Rating: 
Summary: I wish I'd gone to Yale
Review: Donald Kagan's "On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace" is a fabulous book with an important message. Derived from his popular undergraduate class at Yale, the book uses an eclectic mix of great power case studies to illuminate the importance of actively and energetically working to maintain great power peace is an international system that is inherently unstable and competitive.Kagan's basic thesis is that war is a natural component of human society. Moreover, wars are just as likely to arise over intangible issues such as prestige, power, respect and honor as they are over more tangible concerns like land and natural resources. He demonstrates that attempts to avoid war through unilateral disarmament and conciliation -- although well intentioned -- are ultimately chimerical and doomed to failure. Kagan notes that many wars may be "unnecessary" and therefore avoidable, but war as an instrument of policy and change is permanent. Thus, the objective of statesmen should be to fight only those wars that are necessary, while maintaining a strong and credible defense to keep the peace. As Kagan writes "the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does." As for the individual case studies, I found them to be a bit longer than necessary, but each one was well-crafted and powerfully argued. The book does assume a certain familiarity with the subject matter, so the content may be a little overwhelming for those less-steeped in military history or foreign affairs. The chapter on the causes of the Peloponnesian War is a gem, but essentially a synopsis of Kagan's seminal work in that area. The piece on the origins of the First World War is forcefully argued and long enough to stand on its own as a monograph on that much-debated historical case study. Kagan revives the classic argument that the perceived ambiguity of a British response to a German invasion of Belgium and France is what set the stage for war, with the author arguing that war could have been avoided if London made their commitment to defend the Low Country clear and by introducing peace-time conscription to field a credible European land army. The chapter on the Second Punic War is crisp and compelling; that on the Second World War too long (he again blames the British for doing the most to "lose the peace"). The last case study was a bit surprising in that Kagan takes a classic diplomatic "success story" and lumps it in the same category as classic blunders like August 1914. In short, he argues that Kennedy's many mistakes, attempts at conciliation, and failure to understand his adversary is what put him in the crisis in the first place. Kagan contends that Kennedy was inclined to accept missiles in Cuba and it was only because of a coterie of strong-willed advisors, upcoming mid-term elections that threatened to overturn his slight Democratic edge in Congress, and a genuine fear of impeachment that compelled him to act. And the resolution of the conflict only came at the expense of the US removing missiles from Turkey in a quid pro quo with the Soviets. The case studies, which focused exclusively on conflict between great powers and/or their alliance systems, don't apply to the current War on Terror, but the general thesis that tough decisions and sacrifice are required for larger catastrophes to be avoided is still valid and directly applicable. Whether you are a serious student of war and peace, or are simply looking to gain some insights into such issues, you'd be well-advised to put this book on your reading list.
Rating: 
Summary: Peace does not keep itself
Review: Donald Kagan's "On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace" is a fabulous book with an important message. Derived from his popular undergraduate class at Yale, the book uses an eclectic mix of great power case studies to illuminate the importance of actively and energetically working to maintain great power peace is an international system that is inherently unstable and competitive. Kagan's basic thesis is that war is a natural component of human society. Moreover, wars are just as likely to arise over intangible issues such as prestige, power, respect and honor as they are over more tangible concerns like land and natural resources. He demonstrates that attempts to avoid war through unilateral disarmament and conciliation -- although well intentioned -- are ultimately chimerical and doomed to failure. Kagan notes that many wars may be "unnecessary" and therefore avoidable, but war as an instrument of policy and change is permanent. Thus, the objective of statesmen should be to fight only those wars that are necessary, while maintaining a strong and credible defense to keep the peace. As Kagan writes "the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does." As for the individual case studies, I found them to be a bit longer than necessary, but each one was well-crafted and powerfully argued. The book does assume a certain familiarity with the subject matter, so the content may be a little overwhelming for those less-steeped in military history or foreign affairs. The chapter on the causes of the Peloponnesian War is a gem, but essentially a synopsis of Kagan's seminal work in that area. The piece on the origins of the First World War is forcefully argued and long enough to stand on its own as a monograph on that much-debated historical case study. Kagan revives the classic argument that the perceived ambiguity of a British response to a German invasion of Belgium and France is what set the stage for war, with the author arguing that war could have been avoided if London made their commitment to defend the Low Country clear and by introducing peace-time conscription to field a credible European land army. The chapter on the Second Punic War is crisp and compelling; that on the Second World War too long (he again blames the British for doing the most to "lose the peace"). The last case study was a bit surprising in that Kagan takes a classic diplomatic "success story" and lumps it in the same category as classic blunders like August 1914. In short, he argues that Kennedy's many mistakes, attempts at conciliation, and failure to understand his adversary is what put him in the crisis in the first place. Kagan contends that Kennedy was inclined to accept missiles in Cuba and it was only because of a coterie of strong-willed advisors, upcoming mid-term elections that threatened to overturn his slight Democratic edge in Congress, and a genuine fear of impeachment that compelled him to act. And the resolution of the conflict only came at the expense of the US removing missiles from Turkey in a quid pro quo with the Soviets. The case studies, which focused exclusively on conflict between great powers and/or their alliance systems, don't apply to the current War on Terror, but the general thesis that tough decisions and sacrifice are required for larger catastrophes to be avoided is still valid and directly applicable. Whether you are a serious student of war and peace, or are simply looking to gain some insights into such issues, you'd be well-advised to put this book on your reading list.
Rating:
Summary: That Donald Kagan, What a Guy!
