Rating: 
Summary: Decent Overview
Review: The Iraq War is a decent overview of the recent war in Iraq. It's strongest points are made in the early chapters where the authors attempt to put the war in context. "Origins of War" and "The Opposing Sides" are the best summaries I've seen on the build up and causes of the war -- from Saddam's duplicity to the UNs fecklessness, Murray and Scales provide an outstanding background as to why war occurred. The summary on the ground war was adequate, while the chapter on the air war was relatively weak and uninspired. The most disappointing aspect of the book was its lack of insightful post-war analysis and impact of the war on our future military capabilities.But, all in all, the book is a good read and well worth the cost for the outstanding pre-war analysis.
Rating:
Summary: Decent Overview
Review: The Iraq War is a decent overview of the recent war in Iraq. It's strongest points are made in the early chapters where the authors attempt to put the war in context. "Origins of War" and "The Opposing Sides" are the best summaries I've seen on the build up and causes of the war -- from Saddam's duplicity to the UNs fecklessness, Murray and Scales provide an outstanding background as to why war occurred. The summary on the ground war was adequate, while the chapter on the air war was relatively weak and uninspired. The most disappointing aspect of the book was its lack of insightful post-war analysis and impact of the war on our future military capabilities. But, all in all, the book is a good read and well worth the cost for the outstanding pre-war analysis.
Rating: 
Summary: Compact, Objective, and Informative
Review: There are already too many books on the Iraq War, but this compact and mostly objective history is the best of the bunch if you are looking for a quick and factual overview from the purely military perspective. Other books treat individual events in greater depth, or take stronger (often controversial) positions on the issues, or provide deeper analysis of the thicket of surrounding issues. But none does as good a job at covering the basic facts of the military operations. If you are looking for an informed and clear-headed account of the military operations of the Iraq War without the encumbrance of ideology or political agendas start here. What analysis this book does contain is provided in a separate chapter at the end of the book and consists exclusively of clear-headed and balanced insights into the military lessons (many of which are bitter pills) of the war. The only real shortcoming of this book is that it is so understated. Events that loomed large in the hysterical real-time media coverage of the war (the firefight at the overpasses on the approach to Baghdad, the Jessica Lynch "rescue") are all given their proper place in the context of the overall strategic situation. As a result, it is easy to miss important clarifications (e.g. the extent to which the disorientation of the maintenance convoy that was attacked at An Nasiriyah was an almost inevitable consequence of the Coalition plan and the speed with which it was executed), though the implications are clearly spelled out (support units need better close-combat training). Like many history books published by non-specialty presses, this one suffers from a lack of maps and diagrams. The few maps that are provided, though colorful, are not tied to the text and convey very little information. There are also no organizational charts provided, which is particularly frustrating given the difficulty of following who did what in a campaign that involved so many ad hoc formations. But these are minor issues. Overall this book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what happened in Iraq in 2003 -- and the military implications for the years ahead.
Rating: 
Summary: A good book.
Review: This is a easy to read book about the Bushs' family latest war for oil..err...WMDs. The authors have written an objective book about what went on over in Iraq from March 2003 to April 2003. It is an engrossing read and worth every penny. The one glaring error in the whole book is when the authors are writing about Desert Storm. They write that LTG Fred Franks commanded V Corps in Germany and Desert Storm. This is wrong. LTG Fred Franks commanded VII Corps in Germany and Desert Storm. Other than that this book is well written and worth every penny.
Rating:
Summary: Lessons To Be Learned
Review: This novel is a solid and very informative overview of the war with Iraq, including a review of the earlier Desert Storm campaign and some reflections on the 12 years of containment and attrition the U.S. and the United Kingdom engaged in against Saddam Hussein. Murray, one of the best military historians of our generation, and Scales, a retired Army major general and one of the leading intellectuals on the art of war and technological change, combine to give this book an enormous chronicle of warfare contemplation. A wide range of personal relationships also allowed the authors to interview many of the key participants immediately following the battles. The Iraq War captures the audacity and daring of General Franks' campaign plan and the persistent boldness with which it was executed. Also emphasized is the fact that the component commanders truly understood Franks' intent and, when in doubt, took risks and kept pushing the envelope for more speed and more surprise. There are no gigantic revelations in the authors' account of Operation Iraqi Freedom and their assessment of what worked and what didn't; however, they highlight some principles that every sophisticated American should reflect upon when thinking about our future national security policies. Several of these principles are covered in the remainder of this review. Murray and Scales signify the human element in war and the stunning mismatch in technology, training, experience, and professionalism between the coalition and the Iraqis. But once the fighting shifted into the existing guerilla phase, most of those advantages lost much of their force. An implicit contrast is drawn between the Marine Corps system of every member being a rifleman and every convoy being expected to protect itself and the very different Army model of inadequately trained non-combat soldiers being protected by combat forces. It is clear from their outline of events that the Marine Corps progress through the inhabited areas was actually much more challengeable than the third division's drive through the desert. This is not to minimize the extraordinary speed and drive of the Army's flanking maneuver, but it does raise an interesting question about examining more carefully the Marine Corps doctrine for urban warfare (and their practice of policing areas with the support of local people). The authors report favorably on the subtle, intelligence-led British effort to capture Basra with minimum casualties to the Shia and the way in which this effort made policing the city much easier. Americans could gain an education from the British in the art of policing potentially hostile people. The largest intelligence failure of the war was our underestimation of the power of the Baathist secret police and the torture system they employed to force others to continue fighting against us. This mistake was compounded by the fact that we didn't comprehend the bitterness that the Shia people had harbored toward us since 1991. In that year, they rebelled at what they thought was President George H.W. Bush's suggestion and then 50,000 were slaughtered by Saddam's forces, while the U.S. did nothing. In the early stages of the Iraq war, these people were restrained by a palpable fear that we would not persist, and they would not risk helping us until they were confident that our troops were there for the duration. The role of the Syrians and other hostile forces is undeniably clear. One example cited is "the enemy was far more skilled ... Hornbuckle was later to learn that most of the attacking fedayeen were not Iraqis but Syrian jihadists who had made the trip to Baghdad specifically to kill Americans; out of the thirty POWs captured on Curly, twenty-eight were Syrians." (p. 215) This and other references raise not only the question of why the Syrian dictatorship was allowing them to enter Iraq but also speculate where these enemies were being trained, since it their training was clearly superior to that of their Iraqi counterparts. A succinct description of the second campaign requirements to rebuild a new system of safety, health, prosperity, and freedom are worth being read by every American:
"Success in this new war will not be gauged by how many Republican Guard tanks are destroyed but by the less tangible and quantifiable measurement of people's acceptance of a new Iraqi leadership. Attitudes will be influenced less by demonstrations of fighting strength than by the emotional security that comes from safe streets, employment, electricity and fresh water. ... wars are conducted by human beings for political ends."
(p. 237) Every informed American should read this book to place their embedded memories of specific events into the larger context of the two campaigns of the war. The first campaign we won brilliantly. The second, we are now engaged in. We should make sure that we learn from these campaigns and apply our learned knowledge to the next time.
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