Thunder on the Dnepr

Rating:
Summary: The Red Army did have a plan in 1941 after all!
Review: The authors have reconstructed, from circumstantial evidence, a revisionist interpretation of Red Army prewar planning and early war strategy. This is an excellent attempt to look at "the other side of the hill" (95% of what's out there being narrated from the German point of view. The authors know their material well, but the specifics of their case (a Soviet master plan based on February 1941 wargames kept secret from all but a handful of generals) hinges on only a few collateral documents. They can document a general similarity of Soviet operations with what they believe was the outcome of the wargame, but cannot conclusively link the two, except by arguing that Zhukov and Timoshenko were at the wargame and conducted grand strategy--ergo they must have employed the strategy from the game. This is dangerous ground upon which to rest your entire thesis. Nonetheless, this book is valuable for approaching the first weeks and months of the war from a Soviet perspective, and makes the point quite strongly that the Red Army had already thrown German operations off their timetable within the first month of the war.

Rating:
Summary: Stalin knew Hitler was coming?
Review: There's an old saw about the aftermath of the battle of Gettysburg. Supposedly, some years after the battle, George Pickett was asked why his famous charge had failed. The questioner was no doubt expecting one of the stereotypical Virginian answers: lack of proper artillery support, lack of support from soldiers from other states, etc. Instead, Pickett responded that he thought the Union army had something to do with it.

Much the same debate goes on in the analysis of the early days of the German army in its campaign in the Soviet Union. Most of the discussion of what occurred and why is focused on the Wehrmacht and their choices, what objectives they strove for, which units were sent where, things like that. Relatively little discussion is directed towards the Soviets, who are seen as helpless, inert automatons, terrified of doing anything that would enrage Stalin. Bryan Fugate has been directly challenging this view of things for some years now, starting with his book Operation Barbarossa, and this current book is a further entry in his campaign.

Operation Barbarossa concluded that Stalin and the Soviet high command knew that Hitler was going to attack in the summer of 1941, and were at least somewhat prepared for the attack. The problem with that book was the lack of evidence proving his point. This current book makes pretty much the same argument, but with better (though still not completely convincing) evidence. Since the publication of his first book, Fugate has apparently come across recently-opened archives in the Soviet Union which seem to prove his point, notably the accounts of three wargames held by the Stavka in early 1941. The first two games are apparently well-documented, while the third is very mysterious and murky. Fugate believes that the third game predicted that the Germans would penetrate far into the interior of the Soviet Union, and showed that it would be wise for the Soviets to station a strong army behind the Pripyet Marshes where it could attack the southern flank of such an army as it advanced towards Moscow. Near as I can tell, co-author Dvoretsky helped Fugate find his evidence, and perhaps helped with the writing and analysis of this book also.

This supposition makes up the first quarter or third of the book, and the rest of the text discusses how the author sees Army Group Center's advance into the Soviet Union in 1941. Most of the narrative follows Guderian's Panzer Group and Fugate's fabled 21st Army as they fight in the southern region of Army Group Center's sector of the front. Zhukov, Fugate and Dvoretsky's hero, comes in for a considerable amount of praise as he supposedly makes few if any mistakes (while watching the collapse of the Soviet army) and outwits the Germans time after time. Stalin, even, turns out to be if not exactly a master strategist, then certainly more clever than Hitler.

The difficulty with all of this is that the authors' evidence for what they're saying is very thin to say the least. The supposed February wargame that predicted the campaign that summer was apparently kept so secret that no records of it have survived, except for some partial material that *may* relate to it which was captured by the Germans. Everything else is supposition and guesswork. Similarly, when it comes to the actual campaigns involved, the author attributes motive and intent to the various personalities involved, often with thin evidence, at best. For whatever reason, while he's sometimes hard on the Soviets, he's very tough on the Germans, especially Guderian, who comes off as a preening fool.

There is some value to this book in that the authors' analysis of why the campaign went the way it did (the actual causes on the battlefied, not the Generals' intentions) is rather good, and intelligent. Fugate and Dvoretsky make a plausible case for their supposition, but unfortunately supposition it must remain, at least until further archives are opened which prove one way or the other if these things happened, or what their affect was.

