were better soldiers than the Allies. These conclusions will surprise none and are an example of crashing through an open door. Ferguson also ignores the fact that the Axis powers held strategic initiative throughout most of the war. Ferguson's 2 most controversial arguments deal with the British decision to enter the war and the financial burdens of war reparations. He argues that Britain did not have to enter the war and that it would have been better to stay out of the war. On the former point, he is undoubtedly correct but the latter point can be argued only with the benefit of hindsight. Ferguson argues that post-war Germany's economic collapse was the result not of the burden of reparations but rather of the efforts of German leaders to avoid payment. His arguments are ingenious but highly technical and may well be incorrect.
Rating:
Summary: A Ludicrous Revisionist Account of the First World War
Review: This is a highly touted revisionist approach to the First World by an Oxford historian. The book is primarily economic, social and literary in nature with quotations from all sorts of obscure (mostly pacifist) academics. The author asks ten questions that challenge accepted notions about the war, including the role of militarism and alliances, why Britain intervened, was the outbreak of war popular, the role of propaganda and why men kept fighting. The author advances many counter-intuitive ideas but does little to back them up with real facts (the author uses data very selectively). Many ludicrous conclusions are drawn, such as "Russia...had the most successful war economy," or "a more militaristic Germany...might have averted war". Too much of the book is full of boring social and economic observations that had little bearing on the war. On the military side, Ferguson totally ignores the contributions of the British Expeditionary Force, particularly in stopping the 1914 German onslaught. According to Ferguson's very one-side use of statistics, the Germans always inflicted heavier casualties on the Allies. This ignores the real fact that the BEF inflicted 2-1 or better casualties on the Germans in most of the 1914 battles, as the Americans did in 1918. The American role in the war is denigrated by Ferguson, who says they merely "showed up" and then launched "old-fashioned and wasteful" frontal attacks. Unable to understand the real doctrinal and technical military problems posed by the Western Front, Ferguson joins the crowd of academics who decry the "waste" of lives and plead for any alternative. The fact that narrow frontages, defended in depth are always difficult to penetrate (not just Ypres in 1917 but Kursk in 1943 and the Suez and Golan fronts in 1973), means that the problem was not unique to the First World War. The price of victory is not always cheap. Instead, Ferguson depicts a supposedly preferable alternative to British intervention in 1914: allowing Germany to conquer the continent while retaining the overseas Empire (which ethnic nationalism would soon deprive them of anyway). This is a ludicrous endorsement for aggression and ignores what Germany might have done to the people in these occupied lands. The real pity of this work, other than shoddy analysis and research, is that Ferguson never asks the most profound question: namely, what if Germany had not mobilized and declared war on Russia in 1914, might the war have remained a local affair in the Balkans? Furthermore, might the inefficient war-making potential of Austria-Hungary versus the limited capabilities of Serbia led to a military stalemate that could have facilitated a general European peace conference? Unfortunately, Ferguson is too pre-occupied with blaming the British for everything to notice that Germany and Austria-Hungary actually started the shooting that claimed millions of lives.
Rating: 
Summary: More essays than a book
Review: This is a rather strange book. It is like a series of essays on various aspects of the First World War. The author aims at dispelling several of what he sees as myths about the conflict. These are (1)That Militarism played a big part in the war breaking out. (2)That the war was popular (3)That Germany wanted the war (4)That Germany used its economic resources badly in the war (5)That starvation led to the collapse of the central powers (6)That fighting men found their life intolerable Some of the book is interesting and well argued. Some of it now is reasonably well accepted generally. For instance a number of commentators have accepted that the weakness of Germany was one reason for the war. Russia at the time of the war was completing an armaments program and a railway system which would bring its armies to Germanys borders within a short time. War for Germany in 1914 was seen as regrettable but better than facing a much stronger army in a few more years.The arguments about the amount of money that each of the nations spent on arms is interesting. The author suggests strongly that if any country was obsessed with the military it was France rather than Germany. Other parts of the book are less well argued. It is clear that the war led to a mixed response from those who fought in it. Some such as Ernst Junger found it the most important experience in their life. In England it has generally been accepted that the high casualties brought widespread disillusionment. The book tries to argue that most who served in the war either enjoyed it or where not to negatively effected. To do this the writer lists a number of books that came out of he war which were jingoistic and patriotic. This however is superficial. Germans emerged from the war feeling reasonably positive about it. They had generally been successful. After the war large numbers of Germans joined the Friekorps units putting down left wing rebellions and trying to preserve the German borders against the newly independent states set up after the war. The allies however had spent most of the war losing. If one reads any account of the Second World War the it is clear the effect that the First had on military thought. Canada who as a dominion sent the largest contingent to Europe in the First War refused to send a significant number of troops in the second. They instead assisted England by the provision of convey escorts. England itself built up its air force as an alternative to fighting a land war in Europe. If one reads the biographies of English military commanders there was a real fear of putting their men through the sorts of experiences that they as junior officers had gone through in the first war. The book is interesting to anyone who is familiar with the war but would probably be incomprehensible to someone who picks it up as their first book on the war.
