Kursk: The German View

Rating:
Summary: Unique Perspective, Well Presented
Review: Author Steve Newton, who is well known to many Civil War students for his books like "Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864," and "Seven Pines," is also a scholar of high merit when it comes to German and Soviet WWII operations. I believe he speaks/reads both languages, and is a firm believer in writing history from the manuscript sources. "Kursk: The German View," is the result of this high standard of excellence he has set for himself.

Students of Operation Barbarossa will find this collection of German material on Kursk indispensable to their study of the campaign. While Glantz and others have carved out a large niche describing the entire action, Newton has opted for a more limited approach, pulling together various high-ranking primary German sources rarely if ever used in their original form.

After a detailed and thoughtful Introduction, Newton presents the edited "papers," adding priceless footnotes and commentary from his deep well of knowledge on the subject. Every German perspective is corps level or close to it. The last 30% or so of the book is a collection of valuable chapters on a wide variety of subjects, all penned by Newton. He is clearly less enamored with German apologists who claim that a few more days would have scored a major tactical and strategic victory. The battle was completely avoidable and should never have been fought. (His insightful chapter on Hoth's orders/intent is worth the price of the book.)

The book's quality of production, editing, etc. is very high. This is a book to buy, read, and put on your shelf. It is definitely a keeper.

Beware: The book is not for neophytes. The detail is deep and the going is often tedious. The maps at the back of the book help wade through the chapters. Stick with it. When you close the book, you will feel a real sense of accomplishment--and know a lot more about Kursk then you knew going in. And the battle will never look quite the same.

Rating:
Summary: Unique Perspective, Well Presented
Review: Author Steve Newton, who is well known to many Civil War students for his books like "Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864," and "Seven Pines," is also a scholar of high merit when it comes to German and Soviet WWII operations. I believe he speaks/reads both languages, and is a firm believer in writing history from the manuscript sources. "Kursk: The German View," is the result of this high standard of excellence he has set for himself.

Students of Operation Barbarossa will find this collection of German material on Kursk indispensable to their study of the campaign. While Glantz and others have carved out a large niche describing the entire action, Newton has opted for a more limited approach, pulling together various high-ranking primary German sources rarely if ever used in their original form.

After a detailed and thoughtful Introduction, Newton presents the edited "papers," adding priceless footnotes and commentary from his deep well of knowledge on the subject. Every German perspective is corps level or close to it. The last 30% or so of the book is a collection of valuable chapters on a wide variety of subjects, all penned by Newton. He is clearly less enamored with German apologists who claim that a few more days would have scored a major tactical and strategic victory. The battle was completely avoidable and should never have been fought. (His insightful chapter on Hoth's orders/intent is worth the price of the book.)

The book's quality of production, editing, etc. is very high. This is a book to buy, read, and put on your shelf. It is definitely a keeper.

Beware: The book is not for neophytes. The detail is deep and the going is often tedious. The maps at the back of the book help wade through the chapters. Stick with it. When you close the book, you will feel a real sense of accomplishment--and know a lot more about Kursk then you knew going in. And the battle will never look quite the same.

Rating:
Summary: The Big Picture as seen by the GermanGenerals
Review: Having waded through the detailed accounts, opinions and viewpoints of the German generals, I was stunned -- and lost; lost because I, just a loader in a German 150 mm Assauly Howitzer Panzer, never knew the Big Picture. Truly eye-opening in may ways and fascinating to the lowly Gefreite.

Having been at the receiving end of a T-34's 76 mm gun, I am missing out on many a thing; as I said, the Big Picture never was mine. What astounds me is the rather poor editing when it comes to the German titles or names: the 1st WSSD, the "Leibstandarte der SS Adolf Hitler" is constantly misspelled (Liebstandarte sounds rather weird in German and could well be misunderstood by persons who are intimately knowledgable in German).

This book is more for scholars accustomed to slogging their way through dry-as-dust recollections that, after all, are sixty years old by now. For those, it is a most valuable addition to accounts by the lower ranking officers and enlisted men. Buy it and treasure it if you are a historian, read it from the public library if you are interested. Forget it if you expect the dirty, muddy, and high-pucker-factor experience of the Landser,

Rating:
Summary: An annotated study of the battle of Kursk
Review: Kursk: The German View by Steven H. Newton (Associate Professor of History, Delaware State University) is an annotated study of the battle of Kursk, fought in the summer of 1943, a crucial struggle and the largest tank battle of World War II. Translating the post-war reports written by German commanders themselves, Kursk: The German View is uniquely insightful and a welcome addition to military history shelves. Also very highly recommended is Professor Newton's German Battle Tactics On The Russian Front 1941-1945 (Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 0887405827, $24.95) and Retreat From Leningrad: Army Group North 1944-1945 (Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 0887408060, $24.95).

Rating:
Summary: What the German generals were thinking
Review: This is a unique book. Newton has collected, translated, and extensively annotated reports of Citadel written by German commanders (mostly corps-level). He also provides extensive footnotes, where he offers analysis, corrections, and insightful commentary.

As such, it is a valuable collection of primary source material and sheds light on many of the command decisions that went into the battle. The primary contribution of the book is to completely strip away any lingering portions of the myth that had the Germans kept pressing they would have won the battle. In fact, the reports plainly show that the Germans were never even close to achieving victory.

