Rating: 
Summary: From Hoplites to Panzers
Review: Soul of Battle's theme is democratic armies raised to invade and overthrow slave or apartheid systems. "Never in human conflict have such vast democratic infantry forces appeared out of nowhere, wrought such havoc and then dispersed among the consensual culture that fielded them." The focus is on Epaminondas of Thebes and his campaigns which destroyed Sparta; Sherman's March to the Sea and march through the Carolinas in 1864-65, and Patton's Third Army campaigns from Normandy to Czechoslovakia in 1944-45. Jumping back and forth while discussing each leader in historical context, Hanson shows that these seemingly different men are very similar.These were ideological wars and each of these men realized that merely defeating armies was not enough - instead they found similar methods to keep casualties low while striking hard and dramatically at the underpinnings of the three slave based societies of Sparta, the Confederate South, and Nazi Germany.
Epaminondas was the first of Hanson's trio of generals to discover the need to do more than defeat an enemy army in the filed. Despite a major defeat at Leuctra, the Spartans recovered quickly and soon were as threatening as ever. It required an invasion of their homeland, in which the Spartiate nobility "hid in the streets with their sobbing women and children - like the females who were left to beg from Sherman on the plantations, and the once proud German citizens who took down their portraits of Adolf Hitler and approached Patton's army with white flags.
Hanson points out that long before Kant, Epaminondas realized democracy is the only way to avoid wars. "For better or worse, after Epaminondas's great invasion the free citizens of the entire Peloponnese would now vote when and when not to go to war."
Soul of Battle is compelling history, mixing biography, background history, and detailed military accounts. The Epaminondas section will be new to most readers, even those who've read Hanson's earlier Western Way of War. At best, we know this short decade as the 'Theban hegemony", filling the gap between Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War and Philip and Alexander's Macedonian conquests. Hanson shows that Epaminondas and the Thebans deserve more attention. This was recognized by both Sherman and to an even greater extent by Patton. Hanson remarks, "It is more than likely that there was not a single American general in Normandy who had ever heard of Epaminondas - a figure that had lived with Patton in the forty years before he took command of the Third Army "
But tactics takes a back seat to ideological and political argument. Nearly the entire population of Sparta could be considered elite, relying on hundreds of thousands of non-Spartan, enslaved helots. Epaminondas destroyed the Spartan system by liberating the helots and assisting them in creating new city-states like Messena and Megalopolis In the South, conditions were different, with slave owners, and particularly owners of large numbers of slaves, being a minority. Yet Hanson shows how even here slavery dictated an entire culture
The Patton section is written in reverse chronological order, starting with Patton's accidental death after the war. These flahsbacks intensify the feelings of what-if and if-only as early decisions by Bradley and Eisenhower are peeled back to expose how they the lengthened the war.
Hanson's piercing analysis of the fall and winter campaigns of 1944-45 adds up to solid support for Patton's diary entry: "I could not help but think our delay in pushing forward would probably result, after due course of time, in the erection of many other such monuments for men who, had we gone faster, would not have died.":
"In every tactical crux of the Normandy campaign, Patton alone offered the correct advice - from the rapid follow-up on the breakout in early August 1944, to the need to hurry on to Brest, to the entrapment of the Germans at the Falaise Gap, to the critical goal of sealing off the exists of the German armies once he crossed the Seine, to the idea of approaching and crossing the Rhine rapidly at the end of August, to the notion of enveloping the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and slicing off the enemy salient at its base, to the desire to trap and destroy two entire German armies west of the Rhine, and to the final question of preventing Soviet occupation of eastern Europe. In each case, had the Americas allowed the Third Army and its seemingly insane general to have his way... thousands of Allied soldiers would have been saved, the war shortened, the horror of the death camps ended months earlier, and the calamity of postwar communism for a few millions perhaps averted. "
(Of course, especially for the considerations of dealings with the Soviets, these Eisenhower's decisions often had more political than military ingredients, but that's for a different book.)
Hanson realizes that it may surprise and even shock or insult some to name Sherman, Patton and Epaminondas as marchers for freedom, but he emphasizes that their thinking led to faster and more solid peace than to further brutalizing war. "True, they had no delusions about either human nature or war; but this realism grew out of humanism, not cynicism, as they practiced a brutal war-making in order to prevent casualties and establish an enduring peace.
"Yet if history offers only three examples of democratic marches for freedom, the record is at least clear. When a free and consensual society feels its existence threatened, when it has been attacked, when its citizenry at last understands an enemy at odds with the very morality of its culture, when a genius at war leads the army with freedom to do what he wishes, when it is to march to a set place in a set time, then free men can muster, they an fight back well, and they can make war brutally and lethally beyond the wildest nightmares of the brutal military culture they seek to destroy."
