Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

Rating:
Summary: Monty, General, Egomaniac, One-Battle Hero
Review: Before the current resurgence in the love of history, I searched in vain for this book in countless new and old book stores. Every new city we went to, I would look for it. I had heard the American viewpoint on Montgomery, I had read Patton's version, but I wanted to hear Montgomery's version. As a Christmas present, there it was under my tree one year, and I devoured it in several days, even though it is incredibly detailed.
After reading the book, I felt I understood the man, the forces, the secret drives that made the General who he was.
He had a rather cold, lonely childhood, and was an aloof, intelligent loner.
The Battle of Dunkirk was the point at which he could no longer tolerate those he felt inferior to him, regardless of his rank. The absurdities of the waste of manpower of machinery, the inefficiencies of command by family name became clear to him. Here Montgomery rose to his highest success, a man who's destiny and abilities were matched by fortune to the time. He succeeded in defying the befuddled outranking superiors, took control, and performed brilliantly at El-Almein, a battle won almost exclusively by his strategic flanking movements.
El-Almein; however, became the soothsayer to his Achilles heel....his extreme egotism.
After El-Almein, he felt himself invincible and always correct regardless of the consequences for his men or the battle. His main focus after El-Almein was to preserve his legacy and reputation and to take credit for any favorable action by anyone, anywhere.
He was personally responsible for one of the two largest largest European debacles of the war: the Bridge Too Far. (The other being the inexperienced Eisenhower's debacle at the Kasserine Pass.) By sheer force of will, against the advise and counsel of many others, Montgomery forced an ill-conceived plan of the largest paratrooper drop in history with poor supplies, lack of artillary support, and a sheer waste of some of the finest men available. Even when it was evident that his plans were horribly inadequate, he refused to allow a strategic withdrawal, abandoning troops to their fate.
Whether politically correct to say or not, it seemed quite evident from the book that there was a strong presence of homosexuality in Montgomery's inner circle. Whether Montgomery was gay, bi, or neuter is impossible to say, and the fact that he procreated is irrelevant.
What is sad is that with his sycophantic inner circle, he could not be dissuaded from ill-conceived plans. He became the McClellan of World War II, sitting with troops that could have been used elsewhere, squandering supplies that could have been put to use for Patton.
Any other General would have been replaced after the fiasco of Operation Market-Garden. MONTGOMERY would have replaced any general of his that had carried out such an ill-conceived plan, then refused to halt when it was evident it was an abject failure.
Read the accounts of the Paratroopers who had to fight the actual battle, the SNAFU's they encountered, the hostility they received when they reasonably requested to withdraw and you have visions of Montgomery in the far distant rear echelons in his bunker, oblivious to the world. Montgomery went so far as to REFUSE to allow his sleep to be interrupted for important phone calls, reasoning that all he had to do was to plan a battle, but battles are vacillating beasts that require the presence of their commanders. Patton's brilliance in Sicily was his front-line presence, and therefore knowledge of the strategic changes that needed to be made.
With Montgomery's star tarnished by Market-Garden, Patton and Eisenhower were able to forge forward and accomplish what they were able to do at their best.
Argument has been made that Montgomery's bogging down after D-Day, and his Operation Market-Garden fiasco allowed the more Sourthern Patton to consolidate his positions, but then one wonders where was Monty when Bastogne was besieged and when Omaha beach was overwhelmed.
When I finally was able to read his version, instead of the American-written versions, I was dismayed that he was even pettier and self-centered than even the Americans realized.
Post-War, Monty was awarded the position of Chief of Staff, and felt it was due him as a royal coronation. He WAS the hero of El Alamein, but he was a one-note, one-battle, egomaniac hero who cost many lives needlessly.

