In Retrospect : The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam

Rating:
Summary: McNamara is still deluding himself
Review: AS an amateur historian on Vietnam, I grabbed this book right away. I thought a man as smart as McNamara would finally spill the beans after all these years. However sincere his aplogies in the beginning and ends of the book, the entire read seems as if it is nothing but a complicated rationalization for the tragedy. It offers no new insights in to the decisions or the main players in the tragedy, and even the lessons i nthe end of the book seem painfully obvious (Though not always followed) to any student of foreign policy. Though McNamara undoubtedly adds some interesting footnotes to history, this book adds little to the existing literature. Halberstam's THe Best and the Brightest, Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, Karnow's Vietnam, and Frances Fitzgerald's Fire In the Lake look better than ever. Read one of those instead, leave this book on the shelf where it belongs. It may have been therapeutic for its author, but it offers us little.

Rating:
Summary: Disappointing
Review: As an avid history book reader, "In Retrospective: the tragedy ..." was a real deception. This book was written with the sole purpose of deceiving the american public opinion. It is well known that Ho Chi Minh had early contacts with the american intelligence agencies during WWII and probably the Viet Cong was a creation of America as an instrument to decolonize French Indochina. How Mr. McNamara dare to say that the entire campaign was a big misunderstanding that drove America to a long war of attrition. It is too late to asume responsabilities but don't asume it in such a way.

Rating:
Summary: Deeply disappointing
Review: As an historian who has studied and taught the Vietnam War, I was deeply disappointed in this book. Robert McNamara is a very intelligent man, which makes it worse. Why the disappointment? As Secretary of State, McNamara had access to excellent information, yet he writes as if he has only recently discovered information that was readily available during the war. I was hoping there was more to the story than willful ignorance.

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Summary: Reevaluation of Fact or Reaction to New Political Winds?
Review: As Secretary of Defense, McNamara soiled virtually everything he touched, in and out of Vietnam. Our military didn't recover from his mind numbing approaches until late in the Carter or early in the Reagan administrations. In this faux profound confessional, McNamara now suggests that he was a victim after all and was, at most, mistaken. Think for a moment if he isn't still mistaken today -- it's something that he is very good at and has never departed from for long. I would suggest an alternative explanation: instead of doing tricks for his old master, Lyndon Johnson, in bungling the Vietnam war, McNamara is now on his hind legs begging for treats in the form of acceptance from a new group of Marxist chic celebrities and editorialists during his Martha's Vineyard summers. One needn't belong to Mensa to infer that McNamara's bad judgment and sycophancy of the 60's hasn't suddenly evaporated, but simply changed directions in a "Road to Damascus" conversion. Seldom in American history has a single individual had such a pathologic influence on our nation. Even one of the easy analogies, that to Benedict Arnold, is inapt, because Arnold was a brave, dedicated and successful general for some years before he went bad. Anyone who believes that McNamara has suddenly found or is suddenly speaking some profound truth need only look at his track record. If he fooled us once, shame on him; if he fools the American public now, shame on us!

Rating:
Summary: Politically Informative
Review: As someone who knew very little about the Vietnam war, I found this book to be informative in the chronology of many of the events leading up to the war's escalation. However, not only does this account stop at 1968, but McNamara comes off somewhat righteous regarding the part he played in the politics of the war. He says he was responsible for not doing more to prevent the US from getting more deeply involved, prevent escalation, or end it. However, he sticks to his belief that he always wanted to do the right thing; it was everyone else who wanted escalation. He only left the Johnson administration after the President stopped listening to him and essentially fired him.

I suspect David Halberstam's "The Best & The Brightest" is a much better account of the war. It's next on my list.

Rating:
Summary: Provides insight
Review: Everything is much clearer in retrospect. This book reveals the thinking behind the decisions about the war, and how mistaken it was, given what we now know.

