Rating: 
Summary: Best Look Yet at Abrams' War
Review: Any student or scholar of the war must read this book to comprehend the Vietnam War from 1968 to 1975. While there are plenty of books whose authors assume that Vietnamization was ineffective or it was a return to counterinsurgency, Dr. Sorley provides the best scholarly account of the effectiveness of the situation in South Vietnam. The shift from Westmoreland's Search and Destroy strategy to Abrams' rebuilding of South Vietnam and strengthening of ARVN is an accomplishment that has long needed to be acknowledged.
Unfortunately, After McNamara's and Westmoreland's war sqaundered and divided U.S. support and demoralized the South Vietnamize, the American people did not have the national will or patience to support a the conflict any longer. Even if future scholars do not agree with the author's conclusions, they well atleast have to acknowledge "A Better War."
Rating:
Summary: Sorley gets it right, again.
Review: As one who served two tours with the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam, I concur with Dr. Sorley's thesis that we won the Vietnam War and then let the victory slip through our fingers by not living up to the pledges we made to the South Vietnamese Government. But there were earlier opportunties to have won a military victory as well. If we had been allowed to pursue the NVA in Cambodia right after the first and second battles of the Ia Drang in 1965 and 1966, respectively, we could have forced Hanoi to the negotiating table much earlier. While I too hold the late, great General Creighton Abrams and his approach to Vietnamization of the war in high regard, I think General Westmoreland deserves equal respect. If General Westmoreland had been given the geographical latitude he needed to prosecute a war of annihiltion, Westy would not have been forced to fight a war of attrition -- something Americans do not fight well at all. Nevertheless, Dr. Sorley brings to this book the same kind of dogged and thorough research that he brings to all of his writings. Clearly, a five-star addition to my personal library Wm. Hamilton, Ph.D.
Rating:
Summary: Author Sorley Corrects the Record
Review: Author Lewis Sorley has done all Americans, especially Vietnam veterans, a service by producing this meticulously researched, balanced study of the Vietnam War's final (post-Westmoreland) years. I served almost four years in Vietnam between January 1971 and the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975. I rarely review books about the war because too many of them evoke the sentiment, "If that was Vietnam, where was I?" But as one who fought the Vietcong guerrillas and struggled to ferret out their shadow government, who felt the fury of the NVA's 1972 Easter Offensive, and who ultimately left Vietnam on a marine helicopter from the embassy roof, I can say without qualification that author Sorley has got it right. He is on the mark when he points out the success of Cambodian sanctuary raids in 1970 and the long-overdue, successful emphasis on pacification pushed by General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker. He is equally correct in his statement that, by late 1972, it was our war to lose as Hanoi's legions faltered in disarray in the wake of the 13-division attack on South Vietnam that had been launched to bolster sagging revolutionary morale in the South. I served in a province that, under the Westmoreland strategy, was a revolutionary hotbed, where a simple trip to pick up the mail was an invitation to ambush. When Abrams, Colby, Vann, and Bunker got their hands on the throttle, this same province became a different place, with significant increases in security, massive morale problems and defections among the Vietcong cadre who had once ruled the countryside, and a significant economic upturn. This was the Vietnam of Sorley's "Better War." Sadly, as some of the reviews of this fine work demonstrate, the truth about that tragic war is too painful to some aging, unreconstructed members of the antiwar movement, some of whom cannot, 25 years later, admit that their love affair with the feisty Vietcong was misplaced, or that their country's men and women in arms had sown the seeds of victory under General Abrams. Bravo Sorley!
Rating:
Summary: Better War a solid academic work and an entertaining read
Review: For readers or researchers seeking a thoughtful and thoroughly researched book on a critical period in U.S. history, Sorley's book should be high on the list. Sorley has given historians and students of the Vietnam War a unique gift in this examination of the later years of America's longest war. For those that think they already know all there is to Vietnam, "A Better War" is a must-read. This is a new perspective from a reliable source and footnoted in manner that puts other works such as Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam" to shame.
Rating:
Summary: Not revisionist history
Review: I am writing in response to the many critical reviews of this book, as to the actual book. Many reviewers call this revisionist history, and claim that Lewis Sorley's admiration for General Abrams biases the work. Sorley is obviously a great fan of General Abrams, but hey, most people who knew him were fans of his. He was a great soldier, leader, and General. I studied guerrilla warfare before I went to Vietnam (1966-1967). I was part of the Westmoreland multi-battalion offensive actions against the communist forces. I returned to Vietnam (1970-1971) to experience the Abrams emphasis on population security and control. Both type operations are necessary to successfully win a guerrilla war, but Abrams emphasis was clearly the better long term strategy. I suspect that most of the critical comments about this book are written by those most against America's presence in Vietnam. I my opinion, Sorley speaks the truth here. He has done a masterful job of presenting the way the war was fought after the 1968 Tet offensive. Like it or not, that is the way it really was. It is a story that not enough people have heard.
