Rating: 
Summary: Fascinating, enlightening
Review: The Tripolitan War recieves little coverage in U.S. History Survey courses, and that's a shame, because it was in this war that the likes of Stephen Decatur cut his teeth in preparation for the to Rev War II in 1812. It is also the first time a U.S. soldier died in a foreign land, and the first time the U.S. stood up to a bunch of punk bullies fat off of European coddling who deserved to get their butts spanked. The first attempted "regime change", the first "special op" war w/ native foot soldiers, and sadly, the first time the U.S. backed out of a committment to a foreign ally. Quite like today.There is a lot of good information in this book, not just a fairly detailed account of the Tripolitan War, but soft cinematic character studies of the major characters (Eaton, Decatur, Jefferson, the Bey), impressive "camoes" by the likes of Lord Nelson, and a nice ethnography of the Northern African character following the Spanish reconqest of Iberia. It is an enjoyable read as well, and quite possibly a page turner to him who knows little about the era and is not quite sure how the "story" ends. A more enjoyable read than most fiction, and educational. What more can you ask?
Rating: 
Summary: Terrible Anachronisms and Omissions
Review: This is a bad book. Its not that the quality of writing is poor, while Wheelan's style is cliched he is not an incompetent writer, or that the author is being deliberately misleading. The problem is that the author's desire to see the Barbary War as an analogue of our present situation has overpowered his critical judgement. The Barbary War was not a war on terror in the modern sense. Political terror, in the modern sense, is violent extralegal acts carried out for political ends. In Iraq right now, terrorist acts are being committed to undermine the authority and chance of success of the American occupation. The piracy of the Barbary states was primarily a commercial, not a political, enterprise. Similarly, the American intervention in the Mediterrenean was not primarly in defense of any "principle" but an effort to defend a major American industry. Merchant shipping was tremendously important to the early American economy. Far from being a new phenomenon in American history, the Barbary War was, like several of Jefferson's most successful policies, an extension of pre-existing Federalist policies. During the Adams administration, the American Navy had been involved in an undeclared war in the Caribbean with French commerce raiders, the so-called Quasi-War. As acknowledged by Wheelan, this was the first major episode in the history of the American Navy and as described by Elkins and McKitrick in their excellent book on the Federalist period, was essentially a war to keep down Marine insurance rates. The Barbary intervention was a logical extension of Federalist policies about commercial protection. If the Barbary intervention has a modern analogue, it would be the first Gulf War, which was fought not over the ostensible issue of Kuwaiti sovereignty but really over control of world oil prices. I'm not trying to disparage either Jefferson's policies or those of the first Bush administration, these actions were completely justified, but not in the ways claimed by Wheelan. There are a number of other problems with this book. Wheelan continually contrasts the supine performance of European powers with American devotion to 'principles.' His own narrative, however, shows that American governments frequently resorted to bribery and diplomacy when expedient. Wheelan devotes a number of pages and considerable purple prose to the real crimes of the Barbary states, notably slave-taking. The implication is that the Americans acted nobly in an effort to end this horrible practice which European states tolerated. America at this time, however, undoubtedly contained more slaves than the Barbary states. While importation of slaves into the USA was banned after 1800, American merchant shippers remained active in the African slave trade well after this date and neither the Jefferson administration nor later administrations made much effort to reduce American involvement in the African slave trade. Principle appeared to matter only when signficant commerical interest was involved. Wheelan implies also that European powers were unwilling to use force to suppress the piracy of Barbary states until after being shown how by the Americans. A useful question is what the relevant European powers were doing during this period and specifically, where were their navies? Though you would never know it from reading this book, almost all European nations were involved in the Napoleonic wars. The French, and at various times, Dutch, Spanish, and Danish navies were being blockaded in their home ports by the British Navy. The latter was the largest navy in the world and stretched to its maximum by demands of fighting the French. As Wheelan points out, in 1815 the British return to active suppression of Barbary piracy. This is not because of the example of American suppression but rather because 1815 is the definitive end of the Napoleonic conflicts and the British had the resources to expend on other activities. Writing about history is supposed to be about understanding the past, not about justifying present policies.