Rating:
Summary: A must to better understand the quagmire that was Vietnam
Review: For anyone wishing to better understand the Vietnam War this is a must read. As usual McNamara fills his book with tables and statistics that tend to support his view of Vietnam. Boiled down to its utmost simplicity there are really only several points of controversy in Vietnam. 1. The strategy as promulgated by the General Westmoreland (known as "Westy" by McNamara) was A. Let the South Vietnamese troops basically provide security in the villages and Hamlets, and have US Troops (sometimes assisted by those few South Vietnamese military units that were well organized and disciplined) engage in "Search and Destroy" missions. This was essentially the "war of attrition" philosophy. This was contrasted by the philosphy of having US troops guaranty security of the hamlets and villages so as to encourage the South Vietnamese to cooperate with the South Vietnamese Government. This philosophy was promoted by the United States Marines, primarily Lt. General Victor Krulak as described in his book, "First To Fight", a book not about Vietnam as such but about the Marine Corps. Krulak believes that Gen. Westmoreland's strategy was thus fundamentally flawed and I agree with him. 2.The second major point was that the "military's hands were tied" by McNamara and the President in that it was forbidden to fight in North Vietnam and the concurrent refusal to cut off the supply of military material to the North Vietnamese by bombing and mining the port of Haiphong and hitting other shipping and communications facilities in North Vietnam. On this important point it is vital for the reader to understand that neither North or South Vietnam hadd any material manufacturing abiltiy. All of North Vietnams military material came from either Russia or China or their allies. McNamara's point is that the bombing of Haiphong and other points would have not worked anyway due to the relatively small amount of material need to sustain the North Vietnamese regulars and the Vietcong. North Vietnam has large manpower willing to virtually carry supplies on his back to supply its own troops and the Vietcong. If Haiphong was cut off certainly the supplies would be sent through rail links to China. This point is crucial. McNamara and the President delieved that by bombing Haiphong and other points China and perhaps Russia would directly enter the war. Nobody now can know if that is true. What does seem to make sense is that McNamara's point that the bombing would not work as supplies would still flow into North and South Vietnam in amounts sufficient to maintain both the North Vietnamese regulars and the Vietcong. Another point brought out in McNamara's book is how close we came to use nuclear and biological weapons as proposed by the United States Military in their plan to bomb and mine Haiphong and other points. This account of nuclear weapons use was recently declassied and it is truly scary how close nuclear weapons night have been used. No one of course knows that even if nuclear weapons were used what would have happened. McNamara does not deny that both he and the President did not want to use nuclear or chemical weapons because of the risks involved of the third world war. I agree that such a decision, made at the time was right. 3. McNamara further points out that the Vietnam war was doomed from the get go because of the lack of a strong, popularly supported government in South Vietnam. This obvious point is true. I believe that the only way the South Vietnamese people would have ever supported government would have been to provide security to the villages and hamlets by following the philosophy of Marine General Victor Krulak and his ilk. There is no doubt that McNamara was right. Without popular support the Vietnam war was doomed from the start. The last important point is that if McNamara thought the Vietnam war was doomed from the start and as McNamara points out that there were specific points that the United States should have pulled out why did he not say so. If McNamara felt as strong as he did about the unwinability of the war why did he not resign and say so. If McNamara did take such action what effect would it have on the future conduct of the war after McNamara resigned in protest. No one knows of course. NcNamara points out that his philosophy is that such action is just not right. McNamara feels that cabinet members owe their loyalty to the President and not anybody or anything else. This is where McNamara and I differ. McNamara points out that ours is not a parliamentary system as in England where the cabinet ministers revolt and call a new elections as recently did happen in England. This may be true but I believe that McNamara is wrong. The duty anyone owes is to the people of the United States and its Constitution and not to any one person even if that person is the President. The best example of a cabinet officer to resign in protest was that of Attorney General Elliot Richardson when he resigned in protest in the so called "Saturday Night Massacre". This is an important point and it should not be forgotten. It must be further pointed out that when McNamara "resigned, or quit" there were approximately 20,000 American dead. When the war ended in 1972/73 the total American dead was 58,000. McNamara resignation may have preventeed at least some of those 38,000 Americans who came not in glory but in body bags. Unusual in most books is that McNamara prints both favorable and unfavorable reviews and point by point answers his critics. One may not agree with McNamara but at the very least this book should be read to better understand all the actors points of view at the time. I would like to point out two upcoming events that anybody wishing to further understand Vietnam is that as this review is being written there is conference being held in Hanoi with McNamara and North Vietnamese military officials on the Vietnam War. This is the first time that meetings have happened at this level. The second event is a book which I have not read that is being pubished July 1, 1997 called "Dereliction of Duty" by H. R. McMaster. From the publishers hype this also appears another book to be read. Bernard Barton([e-mail])

Rating:
Summary: The Road to Hell is Paved With Good Intentions
Review: For every person who has ever asked, "How did we ever get into Vietnam," former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's book, "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam," is a must read. In it, Mr. McNamara details clearly what actions American government leaders took at each phase of the conflict, why they did what they did, the assumptions their actions were based upon, and why, in retrospect, their actions were wrong. Their intentions were indeed pure: prevent the spread of communism world wide. However, the result of their actions was to uninitentially plunge two nations at opposite ends of the economic spectrum into the hell that was Vietnam.

