Rating: 
Summary: Not an unenjoyable book
Review: At least one other reviewer pointed out that this author doesn't "have an appreciation for the development of knowledge over time." This is perhaps the best criticism of this book followed closely by the use of a lot of very smug prose.
I don't pretend to know more than Mosier and I'm not qualified to disagree with his thesis. But his idea doesn't seem that controversial to me -- certainly not as controversial as Mosier seems to want you to find it. There are at least three instances in the book where the author directly addresses critics of his last book and attempts to head off what he imagines them saying about this one. I find this to be a tactic more worthy of AM talk radio pundits than of legitimate historians.
Again, as others have pointed out, the idea that strategic bombing in World War II was as effective as it was made out to be at the time has been thoroughly debunked. But Mosier insists upon damning the Allies for embracing the theories of Giulio Douhet which weren't even translated into English until 1942 (he does mention, in passing, in the appendix that the Allies arrived at the same notions independently). Here's where a focus on the organization of Bomber Command and the British/American home front would be useful (i.e. following the development of an idea over time). Other accounts of the air war reveal that the Allies knew that their bombing campaigns were largely useless but that there was too much public outcry for ANY kind of offensive action against Germany in Europe to stop the missions. In short, the air war could be seen as a result of bureaucratic inertia or even a desire to placate Stalin. Mosier's failure to refine his argument doesn't make it wrong -- I just think that the whole issue is not that controversial today.
I found Mosier's discussion of the European ground war much more interesting. Fortunately, his consideration of this topic takes up the bulk of the book. Here, I think I learned a great deal. And considering that you can probably finish this book during a couple of cross-country flights, it's worth the read.
Rating: 
Summary: Bold and Convincing Account of the Blitzkrieg
Review: Despite criticisms of Mosier's thesis in these reviews, I believe Mosier has presented a solid and persuasive case that blitzkrieg tactics during WWII were essentially ineffective. And in defense of Mosier's account, I would add that the battles on the eastern front, which many reviewers complain Mosier neglects, were in fact not Blitzkrieg-style battles at all. The German invasion battles into Russia were series of encirclements at first until a general war of attrition set in. I believe that is why the eastern front battles are neglected in the book. In fact, few operations in WWII ultimately fit the blitzkrieg or "breakthrough" mold as they were initally carried out. And for the most part, as Mosier explains, they did not succeed even where the "breakthrough" method was initially employed. Where Mosier strays is in his more general conclusions about particular generals or wartime strategy as a whole. To claim that Montgomery was a military genius is a major stretch. Mosier's account of the African campaign is not at all convincing. In fact, Rommel was brilliant with the smaller forces he had. Montgomery deserves no great praise simply because he was finally able to stop Rommel by building up three times as many tanks. Without adequate support from Hitler, Rommel couldn't go on forever. He kept attacking vastly superior forces, and he usually won. Eventually this had to end, and it did. Finally, Mosier doesn't give enough credit to genuine instances of brilliant tactical strategy that occurred in WWII or other wars in history. To say, as he does, that the German army was better trained or that the allies simply overwhelmed Germany at the end is not enough. Individual generals or leaders had plenty of sound or brilliant advice that was ignored (to their sides' detriment) or was actually used. After 1941, Germany could have won the war or continued on much longer than it did had Hitler not made any number of serious errors. And however well he refutes the notion that a classic blizkrieg operation defeated France in 1940, he might have considered that German commanders knew the psychology of the French and British political and military commands well enough to know that they would probably blink in the face of attacking German forces as they marched into France. Being able to read your enemy correctly is an important facet of war. In summary, I think Mosier's basic thesis is valid but that some of his other generalizations or observations about the war are more dubious.
Rating: 
Summary: Myth vs. Reality
Review: Every few years a book comes along which turns conventional history on its head, reinterprets things, and generally shakes up thinking on a particular aspect of history, military or otherwise. The Blitzkrieg Myth is a very concious effort to do just that, intending to prove that blitzkriegs didn't work, either when the Germans implemented them against their enemies early in the war, or later when they were the victims of them.