Rating:
Summary: Terrible Anachronisms and Omissions
Review: This is a bad book. Its not that the quality of writing is poor, while Wheelan's style is cliched he is not an incompetent writer, or that the author is being deliberately misleading. The problem is that the author's desire to see the Barbary War as an analogue of our present situation has overpowered his critical judgement. The Barbary War was not a war on terror in the modern sense. Political terror, in the modern sense, is violent extralegal acts carried out for political ends. In Iraq right now, terrorist acts are being committed to undermine the authority and chance of success of the American occupation. The piracy of the Barbary states was primarily a commercial, not a political, enterprise. Similarly, the American intervention in the Mediterrenean was not primarly in defense of any "principle" but an effort to defend a major American industry. Merchant shipping was tremendously important to the early American economy. Far from being a new phenomenon in American history, the Barbary War was, like several of Jefferson's most successful policies, an extension of pre-existing Federalist policies. During the Adams administration, the American Navy had been involved in an undeclared war in the Caribbean with French commerce raiders, the so-called Quasi-War. As acknowledged by Wheelan, this was the first major episode in the history of the American Navy and as described by Elkins and McKitrick in their excellent book on the Federalist period, was essentially a war to keep down Marine insurance rates. The Barbary intervention was a logical extension of Federalist policies about commercial protection. If the Barbary intervention has a modern analogue, it would be the first Gulf War, which was fought not over the ostensible issue of Kuwaiti sovereignty but really over control of world oil prices. I'm not trying to disparage either Jefferson's policies or those of the first Bush administration, these actions were completely justified, but not in the ways claimed by Wheelan. There are a number of other problems with this book. Wheelan continually contrasts the supine performance of European powers with American devotion to 'principles.' His own narrative, however, shows that American governments frequently resorted to bribery and diplomacy when expedient. Wheelan devotes a number of pages and considerable purple prose to the real crimes of the Barbary states, notably slave-taking. The implication is that the Americans acted nobly in an effort to end this horrible practice which European states tolerated. America at this time, however, undoubtedly contained more slaves than the Barbary states. While importation of slaves into the USA was banned after 1800, American merchant shippers remained active in the African slave trade well after this date and neither the Jefferson administration nor later administrations made much effort to reduce American involvement in the African slave trade. Principle appeared to matter only when signficant commerical interest was involved. Wheelan implies also that European powers were unwilling to use force to suppress the piracy of Barbary states until after being shown how by the Americans. A useful question is what the relevant European powers were doing during this period and specifically, where were their navies? Though you would never know it from reading this book, almost all European nations were involved in the Napoleonic wars. The French, and at various times, Dutch, Spanish, and Danish navies were being blockaded in their home ports by the British Navy. The latter was the largest navy in the world and stretched to its maximum by demands of fighting the French. As Wheelan points out, in 1815 the British return to active suppression of Barbary piracy. This is not because of the example of American suppression but rather because 1815 is the definitive end of the Napoleonic conflicts and the British had the resources to expend on other activities. Writing about history is supposed to be about understanding the past, not about justifying present policies.
Rating:
Summary: A Fresh New Look
Review: This is a wonderful fresh new look. In 1801 Jefferson dispatched the newly created U.S Navy to deal with the state-sponsored piracy of the Barbary states, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco. This book paints Jefferson as a President willing to extent American values and principles overseas by fighting America's `first war on terror'. Although this language is slightly clichéd and not entirely accurate in the 19th century sense, nevertheless the book gives a resounding argument behind why terror and unlawfulness must be punished and that appeasement never works in the face of unfettered aggression. Probably the most interesting aspect of this war was that the fledgling America was willing to go all the way across an ocean under the vary eyes of the Europeans America had rebelled against, to fight a nameless enemy only to protect American merchant interests. In many ways this was a forward thinking war. Smacking of Palmerstons later `gunboat diplomacy' this war against the Tripoli showed how a newly formed idealistic republic was willing to go around the globe to protect is citizens from barbarism. A wonderful read, the authors style is quick and witty, and the writing is lucid and action packed. Any student of American history will enjoy this new take on Jefferson and the young American navy just as anyone interested in today's war on terror will enjoy its 19th century antecedents. Seth J. Frantzman
Rating:
Summary: A Fresh New Look
Review: This is a wonderful fresh new look. In 1801 Jefferson dispatched the newly created U.S Navy to deal with the state-sponsored piracy of the Barbary states, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco. This book paints Jefferson as a President willing to extent American values and principles overseas by fighting America's 'first war on terror'. Although this language is slightly clichéd and not entirely accurate in the 19th century sense, nevertheless the book gives a resounding argument behind why terror and unlawfulness must be punished and that appeasement never works in the face of unfettered aggression. Probably the most interesting aspect of this war was that the fledgling America was willing to go all the way across an ocean under the vary eyes of the Europeans America had rebelled against, to fight a nameless enemy only to protect American merchant interests. In many ways this was a forward thinking war. Smacking of Palmerstons later 'gunboat diplomacy' this war against the Tripoli showed how a newly formed idealistic republic was willing to go around the globe to protect is citizens from barbarism. A wonderful read, the authors style is quick and witty, and the writing is lucid and action packed. Any student of American history will enjoy this new take on Jefferson and the young American navy just as anyone interested in today's war on terror will enjoy its 19th century antecedents. Seth J. Frantzman
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