Strategy

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Summary: If you are a Amateur...
Review: If you are a Amateur this is a MUST. If you are a Connaisseur this is a joy.

Rating:
Summary: Essential
Review: If you like to read military history, or any military subject, this book is essential reading. Hart explains why victory depends on doing the unexpected. The author has discoved the why behind so many military successes and failures. This book is simple to understand and the concepts are put forth in an easy to understand manner. Hart uses history to explain how his ideas work and how history confirms them.

A must read for everyone interested in military history or military thinking.

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Summary: The Genius Behind the Indirect Approach
Review: Liddell Hart clearly shows his views on military strategy in this book, and he does it with a lot of historical facts to back him up. In my opinion, there is no greater book on the subject of military strategy and it is a must read for all history and military enthusiasts. If only he would have been a British General during the First World War.....

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Summary: One off the great works on strategy in this century
Review: Liddell Hart is perhaps one of the greatest military thinkers of this century. His early works were influential to the german generals, who invented the blitz-krieg doctrine prior to WW2. And his later works, first of all "Strategy" has been textbook material in military academies throughout the world since WW2.

In "Strategy, The indirect approach" Liddel Hart expands on Clausewitz theories, as they apply to 20th. century warfare. His basic theory is that the concentration of force against the weak points of the enemy is achieved by mobility - in every sense of the word. His basic premise is, that the enemy must ever be on the horns of dilemma - that is in doubt of your intentions. In Liddel Harts thinking, this concept includes: superior use of mobility, the use of multiple possible objectives to confuse the enemy and the ability to concentrate superior force if you do battle.

The sum of Liddell Hart's theories is a grand strategy, that places the emphasis on superior mobility (of troops and mind) and the ability to create confusion in the enemy - in other words Blitzkrieg. Furthermore he was one of the first to consider, how a domocratic government would influence military strategy.

In addition to this the book is a great read.

Messerheim's "Liddell Hart and the weight of history" is recomended as and informed and critical review of Liddell Harts work in general and his use of history to prove his points.

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Summary: It's pretty, but it is not war
Review: Liddell Hart's Strategy was my very first book on war and strategy. I read it some thirty years ago, and twice since. It has not aged well during that time. It fails to deliver on the most important aspect: it does not help you understand. It just pretends to do so.

Mind you, I have no doubt its breadth, prose and elegant style were important in helping me decide to make strategic studies my profession. Strategy is well written, covers a lot of ground, has a wide scope. It gives you the feeling of understanding the heart of the matter of war.

Having said that, I feel I must share a somewhat more mature assessment. Liddell Hart's capstone is the very seductive understanding that strategy can be direct -- nasty, brutish, bloody and cruel -- or indirect -- subtle, oblique, smart and humane.

Alas, that turns out not to be the case. Liddell Hart's book, in spite of its name, is not really a book on strategy -- it's partisan history by someone with an axe to grind. It is a chapter in Liddell Hart's long struggle against the memory of World War I.

Its most cherished example might well be the contrast among Grant's direct strategy, besieging Richmond and facing Lee's Army in various battles, and Sherman's indirect strategy, avoiding southern forces and bringing devastation to the rear areas of the Confederacy during the American Civil War. The war was won on the west, says Liddell Hart. The eastern battles were unnecessary. Sherman knew how to win, Grant did not. This example might take pride of place as a vivid illustration of his point. Regretfully, as I fear Mr. Hart knew even as he wrote they were not two strategies. Grant (actually Meade, in command of the Army of the Potomac) and Sherman were the two necessary sides of the same strategy, conceived and ran by Grant. Without the assaults on Richmond and the constant harassment of Lee's Army, there would have been no opportunity for Sherman to move freely from Atlanta or to march to the sea and beyond. And, in any case, there was nothing indirect on the seizure of Atlanta in the first place.

So, in the end, Strategy does not offer one a key to understand war or strategy, but rather tries to sell the idea that wars can be won by finesse and maneuver, and, even more, that it is a matter of choice to do so. And that is plain wrong. Wars may be played with style if both sides are willing, but if either one is not, then someone has to grapple with the main body of the enemy. In order to present a comprehensive history of strategy and avoid that point, one has to be willing to adjust his facts. That might well have been the case. For those who are interested in the man behind Liddell Hart, there are works that have tackled the myth, such as those of Bond, Agar or, in particular, Mearsheimer.

War is a fascinating subject. There are many books and authors who are very good writers. Some, however, are willing to offer simple formulas, denying the complexity of war and even promising a perfect recipe to victory in all times and circumstances. That is a trend that has been with us at least since Henri Jomini distilled all art of war in the principle of offensive action against the decisive point. It is altogether fitting that Liddell Hart, in the same tradition, came to offer an equally simple rule: avoid enemy strength, be indirect.

For those who want to understand war as it is there remains only Clausewitz's On War. It may not be pleasant to come to understand that war is a paradoxical trinity that has, at all times, the contradictory drives of unreasoning passion and dislike, fear and hate; of cold, pitiless reason; and that it takes place in a province of uncertainty and luck. It may come as a shock that the war is wholly human, and that it depends on the by play of the human qualities and failures, courage and cowardice, generosity and avarice, all at once, as in life. But in order to understand war, one must take it as it really is -- wide, complex, ever changing and profoundly meshed with life -- and not as one would wish it to be.

