Rating: 
Summary: Very readable account of an important subject
Review: At a time when many Americans are revisiting the wisdom of the current war in Iraq, The Illusion of Victory provides a cautionary tale. When the United States joined the English and French in their fight against Imperial Germany in 1917, an overwhelming majority of the populace thought this was the right and honorable course of action. Within a few years after the First World War ended, popular sentiment shifted dramatically and the majority of Americans believed that our participation in the European War was a mistake. Following Pearl Harbor and the Nazi declaration of war against the United States, the conventional wisdom shifted again and it was generally assumed that if fighting Hitler was right, going to war with the Kaiser must also have been correct. The Illusion of Victory re-examines the justification for America's declaration of war against Germany in 1917 and the negotiation of the Versailles Peace Treaty following the armistice. Thomas Fleming's highly critical assessment of American policy with regard to both the war and the peace treaty is hardly novel. Walter Millis expounded these views in the best seller The Road to War in 1935. However, Fleming's book is a very readable account of the American experience in World War I. He is dismissive of the reasons we went to war. Foremost was Germany's resort to unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 to prevent ships of neutral countries from reaching England and France. As Senators Robert La Follette, Sr., George Norris, and a few others pointed out at the time, the United States had acquiesced in the equally illegal British blockade of German ports since 1914. Fleming demonstrates utter contempt for President Woodrow Wilson, a figure whose conventionally good historical reputation is indeed difficult to understand. Wilson is most famous for his "Fourteen Points" speech and his crusade for American participation in the League of Nations. As Fleming points out, at Versailles in 1919, Wilson completely abandoned the Fourteen Points and agreed to British and French demands for a punitive peace. During the War, Wilson repeatedly stated that we had no quarrel with the German people, only with their government. At Versailles, Wilson and the Allies forced the Kaiser's successors to pay reparations, acknowledge sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war and yield territory and its colonial possessions to its neighbors. These measures were regarded to be illegitimate by Germans of every political persuasion and sowed the seeds for World War II. Wilson also acquiesced in the continuation of the British naval blockade of Germany, which starved its civilian population for months after the armistice and the abdication of the Kaiser. Fleming fails to fully acknowledge the domestic political pressures with which Woodrow Wilson had to contend. Beginning with the German sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, there was a very influential segment of American society passionately advocating war. The leader of this group was Theodore Roosevelt, the most notorious warmonger in this nation's history. The author appears to admire Roosevelt, who at least had the courage of his convictions. TR wanted to lead an American division to France and sent all four of his sons to fight. The youngest, Quentin Roosevelt, an aviator, was killed. Nevertheless, if Woodrow Wilson led the United States down the wrong path in going to war in 1917 and mishandled the Paris Peace Conference, Theodore Roosevelt and his allies bear as much responsibility for these errors as the President. Wilson, due to his unwillingness for compromise, bears much responsibility for America's rejection of the League of Nations. However, it is highly unlikely that even with the United States as a member, that the League would have sent an adequate number of soldiers to oppose Hitler's early moves to nullify the Treaty of Versailles. Since Hitler's criticisms of the Treaty contained some half-truths, Americans would have been no more willing than the French and the English to contest German rearmament in the 1930s, remilitarization of the Rhineland and the absorption of Austria. In The Illusion of Victory, Fleming is too easy on Imperial Germany, which was dominated by militarists, many of who believed war with France and Russia was inevitable and preferred it sooner than later. The harsh terms the Germans dictated to Russia at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 indicates that Germany would have been no more magnanimous than the Allies had they been victorious in the west. General Erich Ludendorff, who for all practical purposes ran Germany during the war, was only a slightly less despicable person than Hitler. As it turned out, had the Germans been more patient and not provoked the United States with submarine warfare, they most certainly would have defeated the French and British after the Russians collapsed. By bringing America into the War, the Kaiser's government clutched defeat out of the jaws of victory. Fleming covers the military aspects of American participation in World War I without much analysis. The biggest issue to arise was General John J. Pershing's insistence that American soldiers fight as an American army rather than as replacements in decimated French and British units. The Americans played a vital role in stopping the last German offensive and bringing about the German collapse when the Allies counterattacked. However, one wonders how history would judge General Pershing had the Germans broken through the Allied lines while he was resisting French and British pleas for reinforcements. The Illusion of Victory is an easily digestible introduction to a war whose unintended consequences plague us to this very day. While the Nazis and the Soviet Union no longer threaten us, we are at this very moment dealing with the fallout from the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Iraq for hundreds of years. The reviewer, Arthur J. Amchan, is the author of The Kaiser's Senator: Robert M. LaFollette's Alleged Disloyalty during World War I.
