The Radicalism of the American Revolution

Rating:
Summary: Interesting -- Doesn't Quite Get To His Conclusions
Review: Wood's book is interesting and worth reading as social and economic history.

The question addressed is whether the American Revolution was "conservative" or "radical". Wood likes the word "radical" and says it a lot, but of course he isn't talking about Bolsheviks or anti-globalism protesters; he means old-style (Adam Smith) Liberals, or modern Libertarians.

And Wood paints an interesting and convincing picture of cultural change, from an early colonial society structured around hierarchy and personal relationships to freewheeling, atomistic culture arranging everything by contract. What he never does, unfortunately, is convincingly demonstrate that the American Revolution (the war, or the restructuring of the government under the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution) was either a) fought for the purpose of bringing about this societal change or b) a significant catalyst in accelerating the change.

1. Wood clearly exaggerates the degree to which the colonies, just prior to the Revolution, were hierarchical and conservative cultures.

Some of the evidence he adduces for hierarchy is silly: does the prevalence of Christian churches really indicate a hierarchy, even if they do preach Romans 13 (p. 18)? How about the existence of a hierarchical military (p. 20), or vagrancy legislation (p. 20)? What about the use of titles, like "Esq." (p.21)? We see all these phenomena today, of course -- so if they do indicate hierarchy and conservatism, they also indicate that we are still a hierarchical and conservative culture.

Frequently Wood presents evidence of great freedom and egalitarianism in the colonies, but then wills it away with an unsupported conclusion. On page 14, for instance, we read that "Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic bragged of their independence." Most American farmers "owned their own land" and English farmers were viewed as outrageously independent by continentals, but, cryptically, "most colonists, like most Englishmen at home, were never as free as they made themselves out to be." Huh?

We get quotes out of context. So what if George Washington called ordinary farmers "the grazing multitude" (p. 27)? Without context, this is as meaningless as the John Adams quote that "Common Persons... have no idea [of] Learning, Eloquence and Genius" (p.27). For that matter, Washington's own career is later (p. 197) described as "incomprehensible except in terms of...new, enlightened standards of gentility." So was Washington an aristocrat or an up-and-comer in an era that did not respect blood? He wasn't both.

Some of Wood's stories are contradictory and of little evidentiary value. Old George Hewes trembles in the presence of "Squire John Hancock" because "[p]eople in lowly stations ... were apt to be filled with consternation and awe when confronted with 'what were called gentle folks... beings of a superior order'" (p. 29). But Hancock was born poor, and became rich by inheriting the mercantile empire of his uncle. On page 37, Wood tells us that merchants (even "[p]rominent merchants dealing in international trade", such as Hancock surely was) were not gentlemen: their "status" was "tainted". So Old George Hewes was no doubt awed, not because Hancock was an aristocrat, but because he was a rich and famous man. This, of course, is an indication that pre-Revolution America was ALREADY moving towards its Jacksonian destination, and NOT, as Wood would have it, evidence of the importance of status.

Wood even occasionallys slips and gives away the game, hinting at the egalitarian nature of colonial society. "Most colonial aristocrats were never able to dominate their localities to the extent that English aristocrats did" (p. 115). New Englanders were a "stern, sober people, not much given to the hierarchies and displays of monarchy" (p. 110). "The Americans did not have to invent republicanism in 1776; they only had to bring it to the surface. It was there all along" (p. 109).

And so on.

2. Wood himself indicates several times that the changes in American society were due to economics and demographics, and to processes which began before the Revolution.

In his chapter on patronage (surely one of the most interesting in the book), Wood makes it clearly that the early colonies essentially HAD to operate on a personal relationship basis. With no paper currency and a small population, everyone kept "book accounts" of the debts they owed each other. "[S]uch credits and debts... worked to tie local people together and to define and stabilize communal relationships" (p. 68).

But of course this was coming apart before the Revolution, simply as a result of population growth. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonists had accepted paper money (p. 141); they needed it because they had "expanded their inland trade (p. 140) -- i.e., they were no longer just dealing with their neighbors. These developments, Wood even notes, "suggest the various ways in which ordinary people ... were becoming more independent and more free of traditional patron-client relationships" (p. 142).

And societal change due to economic growth continued after the Revolution. Wood notes factors causing change, including swarms of westward-moving immigrants (p. 310), increasing urbanization and industrialization (p. 312), banks (p. 316), etc., all having "corrosive effects on what remained of the traditional patronage and hierarchical confidences between men in the society" (p. 340).

So it's hard not to conclude that the radical changes chronicles by Wood were the result of simple population growth, and neither the goal nor, principally, the outcome of the Revolution.

3. Finally, Wood notes that the Founders were shocked by the society in which they died.

"This democratic society was not the society the revolutionary leaders had wanted or expected. No wonder, then, that those of them who lived on into the early decades of the nineteenth century expressed anxiety over what they had wrought... All the major revolutionary leaders died less than happy..." (p. 365).

So even if you accept the thesis that Jacksonian America was the result of the Revolution, it was, on Wood's own evidence, not the objective.