The author approaches this theory in an unusual, and not very productive way. Instead of studying each of the campaigns in Europe in World War II that involved armored warfare, he essentially ignores North Africa, Italy, and the war in Russian, and concentrates for the most part on the campaigns in France in 1940 and 1944. This leads to the completely weird phenomenon of the author attempting to prove that both the French collapse in 1940 and the German one four years later weren't the results of mechanized assaults and encirclements by their opponents. He even, at several points in the text, labels both attacks "failures." This is clearly strange.
One major difficulty I had with the book was the author's knowledge of the campaigns and battles, and his command of the issues involved. The text contradicts itself regularly, and it cites facts not available elsewhere (i.e. they're wrong) continuously. He even repeats the statistics on the civilian dead in the bombing of Dresden that Frederick Taylor just proved were inflated by Josef Goebbels, in his book on Dresden. When he's not mangling actual facts, Mosier puts forward some truly odd opinions, often without comment. Thus Sepp Dietrich turns out to have been one of Hitler's best Panzer generals, an opinion I've never seen before. Every other writer I've ever read thought Dietrich was basically useless as an army commander.
Occasionally, there's an opinion that's interesting in its originality. The author, for instance, is a great admirer of Montgomery, and spends considerable time in the book praising him. There are so many things that he ignores or states incorrectly, however, that you have to wonder why and how he came to the conclusions that he did.
When someone writes a book, and expresses amusement at his critics and their lack of understanding of his points, he'd better be completely on target with what he says. If he's not, he's going to be subject to some severe criticism. The author does exactly that (the forward to his book is about as condescending as I've ever read) and then proceeds to fall all over the map as far as getting his facts straight is concerned. As a further impediment to understanding what he's saying, since the author is an English professor by trade, he's apparently exempt from rules governing modern grammar, and feels free to use incomplete sentences throughout his book.
I like history and World War II, and I enjoy new interpretations of events that have been gone over conventionally on a repetitive basis. The problem is that the new light has to be accurate, and in this book it's not even close. I wouldn't recommend this book to anyone; there's nothing here of interest, and if you don't have much knowledge of World War II, you're going to collect a great deal of information that's just plain wrong.
Rating: 
Summary: A few Intersting bits, but overall a failure
Review: I bought this book used, and I find myself dissapointed overall. The reviews here that say its a big revelation must be from those who have been recalling very old tales of WW2, rather than the more modern reassessment of events. This means that to some, Mosier's 'revelations' will be a surprise, but most of the events are rather unshocking. An entire chapter and innumbearble comments are devoted to showing the failure of strategic bombing. This is a revelation? Spare me!
A few interesting facts are brought up when the author discusses the 1940 France campaign, mostly with regards the effectiveness of various battles. Some of these facts are new to me (assuming they are accurate) and here Mosier hits his high point.
Unfortunately, to prove his point of "no armor breakthroughs", Mosier avoids many battles that would demonstrate his 'mythbusting' to be a farce. In the battles he does discuss one often find him rationalizing the cases where there were breakthroughs. The COBRA breakout is weighed down with a boatload of "yes but"s that aren't really relevant to the fighting.
The author heaps scorn over practically all commanders except Montgomery. Even going so far as to declare that the SHEAF command was not aware of the fuel consumption tanks would require for the offensive. Excuse me? This makes it seem like the Red Ball Express was a desperate inspiration. His axe grinding on Rommel is uncalled for, making it seem as if Rommel's only talent was to ingratiate himself to Hitler. This is patently, provably untrue.
Overall, the tone is condescending and demanding of a Oracle-like knowledge over events from commanders Mosier takes a disliking to. In the text, the author is very much ont he offense. In his endnotes, he is very much on the defensive. The overall tone is of one trying to prove an unfounded prejudice rather than a military fact.
In addition, many typos add to the sloppy, agressive feel of this book. At one point a cannon shell is described as being able to penetrate "50mm of armor straight on or 50mm of armor at an angle". huh?
Rating:
Summary: Setting the record straight?
