Rating: 
Summary: Them Bones Or The Dead Lay In Pools Of Maroon Below!!!!!!!!!
Review:
This book is somewhat distressingly oppressive to judge because most of its material unambitiously falls in the indecisive middle-limbo of conflicting pros and cons. The real abrasive exertion is that for each edified pro of Wells' book there's an equally and immediately neutralizing con, which never defends this book to above-average prominence. Transparently, novices, those with no exposure whatsoever to this case study, WILL more likely than not depart with fairly knowledgeable satisfaction about this rarely popular archaeological enigma. Earlier reviewers who chided the supposedly inadequate content of "new information" were likely misguidedly setting their expectations inordinately and unrealistically high. For instance, I was uninitiated in Teutoburg before stumbling across it on amazon, and the book's information's background, history, excavations, and scholarly consensus was pleasingly edifying on those fronts. Answering to my dimly passive half-rating, a catastrophic enormity of the dissatisfying intolerabilities of Wells' book lie in his ANALysis, relevance and efficiency of the information he presents.
The first, and, wickedly instant, materialization of Wells' failings arrives with his heinously-and frequently scandalously-irrespective waywardness into the most secondarily immaterial relationships. Despite the book involves the Roman Empire, Rhineland Germanic Barbarians and Teutoburg, the reader's mercilessly and callously hounded with misdirected preoccupations toward Antony and Cleopatra; Augustus' family history-going so corruptly far even to perversely, specifically recount his family's ties to Caesar and his variously intricate paths to produce an heir for succession; the impertinently useless and contemptible cataloguing of the different kinds of funerary rituals, growth, communities, industry, and trade of the east-of-the-Rhine barbaric tribes; the stationed legionnaires' interaction with local barbarians; and the Teutoburg story being uncovered mainly during the Middle Ages, nearly a thousand years removed. Although the aforementioned are expendably unnecessary to grasping Teutoburg, there's some straying by Wells which, though not directly pertinent to the battle, still is complementary to understanding constituents of it. An establishment of Varus' skills as legate of Syria, legionnaires' lives on the frontier and militarism, Arminius' history with Roman administration, and the ramifications of the legions' wipeout all importantly supplement Wells' book. The real ghastliness is that with this "trimming of the fat", excising the crippling pieces from Wells' book, the actual book should only reach half its length-exposing that at least half's misused by Wells as filler to trickily exaggerate his books' length.
Yet another harassingly grueling agony on the reader is Wells' detestable proneness to redundancy. Wells mentions legionnaires often got to know the locals around the bases they were stationed in at the frontiers, in Ch.5; Wells grindingly excruciates this fact again in Ch.7, this time referring to the same fact in a chicaning difference, that legionnaires often began unofficial families with local women. This is another prevaricating chicanery of Wells', to fraudulently fill his book through concealing the same oppressive bits of information under different headings and applications. Ominously, I've the sinking feeling that Wells was desperate to botch a book together without the necessary weight that would've resulted in a reasonable length appropriate for adults. Wells also tires to death the reasons for Varus' legions' genocide, referring to Arminius' treacherous education of Roman methods in Ch.8-insidiously disguised under legions marching into the trap-and in Ch.6, which, despite being about Arminius himself, deviously recycles the same information that Arminius replicated Roman tactics through auxiliary service in the legions, under differing headings like "Youth and Early Service" to "His Plan, Strategy, Tactics". Equally outraging is Wells' chronic redundancy about Germanic barbarians' so-called militant sophistication expanding in supposed direct acknowledgment of an impending Roman maraud which materialized in the increase of weapons buried with Germans and the alleged incremented communicability between disparate barbarian tribes, by virtue of common burial practices.
Wells' 3rd criticism is certain choice fragments of his objectionable "ANALysis". My most disapprovingly acidic wrath is reserved for Wells' callous partialness for the barbarians. I poisonously repulse his monstrously Roman-derogating censure that Augustus and Rome's full administrative structure "misjudged" the Germanic barbarians' abilities in warfare, coordination and/or learning, for which he frailly offers the woundingly unconvincing citations of their mounting preoccupation with burying weapons in graves and the one-sided absolutism of Arminius' massacre. Wells' charge of Germanic prowess is lawlessly outlandish, because Arminius didn't display better strategy, equipment or strength with his ambush, only infernally conniving guile. Wells cites Rome for underestimating Germanic barbarians' mobilizing capabilities-something absolutely nauseous and murderous to fault with because Augustus was acutely aware of ordeals eastwards of the Rhine, for there were numerous uprisings in 16 B.C.-9 A.D. pressuring Augustus to travel there, reorganizing the military and establishing bases as well as governmental systems like census-taking in preparation for Roman campaigns. Also, that Augustus appointed Varus, who was experienced with quelling torturous rebellions in Syria, reconfirms Augustus' apt notice of the viciously turbulent unsettledness in the Rhineland. Besides factually imperfect ANALysis, Wells grindingly stoops to logically slipping ANALysis. When hypothesizing the development of the battle, Wells alarmingly embellishes that some legionnaires, even after knowing Varus fell on his sword and their kindred were being slaughtered by the thousands, may've "fought like madmen".