Rating:
Summary: Very readable account of an important subject
Review: At a time when many Americans are revisiting the wisdom of the current war in Iraq, The Illusion of Victory provides a cautionary tale. When the United States joined the English and French in their fight against Imperial Germany in 1917, an overwhelming majority of the populace thought this was the right and honorable course of action. Within a few years after the First World War ended, popular sentiment shifted dramatically and the majority of Americans believed that our participation in the European War was a mistake. Following Pearl Harbor and the Nazi declaration of war against the United States, the conventional wisdom shifted again and it was generally assumed that if fighting Hitler was right, going to war with the Kaiser must also have been correct. The Illusion of Victory re-examines the justification for America's declaration of war against Germany in 1917 and the negotiation of the Versailles Peace Treaty following the armistice. Thomas Fleming's highly critical assessment of American policy with regard to both the war and the peace treaty is hardly novel. Walter Millis expounded these views in the best seller The Road to War in 1935. However, Fleming's book is a very readable account of the American experience in World War I. He is dismissive of the reasons we went to war. Foremost was Germany's resort to unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 to prevent ships of neutral countries from reaching England and France. As Senators Robert La Follette, Sr., George Norris, and a few others pointed out at the time, the United States had acquiesced in the equally illegal British blockade of German ports since 1914. Fleming demonstrates utter contempt for President Woodrow Wilson, a figure whose conventionally good historical reputation is indeed difficult to understand. Wilson is most famous for his "Fourteen Points" speech and his crusade for American participation in the League of Nations. As Fleming points out, at Versailles in 1919, Wilson completely abandoned the Fourteen Points and agreed to British and French demands for a punitive peace. During the War, Wilson repeatedly stated that we had no quarrel with the German people, only with their government. At Versailles, Wilson and the Allies forced the Kaiser's successors to pay reparations, acknowledge sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war and yield territory and its colonial possessions to its neighbors. These measures were regarded to be illegitimate by Germans of every political persuasion and sowed the seeds for World War II. Wilson also acquiesced in the continuation of the British naval blockade of Germany, which starved its civilian population for months after the armistice and the abdication of the Kaiser. Fleming fails to fully acknowledge the domestic political pressures with which Woodrow Wilson had to contend. Beginning with the German sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, there was a very influential segment of American society passionately advocating war. The leader of this group was Theodore Roosevelt, the most notorious warmonger in this nation's history. The author appears to admire Roosevelt, who at least had the courage of his convictions. TR wanted to lead an American division to France and sent all four of his sons to fight. The youngest, Quentin Roosevelt, an aviator, was killed. Nevertheless, if Woodrow Wilson led the United States down the wrong path in going to war in 1917 and mishandled the Paris Peace Conference, Theodore Roosevelt and his allies bear as much responsibility for these errors as the President. Wilson, due to his unwillingness for compromise, bears much responsibility for America's rejection of the League of Nations. However, it is highly unlikely that even with the United States as a member, that the League would have sent an adequate number of soldiers to oppose Hitler's early moves to nullify the Treaty of Versailles. Since Hitler's criticisms of the Treaty contained some half-truths, Americans would have been no more willing than the French and the English to contest German rearmament in the 1930s, remilitarization of the Rhineland and the absorption of Austria. In The Illusion of Victory, Fleming is too easy on Imperial Germany, which was dominated by militarists, many of who believed war with France and Russia was inevitable and preferred it sooner than later. The harsh terms the Germans dictated to Russia at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 indicates that Germany would have been no more magnanimous than the Allies had they been victorious in the west. General Erich Ludendorff, who for all practical purposes ran Germany during the war, was only a slightly less despicable person than Hitler. As it turned out, had the Germans been more patient and not provoked the United States with submarine warfare, they most certainly would have defeated the French and British after the Russians collapsed. By bringing America into the War, the Kaiser's government clutched defeat out of the jaws of victory. Fleming covers the military aspects of American participation in World War I without much analysis. The biggest issue to arise was General John J. Pershing's insistence that American soldiers fight as an American army rather than as replacements in decimated French and British units. The Americans played a vital role in stopping the last German offensive and bringing about the German collapse when the Allies counterattacked. However, one wonders how history would judge General Pershing had the Germans broken through the Allied lines while he was resisting French and British pleas for reinforcements. The Illusion of Victory is an easily digestible introduction to a war whose unintended consequences plague us to this very day. While the Nazis and the Soviet Union no longer threaten us, we are at this very moment dealing with the fallout from the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Iraq for hundreds of years. The reviewer, Arthur J. Amchan, is the author of The Kaiser's Senator: Robert M. LaFollette's Alleged Disloyalty during World War I.
