Rating: 
Summary: Supply for longer campaigns and wars...
Review: An excellent work - hard to improve on the comments of the other reviewers who note many of the fine qualities of this work. One point not previously made was that the period of time chosen was not accidental. From Wallenstein on, we began to see what we conceive of as relatively modern armies (that is armies with a command component, teeth or the sharp fighting end, and a tail or supporting component) which had to fight over more than one season. Van Creveld, an excellent historian, covers all of these notions carefully with copious notes. A great work for the serious and specialist reader but should also appeal to the military history buff. I wish that the work were revised in light of Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli War, The Falklands War, and most of all, the Iraqi War. These were relatively shorter wars, and the problems were not one of production or foraging but using the already accumulated stocks effectively. The contraction of time means that choosing wrong (wrong weapons, wrong fuel stocks, wrong plan of distribution) are more profound. There may not be time politically to correct mistakes.
Rating:
Summary: A must-have for military history enthusiasts
Review: At first glance, the method of commenting and explaining the complex matter of military logistics trough a very limited number of specific examples (Wallenstein and Patton, but also Napoleon and Hitler's Russian Campaigns in beetween... and some others)may seem ineffective. Logistics are a matter wich has proven hard to grasp even to some great field commanders (Rommel, to say one) so it is difficult to study it through easy , almost textbook examples, using very limited mathemathics (if you passed primary school exams, you can tackle them). Yet this book does. It does not explain a general theory of logistics : it shows there' s not a general theory, only partial models useful in a special historical and technological situation. And it does not tell it to you through the marketing-style tables you'd expect, but through almost annedotic examples,fun to read and fun to ponder. Did you know almost all the bullets Napoleon's Army carried in the campaign to Wien remained unfired ? And that in the same campaign problems arised from shortage of bread... and from his Marshall's disobedience ? L' Empereur had ordered his front line cavalry squadrons to take supplies only from the (more or less willing) villages on one side of the road, to leave the other side for those coming behind. He was simply not obeyed, and this caused supplying havoc afterwards. And Hitler would perhaps not have attacked Russia, if he only attempted the simple calculations shown in this book, showing he simply had not enough fuel and trucks. Read it.
Rating:
Summary: Eye opening - gave me a new understanding of war
Review: I never realized the importance of supplies in war and the difficulty in obtaining them. Not just food, ammunition, POL, and equipment, but the small over looked things that are critical. The book touches on a wide range of topics and is a must for the student of military history. For example the author covers baking of bread for 17th+18th century armies, the effects of weather (freezing rivers), the use of trains (you can't just dump supplies off a train, you need a depot). Its a little dry, but worth reading and inexpensive as well.
Rating:
Summary: Eye opening - gave me a new understanding of war
Review: I never realized the importance of supplies in war and the difficulty in obtaining them. Not just food, ammunition, POL, and equipment, but the small over looked things that are critical. The book touches on a wide range of topics and is a must for the student of military history. For example the author covers baking of bread for 17th+18th century armies, the effects of weather (freezing rivers), the use of trains (you can't just dump supplies off a train, you need a depot). Its a little dry, but worth reading and inexpensive as well.
Rating:
Summary: Invaluable, an eye opener.
Review: I never realized the importance of supplies in war until reading this book. It covers a wide range of topics and is invaluable for broadening your understanding of military history. Its relatively short, a little dry, and a bargain.
Rating:
Summary: Invaluable, an eye opener.
Review: I never realized the importance of supplies in war until reading this book. It covers a wide range of topics and is invaluable for broadening your understanding of military history. Its relatively short, a little dry, and a bargain.
Rating:
Summary: You do not have to be a logistician to understand this book.
Review: I was amazed at the "tail" pre-Napoleon armies had. The words "Supply & Transport" were almost on every other page in some form. The WWII German Army was not all that mechanized as other books would have you believe. Magazines were just early War Readiness Material(WRM). Early 20th century wargamers either did not crunch or factor the numbers or just ignored them. Although the author portrays Gen. Patton as talking to G-4 types only twice I think his study of ancient battles gave him the insight to logistics or the new buzz word "Supplychain Mangement" as opposed to Rommel who either did not grasp logistic factors or was deliberately set up with a logistic nightmare to get him out of the way using the Italian Army as the fall guys and him as the scapegoat. I would be anxious to read the author's writings on Naval and Air Logistics.
Rating:
Summary: the best book about the history of logistics
Review: Martin Van Creveld provides an interesting overview of how logistics influenced the outcome of miltitary operations. The first part of the book deatils warfare during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the armies had to keep advancing in order in replemish their supplies. If the army stayed in the same area over a large amount of time such as Napoleon's army in Moscow, than the army would run out of supplies. This situation did not change during the Franco-Prussian War in which the Prussian army had to scrounge for food at the outskirts of Paris. All though food remained a problem for the armies there was always a plentiful supply of ammunition since armies of the 18th and 19th centuries expended very little of it. Martin Van Creveld makes some surprising claims in the later part of the book describing twentieth century warfare. Martin Van Creveld believes that the Schlieffen Plan was doomed to failure because of the logistical constraints of the German army. Because most of supplies delivered to the German army were by rail, the desturuction of the railways impeded their advance. Also German planners made no plans to deal with the massive traffic jams in Belgum. The next chapter Van Creveld has an revisionist appraisal of the Germany invasion of Russia in 1941. Van Creveld believes that Germany had the supplies to deal with winter warfare but the inability to transport them across Russia. Due to the difference between German and Russian rail tracks and maintance problems of German engines the supplies never reached the front. Van Creveld strongly criticizes Rommel's handling of the North Africam campaign. Rommel advance to far for his supplies to be replenished. The problem of supply duirng the North African War was that the supplies had to be delivered by trucks that were highly vulnerable to air attack. When Rommel tried to solve the problem by taking Tobruk, he only made matters worse. The ships that arrived at Tobruk were in range of Allied aircraft and as a result sunk. The final Chapter, Van Creveld evaluates Allied operations in Western Europe. Van Creveld believes that Patton's success had to due with the fact that Patton ignored logistic officer's plan for a slow a orderly pace but instead took advantage of the situation to advance quickly. Van Creveld theorizes that Montgomery's narrow front approach could have logistically reached Northwest Germany but were have not captured Berlin. I would highly reccomend this book for anyone who wants a new and interesting perspective about operations during the First and Second World Wars.
Rating:
Summary: Who would think that a book on military logisitcs....
Review: Seriously, this was one of the most mind boggling books that I have ever read. Having read Keegan and military strategists from Machiavelli to Thomas Schelling, I never realized that THE most crucial factor as for wins and losses for battles and wars is getting food and materiel to your men. Van Crevald, really, here, writes a tour-de-force that should be a must read for any politican, public policy official, OR student of miliary history because it changes perspective entirely as to how one views battles and wars.....
Rating:
Summary: Who would think that a book on military logisitcs....
Review: Seriously, this was one of the most mind boggling books that I have ever read. Having read Keegan and military strategists from Machiavelli to Thomas Schelling, I never realized that THE most crucial factor as for wins and losses for battles and wars is getting food and materiel to your men. Van Crevald, really, here, writes a tour-de-force that should be a must read for any politican, public policy official, OR student of miliary history because it changes perspective entirely as to how one views battles and wars.....
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