Review: I submit this review not because I think I have anyting to add to previous reviews (particularly that of Mr. Licari, an excellent overview of Mr. Mosier's book), but because I think the three stars currently awarded to the Blitzkrieg Myth (due to the averaging of all reviewers' scores) is too high. Many of the reviewers give the book 4 stars (or even 5!) because "it makes you think," even though they admit that they disagree with the book's thesis, are not convinced by its argument and evidence, and dislike the writing style.
I have to say, if a book is badly written and poorly argued, the fact that it may have an interesting theory should not redeem it. Even at that, the Blitzkrieg Myth is nothing new. There are many books available that make the same points as Mr. Mosier does, but are much better written and have better evidence. For example, I can recall reading in the classic Time-Life series of books on WWII (the ones that were advertised on TV and were delivered every other month) much of the same evidence concerning the actual effectiveness of armored thrusts and strategic bombing, and those were written 25 years ago.
Three out of five stars comes off as an overall positive rating for the Blitzkrieg Myth, when in fact most of the reviews are negative. I agree with the negative reviews. There are so many other books on the topic that are worth reading instead of Mr. Mosier's, and that will "make you think" (rather than simply make you think angry thoughts about the essentially hypocritical arguments of Mr. Mosier, who excoriates historians for ignoring facts that don't fit their views, and then basically ignores the entire Eastern Front!) in a much more positive and in-depth way. Therefore, I submit this review with one star -- both because I believe the book deserves it, and to try to set the record straight on the book's overall rating.
Rating:
Summary: Re-Evaluation of the Blitzkrieg Worth Thinking About
Review: In his book, Dr. Mosier gives military history a deserved kick in the pants.
The repetitive and standard history of WW-II during the last five decades have given rise to and solidified many failed concepts such as the bomber offensive being a success and the U-boats actually threatening to cut off Britain.
Mosier challenges a lot of established ideas and this is bound to anger many military history buffs who have been brainwashed by the ubiquitous same old, standard hogwash that passes for the established military history of WW-II.
The author does have many good points to make, many of which are unflattering to all sides. It is a book that one can't just swallow whole, but has to stop and think about what the author is saying, without simply rejecting it out of hand.
For example, he states that Luftwaffe superiority over France in 1940 was due in large part to the Luftwaffe simply having their airfield fields very much closer to the front than the Allies.
Another point is that it was the surprise presence of German forces in the Ardennes which triggered the massive French withdrawal in 1940 (along with a British panicky pre-emptive retreat!), not the superiority of armored combat.
Other facts:
-the Polish campaign cost the Wehrmacht 674 tanks
-In 1940 both sides threatened Norway with Invasion
-the Luftwaffe lost 328 planes over Holland
(280 of them transport)
-Luftwaffe lost a third of its strength over France
-By June, 1940, France had more planes than the Luftwaffe
-In 1944 Allied bombing of German communications actually impeded the Allied advance
-Allied planning speculated it would take three months to take all of France....and it did!
It is facts such as these that partly make the book worth a read, though in a certain portion it does come to resemble Deighton's 'Blitzkrieg,' complete with statistics on French, British and German armaments.
In spite of the many intriguing points the author raises, he spends little time dwelling on them or ultimately proving them. This, unfortunately, applies to the author's main point, on which the title is based.
According to Mosier, the narrow front attack, or Blitzkrieg is a glamorized, delusional concept that never really worked on its own. His thesis is that the broadfront attack is the only natural type of attack that has ever worked and will continue to be the standard method of war. At this point, the thesis really does become a matter of semantics.
Mosier does have a point that the German advance in 1940 actually extended from the tip of Holland all the way to the tip of Luxemburg. Yes, there was a 'schwerpunkt' between Sedan and Dinant, but this was simply part of the broad-front advance.
The front during the thrust south did extend from Abbeville on the coast to Verdun at the tip of the Maginot proper, and later (once the Maginot was breached) along the entire French northern front, though there was a 'schwerpunkt' at Rheims.
Again, semantics.
Did the armored narrow front attacks alone win victories? Of course not. Did it supplement the successful advance of the entire front. Of course it did.