Additionally, Newton's notes, analysis, and the reports themselves demonstrate that many of the German failures were due to bad tactical decisions. This convincingly strips away some of the sheen from German tactical commanders, who generally are portrayed in histories as being of uniform excellence. Newton's book shows that some commanders, particularly on the south face, made some extremely poor decisions. The attack of the Panthers in Grossdeutschland's sector gets attention in other sources mainly due to the popularity of that tank and its teething troubles. Newton instead focusses on the poor tactical handling of them, which single-handedly almost derailed all of Grossdeutschland's attack. Poor decisions in Army Group Kempf also get attention (e.g. the dismantling of an infantry division near Belgorod), as do the decisions to delay taking of key hills overlooking Soviet positions until just before the attack (when they could have been useful as artillery observation and intelligence positions). Another valuable addition the book provides is that the German command had from the start planned to "turn" units attacking the southern face to the north-east prior to proceeding north, in order to deal with expected arrivals of Soviet reserves. This lead to the clash at Prokhorovka, which thus was not necessarily "unexpected" by the Germans. The problem for the Germans turned out to be a lack of infantry divisions as well as the slow progress of Army Group Kempf. The reports also reveal the failure of using increased artillery, airpower, and new armored vehicles to make up for the deficiencies in infantry units.

Newton's book also hammers home the point that Citadel was doomed, particularly in the north, because the 9th Army had insufficient protection on its flanks. When the Soviet offensive was launched against the Orel sector, 9th Army was immediately forced on the defensive (it had already bogged down anyway). Soviet offensives in the south forced the application of the few German reserves (including the SS Wiking Division), thus sucking them away from being able to reinforce Citadel. Newton's book leaves the reader with the clear impression that German tactics were flawed in many respects, that the Soviets were able to disrupt the flow of the attack, and that the Germans were never near accomplishing the goals of Citadel, even though units in the south did continue to press northward after meeting the 5th Guards Tank Army in front of Prokhorovka. An excellent book to accompany the Soviet General Staff Study, but not one for the general reader as Newton's book assumes familiarity with the details of the battle.

Rating:
Summary: What the German generals were thinking
Review: This is a unique book. Newton has collected, translated, and extensively annotated reports of Citadel written by German commanders (mostly corps-level). He also provides extensive footnotes, where he offers analysis, corrections, and insightful commentary.

As such, it is a valuable collection of primary source material and sheds light on many of the command decisions that went into the battle. The primary contribution of the book is to completely strip away any lingering portions of the myth that had the Germans kept pressing they would have won the battle. In fact, the reports plainly show that the Germans were never even close to achieving victory.

Additionally, Newton's notes, analysis, and the reports themselves demonstrate that many of the German failures were due to bad tactical decisions. This convincingly strips away some of the sheen from German tactical commanders, who generally are portrayed in histories as being of uniform excellence. Newton's book shows that some commanders, particularly on the south face, made some extremely poor decisions. The attack of the Panthers in Grossdeutschland's sector gets attention in other sources mainly due to the popularity of that tank and its teething troubles. Newton instead focusses on the poor tactical handling of them, which single-handedly almost derailed all of Grossdeutschland's attack. Poor decisions in Army Group Kempf also get attention (e.g. the dismantling of an infantry division near Belgorod), as do the decisions to delay taking of key hills overlooking Soviet positions until just before the attack (when they could have been useful as artillery observation and intelligence positions). Another valuable addition the book provides is that the German command had from the start planned to "turn" units attacking the southern face to the north-east prior to proceeding north, in order to deal with expected arrivals of Soviet reserves. This lead to the clash at Prokhorovka, which thus was not necessarily "unexpected" by the Germans. The problem for the Germans turned out to be a lack of infantry divisions as well as the slow progress of Army Group Kempf. The reports also reveal the failure of using increased artillery, airpower, and new armored vehicles to make up for the deficiencies in infantry units.

Newton's book also hammers home the point that Citadel was doomed, particularly in the north, because the 9th Army had insufficient protection on its flanks. When the Soviet offensive was launched against the Orel sector, 9th Army was immediately forced on the defensive (it had already bogged down anyway). Soviet offensives in the south forced the application of the few German reserves (including the SS Wiking Division), thus sucking them away from being able to reinforce Citadel. Newton's book leaves the reader with the clear impression that German tactics were flawed in many respects, that the Soviets were able to disrupt the flow of the attack, and that the Germans were never near accomplishing the goals of Citadel, even though units in the south did continue to press northward after meeting the 5th Guards Tank Army in front of Prokhorovka. An excellent book to accompany the Soviet General Staff Study, but not one for the general reader as Newton's book assumes familiarity with the details of the battle.

Rating:
Summary: Amazing
Review: Warning - this book is not for the "casual" WWII reader. The detailled account of the Kursk battle & the depth of its analysis require more than a fair knowledge of the Eastern front, of military terminology, of both german and soviet armies and some solid technical knowledge of the weapons used during Barbarossa. If you qualify as such a reader, this book is a must have. If you are "new" to the subject - yet still intrested - I recommended buying "Images of Kursk" by Nik Cornish, which is an easier read, and a good introduction.