Rating: 
Summary: Expecting something different
Review: OK, let's get to the bad parts right off the bat. First, there is too much emphasis on military mechanics - supply lines, divisions, types of ships, calibers, battalions,etc - and not enough political or ideological intrigues. Secondly, several of the stories were the exact opposite of what the book suggested - Japan was NOT victorious. We all know history as it actually happened (at least in our universe according to a certain school of thought) so what I was expecting were stories showing not only how Japan might have won the war but also the aftershocks of such a win. There was also a paucity of different events. One story dealt with the Soviet Union, one dealt with India, one with Australia,
and the rest with the Pacific theater. The Soviet episode was particularly well done because it was so plausible. The Indian scenario, again highly possible, was eventful but in the end mattered little to the overall outcome. Also, the stories seemed to bypass the atrocities of the war as if it the subject were a little too direct for this audience. Read it from the library if you must.
Rating:
Summary: Expecting something different
Review: OK, let's get to the bad parts right off the bat. First, there is too much emphasis on military mechanics - supply lines, divisions, types of ships, calibers, battalions,etc - and not enough political or ideological intrigues. Secondly, several of the stories were the exact opposite of what the book suggested - Japan was NOT victorious. We all know history as it actually happened (at least in our universe according to a certain school of thought) so what I was expecting were stories showing not only how Japan might have won the war but also the aftershocks of such a win. There was also a paucity of different events. One story dealt with the Soviet Union, one dealt with India, one with Australia,
and the rest with the Pacific theater. The Soviet episode was particularly well done because it was so plausible. The Indian scenario, again highly possible, was eventful but in the end mattered little to the overall outcome. Also, the stories seemed to bypass the atrocities of the war as if it the subject were a little too direct for this audience. Read it from the library if you must.
Rating: 
Summary: FULL OF POSSIBILITIES
Review: Overall an excellent book. There were so many points of time during WWII where one person's action guided the entire war. A very eye-opening book.
Rating: 
Summary: Japan Wins: Maybe
Review: Peter Tsouras is one of a handful of writers and editors who are not satisfied with the way America's historical wars turned out. Such alternate historians usually begin their contribution with a 'what if' question that focuses on one small string of a much larger fabric of historical truth that we now call Accepted History. In RISING SUN VICTORIOUS, Tsouris edits ten essays (one of which is his own) all of which purport to demonstrate that the difference between the Accepted History and its alternate version is a lot smaller than we would like to think. The list of essays range from Japan's decision to war on Russia rather than attack Pearl Harbor to a third attack wave that completes the destruction on Pearl Harbor that the first two waves did not. Other essays focus on Japan's assaults on India, Australia, and bombing attacks on Hollywood. As I read these various alternate histories of how the war in the Pacific could have turned out differently, I reached the following conclusions:
First: Even for those who like their alternate histories in novelized form (Harry Tutrledove's novels come to mind), such dry renderings come across as hard reading at best and astoundingly dull at worst. Each of the ten essays reminded me of Tsouras' other A-H book, DISASTER AT D-DAY. Such works are replete with a staggering array of names, dates, places, battles, army and navy military groupings. After a dozen or so pages, the reader gets lost in a sea of data that screams out for some unifying element. Novelized A-H stories can provide this needed human interaction between 'what if' and 'who cares.'
Second: Some elements of A-H are simply more interesting than are other elements. In RISING SUN VICTORIOUS, the essay on the Kamikaze suicide bombers was simpy neither inherently interesting nor believable for me to swallow. The essays that really caught my eye involved areas that combined reader interest with reasonable probability: the third wave attack on Pearl Harbor and the conquest of India, for example. Perhaps future A-H military writers might couch their tales with less miltary data and more human interaction.
Third: Most A-H tales involving the Second World War posit scenarios ranging from the total defeat and occupation of the United States by Axis powers (THE MAN IN THE HIGH CASTLE by Phillip K. Dick) to histories that suggest that the Japanese/Nazi axis might have won a partial victory that could have permitted them a conditional peace with America. Critics of RISING SUN VICTORIOUS and others of its ilk dryly point out what they deem an inherent flaw in such scenarios, namely that the overwhelming industrial might of the United States must, at some point, have proven decisive in the long run. Yet, each of the contributors to this book acknowledges this very limitation on their fantasies. Clearly, no coalition of Japanese and/or German armies could have brought America to its knees. What emerges in most of these scenarios is a world that is not vastly different from the one which we now inhabit. In fact, most of the contributors go to great pains to suggest that any victory in the Pacific would be ephemeral, and that events, even in this alternate timeline, would sooner or later 'catch up' to their real world counterparts.