Wells is undoubtedly blameworthy for scheming to swindle the customer with a book that's both unsatisfactory in length and substance. While revilingly acceptable for the Teutoburg novice, Wells sins in cataclysmically many important aspects of composing a worthy volume. In the preface, Wells confesses THE ONLY CHAPTERS EVER DEALING WITH THE BATTLE-one, eight, nine-are entirely distressing speculations from his own biases. Wells delinquently forebodes that a vindictive majority of his book is questionable due to archaeology's "gray-areas"-yet Wells capitalizes on this raw fact and venomously abuses it to an appalling terrorization. Alongside this already subtracting trepidation, the charting and pictorial attempts that Wells shoddily and uncaringly includes are vindictively imitative. All "maps" are B&W and so rawly, inexpertly "drawn", they literally look like Kindergarteners' doodles!!!! All pictures are irreligiously B&W also, with most insubordinately misguiding from actual Teutoburg pertinence. The lowest, dislikeable salvageability is that the Teutoburg-respective photos are from recovered artifacts.
Rating: 
Summary: The Lost Legions
Review: "The Battle That Stopped Rome" is a very interesting book about the Battle of the Teutoberg Forest, which may have been one of the most important engagements in European history. Wells offers a somewhat revisionist history of the battle based on his interpretation of the archaeology at the battle site, which was finally located in 1987 at Kalkriese in northern Germany.The broad outlines of the battle are reasonably well understood. Arminius, a member of the Cherusci tribe who had served in the Roman army and had become a Roman citizen, drew three legions under the command of Publius Quinctilius Varus into a trap east of the Rhine. While the legions were on the march in a column that may have been over two miles long, they were ambushed by Germanic warriors. The terrain and the extended column prevented the Roman units from forming up properly, with the horrific result that 20,000 or so men (and possibly a large group of camp followers) were killed on the spot, ritually sacrificed or enslaved. The catastrophe cost the Roman army almost ten percent of its effective strength, revived Roman fears of an invasion by northern barbarians, and may have induced the Romans to halt the expansion of their empire at the Rhine River rather than pressing on to the Elbe. Wells tends to dismiss classical descriptions of the battle, arguing that ancient historians suffered from the fact that they were not eyewitnesses, were often writing long after the fact, and were burdened by stereotyped and inaccurate notions of how the Germanic tribes fought. He suggests that the battle did not take place over three days (as the writer Cassius Dio claimed 200 years later) but that the slaughter was essentially over in an hour, with the rest of the day devoted to capturing or killing the survivors. According to the book's chapter notes, Wells bases his description of a short and bloody battle on historical information about Varus and his legions, Roman accounts of the battle, the archaeological and topographical evidence at Kalkriese, and information from other historical battles. Wells' conclusions may be right, but he could have done a better job of explaining why his analysis of these sources led him to reconstruct the battle as he did. Although Wells offers a gripping description of what must have been a gruesome and terrifying encounter for all concerned, I suspect that his book will not be the last word on the subject. All in all, Wells' book is a perfectly serviceable introduction to the history of this period. Although the book is at times a bit repetitive and has drawn some sharply negative reviews (see below), I can honestly say that I enjoyed the book, read it avidly and thought it was fairly well done (which may explain why it is an Independent Bookseller's BookSense 76 pick). Having said all this, Wells' bibliographical notes suggest that the seminal work on the archaeology of the battle is Tony Clunn's "In Quest of the Lost Legions," which you can find on Amazon (or on Amazon's UK site for quite a bit less, if you don't mind waiting for a shipment from across the pond). Both the US and UK Amazon sites suggest that Clunn's work is well worth reading, and I look forward to learning more about this important battle.
