Rating: 
Summary: welcome change
Review: This is probably the first attempt at a comprehensive history of the Ulm/Austerlitz campaign. It is, however, flawed and must be used with care. There are mistakes both on the French and on the allied side, most of which have already been covered in some detail. There are some, however, that can be traps for the enthusiast, researcher, and historian. Thiebault's memoirs, which were ghost written after his death, were relied on too much in this book. The theory presented by them that Soult was a coward is ridiculous. Soult's nickname was 'Hand of Iron' and he was respected by such officers as Ameil, which would have been impossible had he been cowardly. This book is too pro-French. While all of us do tend to pick sides and 'root' for them so to speak, this time, for me at least, it was too much. The French, and Napoleon, weren't perfect, far from it. The Grande Armee was better trained and better led in this campaign, but there were errors made, especially by its generals, two of whom come to mind immediately, Murat and Dupont. The account needs to be more balanced, and the anti-English bias needs to go, or at least toned down some. This book is a gallant attempt at an immense campaign study, a campaign that quite literally swept the length of Europe. Hopefully, the follow on volumes were be more carefully researched and written.
Rating: 
Summary: Comprehensive, but Flawed
Review: This is probably the first attempt at a comprehensive history of the Ulm/Austerlitz campaign. It is, however, flawed and must be used with care. There are mistakes both on the French and on the allied side, most of which have already been covered in some detail. There are some, however, that can be traps for the enthusiast, researcher, and historian. Thiebault's memoirs, which were ghost written after his death, were relied on too much in this book. The theory presented by them that Soult was a coward is ridiculous. Soult's nickname was 'Hand of Iron' and he was respected by such officers as Ameil, which would have been impossible had he been cowardly. This book is too pro-French. While all of us do tend to pick sides and 'root' for them so to speak, this time, for me at least, it was too much. The French, and Napoleon, weren't perfect, far from it. The Grande Armee was better trained and better led in this campaign, but there were errors made, especially by its generals, two of whom come to mind immediately, Murat and Dupont. The account needs to be more balanced, and the anti-English bias needs to go, or at least toned down some. This book is a gallant attempt at an immense campaign study, a campaign that quite literally swept the length of Europe. Hopefully, the follow on volumes were be more carefully researched and written.
Rating: 
Summary: Interesting reading with a strong bias against Russians
Review: When I read on page 101 a capton "Ochakov - another Suvorov's victory" I thought for a moment that it was a little mistake that could be found even at best-researched books. Suvorov was present at the siege of the fortress under command of prince Potyomkin, but did not take part in the final storm of Ochakov in December 1788 being severely wounded in a Turkish sortie. Author defenitely mistook the storm of Ochakov with the storm of another strong Turkish fortress - Izmail, which was a really great Suvorov's victory. But as read the book more I understood that it was not a chance mistake, because Mr.Bowden demonstrated a lack of knowledge of Russian military history, and a lot of false statements proved it. Just one example - he stated, that Emperor Paul disbanded all jager units of the Russian Army and there remained only several companies. It's just not true, because in 1797 Paul reorganised ten jager corps he inherited from the Catherine the Great (each corps consisted of four battalions) into twenty small regiments. When explaining the reason for ferocity of Russian soldiers Mr.Bowden says it was the heritage of wars with Turkey and "take-no-prisoners" nature of that wars. False statement again - there were excessions in wars of XVII - early XVIII centures, but in later conflicts (wars of 1768-74 and 1787-91) excessins were rare. One example - many Turks, taken prisoner in the 1787-91 war, served at Russian galleys at the Baltic and were decorated for the bravery in actions against Sweden. And only as bad-tasted jokes can be described stories of Inspector of Russian artillery Arakcheev with his hands cutting heads of his unfortunate officers, burying them alive etc. Such anecdotes were very good for XVIII centure propaganda, but in a XXI century historic research they look rather misplaced. Generally speaking, Mr.Bowden gives his readers a picture in the "French heroes against Russian hordes" style. Historians can have their preferences, but solid works shoud not be such one-sided. Author preferred to forget (or may be ignorant of) that in 1799 Russian Army soundly defeated French armies in Italy. In that campaign with great distinction fought the same regiments that fought in 1805 - Apsheron, Butyrsk, Ryazan, Novgorod musketeers, and much maligned by Bowden Russian jagers outfought French infantry in every aspect. I'd like to ask Mr.Bowden a question - if the Russian Army was so bad as he described, how come that just in a year when Russians and French met on the battlefield again, just the same French Army after several months of bitter fighting failed to produce another Austerlitz and had a victory only after a fatal blunder by Russian C-in-C, Hanoverian mercenary Bennigsen at Friedland? "General Winter" again? Definetly not. Russian army had many faults, but it was not a band of bad-disciplined savages, led by ignorant officers as Mr.Bowden tries to convince us.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting reading with a strong bias against Russians
Review: When I read on page 101 a capton "Ochakov - another Suvorov's victory" I thought for a moment that it was a little mistake that could be found even at best-researched books. Suvorov was present at the siege of the fortress under command of prince Potyomkin, but did not take part in the final storm of Ochakov in December 1788 being severely wounded in a Turkish sortie. Author defenitely mistook the storm of Ochakov with the storm of another strong Turkish fortress - Izmail, which was a really great Suvorov's victory. But as read the book more I understood that it was not a chance mistake, because Mr.Bowden demonstrated a lack of knowledge of Russian military history, and a lot of false statements proved it. Just one example - he stated, that Emperor Paul disbanded all jager units of the Russian Army and there remained only several companies. It's just not true, because in 1797 Paul reorganised ten jager corps he inherited from the Catherine the Great (each corps consisted of four battalions) into twenty small regiments. When explaining the reason for ferocity of Russian soldiers Mr.Bowden says it was the heritage of wars with Turkey and "take-no-prisoners" nature of that wars. False statement again - there were excessions in wars of XVII - early XVIII centures, but in later conflicts (wars of 1768-74 and 1787-91) excessins were rare. One example - many Turks, taken prisoner in the 1787-91 war, served at Russian galleys at the Baltic and were decorated for the bravery in actions against Sweden. And only as bad-tasted jokes can be described stories of Inspector of Russian artillery Arakcheev with his hands cutting heads of his unfortunate officers, burying them alive etc. Such anecdotes were very good for XVIII centure propaganda, but in a XXI century historic research they look rather misplaced. Generally speaking, Mr.Bowden gives his readers a picture in the "French heroes against Russian hordes" style. Historians can have their preferences, but solid works shoud not be such one-sided. Author preferred to forget (or may be ignorant of) that in 1799 Russian Army soundly defeated French armies in Italy. In that campaign with great distinction fought the same regiments that fought in 1805 - Apsheron, Butyrsk, Ryazan, Novgorod musketeers, and much maligned by Bowden Russian jagers outfought French infantry in every aspect. I'd like to ask Mr.Bowden a question - if the Russian Army was so bad as he described, how come that just in a year when Russians and French met on the battlefield again, just the same French Army after several months of bitter fighting failed to produce another Austerlitz and had a victory only after a fatal blunder by Russian C-in-C, Hanoverian mercenary Bennigsen at Friedland? "General Winter" again? Definetly not. Russian army had many faults, but it was not a band of bad-disciplined savages, led by ignorant officers as Mr.Bowden tries to convince us.
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