Throughout, Mr. McNamara takes full responsibility for his actions or inactions, something no one else has ever done. He also does an outstanding job of describing the cold war mentatlity that that made South Vietnam seem worth the sacrifice of so many millions of lives and so many billions of dollars. In short, it seemed that the loss of Vietnam would start the fall of nations, like dominos, ending perhaps at the shores of the United States itself. It seemed there was adequate reason to think that given the rape of Eastern Europe by the Soviets after WWII, the stalemate in Korea, the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, and Soviet Premier Kruschev's bellicose statement, "We will bury you,!" and the national hysteria caused by McCarthyism. McNamara and Company made their decisions accordingly. The present and future generations that did not and will not grow up under a nuclear shaped cloud called the, "Cold War," will benefit from reading this account as virtually all decisions were made under these assumptions for over 40 years.

Mr. McNamara ends his work with a blueprint for future international relations based on the changing economic and political situations emerging worldwide. His assertions that American ability to shape the world in our own image is now gone and that domestic spending programs are as essential for our security as military spending are deserving of serious study.

The Holy Bible says in the book of Proverbs, Chapter 20, Verse 29, "The glory of young men is their strength; of old men, their experience." Future leaders would do well to heed this "old man's" advise, borne of hard experience. In a world now characterized by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of increasingly radical groups, we can afford to do no less.

Rating:
Summary: Bad, bad, bad
Review: For me reading this book was a real disappointment. To me, it sounds very naive, coming from a person who was in one of the highest positions in the US government. It sounds like the truth is absent from its pages. Lets write another one but more realistic. This one is a mix of history, biography, novel and science fiction.

Rating:
Summary: revisionist at best and close to fiction
Review: For those people who want the truth about the Vietnam war, read -"Shadows of Power" by Perloff. This book is revisionist at best and comes close to fiction. Mc Namara engineered the war and forced it on LBJ who was naive. LBJ had those Council on Foreign Affairs (CFR) idiots advising him. Connolly advised LBJ to get rid of McNamara and all of them. The difference between Kennedy and LBJ was that Kennedy was going to pull out of Vietnam when he was assassinated. This fact was omitted and revised in the book. Also, JFK was limiting the power of the Federal Reserve and dismantling the CIA because of what they did to him at the Bay of Pigs. This was also revised somewhat. These facts may have been why he was assassinated. Mc Namara tried to foster the same lie on a C-Span book review. He was humiliated on that show for being a liar and revisionist for stating that he wanted to pull out of Vietnam in the LBJ period - a lie among others in his recently published book. LBJ did a great deal with his Great Society and had vision. His only mistake was listening to the "wise men" (CFR). There are many facts that are still unknown but after reading some books - one can connect the dots. LBJ was manipulated by the elitist CFR and the establishment. I can only surmise that the reasons were multi-fold. To foster a one world govt. and prove to the communists that we would fight a stupid war and sacrifice 58k Americans for nothing - are two of the reasons. In short, every American should educate himself on this subject. There is a great deal of policy that we are paying for to this day. The CFR was also behind the Marshall plan. Marshall was the fastest rising general ever in the history of America. It's noteworthy that he never did anything to deserve that position except be the puppet of the CFR and Dean Acheson. A great deal like Johnson, Truman was also naive and listened to them because he did not like Mc Arthur. So, they gave away all of eastern Europe and Asia to the communists - a problem that we are still paying for. Ho Chi Minn and Chaing Kai Shek were backed by the Americans in WWII. We cut aid to them at shortly after the end of the war and unleashed the French on Vietnam as compensation for rebuilding of France after WWII. Ho Chi Minn had no choice but to embrace the communists. All this because of Acheson and Mc Namara, CFR elitists.