Rating:
Summary: The Lost Legions
Review: "The Battle That Stopped Rome" is a very interesting book about the Battle of the Teutoberg Forest, which may have been one of the most important engagements in European history. Wells offers a somewhat revisionist history of the battle based on his interpretation of the archaeology at the battle site, which was finally located in 1987 at Kalkriese in northern Germany. The broad outlines of the battle are reasonably well understood. Arminius, a member of the Cherusci tribe who had served in the Roman army and had become a Roman citizen, drew three legions under the command of Publius Quinctilius Varus into a trap east of the Rhine. While the legions were on the march in a column that may have been over two miles long, they were ambushed by Germanic warriors. The terrain and the extended column prevented the Roman units from forming up properly, with the horrific result that 20,000 or so men (and possibly a large group of camp followers) were killed on the spot, ritually sacrificed or enslaved. The catastrophe cost the Roman army almost ten percent of its effective strength, revived Roman fears of an invasion by northern barbarians, and may have induced the Romans to halt the expansion of their empire at the Rhine River rather than pressing on to the Elbe. Wells tends to dismiss classical descriptions of the battle, arguing that ancient historians suffered from the fact that they were not eyewitnesses, were often writing long after the fact, and were burdened by stereotyped and inaccurate notions of how the Germanic tribes fought. He suggests that the battle did not take place over three days (as the writer Cassius Dio claimed 200 years later) but that the slaughter was essentially over in an hour, with the rest of the day devoted to capturing or killing the survivors. According to the book's chapter notes, Wells bases his description of a short and bloody battle on historical information about Varus and his legions, Roman accounts of the battle, the archaeological and topographical evidence at Kalkriese, and information from other historical battles. Wells' conclusions may be right, but he could have done a better job of explaining why his analysis of these sources led him to reconstruct the battle as he did. Although Wells offers a gripping description of what must have been a gruesome and terrifying encounter for all concerned, I suspect that his book will not be the last word on the subject. All in all, Wells' book is a perfectly serviceable introduction to the history of this period. Although the book is at times a bit repetitive and has drawn some sharply negative reviews (see below), I can honestly say that I enjoyed the book, read it avidly and thought it was fairly well done (which may explain why it is an Independent Bookseller's BookSense 76 pick). Having said all this, Wells' bibliographical notes suggest that the seminal work on the archaeology of the battle is Tony Clunn's "In Quest of the Lost Legions," which you can find on Amazon (or on Amazon's UK site for quite a bit less, if you don't mind waiting for a shipment from across the pond). Both the US and UK Amazon sites suggest that Clunn's work is well worth reading, and I look forward to learning more about this important battle.
Rating: 
Summary: A poorly researched and badly written book
Review: From time to time a book come along that reinterprets an element of history and offers a new slant on an old argument. This book does not fall into this category and falls flat at the very first hurdle. Dr Wells borrows heavily from recent works on the Teutoburg battle (and often fails to fully acknowledge his sources). He has decided that contrary to the accepted view that the battle took place over three days, it was all over within one. This would be fine if he at least offered the alternative view and did not disregard a significant chunk of the historical sources in order to bolster his own interpretation. He also has an awful habit of repeating himself and you will get a terrible sense of déjà vu as you read the same paragraph you know you read a few chapters earlier. For a book on the Teutoburg battle there is woefully little space given over to the event. Wells wastes far too many pages on an amateurish attempt to explain the socio-economic situation in the Roman Empire at the time of the battle. Upon reading these chapters you get the impression Wells has lifted from primary sources without really understanding what he is reading. At one point he writes a particularly graphic description of the battlefield post-conflict. Sadly his inability read up on the local flora and fauna leads to a rather ridiculous description of local animals, including vultures feasting on the fallen. If written by a student on Roman history, his text would be worthy of a reasonable grade as it at least shows some evidence that the author has examined the primary sources, but when you take into account the author is supposedly an expert on Roman archaeology and is a professor of Anthropology this book can only be described as an expensive doorstop. If you are interested in the battle , search for texts on the recent archaeological excavations, please, avoid this inaccurate, badly written tome that I very much doubt will ever be regarded as anything other than a joke in the academic world.
Rating:
Summary: A good general starter....