Rating:
Summary: Relevance to Today's War on Terrorism
Review: Lewis Sorley, in his book "A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam", makes the boldest statement that I have heard or read regarding the Vietnam War. On page 217 Sorley writes, "There came a time when the war was won. The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won. This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970..." This is a very provocative statement considering what we know the final result of the Vietnam War to be.With "A Better War" Sorley attempts to portray America's last years in Vietnam, a time period from roughly the emergence of Creighton Abrams right before he took command to when we pulled out, as a time when America held within its grasp, if not victory in Vietnam, then at least the potential for the same strategic stalemate we achieved in Korea. Sorley details how this victory slipped through our fingers as a result of political reverses at home and not military reverses in Indochina. While saying that we had the war won may not be entirely accurate, we were certainly doing better than what has been portrayed in most accounts of the war. We were approaching our ultimate goal of creating a viable nation state out of South Vietnam that would be a bulwark against the spread of communism in southeast Asia. It is Sorley's belief that we had mostly achieved that goal by late 1970. Sorley seems to think that the main reason we faired so poorly in Vietnam was because of failed tactics at the beginning of the conflict. He faults William Westmoreland for not paying enough attention to Vietnamese forces and by employing a strategic plan that was more interested in killing the enemy than in providing a secure environment for the Vietnamese people. Sorley also believes that a combination of civil unrest over Vietnam and biased reporting by the media, especially Walter Cronkite, was the main contributing factor in America losing the war. President Nixon was unwilling to expend the political capital to be able to undertake the necessary military actions that would bring the North Vietnamese to their knees. Each new "escalation" of the conflict brought ever stronger rebuke upon Nixon until he just stopped fighting against it and made the fateful decision to withdraw all American troops whether the South Vietnamese were ready to accept all the responsibility or not. The end of the Vietnam War is easily America's most shameful moment. It is so not because we fought there or even because we didn't achieve our objective. It is our national shame because of the way in which we bailed out on a people who were totally dependent upon us for their freedom and their lives. Without American assistance the South Vietnamese didn't stand a chance against the North Vietnamese onslaught. The American president knew this, the Congress knew this, and, worse yet, the people knew this and they just didn't care. The worst thing that was ever said by an American about the war was said by President Gerald Ford. At a time when North Vietnamese soldiers were overrunning the South Vietnamese countryside, terrorizing and killing the people at will, Ford said during a speech he was giving at Tulane University, "As far as the United States is concerned, the war in Vietnam is finished." Yes, President Ford, the war may be over but America's shame from abandoning the Vietnamese people will never go away.
Rating: 
Summary: Wish it were true
Review: Sorley doesn't have to convince me to like Abrams, or that his efforts at recovery in the wake of Westmoreland were remarkable. I wish it were true that we could have won the war under Abrams' leadership, but even Sorley's dedicated and painstaking review of new evidence did not convince me. Too much of the evidence is taken out of historical context, and it does not sufficiently address an essential variable: South Vietnam's government and military. A review of other old soldiers has proved more convincing to me, particularly the career, writings, and findings of General Matthew Ridgway. As Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower, Ridgway found himself confronting Indochina early on. Then and throughout the Vietnam War, he was a spokesman for military opposition to military intervention. Had Ridgway himself been in command, it would not have been a viable, sustainable means of negotiating or winning the conflict. Sorley's book provides insights and information worth reading, but it did not convince me that Abrams, or anyone else, could have won that war.
Rating: 
Summary: The best yet in Vietnam War Revisionism
Review: This book is by far the best in a new wave of scholarly works that contend the American War effort in Vietnam was legitimate and/or winnable. Sorely convincingly argues that the Free World Forces had essentially won sometime in 1970-1971 by successfully denying the Communists access to the Republic of Vietnam's population and through successful nation building. By this time, South Vietnam was a viable nation that could survive indefinitely as long as it continued to recieve US financial support and access to American air power. Mr. Sorley backs his thesis up with good statistics. He seems to understand that many will question any US government data from Vietnam and backs each contention with anecdotal evidence. Some examples of this include CIA chief Colby wandering alone at night alone in a rural area where years earlier he would surely have been murdered and South Vietnamese militia (the folks common wisdom says either ran away or defected on sight of Communist forces) going toe to toe and besting the cream of the North Vietnamese Army. Most criticisms of this book claim its just another in a line of "we were stabbed in the back by liberals and the media" tomes. Its more than that but there is a very minor undercurrent of this. If Mr. Sorely contends we had victory in the bag, then an exploration of why we ultimately lost is essential. Sorely seems to believe the opportunity for success was destroyed by liberal elites (here represented by Senator Kennedy and Jane Fonda) campaigning for a Communist victory even after American ground forces were being removed from the theater and by powers in the media largely refusing to broadcast the later successes in Vietnam (represented mainly by anectdotal evidence that Walter Cronkite spiked all reports showing the war effort in a good light during this time period). Such activity further sapped war weary Americans and the anti-communist leadership. This in turn allowed the pro-Comunist elements in our society to cut off the essential aid discussed above. All in all this is a very small portion of the book (10-15 pages at most). I docked the book one star because of Sorely's irrational hero worship of General Abrams who seems to be the prime mover in the reforms that brought such success. I agree Abrams was a much better commander than Westmoreland and he was largely responsible for the improvements Sorely describes. Unfortunately, Sorely pushes it too far at times. Heres a prime example. Abrams' main strategy was to secure population centers and use American forces in direct combat only if the benefits would be high and the price low. By doing this, he denied the Communists recruits and logistical support while not exaserbating American war weariness. This flies in the face of the "Hamburger Hill" Battle where elements of the 101st Airborne were sent head on up a fortified hill. Sorely says this was justified because it was necessary to open up an access route into Saigon. Im not convinced. By this time, ARVN had adequate resources to do the job. Also, the battle caused Congressional constraints that essentially ended his ability to use Ameircan ground forces in direct action again. Doesnt seem worth the price to me. However, this book is a keeper and essential to any serious study of the Vietnam War.
