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Summary: Excerpts from professional reviews:
Review: "Geoffrey Wawro's meticulous analyses of battle make The Austro-Prussian War an important book; his pungent judgements make it a lively one." (TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, March 1997) "This is a very good book [on the war], perhaps the best that has appeared in any language." (THE JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY, July 1997)"Wawro's treatment of the Austro-Prussian conflict shows how battles in this emerging Age of Firepower were actually fought, as opposed to how they were subsequently reconstructed by staff officers and general staff historians. He never allows his readers to forget the importance of the final 300 yards between the combatants." (INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW, November 1997)."Austria's war with Prussia and Italy in 1866 was arguably the most important six weeks in modern European history ... Unique in its treatment of the war's Italian campaign, usually neglected in other accounts, this work remorselessly catalogs Austria's errors ... It is an outstanding work, illustrating once again that operational military history can make important and enjoyable contributions to understanding the past." (CHOICE, January 1997)A selection of the HISTORY BOOK CLUB
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Summary: The Austro-Prussian War : Austria's War With Prussia
Review: Excellent history; excellent reading. Two disappointments: the situational maps are worthless (places discussed in the text cannot be found on the accompanying map, and the maps have no scale), and the typeset is far too small and light.
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Summary: The Austro-Prussian War
Review: People introduce Geoffrey Wawro?s The Austro-Prussian War as the first major work on the subject in twenty years. Well maybe I?m more unfamiliar with the field than I thought, but I don?t recall any book on the subject for a very long time. Wawo works to dispel myths regarding Prussian military efficiency and attribute Prussian?s victory in 1866 to the total ineptitude of Austria.This is an important point, for by 1866 Austria was a great power in name only. The polyglot empire of a dozen languages and little common cultural heritage struggled with its own vastness and its failure to develop an industrial base that would support a military. Chapter by chapter, Wawro illustrates how unable Austria?s military commanders were (except when they faced the Italians, who were even less capable that themselves). The book is not long, but at times Wawro belabors his point too much. He always finds new ways to describe Austrian bungling, whether it be appointing the wrong field generals or naming the wholly inept Benedek as the overall military leader. Prussia had its own detractors leading individual forces, but Moltke and Bismarck were fully capable as military/political leaders. Their plans worked in spite of those given the task of carrying them out. The Austro-Prussian War is an important work that really sets the stage for Warwo?s most recent work on the Franco-Prussian War, which, presumably, he will carry forth the same thesis and apply it to other nations and personnel.
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Summary: The Austro-Prussian War
Review: People introduce Geoffrey Wawro?s The Austro-Prussian War as the first major work on the subject in twenty years. Well maybe I?m more unfamiliar with the field than I thought, but I don?t recall any book on the subject for a very long time. Wawo works to dispel myths regarding Prussian military efficiency and attribute Prussian?s victory in 1866 to the total ineptitude of Austria. This is an important point, for by 1866 Austria was a great power in name only. The polyglot empire of a dozen languages and little common cultural heritage struggled with its own vastness and its failure to develop an industrial base that would support a military. Chapter by chapter, Wawro illustrates how unable Austria?s military commanders were (except when they faced the Italians, who were even less capable that themselves). The book is not long, but at times Wawro belabors his point too much. He always finds new ways to describe Austrian bungling, whether it be appointing the wrong field generals or naming the wholly inept Benedek as the overall military leader. Prussia had its own detractors leading individual forces, but Moltke and Bismarck were fully capable as military/political leaders. Their plans worked in spite of those given the task of carrying them out. The Austro-Prussian War is an important work that really sets the stage for Warwo?s most recent work on the Franco-Prussian War, which, presumably, he will carry forth the same thesis and apply it to other nations and personnel.