But ignoring Wood's arguments and reading his evidence, it looks to me like the radical changes in American society were neither the goal of the Revolution nor its outcome.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting -- Doesn't Quite Get To His Conclusions
Review: Wood's book is interesting and worth reading as social and economic history.

The question addressed is whether the American Revolution was "conservative" or "radical". Wood likes the word "radical" and says it a lot, but of course he isn't talking about Bolsheviks or anti-globalism protesters; he means old-style (Adam Smith) Liberals, or modern Libertarians.

And Wood paints an interesting and convincing picture of cultural change, from an early colonial society structured around hierarchy and personal relationships to freewheeling, atomistic culture arranging everything by contract. What he never does, unfortunately, is convincingly demonstrate that the American Revolution (the war, or the restructuring of the government under the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution) was either a) fought for the purpose of bringing about this societal change or b) a significant catalyst in accelerating the change.

1. Wood clearly exaggerates the degree to which the colonies, just prior to the Revolution, were hierarchical and conservative cultures.

Some of the evidence he adduces for hierarchy is silly: does the prevalence of Christian churches really indicate a hierarchy, even if they do preach Romans 13 (p. 18)? How about the existence of a hierarchical military (p. 20), or vagrancy legislation (p. 20)? What about the use of titles, like "Esq." (p.21)? We see all these phenomena today, of course -- so if they do indicate hierarchy and conservatism, they also indicate that we are still a hierarchical and conservative culture.

Frequently Wood presents evidence of great freedom and egalitarianism in the colonies, but then wills it away with an unsupported conclusion. On page 14, for instance, we read that "Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic bragged of their independence." Most American farmers "owned their own land" and English farmers were viewed as outrageously independent by continentals, but, cryptically, "most colonists, like most Englishmen at home, were never as free as they made themselves out to be." Huh?

We get quotes out of context. So what if George Washington called ordinary farmers "the grazing multitude" (p. 27)? Without context, this is as meaningless as the John Adams quote that "Common Persons... have no idea [of] Learning, Eloquence and Genius" (p.27). For that matter, Washington's own career is later (p. 197) described as "incomprehensible except in terms of...new, enlightened standards of gentility." So was Washington an aristocrat or an up-and-comer in an era that did not respect blood? He wasn't both.

Some of Wood's stories are contradictory and of little evidentiary value. Old George Hewes trembles in the presence of "Squire John Hancock" because "[p]eople in lowly stations ... were apt to be filled with consternation and awe when confronted with 'what were called gentle folks... beings of a superior order'" (p. 29). But Hancock was born poor, and became rich by inheriting the mercantile empire of his uncle. On page 37, Wood tells us that merchants (even "[p]rominent merchants dealing in international trade", such as Hancock surely was) were not gentlemen: their "status" was "tainted". So Old George Hewes was no doubt awed, not because Hancock was an aristocrat, but because he was a rich and famous man. This, of course, is an indication that pre-Revolution America was ALREADY moving towards its Jacksonian destination, and NOT, as Wood would have it, evidence of the importance of status.

Wood even occasionallys slips and gives away the game, hinting at the egalitarian nature of colonial society. "Most colonial aristocrats were never able to dominate their localities to the extent that English aristocrats did" (p. 115). New Englanders were a "stern, sober people, not much given to the hierarchies and displays of monarchy" (p. 110). "The Americans did not have to invent republicanism in 1776; they only had to bring it to the surface. It was there all along" (p. 109).

And so on.

2. Wood himself indicates several times that the changes in American society were due to economics and demographics, and to processes which began before the Revolution.

In his chapter on patronage (surely one of the most interesting in the book), Wood makes it clearly that the early colonies essentially HAD to operate on a personal relationship basis. With no paper currency and a small population, everyone kept "book accounts" of the debts they owed each other. "[S]uch credits and debts... worked to tie local people together and to define and stabilize communal relationships" (p. 68).

But of course this was coming apart before the Revolution, simply as a result of population growth. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonists had accepted paper money (p. 141); they needed it because they had "expanded their inland trade (p. 140) -- i.e., they were no longer just dealing with their neighbors. These developments, Wood even notes, "suggest the various ways in which ordinary people ... were becoming more independent and more free of traditional patron-client relationships" (p. 142).

And societal change due to economic growth continued after the Revolution. Wood notes factors causing change, including swarms of westward-moving immigrants (p. 310), increasing urbanization and industrialization (p. 312), banks (p. 316), etc., all having "corrosive effects on what remained of the traditional patronage and hierarchical confidences between men in the society" (p. 340).

So it's hard not to conclude that the radical changes chronicles by Wood were the result of simple population growth, and neither the goal nor, principally, the outcome of the Revolution.

3. Finally, Wood notes that the Founders were shocked by the society in which they died.

"This democratic society was not the society the revolutionary leaders had wanted or expected. No wonder, then, that those of them who lived on into the early decades of the nineteenth century expressed anxiety over what they had wrought... All the major revolutionary leaders died less than happy..." (p. 365).

So even if you accept the thesis that Jacksonian America was the result of the Revolution, it was, on Wood's own evidence, not the objective.

But ignoring Wood's arguments and reading his evidence, it looks to me like the radical changes in American society were neither the goal of the Revolution nor its outcome.