Rating: 
Summary: The Phantom Soldier - Battle Field Wisdom
Review: RE: The Phantom Soldier,
I spent over 15 years of my life with the US Army Armor Recon, known as Armored Cavalry. Three overseas tours including the Gulf War, I wish this book had been written then. The problem with today's military is that we forget the lessons of the past wars and we don't keep comprehensive records of tactics and hard earned lessons - Part One, -The Eastern Way of Attack-, Chapter 14, -How Much Has War Changed? Chapter Three, - The False Face and the Art of Delay-. Are some of the exceptional pieces of work in his book, among the chapters.
The Phantom soldier points out our strengths and weakness, as well as enemy's on the battlefields of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Korea was one of the most painful wars that the US fought, The Vietnam War, a few short months of training and you were off to war, and that training was mostly marching and polishing boots. The enemy today as seen in Afghanistan, fighting has been a way of life as soon as they can walk. A strong knowledge base is needed more so now that ever. This book will be an asset on the today's battlefield as much as the rifle.
I think the ancient Philosopher and Military General Sun -Tzu said it best " One seeks victory before the battle, by knowing oneself and the enemy -. does one defeat the enemy"
The author continues to provide hard learned information in his book series, paid for in the lives of Americans. For the worst thing in battle is , How does the enemy fight, and how can I fight him?
Stephen E Hughes
Rating:
Summary: Understanding the Enemy
Review: Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel John Poole has written a timely book to help soldiers understand the enemy and to learn how to fight in the post-911 wars. Based on ancient Chinese writings, some only recently made available, historical example, and his own experiences, Poole takes away a large part of the mysticism surrounding the tactics and thinking of the armies of the shadows. Further, he has the audacity to suggest that the American combat forces adapt to, if not adopt, many of these ideas. One of the most chilling passages in Poole's book is a reflection from the 36 Stratagems, a Chinese work relatively new to the West, which translates to: "Kill with a borrowed knife or sword". Further, it is not a big stretch to link the Japanese Kamikazes in World War II to the terrorists' crashing of airliners into buildings at the beginning of this new war. This is not a book for the advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs. While Poole does not reject the RMA, he is clearly down in the weeds where the American fighting man will be. Nor will this book please the cognoscenti who have never seen the face of war, but this is a book that will save American lives. How can these third world armies of the night stand up to the might of the American military machine? Poole's answer is that by using maneuver against an attrition-oriented army, these enemies have been able to wreak havoc. The focus of our asymmetric enemies is squad level tactics and low tech weapons. American Special Forces in Afghanistan have perhaps taken a page from Poole's book in applying the American Way of War asymmetrically to the elusive Taliban and Al Qaeda enemies. Operating from the ground and with indiginous forces, the Special Operations teams adapted to the environment, advised alliance forces, and provided timely direction of some very effective precision air power enabling the ground war to succeed. Clearly, however, as Poole warns, the illusive enemy is still underground, both literally and figuratively, and this is but Phase I of a long war. It is time to revisit the long-enduring fascination with Clausewitz. The new face of war has little relation to Clausewitz, but there are many parallels with Sun Tsu. Before we can begin to fathom the terrorist or the Eastern way of war, we should be compelled to learn more about Sun Tsu and his progenies. Poole points out the major differences between the Sun Tsu and Clausewitz approaches: "While the Eastern commander avoids combat wherever possible, his Western counterpart seeks it". Moreover, the reader is led into a practical description of the Eastern philosophy of the I Ching (Book of Changes), and how it applies to Eastern tactics in a way that is easily understood by the average Joe. Lieutenant Colonel Poole is clearly in the maneuver warfare camp. His mentors include the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF of OODA Loop fame, William S. Lind, author of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, and Colonel David Hackworth USA (Ret). Lieutenant Colonel Poole's experience includes both enlisted and officer service in the USMC in war and peace. Whatever one's predilections for or against the philosophy of maneuver warfare, this book illuminates many perceptions and practices of the Eastern fighter. This affordable book needs to be read by all combat arms soldiers, all special operators, and all generals as a companion piece to William S. Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook for an appreciation of this new, and yet old, face of war and how to fight it.