An epilogue looks at how Epaminondas, Sherman and Patton might have conducted the Gulf War.
Rating: 
Summary: The Soul of Battle
Review: Reviewer Kelly J. Snowden has it right. This book is based on a terrific premise and would have been a 150 page best-seller. Unfortunately, Hanson wrote more than 400 pages, setting a new standard in tautology.
Rating:
Summary: Very Influential
Review: The Soul of Battle is astonishing in its depth, and freshness. It is original, innovative and well written. Victor Davis Hanson has written a book that is one of the most influential of my military career. He sees beyond the headlines and self-serving memoirs, to the truths of the soul. He understands war better than those that write the feel good hack, so much the norm today. The truth is that the leaders he profiles are men who rose above their times, their culture and the expectations of their peers. For those that are looking for what really motivates democratic solders, and is done with the superficial SLA Marshall types of books, settle down, read, and be prepared to be a better leader.
Rating: 
Summary: VALID PREMISE BUT TOO LONG AND TOO STRIDENT
Review: Hanson uses the exploits of three historical military leaders -- Epaminondas of Thebes, who led 70,000 hoplites through Sparta and the Peloppenese; Union General William T. Sherman, who marched his Army of the West through the heart of an unrepentant South; and George Patton, who drove his army into Germany following the Allied invasion of Europe -- to illustrate the importance of an ideal in motivating "democratic" armies to defeat corrupt or morally bankrupt societies. The message is an important one and the historical analysis provided is first-rate, as is that demonstrated in Mr. Hanson's other works.
The problem is that the same message is repeated ad nauseam. Each of the three sections -- particularly that on Epaminondas -- could have been half the length to convey the same message. Mr. Hanson literally repeats the same message over and over and over -- for example, how Epaminondas motivated his hoplite host, the evil inherent in the Spartan helot system, the effect of the success against the Spartiates that gave Epaminondas the momentum to invade the Pelopponese and humiliate the knights of Sparta before their women, etc. He uses the same relatively sparse quotations over and over again, or uses redundant sources to convey the same message -- like quoting from the letters of ten privates in Sherman's army to make a point rather than just using one or two. The endless repetition tests the patience of the reader -- I actually skipped several pages from the concluding chapter in the section on Epaminondas when I realized that I was reading yet another rehash of the same points made several times before.
The lack of a firm editing hand is exacerbated by Mr. Hanson's continual use of hyperbole in describing and emphasizing the "genius" of the profiled generals. If the point being made is valid and the evidence supports the theme, there is no need for such literary crutches. If he would have simply given the reader the facts and allowed the conclusion to be drawn inexorably from the text, the message would have been delivered far more forcefully.
It is also curious that Mr. Hanson did not more fully describe the tactical innovations that went hand in glove with the strategic decisions that brought these generals such success. The first section on Epaminondas describes only briefly the innovation of putting the finest hoplites against the Spartan right and increasing the depth of the phalanx to 50 shields, rather than the typical 8-10, which provided far more thrusting power and allowed the Thebans to penetrate the Spartan line and send the Spartan allies fleeing. Although the theme of the book may have been the importance of the democratic ideology motivating the armies and the generals leading them, the practical reality is that no amount of ideology can succeed without effective tactics. Given Mr. Hanson's immense familiarity with the minutiae of hoplite warfare, I was disappointed that more attention was not given to this issue.
I was also disappointed in Mr. Hanson's dismissal of other military leaders as corrupt or otherwise not deserving of praise or recognition because their motives were not as pure as the three generals featured. Although Epaminondas did accomplish an amazing feat, to consider him the greatest general of the classical age is simply unsupportable. What of Scipio Africanus, who vanquished Hannibal, never lost a battle and saved Rome? Or Alexander the Great, who -- whatever his motivations -- conquered more territory in five years than any other leader in history, and could very well have brought all of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa under his dominion had he not died at age 33? It is one thing to distinguish the moral imperatives that drove these men, and quite another to simply dismiss those that, at least in Mr. Hanson's mind, did not fight for the right reasons.
In sum, like this review, the book could have been much shorter, more concise, more sparing in the use of hyperbole, and more inclusive of the technical and tactical innovations that freed these impressive and influential leaders to execute the strategies that made them famous. I do recommend the book, but believe the material could have been more strongly and effectively wielded by others, such as B.H. Liddell Hart or John Keegan.