Review: He provides a good prospective on war...particularly good is his sections on WWI and WWII. Its been the focus of my history class this year, I recommend it.
Rating:
Summary: Study War No More
Review: I found Kagan's book thorough in its factual content but was a little disappointed that the case studies on the Athens-Sparta war and the Second Punic War were confined to periods preceding the conflicts without going further into its aftermath and consequences. The writer assumes that the reader already has some general background knowledge of the surrounding facts. One sobering point was that in the late 19th century, the European powers thought they were enlightened enough never to go to war again. What was supposed to come was a new period of trade and prosperity to replace primitive tribal warring. Sadly we know different. Kagan gives a timely, prophetic warning that wars have been with us since time immemorial and with the threat of thermonuclear weapons, the next big one could be the last if we're not careful. The last section on the Cuban Missile Crisis with references to recently declassified documents shows that contrary to public perception, JFK was indecisive and vacillating, allowing the Russians to press home a poker-faced advantage over the missile placement and the Berlin refugee exodus, when they had poor cards all along. Overall it was a readable fascinating study. To keep the peace, everyone needs to know the reasons why states go to war in the first place.
Rating:
Summary: Enjoyable Military Philosophy
Review: I have read Thucydides and I wondered how anybody could write about the causes of that war anywhere near the quality of Thucydides. But Kagan did it. His chapter on the Peloponnesian War was so intersting that I read it and the World War One chapter twice! He really shows the reader how one event leads to the next to the next and finally to the outbreak. His thesis about how World War Two started was clearly proven. The Cuban Missile Crisis was another very interesting chapter. He reaveled details in such a way that I wondered how Kennedy can be considered such a great president. I thought the Second Punic War chapter could have had some more work, it was very short and was not as in depth as the other four chapters. His choices for the wars he used are excellent. It was great how he kept interlocking the Peloponnesian War and World War One and how he showed the many similarities between the Second Punic War and World War Two. His students must be so lucky to have him as a teacher. He proves his point in this enjoyable philosophy book.
Rating:
Summary: I wish I'd gone to Yale
Review: I wish I went to Yale undergrad because this fine book is based on a course Kagan teaches in New Haven. I was amused by the previous review citing "ideological bias." I suspect that's because the reviewer disagrees with Kagan's conclusions on the Cuban Missile Crisis...Do yourself a favor: If you (like me) were fed the "13 days" RFK/Schlesinger/McNamara/Sorensen version of the CMC in High School or College, please read this book.
Rating:
Summary: I wish I'd gone to Yale
Review: I wish I went to Yale undergrad because this fine book is based on a course Kagan teaches in New Haven. I was amused by the previous review citing "ideological bias." I suspect that's because the reviewer disagrees with Kagan's conclusions on the Cuban Missile Crisis...Do yourself a favor: If you (like me) were fed the "13 days" RFK/Schlesinger/McNamara/Sorensen version of the CMC in High School or College, please read this book.
Rating: 
Summary: Ideological Bias
Review: If current readers want some sense of how academic writing can serve the interests of those who have and want to hold onto power, they should read this book. They can take it as a fine example of how government and their intellectuals produce stories to support their own positions and find in them the words and language they need to justify and 'explain' their actions. Kagan's enormous attack on John Kennedy (nicely refuted in recent writings on JFK) aims to shatter the idea that there are other ways of dealing with power than those recommended by the chicken-hawklets in the Bush administration. Also, there are other things to say about Thucydides than those Kagan chooses as essential to understanding war and the preparation to 'deter' it. Surely readers notice how often Kagan offers accounts of 'pre-emptive' wars?
Rating:
Summary: Ideological Bias
Review: If current readers want some sense of how academic writing can serve the interests of those who have and want to hold onto power, they should read this book. They can take it as a fine example of how government and their intellectuals produce stories to support their own positions and find in them the words and language they need to justify and 'explain' their actions. Kagan's enormous attack on John Kennedy (nicely refuted in recent writings on JFK) aims to shatter the idea that there are other ways of dealing with power than those recommended by the chicken-hawklets in the Bush administration. Also, there are other things to say about Thucydides than those Kagan chooses as essential to understanding war and the preparation to 'deter' it. Surely readers notice how often Kagan offers accounts of 'pre-emptive' wars?
Rating:
Summary: Phenomenally good
Review: If you are at all interested in international relations, politics, or war as subjects for study, why haven't you read this book? Kagan, without ever pressing home some pet thesis, lays out in detail the events leading up to four wars that were and one that wasn't. Aside from learning many lessons from these individual histories - states and individuals almost never truly want war, "honor" construed as a potential or actual presence in international affairs (deference, prestige, etc.) often winds up being crucial in triggering a conflict, wishful and idealistic thinking or a failure to recognize a threat to a rival nation's security or honor have often contributed mightily to growing conflicts, and many others - one will also get a vivid, in-depth account of some critical moments, accounts that are likely to stick in your mind better than a more general history. While some of Kagan's points may seem to lean toward the trivial when taken out of context and looked at in the clear light of day, it is the very fact that over many years and many events, a slow buildup toward war involves these very things - that at the time are much harder to see clearly - that contribute to movements that end in war. To see the many missteps in detail in these cases is fascinating. With the exceptions of Chamberlain and some of his cronies, and especially Kennedy, very few of the men in this book come off as anything approximating downright foolish; nevertheless, in these pages you will find many men, through many small mistakes, leading their nations to war.
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