So where do readers go if they want to ponder other timelines? Books like RISING SUN VICTORIOUS ought to carry a label that might read: Caution--Intended for mature (and patiently erudite) readers only. All others might find more enjoyment in novelized versions that give readers the chance to interact with history through the perceptions of a novel's all too human characters whose failings and strengths may not be very different from his own.
Rating:
Summary: Japan Wins: Maybe
Review: Peter Tsouras is one of a handful of writers and editors who are not satisfied with the way America's historical wars turned out. Such alternate historians usually begin their contribution with a 'what if' question that focuses on one small string of a much larger fabric of historical truth that we now call Accepted History. In RISING SUN VICTORIOUS, Tsouris edits ten essays (one of which is his own) all of which purport to demonstrate that the difference between the Accepted History and its alternate version is a lot smaller than we would like to think. The list of essays range from Japan's decision to war on Russia rather than attack Pearl Harbor to a third attack wave that completes the destruction on Pearl Harbor that the first two waves did not. Other essays focus on Japan's assaults on India, Australia, and bombing attacks on Hollywood. As I read these various alternate histories of how the war in the Pacific could have turned out differently, I reached the following conclusions: First: Even for those who like their alternate histories in novelized form (Harry Tutrledove's novels come to mind), such dry renderings come across as hard reading at best and astoundingly dull at worst. Each of the ten essays reminded me of Tsouras' other A-H book, DISASTER AT D-DAY. Such works are replete with a staggering array of names, dates, places, battles, army and navy military groupings. After a dozen or so pages, the reader gets lost in a sea of data that screams out for some unifying element. Novelized A-H stories can provide this needed human interaction between 'what if' and 'who cares.' Second: Some elements of A-H are simply more interesting than are other elements. In RISING SUN VICTORIOUS, the essay on the Kamikaze suicide bombers was simpy neither inherently interesting nor believable for me to swallow. The essays that really caught my eye involved areas that combined reader interest with reasonable probability: the third wave attack on Pearl Harbor and the conquest of India, for example. Perhaps future A-H military writers might couch their tales with less miltary data and more human interaction. Third: Most A-H tales involving the Second World War posit scenarios ranging from the total defeat and occupation of the United States by Axis powers (THE MAN IN THE HIGH CASTLE by Phillip K. Dick) to histories that suggest that the Japanese/Nazi axis might have won a partial victory that could have permitted them a conditional peace with America. Critics of RISING SUN VICTORIOUS and others of its ilk dryly point out what they deem an inherent flaw in such scenarios, namely that the overwhelming industrial might of the United States must, at some point, have proven decisive in the long run. Yet, each of the contributors to this book acknowledges this very limitation on their fantasies. Clearly, no coaltion of Japanese or German
armies could have brought America to its knees. What emerges in most of these scenarios is a world that is not vastly different from the one which we now inhabit. In fact, most of the contributors go to great pains to suggest that any victory in the Pacific would be ephemeral, and that events, even in this alternate timeline, would sooner or later 'catch up' to their real world counterparts. So where do readers go if they want to ponder other timelines? Books like RISING SUN VICTORIOUS ought to carry a label that might read: Caution--Intended for mature (and patiently erudite) readers only. All others might find more enjoyment in novelized versions that give readers the chance to interact with history through the perceptions of a novel's all too human characters whose failings and strengths may not be very different from his own.