Rating: 
Summary: Idealistic beyond any objectivity
Review: I came away from The Soul of Battle feeling dirty and betrayed. I bought the book because I'm a Patton fan, loved the FACTS about Epaminondas, and still managed to hate this book completely. The Soul of Battle's thesis revolves around the power of the idealistic people's army and tells the stories of three great generals through rose colored glasses. Patton, for instance, is made out to be a saint whose only concern is destroying the pure evil of the Nazi regime. His less appealing attributes are completely glossed over and his methods of achieving victory are simplified into rightous indignation. Same story for Sherman. In Sherman's case, Hanson decides that because of slavery, the South is inherently evil, its people are inherently evil, and therefore, Sherman couldn't have been more proper in indiscriminately razing everything in sight. On top of all this, Sherman's contribution is hugely exaggerated, with Hanson putting most of the credit for the Northern victory being put on Sherman and his men. I wouldn't buy this book again, I won't be reading it again, and I won't be recommending that any of my friends read it.
Rating:
Summary: A good comparison of three Genrals who fought for democracy
Review: I really enjoyed this book and its premise and it also lead me to even read other books on the subject.
The book parrells three generals and their armies, Epaminondas and his army of thebes, William Techumsa Sherman and the Army of the west and George S. Patton and his third army. There are very detailed accounts of the generals biographies. As well the campaignes through Sparta, Georgia and Germany are good quick over views of the campaigns.
There are three main thesises of this book. The first is that a democracy can quick assemble and train an army because they are motivated by principle. They are fighting of their nation s values and this congeals the army into an effective fighting machine. As well once the army has completed its task it is quickly disassembled for it has served its purpose.
The second thesis is that democrartic generals are willing to use fast swift tactics against the means to war rather than risking their troops or destroying enemy troops. Also move with a quick large force and the enemy will be unwilling to face you. Land need not be occupied just made unproductive by making a wake of destruction.
The third thesis is that these great democratic armies have needed leaders who are able to take calculated risks to acheive great victories. The leader must understand motion, terain, disipline, justice and supply. He must also be at the head of his army, he must be at the center of the fray inorder to instill his troops repect for him inorder to follow. I believe the author did a good job in proving his point.
If you like this book read Sherman's Memiors and the art of war by Sun-tu
Rating:
Summary: Moral Causes
Review: Three heroes who were masters of violence and were eager for it to end.
The bluster and rhetoric of all three (see Epaminondas' response to his Theban accusers) held all the evil that war entails, and that rhetoric held the answer as to why the war should be fought as they envisioned. Their enemies deserved destruction of the quickest and most brutal type, rendering them incapable of fighting in the near future and leaving the conquerors and their armies free to return to their lives. This approach, ironically, led to few casualties on both sides.
With Epaminondas and Sherman, they were able to complete their vision and the results brought peace for an age.
Patton's vision was the same, but his treatment, given the context, defines superficiality. The enslavement of Eastern Europe and an aggressive Soviet Union was the result.
On at least five occasions, Patton was restrained from shortening WWII by months, saving lives and depriving the Soviet Union of its Warsaw Pact "allies". He was punished for the most trivial offenses (i.e. forgetting to mention the Soviets in a speech) while the Nazi's were murdering millions and the Soviets were gearing up for the same.
These three deomstrated the moral way to deal with an immoral enemy, and with the exception of Patton for reasons beyond his control, they demonstrated the results of war when fought in the name of a moral cause.
Rating: 
Summary: An Interesting Perspective on the Power of Democratic Armies
Review: Victor Davis has presented in a compelling fashion the thesis that the historically most powerful and effective armies are those motivated by democratic, altruistic principles. And yet-- paradoxically--these self-same armies are not infrequently led by strongly authoritarian (even at times overtly antidemocratic) generals. To illustrate this view he compares three campaigns: the Theban Epaminondas' assault on the stronghold of Spartan power in Classical Greece; Civil War General Sherman's "march to the sea" from Atlanta to Savanah in 1864; and Patton's lightning mobile warfare across France and Germany in 1944/45. For the most part the comparisons seem apt and convincing. While there is considerable room for debate about many of his particular assessments (you only have to look at a number of the other reviews to be convinced that this is true!), overall his arguments are generally persuasive, even comforting. I say the latter because I think most of us are predisposed to feel that ultimately the armies of "good" should actually triumph over the armies of "evil". While some may find this almost Manichaean concept simplistic, it does have a powerful appeal.
Even if you don't agree with the basic premises of the book, it does make for stimulating and provocative reading at a number of levels. I for one did not know much if anything about the remarkable Epaminondas or his equally amazing army of hoplites; I found this segment particularly fascinating. Having read John Keegan's earlier "The Mask of Command", I was also struck by the contrasting choice of protagonists made by these two capable historians. Where Hanson uses Epaminondas/Sherman/Patton to illustrate his points, Keegan champions the trilogy of Alexander/Wellington/Grant. The two books perhaps should be read side by side, since they provide sometimes quite different assessments of what are usually revered military leaders. It would be interesting to see a discussion by the two authors of each others work!