Review: I bought this book in the hope it would offer new evidence and discussion on the infamous loss of the Varus legions in the Teutoberg forest in AD 9. However, it amalgamates to what is in effect the general history reader's guide to the Roman Empire's policies and strategies during the early principate delivered in a popular history style. If it is intended to translate to the small screen as a documentary it would succeed very well as anyone who has no knowledge at all of the period and the events would find it explains both background and actions extremely well. However, anyone with knowledge of the event will find this a disappointing effort as it offers nothing new, simply rehashing currently accepted theory based on the wealth of archeologicial evidence. To be honest I skipped several sections based on the titles as they provided no more that general background knowledge and in some respects the fact that the format of the text allows you to do this is quite effective as you can dip in and out more easily.
The author would have us think that this battle has been lost in the mists of time but I am not too certain why given most of my contemporaries have heard of the battle, if not the events surrounding it, at the very least.
Simply put, this is written for the general history reader or pre-college student, not for the university or serious historical scholar, but there is certainly a place for this type of history book on the shelves. So, certainly recommended for the general history audience but specialists in the subject will find it offers nothing new.
Rating:
Summary: What a disappointment!
Review: I have forced myself to slog through this incredibly tedious tome, hoping eventually to come to something worthwhile but it hasn't happened. I cannot believe this guy actually teaches and is considered an "expert." There is no information in the book that hasn't been presented elsewhere and invariably better. I expected illustrations from the site of the battle, not photos of a painting of Hans Brusamer's idea of Arminius (in 1583), a statue of Arminius erected in Denmark and a copper engraving of Arminius from 1689. The crude drawings of the battle site are useless and the "maps" show other sites that Wells supposes are like Kalkreise. Not one illustration (except those little line drawings) shows the actual site. There are no photographs of the site. A few photos of bolts and swords. All illustrations are black and white, of course. The most ridiculous illustration is a photo of a statue of Cleopatra. The only thing worse would have been inclusion of a photo of a Little Caesar's Pizza store. This is one of the most intriguing stories in history and this guy has made it mind-numbingly dull. But at least he is redundant. Another annoying thing is that he references other chapters, as in "See Chapter 5" so you'll be able to refer to another place where he said the same thing. This book was such a waste of money. It is padded with a rehash of every other author's version of the story. Wells even references the movie "Gladiator" as if it is a true story. To paraphrase Augustus, Peter S. Wells, give me back my money!
Rating:
Summary: A modern Varian disaster
Review: I was very excited when I saw this book on the shelf. It promised a modern perspective on an important battle that has shaped western history and borders of Europe. Wells had me quite excited for the first seven chapters. He sets the background of the story reasonably well. But when he describes his reconstruction of the battle in chapter eight, things quickly went astray. The battle itself covers only 16 pages of the 200 pages of text. Worse than that, the probable 3 day battle, he claims was all over in the space of an hour. He discounts the 4 latin sources about the battle and substitutes his own fantastic reconstruction. There are too many faults in this book for me to detail them all. However just to point out one of the more extreme errors. Wells has Germanicus withdraw from German lands after 15-16 AD because german resistance and not because the emperor was worried about his popularity with the troops and the population of Rome. He sacrifices the weight of evidence for his own weak arguements. He claims the roman sources are untrustwothy and totally contradictory. Yet he has no problem in using some of the more sensational elements to embellish his own narrative. His conclusions are weak and unsupported. This book is ultimately a complete waste of your time and money. As a previous reviewer noted Wells is trying to make a quick buck. I've lost mine, don't lose yours.
Rating:
Summary: The day Rome lost a chance to make Germania a province
Review: In a dozen easily read chapters, Peter S. Wells gives background information on the opening years of the A.D. 1st century, the political situation at Rome, the makeup of the army, and failed military attempts to subdue various Germanic tribes living to the east of the Rhine River frontier. Fans of "I Claudius" may recall Augustus Caesar wailing, "Varus, give me back my legions!" Wells relates the background of the doomed commander, as well as that of Arminius, the chieftain of a Germanic tribe who ambushed Quintilius Varus, in A.D. 9, near Teutoburg Forest and destroyed 18,000 legionaries and their equipment. Told by several ancient authors, the massacre was forgotten until manuscripts by Tacitus and other Roman historians surfaced in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. Wells fleshes out the story in a bloody narrative of what the unsuspecting Varus and his men must have experienced by being trapped in a narrow defile by frenzied warriors bent on annihilating the intruders.
Because Arminius had enlisted in an auxiliary unit of the Roman army and was familiar with tactics, Rome saw him as a traitor, but, in the burst of 19th century German nationalism, the chieftain was renamed Hermann and celebrated as "the Liberator of Germany." An immense statue of him still stands at Detmold near the battle site. Wells describes recent archaeological finds on the battlefield at Kalkriese, and includes 30 photographic plates related to the story. Nine maps help locate the region and battle site.