Rating: 
Summary: An Outstanding Work
Review: By far one of the best works ever written on this period, covering the First World War and its aftermath. Vast amounts of detail easily amalgamate into a smooth and informative accounting of this treacherously delicate moment in American History. Fleming is a master with his writing, making this book excellent for the historian and student alike. If you read only one book to edify yourself on how the United States, its elected representatives, and populace were systematically duped into fighting as a colonial possession of England in World War One, this is it. Any objective historian upon reading this book will see the melancholy similarities of rabid jingoism and suppression of facts preceding America's entry into other military conflicts.
Rating:
Summary: learn the truth about wilson the farce
Review: I knew almost nothing about WWI besides the standard high school history textbook line that glorifies Wilson as a visionary leader. Clearly, as Thomas Fleming demonstrates conclusively - the evidence clearly shows Wilson out to be a demagogue, a myopic idealist and a fool. I learned a great deal about the story of WWI from America's perspective, about how British propoganda fooled millions into supporting the war in Britain's favor and I gained a new perspective about Germany in WWI vs. Germany in WWII - the 2 are vastly disimilar. At times I thought Fleming to be very biased, but I couldn't find any flaws in his reasoning or his use of sources. He backs it all up and makes a convincing revisionist case against Wilson. Entertaining, well written and elucidating!
Rating: 
Summary: A Screed, not a History
Review: In his latest work, The Illusion of Victory, Thomas Fleming attempts the same revisionist approach to history that served him so well in his previous work, The New Dealer's War. In Illusion, the subject is Woodrow Wilson and his handling of America's role in World War I. That may seem an easy target, but Fleming has produced a book that is so unbalanced and filled with errors that he nevertheless manages to overshoot the mark. Let there be no mistake, Wilson deserves every ounce of opprobrium that has befallen him. His lack of realism in foreign policy has unleashed forces that still torment the modern world. His high-handedness toward Congress set a standard for political ineptitude that is almost unmatched in American history, and his indifference to the niceties of Constitutional law and civil rights would make even the the most populist "law and order" politician gasp at its brazenness. All of this Fleming discusses in almost excruciating detail. Yet, so lacking in balance is Fleming's approach, that he effectively calls into question his own thesis and leaves the reader wondering if this is not so much history as polemic. That is unfortunate, because America's conduct, both at home and abroad, before, during and after World War I is something that cries out for more exploration. Unfortunately, this book falls far short. The book is replete with factual errors that run from the trivial to the appalling. For example, Fleming refers to the British Army as the Royal Army. This is incorrect. While the British Navy and Air Force are officially referred to as "Royal," the British Army, for historical reasons, is not. He discusses the post-war efforts by South Africa to acquire German West Africa, a colony he claims is present day Zimbabwe. This is wrong on several counts. German West Africa was actually called German South-West Africa, and it is the present day state of Namibia, not Zimbabwe, the latter of which, had Fleming consulted an atlas, he would have found in southeast Africa, not southwest. He refers to the then new state of Yugoslavia as a republic - it was a monarchy. He claims that Germany's first Kaiser was the father of Kaiser Wilhelm II. He was not, the first Kaiser was Wilhelm's grandfather. The list of errors is endless, and it calls into question Fleming's credentials as a historian. If Fleming cannot get these basic points right, then there is grounds for doubting the credibility of his wider conclusions about the war. More than the factual errors, however, are Fleming's wildly erratic moral judgments. British atrocities, such as the naval blockade of Germany, are outrages in the Fleming moral universe. Yet German atrocities are presented as being either grossly misstated propaganda or are simply not that bad. It seems not to occur to Fleming that one can deplore British actions without excusing German ones. Similarly, Woodrow Wilson stands accused of being both too moralistic and not moralistic enough. Fleming roundly criticizes Wilson for failing to uphold the Fourteen Points, but he portrays the idealism that inspired them as unrealistic utopianism. That latter argument is well justified, but it also sugests that accusations of hypocrisy are overstated. That Wilson was not being a hypocrite, but was haphazardly bending to forces he could not understand seems not to have occurred to Fleming. Also, like many so-called revisionist historians, Fleming is prone to apply moral judgments that would not have been operative to the subject of their study. Fleming berates Wilson for his racial views while neglecting the fact that such views were common in Wilson's time. This does not make those views valid, but it does suggest that Wilson was no