Rating:
Summary: A "What if?" that informs as well as entertains
Review: The field of "counterfactual" history or Alternate History is divided into fictional accounts, written up as novels, and pseudo documentaries, written up as history books might be done in the alternate future caused by the changed events. The more challenging task is the latter because in fiction one can mix fact and fantasy without having to explain the choices... after all, it's a novel. However the essay format requires some hard thinking and deep research, because even a fake history has to be footnoted. This counterfactual collection of essays on might-have-been wars in the Pacific does not disappoint. Many of the entries utilize fake references which are supposedly written in that rearranged future. The fake notes are distinguished from the real by an asterisk. It's a measure of the verisimilitude of the accounts that many of these fake references could be accepted as real, though some, such as court martials of Douglas MacArthur and victorious Japanese generals' memoirs are more self-evident. Just because these alternate histories are cast as essays does not mean they are colorless didactic prose. The reading is lively and provocative, just as good military history should be. Some discussions with a few of the contributors at a book signing convinced me that these authors had considered most of the pitfalls of their thesis in advance. This book is not simply another variant of that old Saturday Night Live gag about a television show that answers adolescent inquiries such as "what if Napoleon had B-52s at Waterloo" or "What if Margaret Truman could fly" (she lead a wing of B-24s in a raid over Germany). None of these conjectural essays depend on "magic"....such as wonder weapons concocted from thin air, or giving allies or axis forces that could not have been possibly available. Nor are there dramatic personality changes. The key commanders and political leaders all stay "in character" reacting to each changed situation as one might expect. This book broadens horizons and, miracle of miracles, finds something new to say about WW II. Highly recommended.
Rating:
Summary: 5 stars for proffesionalism and 3 for possibility
Review: These books have got to be a bear to write. Although certainly there are a fair number of pivot points in history there are darn few major things that could have been dramatically different. That means, for these books, that there is always a certain amount of hand-waving away of inconvenient facts to allow an alternate ending. Although much of this book is not as strained as the invasion of Britain volume (which completely glosses over the fact that Germany had no means to cross the channel and no navy to contest the channel with the Royal Navy) it does have the requisite hand-waving. The only real alternative is the invasion of the Soviet Union instead of an attack on Pearl Harbor which leads to some interesting and well explored speculation. There is the requisite rewriting of the Pearl Harbor attack which, while including the blocking of the channel by the Nevada which is a good idea, has the requisite attack on the oil farms which, sadly for the author, were not nearly as easy to destroy as portrayed and would have required a third attack wave into rapidly stiffening resistance. Most of the scenarios are like this, requiring careful ommision of inconvenient facts to allow the Japanese to win. This is not a condemnation of the authors, simply a statement that the Japanese had a poor army, a decent but over-extended navy, poor resource-management and availability and were against a huge wealthy power. The Japanese were overextended just taking what they had in the Pacific, no invasion of the US was seriously contemplated or possible. No resources for the landing craft, no capability to refuel at sea, no way to transport the troops, etc. They were destined to lose unless the US simply said "to hell with it". Even in that instance, the British and Australians would have fought on and perhaps done the job themselves. That said, the book is quite readable, very well researched (even the ommissions are done in such a way that you realize the authors knew of them and danced around them), interesting, and very well put together with fictional charts, OBs, etc. It's an excellent effort marred only by the lack of an epilog describing what inconvenient facts were ommitted for the scenarios to work. This ommission can make the reader think that a victorious Japan was quite possible had they been more savvy, when it was not. Matt
Rating:
Summary: Interesting but one-sided
Review: This collection of alternative histories of the Pacific War, superbly edited by Peter G. Tsouras, is at once enlightening and entertaining. In ten essays, the various authors provide much intellectual fodder on how various changes might have influenced the outcome of the war. This book will particularly appeal to military professionals or those readers interested in military history, but the general public will find many of the essays too technical. However, the reader should be aware that the alternative nature of this history tends toward the one-sided in Japan's favor (it would have been more interesting if their were at least some chapters that favored the US side, like what if the US defenses at Pearl Harbor had been alerted prior to the Japanese attack.) and this can be annoying at times. Most soldiers know that war is the realm of chance and that luck favors each side sooner or later; to presume that only one side enjoys all the luck in a war seems to violate one of the basic laws of human conflict. The other issue is that virtually all the essays suggest that victory could have hinged on one "winner-take-all battle," and had Japan fought its "decisive battle" on its terms the outcome