Rating:
Summary: The best yet in Vietnam War Revisionism
Review: This book is by far the best in a new wave of scholarly works that contend the American War effort in Vietnam was legitimate and/or winnable. Sorely convincingly argues that the Free World Forces had essentially won sometime in 1970-1971 by successfully denying the Communists access to the Republic of Vietnam's population and through successful nation building. By this time, South Vietnam was a viable nation that could survive indefinitely as long as it continued to recieve US financial support and access to American air power. Mr. Sorley backs his thesis up with good statistics. He seems to understand that many will question any US government data from Vietnam and backs each contention with anecdotal evidence. Some examples of this include CIA chief Colby wandering alone at night alone in a rural area where years earlier he would surely have been murdered and South Vietnamese militia (the folks common wisdom says either ran away or defected on sight of Communist forces) going toe to toe and besting the cream of the North Vietnamese Army. Most criticisms of this book claim its just another in a line of "we were stabbed in the back by liberals and the media" tomes. Its more than that but there is a very minor undercurrent of this. If Mr. Sorely contends we had victory in the bag, then an exploration of why we ultimately lost is essential. Sorely seems to believe the opportunity for success was destroyed by liberal elites (here represented by Senator Kennedy and Jane Fonda) campaigning for a Communist victory even after American ground forces were being removed from the theater and by powers in the media largely refusing to broadcast the later successes in Vietnam (represented mainly by anectdotal evidence that Walter Cronkite spiked all reports showing the war effort in a good light during this time period). Such activity further sapped war weary Americans and the anti-communist leadership. This in turn allowed the pro-Comunist elements in our society to cut off the essential aid discussed above. All in all this is a very small portion of the book (10-15 pages at most). I docked the book one star because of Sorely's irrational hero worship of General Abrams who seems to be the prime mover in the reforms that brought such success. I agree Abrams was a much better commander than Westmoreland and he was largely responsible for the improvements Sorely describes. Unfortunately, Sorely pushes it too far at times. Heres a prime example. Abrams' main strategy was to secure population centers and use American forces in direct combat only if the benefits would be high and the price low. By doing this, he denied the Communists recruits and logistical support while not exaserbating American war weariness. This flies in the face of the "Hamburger Hill" Battle where elements of the 101st Airborne were sent head on up a fortified hill. Sorely says this was justified because it was necessary to open up an access route into Saigon. Im not convinced. By this time, ARVN had adequate resources to do the job. Also, the battle caused Congressional constraints that essentially ended his ability to use Ameircan ground forces in direct action again. Doesnt seem worth the price to me. However, this book is a keeper and essential to any serious study of the Vietnam War.
Rating:
Summary: Different perspective, with faults
Review: This book is worth reading if the reader wants a full perspective on the Vietnam war.
In a lot of ways, the book is a wasted opportunity. Having additional sources of information (the Abrams tapes) available to him, the author feels compelled to quote from those sources at length. Wishing to point out who was responsible for a beneficial change in policy in the war, Sorley worships General Abrams and demonizes General Westmoreland. Wanting to illustrate the unimportance of bombing North Vietnam, he mixes up statistics of Cessna mail flights with those of B-52 raids over Hanoi. To persuade us that most South Vietnamese civilians were in safe hamlets and that the South Vietnam government was protecting its people, he forgets to tell us that the "safe hamlets" were not the villagers' own home hamlets.
His main point is that moving away from Westmoreland's "search and destroy" tactic to Abram's "clear and hold" tactic brought us to the brink of winning the Vietnam War. Yet let's not forget that the commanders' actions were often both dictated and limited by American politics: Westmoreland had Johnson, and Abrams had Nixon.
To what extent was South Vietnam a viable country? They were much more our "client" than our "ally," by any measure. Would pointless activities such as the Thieu/Ky rivalry, and Thieu's continuing support of ineffective generals, have ever resulted in a stable situation, such as we have now in North/South Korea? Would the North Vietnamese have ever given up? Would it be politically and physically possible to continually invade Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ to deny the North Vietnamese their staging and supply areas? Would we risk scuttling our valuable relationships with Russia and China to coerce Russia and China into abandoning North Vietnam?
If you read this book, keep in mind that it has its limitations, biases, and inaccuracies. Be sure to read other books, such as _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
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