One further note. The prose here is very stilted and dry, and the books is pretty heavy sledding as a reading experience. Fugate is a historian (he has a doctorate from a university, in German and Russian military history) and Dvoretsky is a Russian soldier. I wouldn't recommend this book to anyone unless they already know a great deal about the Eastern Front in World War II, and want to know more about the campaign in 1941.

Rating:
Summary: The Red Army did have a plan in 1941 after all!
Review: This book has caused me to re-evaluate my views of the 1941 part of the Great Patriotic War and my approach to creating a simulation of this campaign. The defense of the upper Dnepr has been documented in other books, but, that this defense was pre-conceived and not just spur-of-the-moment or last-ditch scrambling has never been made clear before now. I'm not sold on everything the author(s) contend. (E.g., rather than believe Pavlov was set up for failure, I'm more inclined to believe that Stalin allowed Zhukov and Timoshenko to start preparing a defense in depth in case Pavlov was wrong, which possibility showed up from the wargames, and/or in case the Germans struck while the Red Army was still being re-organized.) I perceive there were a number of reasons why the blitzkrieg failed in the Soviet Union. It is evident from the information in this book, that Soviet strategy for a defense in depth was a contributor. Overall I'm very pleased with the presentation of information in this book. The fresh perspective is both interesting and rewarding.

Rating:
Summary: A good book with interesting insights into this conflict
Review: This book has caused me to re-evaluate my views of the 1941 part of the Great Patriotic War and my approach to creating a simulation of this campaign. The defense of the upper Dnepr has been documented in other books, but, that this defense was pre-conceived and not just spur-of-the-moment or last-ditch scrambling has never been made clear before now. I'm not sold on everything the author(s) contend. (E.g., rather than believe Pavlov was set up for failure, I'm more inclined to believe that Stalin allowed Zhukov and Timoshenko to start preparing a defense in depth in case Pavlov was wrong, which possibility showed up from the wargames, and/or in case the Germans struck while the Red Army was still being re-organized.) I perceive there were a number of reasons why the blitzkrieg failed in the Soviet Union. It is evident from the information in this book, that Soviet strategy for a defense in depth was a contributor. Overall I'm very pleased with the presentation of information in this book. The fresh perspective is both interesting and rewarding.

Rating:
Summary: Brilliant account of Soviet defence preparations for WW2
Review: This remarkable book takes a completely fresh look at the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, using the Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, the Soviet Army and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The authors are Brian Fugate, a distinguished American military historian, and Lev Dvoretsky, a retired Russian colonel and military historian.

They present their findings in their opening words: 'It is an enduring myth of the twentieth century that the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 caught Stalin and the Red Army totally by surprise.' Their work demolishes this myth, sponsored by Khrushchev and repeated by virtually every historian since. For example, they found the logbook of Stalin's appointments: he had meetings with thirteen political and military leaders on 21 June, and with nineteen on 22 June, which disproves Khrushchev's claim that panic immobilised Stalin after the invasion.

The book shows that the invasion did not catch Stalin and the Soviet High Command off guard: they had developed a skilful, innovative and highly secret plan to oppose it. This plan ensured that the Soviet Union would not only survive the biggest and most violent invasion in history, but would also defeat it. They developed the key elements of the strategy during three war games held in January and February 1941, probably the most important war games ever played.

The Red Army considered war games the ultimate form of strategic planning, the best way to test alternative strategies. General Pavlov, Commander of the Western Front, advocated a forward strategy of defending Bialystok, which jutted 150 miles into the Nazi-controlled part of Poland, following with a counterattack into Germany. This strategy meant placing the Red Army's main forces near the border. Marshal Timoshenko, commissar for defence, and General Zhukov, head of the Kiev Special Military District, proposed placing their main forces deep in Soviet territory for an active strategic defence. This would create the conditions for a counterattack by the strategic reserve that would sweep the invader out of the Soviet Union and destroy the core of his army. The general staff put the current military situation on the map board, then launched the Nazi attack and played out the moves, testing the two strategies.