could have been different. The idea of single, decisive battles swinging on chance is a favorite for alternate histories and is mostly nonsense; throughout military history, there are few examples of single battles like Hastings in 1066 that decide major wars. Thus, all the changes in this anthology hinge on operational or strategic decisions that Japan could have made differently, not on anything involving diplomacy or technical innovation. The approach of this anthology, which focuses very heavily on the purely military level, tends to avoid any examination of the Japanese centers of gravity. At the strategic level, the Bushido warrior code among the Japanese military elite and its acceptance by the general populace provided the Japanese with intense motivation and tenacity (take Bushido out of the equation and there would have been kamikazes or suicidal island defenses) and this center of gravity was not broken until the atomic bomb raids of 1945. However, the Japanese operational center of gravity was their mobile carrier fleet which - while powerful - was also very fragile. The Japanese never had more than six fleet carriers with 430 aircraft available, with very little ability to replace losses quickly. In the essay "Nagumo's Luck," where the Japanese win the Battle of Midway (in itself a plausible event), the author posits an outcome where the Japanese sink all three US carriers at virtually no cost to themselves. This is not alternate history, but bunk. In all four carrier-vs-carrier battles in 1942, both sides were always able to inflict significant damage on each other, despite quantitative and qualitative imbalances. By the end of 1942, virtually all the pre-war US or Japanese fleet carriers had been sunk or damaged. Thus even if Japan had won at Midway - a distinct possibility - they would have lost carriers and aircraft that they could not easily replace. No author here mentions that the US commissioned 13 capital ships in 1942-3, against only 3 Japanese capital ships. Once the Japanese operational center of gravity was eroded - as it surely must if they maintained protracted offensive operations - Japan would be forced into a relatively static defense. Furthermore, no author in this collection addresses the twin nemeses for the Japanese: US submarines and long-range bombers. After a slow start, both US subs and bombers inflicted enormous military and economic damage on the Japanese war machine and the Japanese were never able to effectively counter these threats. An interesting essay might have been, what if the Japanese had invested more in ASW or air defense technology prior to the war and adapted quicker. Bottom line: no matter how much better Nagumo's carriers did, attrition was more of a threat to Japan than the US and Japan lacked the resources to pose multiple operational threats to the USA. Japan fought the war mostly on the emotional level, the Americans primarily on the industrial level. These essays tend to ignore that dichotomy and downplay American material resources, as well as the will to use it. Probably the worst essays are the last two, which suggest that a Japanese "victory" at Leyte Gulf (in which they still lose half their remaining fleet) or a repulse of Operation Olympic could have led to cease fires rather than unconditional surrender. Incredibly, the last author seems to feel that the US could not replace 29,000 combat casualties in a defeat on Japan's shore - what about the millions of troops just freed up in Europe? The idea that the United States could not accept large casualties seems a post-Vietnam anachronism that would be inappropriate for 1944-1945. Furthermore, all the author's ignore the value of the United States fighting in a coalition; unlike the too-distant, self-centered Axis alliance, the Anglo-American alliance was capable of reacting to setbacks and providing a common response. For example, after the heavy American carrier losses in 1942, the British "loaned" the US Pacific fleet the new carrier HMS Victorious for ten months. While hard-pressed itself in 1942-1943, Britain could and did share resources with the US and greater Japanese successes in the Pacific in 1942 would probably have resulted in greater Allied cooperation. All these points are not meant to denigrate what is in many respects a fine book. However these points are made to highlight the essentially one-dimensional (i.e. operational) nature of most of the essays and the lack of a true combat dynamic. Clausewitz said that war was an action-reaction dynamic, where each fighter attempts to disarm the other. If you must write alternate history, this dynamic should be included, rather than one-sided scenarios wherein one side is bold and wise, and the other side are little more than fish in a barrel.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting but one-sided
Review: This collection of alternative histories of the Pacific War, superbly edited by Peter G. Tsouras, is at once enlightening and entertaining. In ten essays, the various authors provide much intellectual fodder on how various changes might have influenced the outcome of the war. This book will particularly appeal to military professionals or those readers interested in military history, but the general public will find many of the essays too technical. However, the reader should be aware that the alternative nature of this history tends toward the one-sided in Japan's favor (it would have been more interesting if their were at least some chapters that favored the US side, like what if the US defenses at Pearl Harbor had been alerted prior to the Japanese attack.) and this can be annoying at times. Most soldiers know that war is the realm of chance and that luck favors each side sooner or later; to presume that only one side enjoys all the luck in a war seems to violate