The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II

Rating:
Summary: Inconclusive
Review: For most people, Munich is the hallmark of shameful appeasement. But for many scholars over the past three decades the British and French had no choice but to give in to Hitler at Munich. A crucial argument for the pro-appeaser scholars, and the one that is the subject of this book, concerns the position of the Soviet Union. Not only were the Soviets led by the untrustworthy and cruel Stalin, but the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia did not even share a common border so that the Soviet Union could fulfill her treaty commitments. Hugh Ragsdale is clearly unsympathetic to this argument, as he is to appeasement generally. Neville Chamberlain comes out looking particularly badly, ignoring his own cabinet and making concessions to Hitler they had explicitly told him not to make, while at other times ignoring the French, the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets in his willingness to make a deal. The key to the mystery of Soviet intentions is Romania. Romania, along with Poland, were the two countries interposed between the Soviet Union and Czechsoslovakia. Poland was ruled by a military regime that was intensely hostile to the Soviet Union. It does not come out looking very well in this account, showing more interest in humiliating Czechsoslovakia and taking the territory of Teschen, then trying to stop the German foe. Romania by contrast, was more open minded. Although it was a corrupt conservative monarchy many in the Romanian foreign ministry thought that the Soviet Union could be used to offset a dangerously strong Germany. And so we get a discussion of Soviet-Romanian relations based on documents in the Romanian archives. We learn of problems the two countries had over a defecting Soviet diplomat fleeing from the purges. We learn how in 1938 the Romanian government turned sharply to the right as avowedly fascist parties increased their power. We read tantalizing hints of how Romania was willing to help Soviet assistance, either by land or by air. Yet at the same time Romania had to worry about Poland, officially their ally, who kept reminding Romania that allowing Soviet military access would jeopardize their alliance.

So what were Soviet intentions in September 1938? Well, in the late eighties memoirs were published in the Soviet Union that strongly point to Soviet mobilization of the Red Army to assist Czechoslovakia, if the Czechoslovaks asked for their help. There are other military histories which make similar claims. There are documents from Polish intelligence where the Poles believe the Romanians were going to allow Soviet military access. Some Czech historians have argued that Romania explicitly allowed Soviet military access. But there are problems. We don't have access to Soviet archives for this period. The Czech historians do not like all that convincing when looked at more closely, and may be motivated by a parti pris to argue that the Soviets were untrustworthy. We cannot get confirmation of the Polish intelligence in the Romanian archives. On the other hand the Romanian archives are incomplete, as many of them were taken back to the Soviet Union after they defeated Romania in the war. So the result is inconclusive, and likely will remain so until we have better access to Russian archives. There are other problems with this book. At one point Ragsdale argues that Polish foreign policy was not popular with Polish public opinion. That would be interesting if true, but the information comes from a Communist era historian and needs more detail. Other historians are more skeptical than Ragsdale whether there would have been a military coup in Germany if the West had successfully stood Hitler down at Munich. At one point Ragsdale argues against a historian who argues that the Soviet Union supported revolutionary war and the possibility for the Soviet Union to dominate other countries. He argues instead that the Soviet Union supported a "popular front" strategy, and cites Ronald Radosh et al's Spain Betrayed in support. There are two problems with this. (1) Radosh is arguing that the Soviet Union was using the popular front as a strategy to impose a dictatorship on Spain, so the different strategies do not make much difference in the end. (2) It's not clear whether this was actually the Soviet Union's strategy in Spain, which has been vigorously contested by Helen Graham in her recent book on the Spanish Civil war. All in all, this is an incomplete book.

Rating:
Summary: Inconclusive
Review: For most people, Munich is the hallmark of shameful appeasement. But for many scholars over the past three decades the British and French had no choice but to give in to Hitler at Munich. A crucial argument for the pro-appeaser scholars, and the one that is the subject of this book, concerns the position of the Soviet Union. Not only were the Soviets led by the untrustworthy and cruel Stalin, but the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia did not even share a common border so that the Soviet Union could fulfill her treaty commitments. Hugh Ragsdale is clearly unsympathetic to this argument, as he is to appeasement generally. Neville Chamberlain comes out looking particularly badly, ignoring his own cabinet and making concessions to Hitler they had explicitly told him not to make, while at other times ignoring the French, the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets in his willingness to make a deal. The key to the mystery of Soviet intentions is Romania. Romania, along with Poland, were the two countries interposed between the Soviet Union and Czechsoslovakia. Poland was ruled by a military regime that was intensely hostile to the Soviet Union. It does not come out looking very well in this account, showing more interest in humiliating Czechsoslovakia and taking the territory of Teschen, then trying to stop the German foe. Romania by contrast, was more open minded. Although it was a corrupt conservative monarchy many in the Romanian foreign ministry thought that the Soviet Union could be used to offset a dangerously strong Germany. And so we get a discussion of Soviet-Romanian relations based on documents in the Romanian archives. We learn of problems the two countries had over a defecting Soviet diplomat fleeing from the purges. We learn how in 1938 the Romanian government turned sharply to the right as avowedly fascist parties increased their power. We read tantalizing hints of how Romania was willing to help Soviet assistance, either by land or by air. Yet at the same time Romania had to worry about Poland, officially their ally, who kept reminding Romania that allowing Soviet military access would jeopardize their alliance.

So what were Soviet intentions in September 1938? Well, in the late eighties memoirs were published in the Soviet Union that strongly point to Soviet mobilization of the Red Army to assist Czechoslovakia, if the Czechoslovaks asked for their help. There are other military histories which make similar claims. There are documents from Polish intelligence where the Poles believe the Romanians were going to allow Soviet military access. Some Czech historians have argued that Romania explicitly allowed Soviet military access. But there are problems. We don't have access to Soviet archives for this period. The Czech historians do not like all that convincing when looked at more closely, and may be motivated by a parti pris to argue that the Soviets were untrustworthy. We cannot get confirmation of the Polish intelligence in the Romanian archives. On the other hand the Romanian archives are incomplete, as many of them were taken back to the Soviet Union after they defeated Romania in the war. So the result is inconclusive, and likely will remain so until we have better access to Russian archives. There are other problems with this book. At one point Ragsdale argues that Polish foreign policy was not popular with Polish public opinion. That would be interesting if true, but the information comes from a Communist era historian and needs more detail. Other historians are more skeptical than Ragsdale whether there would have been a military coup in Germany if the West had successfully stood Hitler down at Munich. At one point Ragsdale argues against a historian who argues that the Soviet Union supported revolutionary war and the possibility for the Soviet Union to dominate other countries. He argues instead that the Soviet Union supported a "popular front" strategy, and cites Ronald Radosh et al's Spain Betrayed in support. There are two problems with this. (1) Radosh is arguing that the Soviet Union was using the popular front as a strategy to impose a dictatorship on Spain, so the different strategies do not make much difference in the end. (2) It's not clear whether this was actually the Soviet Union's strategy in Spain, which has been vigorously contested by Helen Graham in her recent book on the Spanish Civil war. All in all, this is an incomplete book.