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Summary: Interesting Analysis of The Opening Phases of WWII
Review: In this interesting book, Prof. May is concerned with determining why the Germans conquered France at the outset of WWII. He takes pains to rebut common misconceptions about the fall of France. The most important misconception is that the Germans were destined to win because of overwhelming technological and military superiority. While other authors have commented on this point, May shows well that the French and British Armies had superior manpower, were at least equivalent in the air, and had real advantages in armor capabilities and artillery. The Allies would also enjoy the tactical advantage of defending. May concentrates on how decisions were made and why decision making in Germany, France, and Britain was structured as it was. This results in an overlapping series of sections devoted to the crucial Allied and German decisions. The first section is devoted to why the Allies failed to confront Germany over the acquisitions of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Key issues here were the limitations imposed by domestic democratic politics and the inability of Allied leaders to understand that Hitler actually wanted war. This is an understandable failure. Chamberlain and Daladier, the latter a decorated veteran of the Western Front in WWI, thought that war would be catastrophic (they were correct,)and combat inconclusive (they were wrong), and couldn't imagine that any political leader with a shred of sense would choose war. Looking back over the 20th century, individuals like Hitler are depressingly familiar - Mao, Pol Pot, Stalin, Saddam Hussein - the list is easy to compile. Prior to the 30s, however, there had been no one on the European scene like Hitler since the time of Napoleon. As May points out, moreover, the position of the Western leaders was not based on a perception of French and British weakness but rather on the understanding, shared by the German military, that France and Britain enjoyed superiority. The next set of decisions examined by May are the failure of the French and British to attack Germany during the invasion of Poland. Here, May excoriates the French in particular for the their timidity and lack of imagination. Finally, there is a sustained and excellent series of chapters on German and Allied, particularly French, planning for the anticipated invasion of France. May details the numerous crucial differences between the behavior of decision makers on both sides. Particularly important to May is the comparison of decision making procedures between the two sides, a comparison which exposes the inferiority of Allied command. Poor intelligence gathering, poorer intelligence interpretation, lack of coordination between intelligence services and operational planning, mediocre leadership within the French Officer Corps, lack of interservice cooperation, and poor relations between political and military leaders were all features of the Allied effort. The Germans, in contrast, clearly made the most of their comparatively limited resources. May is careful also to stress that while the Germans were good, they were also incredibly lucky. A huge series of contingencies had to break their way and this is what happened. For example, if the Germans had attacked in the winter of 1939-1940, as Hitler wanted originally, their existing attack plan would probably have resulted in a stalemate in Belgium. A variety of fortunate events led them to postpone the invasion and reformulate their attack plan into the successful assault through the poorly defended Ardennes region. This book has some deficiencies. It is well written and very well researched. May succeeds in avoiding anachronistic judgements and gives a good sense of the perspectives of key decision makers uncontaminated by knowledge of what would follow. By covering a whole series of decisions, however, May dilutes the impact of the book. A good comparison is Richard Frank's Downfall, a book about the decision to use nuclear weapons to end WWII. Frank's concentration on a single decision gave his book dramatic focus without sacrificing the import of the book. May is very interested in the nature of executive decision making in the arena of international affairs. He would like readers to draw conclusions from this book. He does point out some similarities between France in the 30s and contemporary America; a military nervous of engagement without huge political support, a reluctance to risk casualties, and reliance on technology. But, he is careful to avoid facile historical generalizations. Indeed, one of his points is that historical generalization can be profoundly misleading. His final conclusion is that decision makers should be smart, critical, and embrace procedures that test their assumptions. Sensible, but I don't think you need a 400 page plus book to prove this point.