worse than the American people he governed. Yet, in the next breath, Fleming castigates Wilson for not trusting the American people that Wilson claimed to believe in. Ironically, Fleming's view of Kaiser Wilhelm II is surprisingly indulgent. The Kaiser's racist pronouncements about the "yellow peril" are glossed over with barely a whisper of criticism, while his bellicose rhetoric, which helped so much to destabilize pre-war Europe, is completely ignored. This is bizarre, to say no more. While there can be no doubt that the Kaiser was not alone in starting World War I, it is passing strange to suggest that his statements about Germany's "place in the sun" and his erratic policies - such as the Morroccan Crises - played no part in the catastrophe of 1914. Finally, Fleming falls into the revisionist historian's occupational hazard of finding simple explanantions for complex problems. According to Fleming, American hostility to Germany was all born out of the British propaganda effort based in Wellington House. Had Germany had equal access to American media, Fleming seems to say, America might never have gone to war with the Central Powers. That America had extensive historical and economic ties with the Allies, that German unrestricted submarine warfare was seen by a maritime power like the United States as a particularly odious form of war, and that Germany's ham-handed efforts to ally with Mexico would have been viewed negatively by the country that espoused the Monroe Doctrine gains no credence with Fleming. He simply cannot believe that America's history and national interest played a part in shaping America's views of Germany. Instead, Wilson was biased and America was duped by British propaganda. This is silly and a gross oversimplification of history that demolishes Fleming's credibility. In the end, Illusion of Victory takes an unremarkable and broadly accepted view of Woodrow Wilson and attempts to give it a revisionist cast. This is unnecessary. Wilson's failings and lack of realism have long been part of the historical record and criticism of him is well justified. All Fleming has done with this lopsided and sloppy work is to demolish his own arguments by making them.
Rating:
Summary: A Screed, not a History
Review: In his latest work, The Illusion of Victory, Thomas Fleming attempts the same revisionist approach to history that served him so well in his previous work, The New Dealer's War. In Illusion, the subject is Woodrow Wilson and his handling of America's role in World War I. That may seem an easy target, but Fleming has produced a book that is so unbalanced and filled with errors that he nevertheless manages to overshoot the mark. Let there be no mistake, Wilson deserves every ounce of opprobrium that has befallen him. His lack of realism in foreign policy has unleashed forces that still torment the modern world. His high-handedness toward Congress set a standard for political ineptitude that is almost unmatched in American history, and his indifference to the niceties of Constitutional law and civil rights would make even the the most populist "law and order" politician gasp at its brazenness. All of this Fleming discusses in almost excruciating detail. Yet, so lacking in balance is Fleming's approach, that he effectively calls into question his own thesis and leaves the reader wondering if this is not so much history as polemic. That is unfortunate, because America's conduct, both at home and abroad, before, during and after World War I is something that cries out for more exploration. Unfortunately, this book falls far short. The book is replete with factual errors that run from the trivial to the appalling. For example, Fleming refers to the British Army as the Royal Army. This is incorrect. While the British Navy and Air Force are officially referred to as "Royal," the British Army, for historical reasons, is not. He discusses the post-war efforts by South Africa to acquire German West Africa, a colony he claims is present day Zimbabwe. This is wrong on several counts. German West Africa was actually called German South-West Africa, and it is the present day state of Namibia, not Zimbabwe, the latter of which, had Fleming consulted an atlas, he would have found in southeast Africa, not southwest. He refers to the then new state of Yugoslavia as a republic - it was a monarchy. He claims that Germany's first Kaiser was the father of Kaiser Wilhelm II. He was not, the first Kaiser was Wilhelm's grandfather. The list of errors is endless, and it calls into question Fleming's credentials as a historian. If Fleming cannot get these basic points right, then there is grounds for doubting the credibility of his wider conclusions about the war. More than the factual errors, however, are Fleming's wildly erratic moral judgments. British atrocities, such as the naval blockade of Germany, are outrages in the Fleming moral universe. Yet German atrocities are presented as being either grossly misstated propaganda or are simply not that bad. It seems not to occur to Fleming that one can deplore British actions without excusing German ones. Similarly, Woodrow Wilson stands accused of being both too moralistic and not moralistic enough. Fleming roundly criticizes Wilson for failing to uphold the Fourteen Points, but he portrays the idealism that inspired them as unrealistic utopianism. That latter argument