Albert Noyer, author, "The Secundus Papyrus."
Rating: 
Summary: The Battle that Stopped Rome? Tell THAT to Caratacus!
Review: One fact is certain: nine years after the birth of Christ, the Roman Empire was halted in its eastward expansion in northern Europe when the Germans destroyed three legions in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest. Little else is certain. Wells gives a masterful account of the events surrounding this resounding defeat, and suggests it is reason the culture of Europe differs sharply on the east and west sides of the Rhine. About 1,400 years later, the Germans were crushed in the Battle of Grunwald; perhaps this is why the culture of East Europe and Russia differs sharply from central and western Europe. It's tempting to attribute the success or failure of nations and empires to "great men" or "great battles," as if the outcome of a poker game hinges on the turn of one card rather than years of knowledge, skill, experience and daring. Real life is usually not so neat. Wells assumes the Roman legions, who were returning from a summer pacification campaign in Germany, blundered into a clever ambush. But what if the legions had already been seriously weakened by running battles, similar to the British troops as they withdrew from Lexington and Concord in 1775? The British won 90 percent or more of the battles during the US War of Independence; but they over-reached in the campaign that led to their defeat at Yorktown. The Romans may have encountered their own "Yorktown" in the Teutoburg Forest, rather than a Cannae. This book presents enough background detail to give readers any number of scenarios for the battle itself, and subsequent history. Wells offers one reasonable scenario; any intelligent reader will find enough material to suggest many alternatives. He claims, "It was a blow from which the empire never recovered." It's a pity he can't tell that to Caratacus when Rome conquered England in 43 AD. Suppose the revolt led by Boadicea in 61 AD had succeeded in liberating England -- would this have been another turning point in history? This is the danger of the "Great Man" approach to history; Wells bases his book on the Roman commander, Publius Quinctilius Varus and the German leader, Arminius. He overlooks the broader social trends -- was the Roman defeat in Germany inevitable, which produced the invasion of England a generation later as a consolation prize? Or was the conqest of England inevitable, to plunder the resources needed to maintain a defensive position along the Rhine? In brief . . . . . this book is fascinating, because it details a significant event in world history and allows every reader plenty of their own "what if" scenarios. It's a great read.
Rating:
Summary: The Battle that Stopped Rome? Tell THAT to Caratacus!
Review: One fact is certain: nine years after the birth of Christ, the Roman Empire was halted in its eastward expansion in northern Europe when the Germans destroyed three legions in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest. Little else is certain. Wells gives a masterful account of the events surrounding this resounding defeat, and suggests it is reason the culture of Europe differs sharply on the east and west sides of the Rhine. About 1,400 years later, the Germans were crushed in the Battle of Grunwald; perhaps this is why the culture of East Europe and Russia differs sharply from central and western Europe. It's tempting to attribute the success or failure of nations and empires to "great men" or "great battles," as if the outcome of a poker game hinges on the turn of one card rather than years of knowledge, skill, experience and daring. Real life is usually not so neat. Wells assumes the Roman legions, who were returning from a summer pacification campaign in Germany, blundered into a clever ambush. But what if the legions had already been seriously weakened by running battles, similar to the British troops as they withdrew from Lexington and Concord in 1775? The British won 90 percent or more of the battles during the US War of Independence; but they over-reached in the campaign that led to their defeat at Yorktown. The Romans may have encountered their own "Yorktown" in the Teutoburg Forest, rather than a Cannae. This book presents enough background detail to give readers any number of scenarios for the battle itself, and subsequent history. Wells offers one reasonable scenario; any intelligent reader will find enough material to suggest many alternatives. He claims, "It was a blow from which the empire never recovered." It's a pity he can't tell that to Caratacus when Rome conquered England in 43 AD. Suppose the revolt led by Boadicea in 61 AD had succeeded in liberating England -- would this have been another turning point in history? This is the danger of the "Great Man" approach to history; Wells bases his book on the Roman commander, Publius Quinctilius Varus and the German leader, Arminius. He overlooks the broader social trends -- was the Roman defeat in Germany inevitable, which produced the invasion of England a generation later as a consolation prize? Or was the conqest of England inevitable, to plunder the resources needed to maintain a defensive position along the Rhine? In brief . . . . . this book is fascinating, because it details a significant event in world history and allows every reader plenty of their own "what if" scenarios. It's a great read.
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