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Summary: Ineteresting (revisionist) history
Review: It was only a matter of time before someone wrote an apologia for the pitiful performance of the French armed forces during the so-called "Battle of France" during 1940. (I put "Battle of France" in quotes because this phrase itself, which has worked its way into historical writings, is nonsense...France did not lost a battle, France lost the war, and ended it by surrendering, regardless of what De Gaulle might have said from his comfy London exile...when your government captitulates and you are occupied and divided after signing a surrender document, that is called LOSING A WAR not a battle, and if that is not the case, then Germany was not defeated in WWII, it just "lost a battle" and is taking its sweet time getting to the rubber match) Anyhoo, the author's thesis is that the accepted version of events (superior German tactics and weapons, internal rot on the French side) is bogus and that the war was winnable for France as early as 1939, is not as radical or revisionist as it sounds, I must admit. The French army (without the BEF or the armed forces of the Low Countries) was by itself bigger and more concentrated than the German, had more tanks, a large number of combat aircraft, and possessed a formiddable defensive weapon in the Maginot Line. Furthermore, it possessed a strategic opportunity in 1939 which it would never have again: with most of Hitler's army in Poland, the rear of Germany was weak and denuded of troops. Maybe a large scale offensive in Germany's rear by British and French forces, regardless of its success or failure, would have caused the jittery anti-Hitler movement to assissinate the Fuhrer and sue for peace; Adolf's grip on the military in 1940 was nowhere near as strong as it was just a year or two later. Furthermore, it was by no means settled that Germany's ultimately successful 'Guderian/Manstein' plan of conquest (Case Yellow) was the version that was going to be used; many German generals as late as 1940 still favored the same hidebound ideas regarding mobile warfare that the French did. Additionally, the author is spot-on when he harps on the weakness of the democractic leadership versus the bold, aggressive leadership of Hitler. Daladier and Chamberlian were as weak and indecisive as kittens next to the Fuhrer, and the man on the street in Paris, London and Berlin knew it. As that anonymous French cab driver was famed to have said back in 1939: "Germany has a man, Italy has a man, Russia has a man...if only we had a man!" Believe me, the perception that your leaders are weak is just as important as whether or not they really are. These suppositions are what makes this book an interesting read even if you disagree with its conclusions. However... The thesis of "Strange Victory" is still a device to make France's Third Republic look less a house of cards waiting to be kicked over than it really was. Where the author goes wrong is (in my opinion) his suppositions about what an offensive French strategy in 1940 could have accomplished and the liklihood of it occurring. On paper, the French had an advantage, but their army was simply not designed for offensive warfare and their mentaility did not suit it. They had trained to fight the last war, not the next one, and it is difficult to imagine them behaving any other way even if history could be repeated. As for the author's opinions on Hitler, I'm not sure his victory in France caused him to assume the military megalomania and penchant for micro-managing his generals that later destroyed him; the fact is, he was displaying it in the Norwegian campaign prior to Case Yellow; it was simply that in 1940, as opposed to later years, his control over the army had not yet achieved master-and-slave levels (he had not fired the C-in-C of the army and taken that job for himself) and he was still compelled to give some deference to the senior staff generals and field commanders. The bottom line is, in 1940 the French collapsed with a switfness that has seldom if ever been seen in a Western power; weak leadership, lack of strategic vision and bad tactics were only part of the problem. By comparison, the Germans did not quit until after six years of war when their country had been not only bombed flat but physically overrun. The character of the civilian population and the soldiers was a big factor, and the fact is the French lacked the character for an uphill fight. The German/Prussian maxim that 'the man is the most important weapon' was, more than any other military theory, what was proven in the "Battle of France."
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Summary: In only six weeks?
Review: May answers this basic question: How could the German forces conquer France so easily? You may disagree with his answer (or at least with dimensions of it) but, nonetheless, he provides an eloquent argument in support of his analysis. Hitler's was indeed a "strange victory" in that it made no sense to those who were fully prepared to fight World War One again. The Maginot Line was as much a mindset as it was a defensive precaution. Perhaps moreso. For military history buffs, especially those with a special interest in World War Two,. this is a "must read."
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Summary: Well off the Mark!
Review: May's book is well written, but his knowledge of one of the key elements which heavily influenced German planning is totally inacurrate. The element is the Maginot Line which is rarely mentioned and not adequately or correctly described. His information about the Maginot Line is largely inaccurate. How can the term Maginot Mentality be used if you truly do not understand what it was or that the Maginot Line allowed the French the opportunity to concentrate their best field armies at the critical front in 1940. He does much better describing inept leadership, but weapons and fortifications heavily influenced the campaign. For that matter he does not emphasize the failure of the French military as seen in the example (not mentioned in the book) of a French armored division going into action on a critical front and failing because its leadership had tried to imitate the German panzer divisions of 1939 whose tactics had changed in 1940. The Maginot Line and battlefield tactics are two critical elements missing or not properly described in this book, but otherwise it is quite interesting and well written.