Rating: 
Summary: A provocative revisionist history
Review: This is an extremely interesting and thought-provoking book, written by a young and industrious historian who seems to be striving for A.J.P. Taylor-hood. Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War is basically a Euro-skeptical history of Britain's part in the First World War. He argues that there was no reason for Britain to get involved in the war in 1914; that Britain's intervention turned what might have been a brief and victorious war for the Germans into a European catastrophe; that this catastrophe caused the "short twentieth century," from the outbreak of war to the fall of communism; that the short twentieth century was a bloody detour through war and totalitarianism, ending in the result that the Germans were aiming at in 1914, viz. German hegemony in a united Europe; and that by trying to stop Germany Britain only ruined itself and caused the death of millions, directly and indirectly. In a nutshell, since things turned out the same in the end, only worse, it was a pity that Britain intervened in the war. Obviously, this is a book that could not have been written ten years ago, before the collapse of communism pressed an historical reset button. One of things that makes Ferguson's book so interesting is the way post-communist events seem to have influenced his view of the past. One sees the United States' victory in the Cold War arms race behind his argument that Germany should have spent more on arms before 1914. One also sees the herds of Iraqis surrendering to the Coalition forces in the Gulf War behind his discussion of the importance of surrendering and prisoner-taking. As a result, Ferguson may have written the first twenty-first century history of the twentieth century's most important conflict. I didn't agree with many of the things Ferguson says in his book, but I did find it consistently engrossing and challenging. It was a refreshing book that made me re-examine just about everything I have ever learned about the First World War, and I recommend it highly.
Rating:
Summary: Provacative, but not necessarily right.
Review: This is supposed to be a revisionist book about World War I. Around page 1 the author, Niall Ferguson, announces that he is going to correct 10 major myths about the war. (Or, at least, provide a final refutation of those myths.) Although the book is well written, and the arguments clear, I am not certain that the goal of the author is obtained. First, scholars have recognized some of those myths as myths for decades. These certainly include the first two: The myth that war was inevitable due to economic rivalries, imperialism, secret military alliances, or an arms race; and the myth that Germany started the war because the German government felt strong relative to other European powers. Second, while his attack on some other myths are analytically convincing, Mr. Ferguson fails to provide convincing non-analytical explanations for why his numbers come out the way they do. For example, he argues that contrary to the standard myth, the German army was tactically and operationally superior to the armies of Britain, France and the United States clear through to the end of the war in 1918. His evidence essentially is that - ignoring surrender - the average German soldier killed or wounded more than 1 enemy soldier before he himself was killed or wounded. I believe the authors numbers, but I really didn't learn why they turned out the way they did. Yes, the German's developed better tactics for both attack and defense in trench warfare than their enemies, but why? Certainly their enemies tried hard to come up with good answers to those same problems, but failed. Again, why? Class structure is one reason on the part of the British is one reason cited, but I suspect that there must be more to it than that. Third, at least the one myth I completely believe Mr. Ferguson demolished, is sort of a "so what?" While not one of his ten big myths, the author proves through quotes from letters, memoirs, and from other sources, that many soldiers from both sides who tried to surrender were killed (read "murdered") after surrendering. This really should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the military history of this century. There are many documented cases of how dangerous surrender could be during World War II and the Anglo-Boer war. (Try Paul Fussells' Doing Battle, or one of Stephen Ambrose's books about World War II for example, or any first-person account of the World War II eastern front. Or, just talk to a Vietnam era veteran who was in the infantry.) Actually, there is a 11th myth that Dr. Ferguson attacks in "The Pity of War" that has received the most attention from other historians and reviewers. That "myth" is that Great Britain had to participate in the