is well justified, but it also sugests that accusations of hypocrisy are overstated. That Wilson was not being a hypocrite, but was haphazardly bending to forces he could not understand seems not to have occurred to Fleming. Also, like many so-called revisionist historians, Fleming is prone to apply moral judgments that would not have been operative to the subject of their study. Fleming berates Wilson for his racial views while neglecting the fact that such views were common in Wilson's time. This does not make those views valid, but it does suggest that Wilson was no worse than the American people he governed. Yet, in the next breath, Fleming castigates Wilson for not trusting the American people that Wilson claimed to believe in. Ironically, Fleming's view of Kaiser Wilhelm II is surprisingly indulgent. The Kaiser's racist pronouncements about the "yellow peril" are glossed over with barely a whisper of criticism, while his bellicose rhetoric, which helped so much to destabilize pre-war Europe, is completely ignored. This is bizarre, to say no more. While there can be no doubt that the Kaiser was not alone in starting World War I, it is passing strange to suggest that his statements about Germany's "place in the sun" and his erratic policies - such as the Morroccan Crises - played no part in the catastrophe of 1914. Finally, Fleming falls into the revisionist historian's occupational hazard of finding simple explanantions for complex problems. According to Fleming, American hostility to Germany was all born out of the British propaganda effort based in Wellington House. Had Germany had equal access to American media, Fleming seems to say, America might never have gone to war with the Central Powers. That America had extensive historical and economic ties with the Allies, that German unrestricted submarine warfare was seen by a maritime power like the United States as a particularly odious form of war, and that Germany's ham-handed efforts to ally with Mexico would have been viewed negatively by the country that espoused the Monroe Doctrine gains no credence with Fleming. He simply cannot believe that America's history and national interest played a part in shaping America's views of Germany. Instead, Wilson was biased and America was duped by British propaganda. This is silly and a gross oversimplification of history that demolishes Fleming's credibility. In the end, Illusion of Victory takes an unremarkable and broadly accepted view of Woodrow Wilson and attempts to give it a revisionist cast. This is unnecessary. Wilson's failings and lack of realism have long been part of the historical record and criticism of him is well justified. All Fleming has done with this lopsided and sloppy work is to demolish his own arguments by making them.
Rating:
Summary: The Illusion of History
Review: It is astonishing that anyone could write something new and interesting about World War I after all of these years and all of the books already written about that sad, deadly, conflict. Thomas Fleming has written a book that is both new and interesting however like many of the recent crop of books about World War I it is more of an argument than a book of history. In that sense the book is well argued, but in the back of my mind as I read it, I wondered where the argument stopped and the facts began. A specialist will have to answer that. As it is, it is a well written, very interesting story of many of the military and political things that went wrong, and why they went wrong, before, during and after World War I. It is a wonder how Mr. Fleming could tolerate spending so much time with someone, Woodrow Wilson, that he obviously dislikes and does not respect either as a leader or as a person. The acceptance of the still troubling idea of a nation state for almost every little group that demands it can be traced directly to Woodrow Wilson. Few ideas have caused as much misery as the principle of a right of self determination for all peoples. Leaders as disparate as Ho Chi Minh and Eamon de Valera both heeded this call and used it to justify acts that Wilson would never have approved of, nor even thought possibly related to what he thought that he had proposed in one of his Fourteen Points. When you add in Fleming's bad opinions of Wilson's second wife Edith, England's Lloyd George and France's Georges Clemenceau, there are really a lot of people not to like in this book. One of the author's points is that it is important to understand how bad things can get when there is little or no objective information available for a democracy at war. How are the decision makers, the voters, to know what is the right thing to do if they are being force fed a constant torrent of lies. That the propaganda, particularly the British propaganda, during World War I took on a life of its own that still influences even supposedly objective histories of the war is another of the books points. According to the author there are many victories that little deserve that name and defeats that are still unknown. The case Fleming makes for each of these is persuasive, but it is not always history. You need to have some understanding of the history of World War I to fully appreciate the arguments that Fleming makes, but if you do this is a very good read. I will have to leave it to others to answer whether the book is good history, or just good argument.