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Summary: Interesting & Well-Written Look At Fall Of France in 1940
Review: Much of what Harvard historian Ernest May presents in this fascinating and well written book detailing the amazing circumstances surrounding the inexplicably quick defeat of the Allied forces in France at the hands of the Wehrmacht in May and June 0f 1940 is beyond dispute; numerically and technologically the combined forces of the French, British and other forces outgunned and overshadowed their Nazi opponents. Yet in terms of leadership, military philosophy, and a resident willingness to face the true nature of the threat that faced them, they were miserably much more deficient. In this masterfully argued book, Professor May chooses to place most of the stress for this stunning reversal of fortune on the shoulders of the admittedly inept leadership and lack of imagination of the Allied leaders, both military and political. While such an interpretation is indeed hard to argue with, stressing it so prominently tends to belie a welter of complex interacting factors that the author gives short shrift to. For example, anyone familiar with other excellent books detailing the quick defeat and capitulation of the Allied forces such as William Shirer's "The Fall Of The Third Republic" or Phillipe Burrin's "France Under The Germans" understands the massive effect of other salient factors in the collapse of the third republic and the allied forces, factors including reluctance to produce war materials in the midst of the Depression's deprivations, the deeply painful and heartfelt memories associated with the possibility of repeating another bloodbath like that of the "Great War", and the sheer fact that most of the civilized intelligentsia throughout Europe, including those in Germany itself, believed that only a madman would start another such holocaust. Indeed, William Shirer actually lived in both Paris and Berlin during the period in question, and his own explanation of what happened and why is much more complex than is Professor May's. By the way, the fact that Hitler was indeed such a psychopath was not as clear then as it is in retrospect. Therefore, in my opinion, simply laying the blame on the Allies' admittedly execrable failures in leadership and amazing lack of imagination is a reductionistic exercise in describing some quite necessary but certainly not sufficient conditions to explain the stunning reversal the quick Nazi victory represented. All of these factors as well as a general failure of nerve and a shameful moral cowardice on the part of the leaders led to a general discounting of the horrific possibility of another war. This isn't to quibble with the accuracy of the extensive research in the book, nor to take issue with its entertaining and edifying narrative. Rather, it is to contest the author's unnecessarily narrow attribution of cause to the obvious aspects of failures in both civic and military leadership. One need not go far from the case at hand to demonstrate how important factors other than leadership are in determining the outcome of military confrontation. For example, the debacle in Russia during the first year of Operation Barbarossa is largely attributable to a massive failure of imaginative leadership. In many ways one can persuasively argue that the failure of Soviet leadership from Stalin down were far more catastrophic in terms of the defeats and loss of life (given conservative estimates of 6 to 8 million men lost the first year alone) than those in France. Yet the Soviets persevered, often in spite of the terribly inept leadership of the purge-ravaged officer corps of the Soviet military. Clearly, then, there is more to such terrible defeats than a question of leadership. None of this is intended to minimize the value of the book, but rather to pre-warn the reader that the author appears to have an ulterior motive in mind when drawing out his quite persuasive argument. This becomes apparent as he draws some quite stunning parallels between the mindset of the Allied leaders and our own increasingly complacent military trends of our times; for example, the reliance on technological edges, our curious aversion to recognizing casualties are an integral aspect of military operations (a la Kosovo), and the stupefying delays and deferrals contemporary politicians make while searching desperately for easy political solutions to obvious military situations. In this I agree with his conclusions concerning the lessons to be drawn from the fall of France. Indeed, if we are to learn anything from history, it is that the single best way to forestall massive military engagements one must be willing to act quickly and decisively to convince potential foes the risk isn't worth the possible gains. As the late George Santayana said, "those who do not learn the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them". To think otherwise is to court the same kinds of disastrous delusions and wishful thinking that led to the "strange victory" described in the book. Still, Professor May argues (unnecessarily in my opinion) on behalf of an overly simplistic interpretation of the circumstances surrounding the fall of France. Surely any student of the Allies'disastrously consistent acts of appeasement of Chancellor Hitler action in the late 1930s understands the dangers inherent in such a policy. As the good professor contends, it would be even more dangerous for us to not take heed of the lessons he has laid out so clearly for our considerable edification. Enjoy!
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Summary: Germany's Plan Yellow, a green light through France
Review: On May 10, 1940 the German armies under the command of generals Bock in the north and Rundstedt in the Ardennes area, moved forward to carry out Plan Yellow. The invasions of Holland, Belgium and France had begun. Although the allies were caught off guard initially, they were prepared - in the north. The majority of French and British troops were in this area, set up in proper defensive formations anchored by the Maginot Line. The German attack through the Ardenne Forest, with armored divisions, was not expected. It was a complete surprise which turned into a very nasty one when it became apparent that the move in the north was a feint; the major attack was coming through France's unprotected eastern flank. The significance of this battle is immense. It exhibited strategic use of armored divisions; there was the presence of general Rommel and Charles DeGaulle (then a colonel of a tank division); the battle developed into the perfect illustration of the concept of 'Blitzkrieg' or lightning war with a long sweeping knife cut by the Germans through France to the Channel. Further, defeat in this battle destroyed the country, plunging the population into a state of internecine warfare - the establishment of Vichy France as it's ultimate outcome. The frostiness that to this day, occasionally characterizes French-British relationships, can be traced directly to the concluding days of this battle. Far from viewing Dunkirk as a miracle, the French see it as abandonment. This puts the events of May 1940 into perspective and explains why yet another book on the defeat of France is not only to be expected, but welcomed. Especially this one. All of the strategic issues mentioned above are developed by Ernest May in his excellent book. One of the immutable facts of the defeat of France has been that it was as a result of poor generalship, inferior equipment and irresolute behaviour of the army. Mr May will have none of that. The faults lie elsewhere - poor intelligence capabilities on the part of the Allies and inferior command and control, specifically communications. May's assessment is a refreshing example of revisionist history. One area of emphasis in the book is on the development of Plan Yellow. He carefully shows how it changed from it's original conception in the fall of 1939 with inputs from the experienced generals,(especially Manstein), to it's final formulation. Contrasted with this is the French General Gamelin who preferred not to use a general staff to assist with his plans. The actual battle commencing on May 10 through to the collapse of France is also recounted in almost 'first person' level of detail. This is a very useful addition to the long list of books written about those days of darkness.