The first game tested Pavlov's strategy. Zhukov led the German forces and broke through Pavlov's defences, surrounding and annihilating them. The second game tested the Zhukov-Timoshenko strategy. Zhukov led the Red Army against Pavlov's 'German' forces which had advanced deep into the Soviet Union. Zhukov counterattacked, outflanked and defeated Pavlov's forces. The day after the Politburo received the reports of these games, it appointed Zhukov chief of the general staff.

The authors discovered details of the third game in Timoshenko's and Zhukov's private papers. It tested a more developed version of the in-depth strategy, with a defence zoned in three echelons (see Map). The first, tactical, echelon was behind the border. The first strategic echelon was 200 to 300 miles behind the first, on the upper Dnepr. This launched a powerful counterattack against the southern flank of Army Group Centre as it crossed to the north of the Pripyat Marshes. The second strategic echelon was a mobile reserve, massed around Moscow, ready to attack the flanks of the enemy as he advanced towards Moscow. The plan worked in the game: the Red Army's forces were placed accordingly.

The Red Army carried out this strategy in July and August 1941. It successfully counterattacked the southern flank of Army Group Centre as it moved along the upper Dnepr, delaying its advance on Moscow. The delay enabled the forces in the second strategic echelon virtually to destroy Army Group Centre at Moscow in December. As a result of adopting this strategy, 'The war was essentially won in 1941 along the upper Dnepr and at Moscow.'

The authors conclude, 'the USSR was as well prepared for war in June 1941 as it possibly could have been.'

Rating:
Summary: I think the gentleman doth protest too much !!!
Review: When I saw this title I was hoping, against hope, that finally, the history of World War II in the former Soviet Union was coming into the light. That light being one of an objective look into the events surrounding the most titanic clash of arms in history. What we have, I am sorry to say, is something not far removed from the bad old days of "cold war" Russian propoganda. I find it hard to believe that the Wehrmacht, appearantly stumbled along from victory to victory against a well thought out plan by STAVKA to lure the Wehrmacht to Moscow and then destroy it. Fugates' narrative is 'almost totally lacking in description of the massive failing in the Red Army's training, organization, logistics, leadership, etc., etc., etc. The Germans, with appearantly inept planning, hopelessly divided comanders, and an interfereing Hitler, were snookered by Zhukov (who appearantly planned all this in a Feb 1941 wargame). I'm sorry folk, while we know the Germans had problems, it is vveeerryy hard to swallow Fugates' arguments. His saving grace is his description of the purges and its effect on the Red Army's officer corps. If he had only solidly linked these events to the hopeless performance of the Red Army from June 22 to the end of Nov 1941 he might of been closer to the mark. I have no doubt that someone, somewhere, will eventually write a truly definitive account of the invasion of the Soviet Union without either a German 'apologist' or Soviet 'trumpet' bias. It is not this one.

Rating:
Summary: I think the gentleman doth protest too much !!!
Review: When I saw this title I was hoping, against hope, that finally, the history of World War II in the former Soviet Union was coming into the light. That light being one of an objective look into the events surrounding the most titanic clash of arms in history. What we have, I am sorry to say, is something not far removed from the bad old days of "cold war" Russian propoganda. I find it hard to believe that the Wehrmacht, appearantly stumbled along from victory to victory against a well thought out plan by STAVKA to lure the Wehrmacht to Moscow and then destroy it. Fugates' narrative is 'almost totally lacking in description of the massive failing in the Red Army's training, organization, logistics, leadership, etc., etc., etc. The Germans, with appearantly inept planning, hopelessly divided comanders, and an interfereing Hitler, were snookered by Zhukov (who appearantly planned all this in a Feb 1941 wargame). I'm sorry folk, while we know the Germans had problems, it is vveeerryy hard to swallow Fugates' arguments. His saving grace is his description of the purges and its effect on the Red Army's officer corps. If he had only solidly linked these events to the hopeless performance of the Red Army from June 22 to the end of Nov 1941 he might of been closer to the mark. I have no doubt that someone, somewhere, will eventually write a truly definitive account of the invasion of the Soviet Union without either a German 'apologist' or Soviet 'trumpet' bias. It is not this one.