one of the basic laws of human conflict. The other issue is that virtually all the essays suggest that victory could have hinged on one "winner-take-all battle," and had Japan fought its "decisive battle" on its terms the outcome could have been different. The idea of single, decisive battles swinging on chance is a favorite for alternate histories and is mostly nonsense; throughout military history, there are few examples of single battles like Hastings in 1066 that decide major wars. Thus, all the changes in this anthology hinge on operational or strategic decisions that Japan could have made differently, not on anything involving diplomacy or technical innovation. The approach of this anthology, which focuses very heavily on the purely military level, tends to avoid any examination of the Japanese centers of gravity. At the strategic level, the Bushido warrior code among the Japanese military elite and its acceptance by the general populace provided the Japanese with intense motivation and tenacity (take Bushido out of the equation and there would have been kamikazes or suicidal island defenses) and this center of gravity was not broken until the atomic bomb raids of 1945. However, the Japanese operational center of gravity was their mobile carrier fleet which - while powerful - was also very fragile. The Japanese never had more than six fleet carriers with 430 aircraft available, with very little ability to replace losses quickly. In the essay "Nagumo's Luck," where the Japanese win the Battle of Midway (in itself a plausible event), the author posits an outcome where the Japanese sink all three US carriers at virtually no cost to themselves. This is not alternate history, but bunk. In all four carrier-vs-carrier battles in 1942, both sides were always able to inflict significant damage on each other, despite quantitative and qualitative imbalances. By the end of 1942, virtually all the pre-war US or Japanese fleet carriers had been sunk or damaged. Thus even if Japan had won at Midway - a distinct possibility - they would have lost carriers and aircraft that they could not easily replace. No author here mentions that the US commissioned 13 capital ships in 1942-3, against only 3 Japanese capital ships. Once the Japanese operational center of gravity was eroded - as it surely must if they maintained protracted offensive operations - Japan would be forced into a relatively static defense. Furthermore, no author in this collection addresses the twin nemeses for the Japanese: US submarines and long-range bombers. After a slow start, both US subs and bombers inflicted enormous military and economic damage on the Japanese war machine and the Japanese were never able to effectively counter these threats. An interesting essay might have been, what if the Japanese had invested more in ASW or air defense technology prior to the war and adapted quicker. Bottom line: no matter how much better Nagumo's carriers did, attrition was more of a threat to Japan than the US and Japan lacked the resources to pose multiple operational threats to the USA. Japan fought the war mostly on the emotional level, the Americans primarily on the industrial level. These essays tend to ignore that dichotomy and downplay American material resources, as well as the will to use it. Probably the worst essays are the last two, which suggest that a Japanese "victory" at Leyte Gulf (in which they still lose half their remaining fleet) or a repulse of Operation Olympic could have led to cease fires rather than unconditional surrender. Incredibly, the last author seems to feel that the US could not replace 29,000 combat casualties in a defeat on Japan's shore - what about the millions of troops just freed up in Europe? The idea that the United States could not accept large casualties seems a post-Vietnam anachronism that would be inappropriate for 1944-1945. Furthermore, all the author's ignore the value of the United States fighting in a coalition; unlike the too-distant, self-centered Axis alliance, the Anglo-American alliance was capable of reacting to setbacks and providing a common response. For example, after the heavy American carrier losses in 1942, the British "loaned" the US Pacific fleet the new carrier HMS Victorious for ten months. While hard-pressed itself in 1942-1943, Britain could and did share resources with the US and greater Japanese successes in the Pacific in 1942 would probably have resulted in greater Allied cooperation. All these points are not meant to denigrate what is in many respects a fine book. However these points are made to highlight the essentially one-dimensional (i.e. operational) nature of most of the essays and the lack of a true combat dynamic. Clausewitz said that war was an action-reaction dynamic, where each fighter attempts to disarm the other. If you must write alternate history, this dynamic should be included, rather than one-sided scenarios wherein one side is bold and wise, and the other side are little more than fish in a barrel.
Rating:
Summary: Revenge of the Mikado
Review: This is a fascinating series of essay-format speculations on what it would have taken for the Japanese to win, or at least do considerably better, in World War Two. Despite the title, most of the authors cannot realistically portray a scenario where there is outright victory; rather the consensus seems to be that it would have taken a hell of a lot of luck (and disasters on the American side) even to get a negotiated armistice. Japan's best shot, as told in the first chapter, would have been to invade the USSR and kept peace with America. Next best shot: get the carriers at Pearl Harbor rather than the battleships. Overall an intriguing work but it cements my view that the Imperial forces were doomed from the get-go.
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