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Summary: A 20th Century Classic
Review: Liddell Hart's thesis on indirect strategy has always been grounded on two things: the use of surprise and the importance of manoeuvre. This indirect strategy is predicated on his firm belief that wars/battles should be won quickly, decisively, and with the least amount of casaulties. In this book, he continuously demonstrates to the reader that, ironically in almost every century, the uses of surprise and manoeuvres have largely been ignored by most military leaders except the competent ones. This book then is therefore not only a commentary on strategy but it is a voice intended to remind the reader the necessity and usefulness of a strategy that could minimize deaths and has proven itself to be most effective way of winning a war. Hart strongly believes that we should learn from history to avoid repeating the same mistakes over and over again. As always with Liddell Hart's work, this book is written in a lucid manner and full of life. Highly recommend.

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Summary: Ambitious work, but falls short
Review: Liddell Hart, in Strategy, attempts to sell his readers what he believes to be the panacea to war fighting, the Indirect Approach. Hart also goes to great pains to dismiss the relevance of Clausewitz's On War. Like many British historians of his time, Hart reveals his seemingly reflexive distaste for anything Prussian or German. Although Hart provides a rich history of warfare from the time of the Peloponnesian War to World War II, he only supplies examples that support his thesis. Upon reading, I felt like Hart had a preconceived thesis, and then set out to prove it. However, true scholarship requires one to acknowledge contrary points of view, and deal with them. His criticism of Clausewitz is so unfounded as to make me question how deeply Hart actually read On War. Many of Hart's ideas are perfectly consistent with Clausewitz. Their main point of difference would be that Hart claims to have found the secret strategy that will always prove victorious, while Clausewitz painstakingly avoided writing a prescriptive work, emphasizing that each war is a unique situation, and the approach will then be unique. Hart is a good read, but ultimately falls short of his goal.

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Summary: Fascinating...A true masterpiece
Review: Liddell weaves compelling and persuasive arguments throughout his excellent and well-researched book. As a WWII strategist, I can look back with 20/20 hindsight and compare our strategies with his, often wishing I had the book with me in the field. This incredible work of non-fiction covers 25 centuries of warfare, focusing mainly on WWI and WWII. I recomend this book to all adult readers and especially to those taking demanding courses (history...) in college, a good read! Papau N. Guinea, MI5

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Summary: Guderian's bible....
Review: The best book on strategy that I've ever read. I know that doesn't mean anything to you, but it was also the best book on strategy that Heinz Guderian ever read (the German Panzer commander that conquered most of Europe at the start of WW2.)

The whole book is summed up by THE INDIRECT APPROACH (i.e. never, ever, do what the enemy would logically assume that you will do.) Always make it look like there are several targets that you are planning to attack- and throw your whole weight against the least likely at the last moment.

It was this book that gave me a full appreciation of the Byzantine General Belisarius. This is the general that briefly reconquered the the western empire, but was stupidly recalled by a jealous emperor that feared his genius and success. Briefly, Belisaurius, would break through and operate far behind enemy lines. His entire army was mounted. He was forced to live off the land because he was far from his bases, and faced with an unreliable and jealous emperor. He would strike out between two possible targets, putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma, and vear off to strike one of them only at the last possible moment. He would take what supplies he needed and burn the rest. He would repeat this over and over again. If he found a suitalble location to fortify he would do so. He would let his pursuers catch up and bleed their strength off in direct frontal attack on his fortified position (held by dismounted armored cataphracts and horse archers.) Then, he would simply mount up, break out, and start the whole thing over until his enemy was exhausted and ready for decisive defeat.
Needless to say, this is a pattern readily modified to fit armored and mechanised warfare.

Rating:
Summary: You better reaaaally like military history
Review: The book is good. Personally i'd give it 4 stars, but because i'm thinking of the general public i'll give it 3 stars. My complains are that the maps are absolutely necessary to understanding the subject matter yet almost 100% impossible to read. The maps are so hard to read i can't even tell if the cities mentioned are on it or not.

The strategy is extremely detailed. This is almost more of a reference book to military strategy than anything else. Forget what Hannibal did vs Scipio? Open the book, "Oh yeah, now i remember". Although you can read it without any knowledge of the battles, as I did, you may get annoyed at the fact that the author hardly ever even bothers to mention which side generals belong to. You will be told that Prussia and Russia are at war (a totally made up example) and it will tell you about 2 generals that are fighting each other, but you won't know which one belongs to which side. This is why it is more of a reference manual than an amateur book.

Another BIG complaint that i haven't noticed others mention so far is that the author seems to have a HUUUUGE problem with proper pronoun usage. Specifically, there were way too many times where I felt like i could not tell which side was performing the action i was reading about because the general was ambiguous.

But othere than these complaints, i really enjoyed the book. I felt like i really learned a lot from it and would suggest it to anyone who is interested in military history as hardcore as i am. I specifically loved reading about Belisarius, who i never heard about before this book who, after reading about him, became my favorite general of all time. If you go to your local bookstore at least rip that chapter out of it because i think that EVERYONE would enjoy it.