Rating:
Summary: Understanding the Enemy
Review: Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel John Poole has written a timely book to help soldiers understand the enemy and to learn how to fight in the post-911 wars. Based on ancient Chinese writings, some only recently made available, historical example, and his own experiences, Poole takes away a large part of the mysticism surrounding the tactics and thinking of the armies of the shadows. Further, he has the audacity to suggest that the American combat forces adapt to, if not adopt, many of these ideas. One of the most chilling passages in Poole's book is a reflection from the 36 Stratagems, a Chinese work relatively new to the West, which translates to: "Kill with a borrowed knife or sword". Further, it is not a big stretch to link the Japanese Kamikazes in World War II to the terrorists' crashing of airliners into buildings at the beginning of this new war. This is not a book for the advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs. While Poole does not reject the RMA, he is clearly down in the weeds where the American fighting man will be. Nor will this book please the cognoscenti who have never seen the face of war, but this is a book that will save American lives. How can these third world armies of the night stand up to the might of the American military machine? Poole's answer is that by using maneuver against an attrition-oriented army, these enemies have been able to wreak havoc. The focus of our asymmetric enemies is squad level tactics and low tech weapons. American Special Forces in Afghanistan have perhaps taken a page from Poole's book in applying the American Way of War asymmetrically to the elusive Taliban and Al Qaeda enemies. Operating from the ground and with indiginous forces, the Special Operations teams adapted to the environment, advised alliance forces, and provided timely direction of some very effective precision air power enabling the ground war to succeed. Clearly, however, as Poole warns, the illusive enemy is still underground, both literally and figuratively, and this is but Phase I of a long war. It is time to revisit the long-enduring fascination with Clausewitz. The new face of war has little relation to Clausewitz, but there are many parallels with Sun Tsu. Before we can begin to fathom the terrorist or the Eastern way of war, we should be compelled to learn more about Sun Tsu and his progenies. Poole points out the major differences between the Sun Tsu and Clausewitz approaches: "While the Eastern commander avoids combat wherever possible, his Western counterpart seeks it". Moreover, the reader is led into a practical description of the Eastern philosophy of the I Ching (Book of Changes), and how it applies to Eastern tactics in a way that is easily understood by the average Joe. Lieutenant Colonel Poole is clearly in the maneuver warfare camp. His mentors include the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF of OODA Loop fame, William S. Lind, author of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, and Colonel David Hackworth USA (Ret). Lieutenant Colonel Poole's experience includes both enlisted and officer service in the USMC in war and peace. Whatever one's predilections for or against the philosophy of maneuver warfare, this book illuminates many perceptions and practices of the Eastern fighter. This affordable book needs to be read by all combat arms soldiers, all special operators, and all generals as a companion piece to William S. Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook for an appreciation of this new, and yet old, face of war and how to fight it.
Rating: 
Summary: A Great Thesis, But...
Review: The opening pages of this one require a particularly large grain of salt. I don't believe for a minute that the garrison of Iwo Jima snuck off the island though tunnels to be rescued by submarines. Similarly, to read Poole's version of the Second Vietnam War, you'd be forgiven for thinking that the Vietcong actually controlled the entire country from underground bases and abstained from wiping out U.S. forces, as the old song puts it, out of kindness, I suppose. (I'll add that there's also no mystery about the walls of the Citadel at Hue. As clearly recorded by George Smith in his SIEGE AT HUE, the walls were honeycombed with tunnels that the the NVA used with alacrity and were very difficult to clear out. Why Poole treats this as a hypothetical I have no idea.)
But the core of the book is a different matter: this is the first volume on tactics I've read (and as a military historian, I've seen quite a few) which suggests that Asian soldiers not only revere Sun Tzu but, in fact, study him, apply him, and live by him. Stated baldly, this may seem obvious. But entire generations of military men have fought Asian armies as if their commanders had taken the same courses at West Point, or Sandhurst, or (we can't leave the French out of this) St. Cyr. The result, often as not, has been disaster. It's to Poole's infinite credit that he wants to assist future Western armies in avoiding the same fate.
I suggest reading this book in tandem with David Hackworth's STEEL MY SOLDIER'S HEARTS, a memoir of Hackworth's service in the Mekong Delta that clearly demonstrates that the Asian soldier can be met and defeated on his own terms...
Rating:
Summary: H. John Poole is the best
Review: This is an analysis of how the eastern way of war trumps the American/western way of war. It also shows why people in Iraq are shooting at US troops rather than hailing them as heros. I've mailed a copy to George Bush. It's too bad that the military culture that he represents is incapable of understanding the importance of this book. The result of this inability is graphically portrayed in John Shey's two classics ACHILLES IN VIET NAM and ODYSSEUS IN AMERICA.
Rating:
Summary: Small Unit Sanity Check
Review: What a fantastic collection of small-unit lessons learned (or ones that should have been learned) from the history of U.S. armed forces military successes and failures for the last 60+ years! John Poole has "taken the road less traveled, and that has made all the difference." Poole's emphasis on the importance of small unit dominance on the battlefield is definitely less traveled than the mistaken U.S. over-reliance on superior technologies. The convincing discussion and analysis in this book can make all the difference in how the military decides to prepare for the future: tactical parity with our enemies to augment our technological superiority, or technological advances to complement our superior tactical expertise over our enemies. Poole's thought-provoking book provides insights and answers to some very important questions: When our enemies or the environment neutralize our vast technological advantages, can our small-units still fight and win on the battlefield? How easy is it for our enemies to minimize our technological advantages? What are the differences and similarities between the eastern and western approaches to warfighting? How well has our training prepared our small-units to fight since WWII? Is it an advantage for our enemies to willingly train and fight with little to no reliance on modern technologies? How well do our small-units record and pass on tactical lessons learned as compared to what our adversaries have done? Are there better ways to fight and minimize the costs of war? Today's changing face and nature of conflict demand an even greater understanding of the different styles and approaches to warfighting. This book challenges our traditional understandings of battlefield prowess and deserves, at a minimum, serious study and discussion.
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