Rating: 
Summary: Very Good
Review: Probably the definitive book on the Hoplite, and his ordeal in combat. It's a shame this book is not available; I'm glad I bought it way back whenever I did (I was only able recently to pick it up and finish it). It's well-researched... some parts and quotes I found to be quite repetitive, however, I guess the author needed to make his points. Presents excellent and what I found to be unique viewpoints and theories... I learned so much from it.
Rating: 
Summary: Easy reading
Review: The author certainly has an in-depth knowledge of the subject. His style of writing is also very accessible, the main drawback is the continious repetition of items in almost every consecutive chapter. You get the impression that the same content could have been presented in a book with half the amount of pages. It is very good for light bed-time reading, though.
Rating: 
Summary: The cultural genesis of limited war?
Review: The other reviews on this book have covered more than I could say. This book, for me at least, led to an eye opening "paradigm shift" in European military history prior to WWI. What I saw in this book was the beginnings of cultural obsession with limited warfare for limited gains (as opposed to the later conepts of total war) which dominated western Europe for millenia. Hence, the Western historians' fascination with "decisive" battles which, ultimately, led not to any decisive change in political or cultural institutions (after all, did Waterloo really change French institutions that much?).Immediately after reading this book, I read "The Devil's Horseman", a history of the Mongol "Invasion" (it was actually a reconnaisance in force) of Europe. I was struck by the baffelment of the Europeans when, after defeat at the hands of the Mongols, they were not offered some sort of terms of surrender. It struck me, after reading Dr. Hansen's work, that the ancient Greeks had passed on much more to Western society than philosophy, trigonometry, or democracy; they had also passed on an idea of limited warfare for concessions rather than absolute destruction of the enemy and the removal of his capacity to resist. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in military history; it is well written (although dry at times), and will provide a new viewpoint from which to consider when reading new books or re-reading old favorites. For the insight alone, it is well worth the investment.
Rating:
Summary: The cultural genesis of limited war?
Review: The other reviews on this book have covered more than I could say. This book, for me at least, led to an eye opening "paradigm shift" in European military history prior to WWI. What I saw in this book was the beginnings of cultural obsession with limited warfare for limited gains (as opposed to the later conepts of total war) which dominated western Europe for millenia. Hence, the Western historians' fascination with "decisive" battles which, ultimately, led not to any decisive change in political or cultural institutions (after all, did Waterloo really change French institutions that much?). Immediately after reading this book, I read "The Devil's Horseman", a history of the Mongol "Invasion" (it was actually a reconnaisance in force) of Europe. I was struck by the baffelment of the Europeans when, after defeat at the hands of the Mongols, they were not offered some sort of terms of surrender. It struck me, after reading Dr. Hansen's work, that the ancient Greeks had passed on much more to Western society than philosophy, trigonometry, or democracy; they had also passed on an idea of limited warfare for concessions rather than absolute destruction of the enemy and the removal of his capacity to resist. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in military history; it is well written (although dry at times), and will provide a new viewpoint from which to consider when reading new books or re-reading old favorites. For the insight alone, it is well worth the investment.
Rating:
Summary: The cultural genesis of limited war?
Review: The other reviews on this book have covered more than I could say. This book, for me at least, led to an eye opening "paradigm shift" in European military history prior to WWI. What I saw in this book was the beginnings of cultural obsession with limited warfare for limited gains (as opposed to the later conepts of total war) which dominated western Europe for millenia. Hence, the Western historians' fascination with "decisive" battles which, ultimately, led not to any decisive change in political or cultural institutions (after all, did Waterloo really change French institutions that much?). Immediately after reading this book, I read "The Devil's Horseman", a history of the Mongol "Invasion" (it was actually a reconnaisance in force) of Europe. I was struck by the baffelment of the Europeans when, after defeat at the hands of the Mongols, they were not offered some sort of terms of surrender. It struck me, after reading Dr. Hansen's work, that the ancient Greeks had passed on much more to Western society than philosophy, trigonometry, or democracy; they had also passed on an idea of limited warfare for concessions rather than absolute destruction of the enemy and the removal of his capacity to resist. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in military history; it is well written (although dry at times), and will provide a new viewpoint from which to consider when reading new books or re-reading old favorites. For the insight alone, it is well worth the investment.
Rating:
Summary: Greek military practice underpins western cultural sucess.
