Shadow Warriors : The Covert War in Korea

Rating:
Summary: Theater of War Extends Well Beyond the Battlefield
Review: Breuer, William B. Shadow Warriors
The Covert War in Korea DS 921.5 S7 B74 1996

The well published Mr. Breuer--he boasts 23 other war-related texts-- has quite a talent for writing gripping text. Readers will find alot about the Korean War here not described in other books. There is a detailed description of the myriad of deceptive tactics employed by the North Koreans to distract attention from their imminent attack in the Seoul Corridor. Several chapters describe the preparations for the Inchon landing. Operation Trudy Jackson, using surveillance garnered from the small island of Yonghung, twelve miles south of Inchon, gathered vital data on troop strength, tidal ranges, placement of enemy mines, etc. I am eternally grateful to Breuer for finally translating "Wolmi-Do" as 'moon tip island'. (By the way, sunset and moonset over the Yellow Sea are a joy to behold]

Breuer is a bit confusing when he talks simultaneously about Inchon being a 'secret', while soldiers in Pusan, Japan, and the US referred to it as Operation Common Knowledge. Not only had the Chinese wargamed an Inchon landing as a possibility (and never informed the North Koreans they had done so), but the NY Times itself ran an article suggesting the idea in its September 14, 1950 edition. Breuer acknowledges this, but then shifts his focus to the disinformation campaign designed to fool the North Koreans the landing would be at Kunsan. I think his point should be to make clear that secrets are hard to keep and it is best to sew confusion to obscure your true intentions.

Breuer says the damage done by the Philby/Maclean/Burgess spy ring was primarily leaks of UN battle plans in North Korea, especially the restrictions placed on MacArthur. The Chinese knew they did not have to worry about another amphibious landing, for example. (Even when Van Fleet wanted a series of amphibious assaults up Korea's east coast, it was shot down-- the US had decided on a limited war.) Although the spies did their best to hide evidence of planned Chinese intervention, enough evidence was available from Commanders on the ground, and through other channels (such as the Indian Ambassador).

Other intelligence operations had a mixed outcome. The Li-mi project, an attempt to distract and tie down Chinese Communist armies in Yunan Province, was largely a failure. The US missed a major propoganda coup when they failed to publicize that smallpox raged in the devastated Chinese/North Korean territory. Ironically, it was the US that later suffered a barrage of Communist accusations about 'biological warfare.' The North Koreans constantly deceived US aerial reconnaisance into thinking major damage had been inflicted on roads, bridges, tunnels, and supply convoys.
The authors references to spy operations in Manchuria are interesting but sketchy and incomplete. Readers looking for cloak-and-dagger intrigue in Manchuria might want to read Lawrence Gardella's "Sing a Song to Jenny Next," instead. And the elaborate preparations to kidnap Syngman Rhee--who was dismayed at the US's willingness to accept a permanent division of the Peninsula-- make amusing reading for those aware of the crosscurrents of loyalty vs. pragmatism in the Cold War era.

Some spy operations pay off in ways that are unanticipated. Such was the outcome of operation Moolah, which offered a hundred grand to any communist who landed a MIG-15 at Kimpo airport. Two months after the War was over, North Korean Air Force Captain Ro Kum Suk did exactly that

Rating:
Summary: Theater of War Extends Well Beyond the Battlefield
Review: Breuer, William B. Shadow Warriors
The Covert War in Korea DS 921.5 S7 B74 1996

The well published Mr. Breuer--he boasts 23 other war-related texts-- has quite a talent for writing gripping text. Readers will find alot about the Korean War here not described in other books. There is a detailed description of the myriad of deceptive tactics employed by the North Koreans to distract attention from their imminent attack in the Seoul Corridor. Several chapters describe the preparations for the Inchon landing. Operation Trudy Jackson, using surveillance garnered from the small island of Yonghung, twelve miles south of Inchon, gathered vital data on troop strength, tidal ranges, placement of enemy mines, etc. I am eternally grateful to Breuer for finally translating "Wolmi-Do" as 'moon tip island'. (By the way, sunset and moonset over the Yellow Sea are a joy to behold]

Breuer is a bit confusing when he talks simultaneously about Inchon being a 'secret', while soldiers in Pusan, Japan, and the US referred to it as Operation Common Knowledge. Not only had the Chinese wargamed an Inchon landing as a possibility (and never informed the North Koreans they had done so), but the NY Times itself ran an article suggesting the idea in its September 14, 1950 edition. Breuer acknowledges this, but then shifts his focus to the disinformation campaign designed to fool the North Koreans the landing would be at Kunsan. I think his point should be to make clear that secrets are hard to keep and it is best to sew confusion to obscure your true intentions.