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Summary: The War of 1866
Review: The Austro-Prussian War, by history professor Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, is a well-written and interesting revisionist account of that oft-neglected conflict in 1866. Dr. Wawro has assembled an impressive amount of existing and new source material that sheds an entirely new light on the brief war of 1866 that brought Prussia to the brink of German unification and presaged a new era of professionalization in war. Wawro's account is particularly strong in its use of Austrian and Italian sources; the Italian role in the war is usually reduced to a few paragraphs but in these pages it is covered in great detail. However, readers should be aware that Dr. Wawro's account is revisionist in intent and tone, which the author does not always make clear. Dr. Wawro's central hypothesis is that both Austria and Prussia were fairly evenly matched opponents but that, "Austria did lose in 1866 for many reasons, but chiefly because...Ludwig Benedek, Austria's supreme commander on the Prussian front, revealed himself to be a supremely incompetent general." While the author also cites the technical superiority of the Prussian needle gun and the poor combat performance of many ethnic minority units in the Austrian army, the main cause the author ascribes for Austrian defeat is the poor generalship of Benedek. The "inferior generalship" hypothesis is a difficult one to prove, particularly given notable lapses in Prussian generalship, but by and large the author succeeds. Overall, the Austro-Prussian War belongs on any bookshelf of anyone seriously interested in the evolution of 19th Century warfare. The Austro-Prussian War consists of 11 chapters, beginning with strategy and tactics in 1866 and origins of the war. Two more chapters cover opposing war plans and Italian involvement in the conflict. The fifth chapter covers the Battle of Custoza and the rout of the Italian Mincio Army. The next three chapters cover the covering force battles that preceded the decisive battle of Königgrätz, and then the next two chapters cover the battle itself. A final chapter covers the aftermath of the battle, which does an excellent job discussing the results and implications of the war. The author has included many sketch maps in the book, which while useful, are rather crude and incomplete. None of the maps have scales or depict railroad lines, or even depict tactical movements. I found it necessary to consult another source on the war that had better maps, to follow the author's narrative. There are also a number of photographs, mostly of Austrian generals (note, other than one photo of Moltke, there are no photos or illustrations from the Prussian side). The author includes excellent footnotes and a detailed bibliography, but no appendices. An appendix listing rival orders of battle and casualties in the war would have been useful. For military professionals, the author's discussion of the development of Austrian "fire tactics" and the needle gun will be an interesting evolutionary study. While the author notes that not all Prussian commanders subscribed to these tactics, the superiority of the tactics in themselves are not so clear because the author tends to ascribe too much importance to the needle gun. The author ignores the importance of combined arms tactics in favor of over-emphasis of one weapon system. While the needle gun was revolutionary as the first mass-produced breech-loading rifle and conferred firepower advantages to the Prussian infantry, the rest of the Prussian combined arms team was pretty weak. Prussian artillery was obsolescent, Prussian cavalry was timid and poorly trained and the vital support services were not up to supplying a fast-moving campaign. On the Austrian side, the retention of column assaults bordered on reactionary but such tactics did not become truly obsolete until the introduction of the machinegun. Austrian artillery and cavalry was superior, but these arms were improperly used. Two interesting areas of modern military technology that the author fails to address in detail are the use of telegraph and railroads. While the author does mention that the Austrians foolishly shunned the use of telegraphs, they do not seemed to have suffered badly for it, but the Prussians who did use telegraphs were often out of communications and suffered badly from lack of adequate command and control. The military use of the railroad is hardy mentioned, and one wonders why Benedek - who enjoyed an excellent rail net in Bohemia and Moravia - was constantly marching his troops to and fro instead of using rail lines to transfer troops rapidly. The author's conclusions about the implications of the war are also striking, "the complete triumph of Prussian grand strategy in 1866 served to tighten the political connection between the Prusso-German state and army. After 1866, the example of Königgrätz suggested that Prussia-Germany could extend its influence and make vast annexations against any rival if only it struck fast and hard enough. This thinking, which originated with Clausewitz and Moltke, would be the basis of Prusso-German military strategy in 1870, 1914 and 1939." The author notes that other armies attempted to copy the Prussian military professional standards after Königgrätz, but none fully succeeded. Indeed, the Austrians failed to learn much from their defeat and in fact their military capabilities declined. However, one interesting question that the author does not ask is that given the demonstrated military incompetence of the Austrian and Italian armies in 1866, why did Prussia choose to later ally itself with such second-rate powers? In choice of weapons and tactics the Germans clearly excelled, but in choice of allies they were clearly inferior.
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Summary: 1866
Review: There is only one way to describe this book, serviceable. If you are interested in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, this book will appeal to you. Of course the issue of the war was not minor. The decision as to who would dominate the as yet divided states of Germany was decided, and Bismark's design for a united Germany under Prussian domination moved one step closer. The First World War became a little more inevitable with the Prussian victory, and also the fatal weakness of Austria, the ally in the Great War that the Prussia had defeated 38 years earlier, moved closer to becoming an albatross around Germany,s neck. Understand, however, that this book is primarily a military history of the war. You will find material here on the campaign against Prussia's junior ally Italy, the major actions between Austria and Prussia, and a two chapter treatment of Koniggratz. The naval aspects of the war are not covered and you will find no discussion of Lissa here.