war to prevent Germany from dominating continental Europe, and thereby destroying its role as a great power. Ferguson argues that the original war aims of Germany in the west were relatively benign, and that after quickly defeating a France unaided by Great Britain, the Germans would have imposed heavy monetary reparations of France, and then restored independence to both Belgium and France. At worst, Germany would have forced both countries, along with much of central Europe into an economic union, not much different and not much more dangerous to Britain than the German-centered European Union that exists today. In defense of this 11th myth, Ferguson points out that German plans for serious annexations of territory, such as all of Belgium and the Northwest of France, were not formulated until the war was a couple of months old. There are problems with this argument. The most obvious to me, is that although France would have lost the war without the aid of Great Britain, the logistic problems encountered by the German army during the opening phase of the war meant it would have taken France several months to lose. Those several months would have given the Germans plenty of time to decide that they deserved both territorial and political rewards for their war against France. So, even a short war won by Germany would have left them as the type of people you don't want as neighbors. Especially if you are the center of an empire based on sea power, and your new neighbors are going to control ports just on the other side of the English Channel.
Rating:
Summary: Is this book really necessary?
Review: This work gives the impression of being the result of a very long literature search, undertaken in conditions far removed from the battlefield, and conducive to wisdom after the event, and with little feeling or understanding for the passions, good and bad, that actually motivate flesh and blood people. The writer has obviously trawled through forests of data and statistics and is determined to get as much of them as possible on to the printed page, ideally to support "controversial" viewpoints. Despite this repeated emphasis on provision of "shocking" theses, the effect is in the end somewhat predictable and indeed boring. No matter how the statistics are piled up, arguments that make Britain as culpable as Germany for the escalation, if not indeed the origin, of the war, or that a German victory might have brought about something like the current European Union, are hard to swallow. The arguments around casualty statistics as a rationale for who should have been the final victor have an uncomfortable affinity with Falkenhayn's Verdun strategy and demonstrate a lack of feeling for factors such as morale and commitment. The uncomfortable reality for those who argue as the present author is that in the end it was these factors - as summarised in Haig's "backs to the wall" order of 1918 and embodied in the bloody-minded determination of thousands of ordinary men - that led to the German defeat. The sections of the book that discuss behaviour in the field, and particularly the decision whether to surrender, fail to convey any convincing understanding for how men act in extremis, and though many individual memoirs are quoted one suspects that another selection might have as easily supported an alternative view. ...
Rating: 
Summary: Best overview of World War One available.
Review: Though not a military history (I'd rely on John Keegan's magisterial new book for that), Ferguson's bold and beautifully written revisionist argument is indispensable. I teach a course (at the community college level here in California) on the First and Second World Wars, and have found myself integrating more and more of Ferguson's material in the past year. BY FAR the best material is in the chapter "The Death Instinct: Why Men Fought" -- though it will make some readers uncomfortable, it helped me to understand the strange joy in killing that I find seeping through in the words of supposedly anti-war writers such as Sassoon and Graves. All in all, a bit unwieldy, but provocative, useful, and scholarly.
Rating:
Summary: Another Academic Wonderland
Review: To make a reputation in the world, one has to come up with new ideas. Sometimes they are closer to Hitler's BIG LIE than anything else.While there is much interesting in the book, he fails to convince. After all, the Germans still invaded a neutral country. This area was also one that England had fought for before. I could go on but one more point must be presented. Perhaps it was destiny that Germany become the dominant nation of Europe and the First World War only delayed the results. But the liberal, democratic society of today is better than the aggressive, insecure German nation that existed in 1914.
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