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Summary: Masterful
Review: Since I had read Ernest May's great The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917, I decided to read this book, tho the subject is one I have read about before: The Ides of May: The Defeat of France May-June 1940, by John Williams, and The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry Into the Fall of France in 1940, by William L. Shirer. Neither of those books can hold a candle to this well-researched and well-written study. May brings new insights into the momentous events of 1938 to 1940, and they provide thought-provoking and well-reasoned answers to questions which have been the subject of study ever since the fall of France. I think May supports well his thesis that with a few different happenings Hitler could have been defeated in 1939 and even in 1940, with a result changing our whole subsequent history. (Incidentally, I question the indication that the book has 384 pages. It has 484 pages of text, 48 pages of footnotes, and a 50 page bibliography.) This is a book you will find well worth reading if the events of the time are of interest to you, and especially if you lived thru them as did I.
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Summary: Notably abbreviated ending...
Review: Something potential readers of this book should be aware of is that May devotes much of his work to analysis and description of the lead-up to the Battle of France, and his treatment of the battle gets more and more condensed as we approach its end: Dunkirk gets all of half of one page, and the period after Dunkirk which saw some of the best fighting by the French against long odds get a mere half-paragraph. In fact, the author himself writes that after the Ardennes breakthrough, "the rest of the story of the Battle of France can be abbreviated." (pg. 434) I found the hasty ending to the book to be quite disappointing, and those looking for any in-depth writing on that half of the battle should look elsewhere.
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Summary: THE VICTORY WAS NOT STRANGE.
Review: STRANGE VICTORY has generated a very nice discussion about the condition of France in 1939-40, its armed forces, French Politics, German Intentions, and counter-factual history. I offer my 2 cents because I have spent decades studying the German WW2 experience. Up until the recent Iraq "police action" by the US Army, the German strategy against France in 1940 stood out as the single most successful major campaign using "blitzkreig warfare." They study that campaign at all the major military schools today. There is still a very strong consensus that the German Army was the finest army in the World in 1940. To see an example, read Van Crevelt's book "Fighting Power" where VC shows why German soldiering was far superior to American or British, man for man. Or, look at the generalship on the German side, Guderian, Hoth, Rommel, Kleist, Reinhardt, Von Rundstedt, etc. The French generals did not want to fight. Instead they played budgetary and career politics with slimy politicians. Gamelin was truly slippery. Lastly, consider the breath-taking nerve of Hitler and his generals in launching Plan Yellow. Long exposed flanks! I see an intriguing point about politics and democracy in the story. The only clear-headed politician, the only risk-taker, the only politician who took proper measure of his enemies, was HITLER. Reading about Reynaud, Darlan, Daladier, Chamberlain and the rest of them was depressing. Democratic politicians lacked nerve, they tried to avoid commitments, they weaseled out of commitments they already made. A sorry record for the democracy. To sum up, it is an interesting book to read, but May has not presented new evidence that could make a serious dent in the pervious consensus about the French v Germans in 1940.
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Summary: Disappointing - Strange Defeat is a Much Better Book
Review: The author argues that the Allies in 1939 the French could have easily driven to the Ruhr and knocked Germany out of the war while the vast bulk of the Wehrmact was tied down in Poland. That scenario is reasonable. However, the autthor's assertion that the Allies in 1940 could have held their own if their best troops met the panzers head on is unconvincing. While he mentions the general lack of radios in Allied tanks, he overlooks other flaws they exhibited - many tanks with one man turrets for one. Imagine being a platoon or company commapnder and trying to control your tanks while also being the loader and gunner of your own vehicle. The two best parts of the book are the sections dealing with the politico-military struglles in Berlin, London & Paris as well as the Allied difficulties with the Belgians; and the Allied (especially French) paranoia about unsecure radion communications and their reliance on messengers and carrier pigeons. A useful, though not great, book which should be read in concert with Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat which still holds up after so many years.
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