Rating:
Summary: Badly Needed Revisionism
Review: Mr. Fleming has admitted that he had to abandon the prejudices of a liberal New Jersey upbringing to arrive at an objective assessment of FDR (The New Dealers' War) and Wilson. He certainly has done that. Frequently he crosses over the line of purely objective historian into political and personal commentary, but his assessments all stand scrutiny. While "Illusion" contains some factual errors (note that Fiorello LaGuardia flew in Italy, not France) none are related to the major subject and none detract from Fleming's thesis: Woodrow Wilson's hypocrisy, arrogance, and hunger for power overcame his early idealism, leading to one of the greatest failures of any American administration. Fleming's description of the scheming and lies of Edith Galt Wilson and presidential doctor, Adm. Grayson, foretold comparable lies from FDR's naval aides in WW II. Mrs. Wilson emerges as the Shrew From Hell, reminiscent of the Clinton White House but without Hillary's softer, feminine side (!)
Fleming details Wilson's failure in every major aspect: his refusal, after months of immobility, to hand over to his vice president; persistently ignoring vital domestic issues such as massive strikes and riots, a winter coal shortage, and persecution of minorities, to say nothing of the Prohibition debate. Wilson's tolerance for the continuing postwar naval blockade of Germany ("the worst atrocity of the war" says Fleming) led to thousands of deaths by starvation--this from the president who vowed to conduct "a war without hate."
Yet after all that, WW still felt he deserved a third term and declined to endorse his own son in law for the nomination.
Well done--again--Tom Fleming.
Rating:
Summary: An Excellent, Disturbing History
Review: One of the first things I look for in books of this genre are the references. Had Fleming been less diligent in annotation, I might agree with critics who found errors or disagreed with his analysis. However, I found it a stimulating read precisely because it presents an alternative point of view. As it's the first printing, one hopes the factual errors will be corrected for later editions, however, the value of the book is in seeing the period as the prelude to a century of wars rather than the war to end war. The wars within and without our borders evolved from this period. It was an ending and a beginning. Fleming makes his prejudices quite clear so that readers can take them for what they're worth. However, the book is very timely as we enter a new century defined, to date, by war. Questions of succession and globalization as well as questions of homeland security are defined in a new way by seeing how they played out almost a century ago. No one book should be considered the defining statement of such a tumultous time. But, I truly believe this work by Fleming is important to the dialogue. The very idea of a president not respecting his own advisers, being out of the country for months at a time, and allowing his wife to have more control over his office than elected and appointed officials should be anathema in any age. This is more than a discussion of Wilson and the war. It is an illustration of the politics of power and the reasons why our constitution defines things as it does. It also illustrates how the constitution can be sidestepped by egos over intellect. Whether one agrees with Fleming or not, this is a timely and necessary discussion.
Rating:
Summary: stimulating read
Review: One of the first things I look for in books of this genre are the references. Had Fleming been less diligent in annotation, I might agree with critics who found errors or disagreed with his analysis. However, I found it a stimulating read precisely because it presents an alternative point of view. As it's the first printing, one hopes the factual errors will be corrected for later editions, however, the value of the book is in seeing the period as the prelude to a century of wars rather than the war to end war. The wars within and without our borders evolved from this period. It was an ending and a beginning. Fleming makes his prejudices quite clear so that readers can take them for what they're worth. However, the book is very timely as we enter a new century defined, to date, by war. Questions of succession and globalization as well as questions of homeland security are defined in a new way by seeing how they played out almost a century ago. No one book should be considered the defining statement of such a tumultous time. But, I truly believe this work by Fleming is important to the dialogue. The very idea of a president not respecting his own advisers, being out of the country for months at a time, and allowing his wife to have more control over his office than elected and appointed officials should be anathema in any age. This is more than a discussion of Wilson and the war. It is an illustration of the politics of power and the reasons why our constitution defines things as it does. It also illustrates how the constitution can be sidestepped by egos over intellect. Whether one agrees with Fleming or not, this is a timely and necessary discussion.
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