Review: This book makes a convincing argument for the role of decisive battle in the development of western culture. Because their armies of small farmers had to return home for harvest; the Greek city-states waged wars of unprecedented brutality to win quick victories. This logic was passed on to the rest of Europe through Rome, and gave European civilization the efficent military society that has allowed it to dominate the world
Rating:
Summary: An excellent book of war -- but without pictures
Review: This is an extraordinarily exacting but readable study of hoplite warfare. The author demonstrates an impressive command of both primary and secondary sources, but his pen is light and his style engaging. His attention to the fate of the "everyman" within the phalanx provides a rich perspective from which to examine, ultimately, the whole of the Greek way of fighting war. This book surely well deserves the praise it has earned. Perhaps the only element lacking in this book is even a modest set of illustrations, such as reproductions of vase paintings or simple diagrams. Too much about the hoplite armor and the array of hoplites within the phalanx is left to the imagination by a book otherwise intended to appeal to non-classicists (or, at least, to amateur classicists). Other than the cover art, there is not a single illustration in the second edition. The next edition would be greatly improved by an attempt to incorporate representative illustrations.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent book on the orgins of western warfare
Review: This is my second time through the book and it is still an excellent read and provides an engrossing account of the orgins of how warfare in the Greek world was waged and its impact throughout history. On that note I must disagree with George Delke Sr. that the Greeks were not the inventors of this type of warfare and that the Assryians were good at it (if they were the Greeks wouldn't have slaughtered them as often as they did). Dr. Hanson makes a thorough and thoughful analysis of the Greek hoplites and the way they fought. From the hoplight to the their commander no stone is left unturned. But while the main emphasis on the book itself is the hoplight and Greek warfare in general there is much more to it than just that. The Greek hoplights were not successful because of their bravery or for their numbers, the Assyrians were brave and they outnumbered the Greeks in all their battles, then why was it the hoplight armies were so successful against the Assyrians. It was because of their orginization and their training (this is why I disagreed with the previous reveiwer). This then is the underlying theme to the book, not the heroics of one man but the performance of the whole. The Greek structure of warfare will go on to conquer almost the whole ancient world under the hands of men like Alexander the Great, Scipio Africanus, Julius Ceasar, and the other great Roman generals of the ancient world. But the traditions of Greek warfare would go on to influence the later nations of the European world and from there the whole of the Western World. Using a plethora of sources from ancient authors, battles, archeology, and others the author has managed to write an excellent resource that is original, readable, enthralling, and most importantly is its credibility. This is a must have for any student of military history, both professional and layperson alike.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent in both research and voice
Review: To be honest, I find the vast majority of writing by classicists to be somewhere between awful and incomprehensible. This book is neither. Hanson does and excellent job of citing a number of sources for his arguments from original texts. The book is also written with a clarity that is refreshing. I found out about this book from Forbes FYI (of all places) and would recommend it to anyone interested in warfare or history.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent book marred slightly by sentimentality
Review: Victor Davis Hanson has recently emerged as a particularly right wing columnist at the National Review. However, anyone familiar with his writing there should be aware he is a far better historian than pundit, at least when it comes to Ancient Greece. His basic thesis is that the ancient Greeks evolved a unique form of warfare, focused on a single, short and bloody clash between two armies of citizens. This warfare arose from the circumstances of their society. The typical soldier was an independent small farmer who supplied his own arms and fought as part of a body of amateur citizen soldiers to defend his land and city-state. Generals were chosen from among the citizens and led from the front, sharing risks equally. Conflicts had to end quickly so the farmers could get back to their fields. Consequently, the Greeks developed a style of warfare that emphasized equal risk among soldiers, strength and courage over skill and maneuver, and seeking a decisive battle even at a high cost to their own side. When the Greeks came into contact with less determined cultures, they scored devastating victories. This kind of warfare became the standard for Western armies up into modern times. Hanson further argues that the reliance on citizen soldiers and the emphasis on equality produced a society of democratic, free speaking, free thinking men and ultimately accounted for men such as Socrates and Thuycidides. When small farms started to die out and states began to rely more on professional soldiers, Greek democracy and intellectual life declined as well.
Hanson's work suffers from two flaws, one minor and one major. The minor flaw is that he puts most of his effort into reconstructing Greek warfare and relatively little in demonstrating how that style of warfare dominated Western armies. The focus, as the subtitle suggests is on the Greeks. John Keegan's "A History of Warfare" does a much more thorough job of developing and supporting this thesis (Keegan relied heavily and explicitly on Hanson's work when discussing Greek warfare and wrote the introduction to "The Western Way of War.") Hanson's sentimentality is a far more serious flaw. A farmer himself, he deeply admires the small independent farmers who made up the backbone of Greek armies and society. Consequently he tends to disparage later military developments. For him, the clash of amateur citizen soldiers, with generals leading from the front, is the ideal form of battle. He mocks as cowards and fools Hellenistic era military theorists who shied away from frontal assaults, encouraged generals not to expose themselves to danger and preferred professional soldiers to citizen amateurs. Here he makes selective use of the evidence. By his own account, the professional soldiers of Sparta were regarded as superior and other Greeks feared to face them in battle. Likewise, Xenophon, who had served as a common soldier and was elected an officer by his fellow soldiers, was one of the military theorists who argued against generals risking themselves in battle. Hanson is so fond of the amateur citizen soldier that he seemingly cannot bear to acknowledge that other forms of warfare might be more effective.
Why should anyone in the general public be interested in a book on ancient Greek warfare? The current crisis provides a strong reason. Hanson shows how the Greek way of warfare was integrated into their society and government. A body of citizens decided elections and battle alike as equals. The shift away from amateur citizen soldiers paralleled the shift away from democracy and toward autocratic government. In our current war we are depending heavily on a professional military, rather than citizen soldiers. In previous wars the bulk of troops came from ordinary citizens. Now military service is no longer part of citizenship. As in the time of the Ancient Greeks, there are practical reasons today for relying on professionals. However, there are social costs to such a change. President Clinton's disputes with the military are only the most obvious examples. Hanson reminds us that we cannot easily separate how a society fights wars from how it is governed. There is a sense in his sentimentality. For that alone, his book is worth reading.
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