Rating:
Summary: Monty, General, Egomaniac, One-Battle Hero
Review: Before the current resurgence in the love of history, I searched in vain for this book in countless new and old book stores. Every new city we went to, I would look for it. I had heard the American viewpoint on Montgomery, I had read Patton's version, but I wanted to hear Montgomery's version. As a Christmas present, there it was under my tree one year, and I devoured it in several days, even though it is incredibly detailed.
After reading the book, I felt I understood the man, the forces, the secret drives that made the General who he was.
He had a rather cold, lonely childhood, and was an aloof, intelligent loner.
The Battle of Dunkirk was the point at which he could no longer tolerate those he felt inferior to him, regardless of his rank. The absurdities of the waste of manpower of machinery, the inefficiencies of command by family name became clear to him. Here Montgomery rose to his highest success, a man who's destiny and abilities were matched by fortune to the time. He succeeded in defying the befuddled outranking superiors, took control, and performed brilliantly at El-Almein, a battle won almost exclusively by his strategic flanking movements.
El-Almein; however, became the soothsayer to his Achilles heel....his extreme egotism.
After El-Almein, he felt himself invincible and always correct regardless of the consequences for his men or the battle. His main focus after El-Almein was to preserve his legacy and reputation and to take credit for any favorable action by anyone, anywhere.
He was personally responsible for one of the two largest largest European debacles of the war: the Bridge Too Far. (The other being the inexperienced Eisenhower's debacle at the Kasserine Pass.) By sheer force of will, against the advise and counsel of many others, Montgomery forced an ill-conceived plan of the largest paratrooper drop in history with poor supplies, lack of artillary support, and a sheer waste of some of the finest men available. Even when it was evident that his plans were horribly inadequate, he refused to allow a strategic withdrawal, abandoning troops to their fate.
Whether politically correct to say or not, it seemed quite evident from the book that there was a strong presence of homosexuality in Montgomery's inner circle. Whether Montgomery was gay, bi, or neuter is impossible to say, and the fact that he procreated is irrelevant.
What is sad is that with his sycophantic inner circle, he could not be dissuaded from ill-conceived plans. He became the McClellan of World War II, sitting with troops that could have been used elsewhere, squandering supplies that could have been put to use for Patton.
Any other General would have been replaced after the fiasco of Operation Market-Garden. MONTGOMERY would have replaced any general of his that had carried out such an ill-conceived plan, then refused to halt when it was evident it was an abject failure.
Read the accounts of the Paratroopers who had to fight the actual battle, the SNAFU's they encountered, the hostility they received when they reasonably requested to withdraw and you have visions of Montgomery in the far distant rear echelons in his bunker, oblivious to the world. Montgomery went so far as to REFUSE to allow his sleep to be interrupted for important phone calls, reasoning that all he had to do was to plan a battle, but battles are vacillating beasts that require the presence of their commanders. Patton's brilliance in Sicily was his front-line presence, and therefore knowledge of the strategic changes that needed to be made.
With Montgomery's star tarnished by Market-Garden, Patton and Eisenhower were able to forge forward and accomplish what they were able to do at their best.
Argument has been made that Montgomery's bogging down after D-Day, and his Operation Market-Garden fiasco allowed the more Sourthern Patton to consolidate his positions, but then one wonders where was Monty when Bastogne was besieged and when Omaha beach was overwhelmed.
When I finally was able to read his version, instead of the American-written versions, I was dismayed that he was even pettier and self-centered than even the Americans realized.
Post-War, Monty was awarded the position of Chief of Staff, and felt it was due him as a royal coronation. He WAS the hero of El Alamein, but he was a one-note, one-battle, egomaniac hero who cost many lives needlessly.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent hiistorical accounts
Review: Most vivid and accurate account of world war II war through the eyes and mminds of a brillliant strategist and a great humanitarian.

Rating:
Summary: Monty - Master of the Battlefield and the back room
Review: This book makes such a strong case for Monty's military genius one might suspect partisanship (and the author acknowledges a warm personal friendship with him), yet it also seems unflinching in its depiction of his flaws (abrasiveness, egotism, and great coldness in dealing with certain family members). Its depiction of some of the brightest stars in the American military pantheon (at least those that Monty had to deal with) is extremely unflattering. Eisenhower in particular is depicted as completely removed from the realities of command in the field, and whose meddling interference in Monty's D-Day masterplan could well have cost the allies the war. The book is quick to concede Eisenhower's talents as an administrator and as a tactful coalition maintainer, but argues that he had little grasp of the battlefield, and that little grasp proved to be a dangerous thing. Patton and Bradley fare somewhat better.

I was very skeptical when I approached this book, since it challenged every preconception I ever had of Monty, that of the overcautious, slow, egocentric pedant who only cramped the styles of the Pattons of this world. This book changed my views. While in no way glossing over the Montgomery ego, time and again it cited examples of Montgomery putting the objective first, of repeatedly assuming the role of play-maker for Bradley and Patton in Normandy and Sicily, because that was what made the most military sense at the time.

Somehow, Hamilton succeeds in reconciling his depiction of the abrasive, egotistical, pompous, Montgomery with the military visionary who never lost sight of the ultimate end nor of the sacrifices that had to be made to attain it. The picture is of someone with all the elan of Patton yet a far greater feel for the individual soldier. Initially I was very uncomfortable with his depiction, yet at the end of the day one has to admit, Monty was at the helm when the allied armies won two of their most spectacular victories in the west, El Alamein and Normandy. What's more, the adversary Monty defeated there, Rommel, was by no means the 3rd Reich's "B-team". Hamilton argues those victories were the result of careful planning combined with a keen grasp of battlefield realities.

The book is well-argued. The author has clearly paid close attention to his source materials, noting that one military aide to Eisenhower even falsified a key diary entry that casts Montgomery in a somewhat more negative light. That pretty well destroyed the credibility of that aide for me, whose diary is relied upon unquestioningly by many other noted historians of the war.

The book is lively and well-written, with an occasional touch of humour to enliven what is a massive torrent of military information. It begins in the aftermath of El Alamein (November 5, 1942) and runs to the autumn of 1944, including the rest of the African campaign, the invasion of Sicily and Italy proper, and the Normandy campaign.

The book also conveys a keen appreciation of the personalities involved in the Allied Supreme Command. The intrigues carried on there, particularly by the Supreme Air Commander, another bigwig with little grasp of the situation on the ground, were another serious threat to Monty's plans, the plans which ultimately won the battle of Normandy. It demonstrates that mastering the battlefield was small cheese for Monty compared to the challenge of persevering in the face of all the scheming back room boys who wanted to bring him down, and nearly succeeded.

At the end of the book one is left wondering, how did we ever win?