Breuer says the damage done by the Philby/Maclean/Burgess spy ring was primarily leaks of UN battle plans in North Korea, especially the restrictions placed on MacArthur. The Chinese knew they did not have to worry about another amphibious landing, for example. (Even when Van Fleet wanted a series of amphibious assaults up Korea's east coast, it was shot down-- the US had decided on a limited war.) Although the spies did their best to hide evidence of planned Chinese intervention, enough evidence was available from Commanders on the ground, and through other channels (such as the Indian Ambassador).

Other intelligence operations had a mixed outcome. The Li-mi project, an attempt to distract and tie down Chinese Communist armies in Yunan Province, was largely a failure. The US missed a major propoganda coup when they failed to publicize that smallpox raged in the devastated Chinese/North Korean territory. Ironically, it was the US that later suffered a barrage of Communist accusations about 'biological warfare.' The North Koreans constantly deceived US aerial reconnaisance into thinking major damage had been inflicted on roads, bridges, tunnels, and supply convoys.
The authors references to spy operations in Manchuria are interesting but sketchy and incomplete. Readers looking for cloak-and-dagger intrigue in Manchuria might want to read Lawrence Gardella's "Sing a Song to Jenny Next," instead. And the elaborate preparations to kidnap Syngman Rhee--who was dismayed at the US's willingness to accept a permanent division of the Peninsula-- make amusing reading for those aware of the crosscurrents of loyalty vs. pragmatism in the Cold War era.

Some spy operations pay off in ways that are unanticipated. Such was the outcome of operation Moolah, which offered a hundred grand to any communist who landed a MIG-15 at Kimpo airport. Two months after the War was over, North Korean Air Force Captain Ro Kum Suk did exactly that

Rating:
Summary: Exhilarating for any fan of military intrigue
Review: In June 1950, North Korean communist soldiers crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. The United States' stance against global communism would endure its first bloody test. Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea documents the high level clandestine operations that encompassed the "Forgotten" War in the Far East. Breuer reveals that perilous cloak-and-dagger operations were equally common on both sides of the conflict. Whether it be evidence supporting direct Soviet military involvement in Korea or CIA operations deep into the Chinese mainland, Breuer writes with a flair that hooks the fan of political intrigue while presenting enough historical detail to satisfy the avid military historian.

Upon perusing Breuer's notes, most of his book is based upon memoirs of top-level officials in the Korean conflict and author interviews with key players. Nevertheless, further government documentation appears warranted to support the author's arguments. However, Shadow Warriors is highly entertaining as a work of literature and most informative into a realm of military history of which most casual historians are unaware.

Rating:
Summary: misuse of the facts
Review: on page 228, chapter 30, the author quoted that a Communist official said " You are a turtle egg!" This is a fact, but it happend on Nov 14, 1951(ref: "Truce Tent and Fighting Front", US Army Offical Korean War History), not in the spring of 1953 as the author claimed.

This seems small but the whole book thus becomes questionable.

Rating:
Summary: misuse of the facts
Review: on page 228, chapter 30, the author quoted that a Communist official said " You are a turtle egg!" This is a fact, but it happend on Nov 14, 1951(ref: "Truce Tent and Fighting Front", US Army Offical Korean War History), not in the spring of 1953 as the author claimed.

This seems small but the whole book thus becomes questionable.

Rating:
Summary: Is it the truth? Who knows...
Review: Special oeprations in the Korean War is a new/interesting subject for me. I've read quite a bit about Vietnam and post-Vietnam special ops stuff but this was my first text on the Korean War. Unfortunately, even if what is contained in this text is true...I have serious reservations about this text. This book is written with such a slant that it almost sounds like early 80's anti-communist propaganda!!!

For one thing, it constantly uses racial slurs to make the North Koreans, Chinese, Russians and the Japanese(?) sound like monsters or sub-human. It continues to wave flags about how great the Western "democratic" forces were and how evil the Communists were. Now I'm not making a judgement call here, but I think I can make up my own mind if facts are presented as objectively as possible...I'm not 2 years old and have to be told what is good or evil.

If that's not enough for you, the language used to describe operations is repetitive and dull.

I now see why this is "bargain price" book. Find something else. You'll thank me later.