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Summary: Excellent Overview of this Forgotten war
Review: This book by Geoffrey Wawro on the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866 offers the reader a decent and easy to read account of this largely forgotten war. Most people have heard about the battle of Koniggratz but in this book Wawro provides the full story of how this disastrous battle came about. I must admit I was surprised of the level of stupidity shown by the Austrian commanders. Wawro offers some very interesting insights into the decisions made by the Prussian and Austrian High Command and the results. I found that the book was very easy to read and the narrative flowed along smoothly. The maps provided (26) were also easy to read and follow. The authors level and depth of research is excellent and I don't think you could fault him in his conclusions, The one and only compliant that I have with the book is the cost.
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Summary: The War of 1866
Review: This is a really good book. It is very easy to read. The author has studied primary sources in Italy and Austria (the best German primary sources did not survive WWII). It covers both the Italian and German theatres - it is primarily about the war from the Austrian Army's point of view, so there isn't that much about the Bavarian's, etc, and the naval campaign is barely mentioned. The only way this book could have been improved significantly would have been to have had a statistical annex filled with strengths and casualties by regiment for each day of combat.
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Summary: An examination of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866,
Review: This is one of the main references for this particular war between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Prussia. I would not determine it revisionist, since it examines the efficiency of the Prussian Army and the total incompitence of the Austro-Hungarian militay. In fact, Professor Wawro alludes to the fact that the Austro-Hungarians almost talked themselves into defeat.
Wawro demonstates why Prussia and Sardinia won this war, and why the Austro-Hungarians lost.
At times, this book was a difficult read. Both my Dad and I read this book. My Dad states this book reads like a history thesis, and since he has a Master's in History, I believe him. It is not the easiest read, but the reader will get an understanding of the war and the ultimate outcome for Europe. Since then, Wawro has come out with a book on the Franco-Prussian War. I can't wait to start this book and compare it to Howard's book on the same subject.
For one wanting to understand the rise of Prussia and the decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this is a challenging but enjoyable read. A good read.
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Summary: Good but biased work
Review: This is overall a good, well written and serviceable book, but the parts devoted to the Austrian-Italian conflict leave much to be desired. Much of what the author writes about the structural flaws, drawbacks and defects of the newly born Italian army certainly hold broadly true. However his account of the 1866 campaign and the battle of Custoza relies heavily on Austrian material - obviously magnifying their troops' achievements as well as the Italian defeat - while Italian sources, albeit mentioned in the bibliography, seem to be discounted or rather neglected in the narration.
The truth about Custoza is that, and no offense meant to the widely acknowledged Austro-Hungarian bravery and toughness, it was an Italian self-defeat rather than an Austrian victory. The conduct of the battle on the part of the Italian army, army corps, and some division commanders was abysmally botched, an outright failure which led the troops on the field (and a few divisional commanders who fought very well) to lose a battle they had already won. In spite of the collapse of two Italian divisions (and another was badly mauled), the Austrians had achieved nothing when the battle reached its climax: on their right flank they had suffered so many casualties they could not move forward any further and were going to be attacked, in the center Italian counterattacks had bloodily pushed them back and their cavalry action on their left had gone nowhere. They were just ripe for destruction. The Italians still had several intact divisions ready for action and had those units been properly used, and had the Italian army had a leadership up to the challenge instead of the panicking or dull blockheads it had, the Austrians would surely have been crushed.
In the first phase of the battle, two Italian divisions with 16,000 fatigued, hungry and thirsty men caught by surprise in march order, held back 32,000 Austrians for hours inflicting heavy casualties. Those units eventually crumbled and some exhausted battalions broke and ran, but elements of the two divisions fought to the last and the Austrians had suffered so badly that they didn't push any further. Stating, as Wawro does, that "whole Italian divisions dissolved upon contact with the enemy" is an absurd exaggeration. During the battle an Austrian regiment, too, was routed, but this piece of news from the battlefield is apparently overlooked in the text.
Much is also made of the 3,500 or so Italian prisoners (a small fraction of the Italian force) taken by the Austrians, and the classic stereotyped portrayal of the "surrendering Italian" is unavoidably dished out to the reader, but out of the 2,800 Austrian MIA, 1,500 were captured by the Italians.
Readers interested in a fairer, less stereotype-fed account of the clash between Italy and Austria-Hungary in 1866 will have to look for less biased works.
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