Mosier points to Arnhem as the classic failure of the narrow-front attack. As such it was...because the broad front was nowhere to be seen advancing along with it. Allied supply problems had frozen it.
Be that as it may, it is Mosier's tendency to judge in absolutes obfuscates his thesis. Something is either a glorious success or an absolute failure, when in practice, reality tends to be very much a grey area.
All in all this is a book one has to read carefully and think about while not accepting everything as complete dogma.
The author does indeed have some very interesting points to make.
I think just by writing it, Mosier has stimulated a re-thinking of what Blitzkrieg really was and how it operated.
I would have missed something indeed if I had not read this book.
Rating: 
Summary: interesting and provocative
Review: John Mosier's book, The Blitzkrieg Myth is not THE definitive statement on military strategy in WWII. The historical evidence is selective in places, and it's two central theses regarding the limitations of strategic bombing and armored breakthroughs are already well known by the military establishment. That said, I must admit that for the casual reader, this book is a thought provoking treatise that challenges some common, yet erroneous assumptions about the nature of fighting during the war.
Other reviewers have already extensively reviewed this work, and I don't want to repeat what has already been said. Still, I would like to make the point that the author oversimplifies in a number of places. To blame the difficulties faced on Omaha Beach and operation Market Garden on a misunderstanding of combat theory is to ignore a vast number of much more relevant factors!
Mosier is correct to criticize the idea of blitzkrieg, but he goes too far in throwing out the concept altogether. The fact remains that WWII witnessed a number of fast moving land battles in which massed forces of tanks and aircraft did play an essential role. Just because psychological factors such as surprise and panic made this possible doesn't mean it didn't happen. The author comes very close to concluding that fixed fortifications are the best possible defense, but this is simply substituting one myth with another, instead of cutting the first myth down to a more appropriate size.
This is a good book that is fun to read, and has mostly sound conclusions. It's just a little too extreme and poorly argued in places. Read it, but don't accept everything at face value.
Rating:
Summary: Blitz or myth: Who spins the best story?
Review: Let me state right up front that an interesting thesis, if written well, can still make one think about the subject matter, even if researched poorly or selectively. This fact played heavily in my final analysis and rating of John Mosier's "The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II". Now for the breakdown:First, this is an easy book to read and one can get through it pretty quick. In addition, it is one that, while not impossible to put down, I was compelled to read a bit more even late at night when my eyelids were getting heavy. As a literary piece this is a solid read - even if Mosier has a proclivity for semicolons! Second, Mosier's thesis that "breakthroughs" with armor and airpower, as he re-termed tank Blitzkrieg and strategic bombing tactics together, were in fact products of historical imagination for the most part and not really practical outcomes of WWII is an interesting one - or at least the portion revolving around armored thrusts. The failure of strategic bombing has been acknowledged for years by historians both connected with and independent from the Armies that battled. Thus this portion of his thesis is accepted and need not be argued and re-proven. The former portion, that armored breakthroughs did not actually swing the balance of the war is a more interesting one that probably deserves some critical analysis. The problem here is that Mosier falls into the very trap that he claims post-war analysts and historians have fallen into - chosing events and situations that tend to provide support for the idea being proposed and spinning the history according to thesis. Mosier argues that disciples of Fuller (let's limit our discussion to tanks and armor as airpower failures are already accepted) spun the war to fit the theory of breakthroughs such that breakthroughs were the resultant history. One has to agree that their appears to be some truth in this. Certainly tanks alone were not decisive in determining the outcome of the war, and what appeared temporally and spatially as breakthoughs on the battlefield were influenced as much by political situations and non-armor Blitz military tactics as motorized tactics implicite in Fuller's ideas. Yet tanks and armor were important factors in there own right - the most important case in point being the Eastern front. Mosier tells the reader that the T34 Russian battletank was the BEST tank of the war - a point generally agreed upon by decades of historians - yet he omits essentially all reference to brilliant Russian tactic use of this tank on the Eastern front. Rather he limits his discussion to Poland, France, brief synopsis of desert battles, and post-Allied invasion western Europe. In doing so he avoids clear examples of dramatic armored breakthroughs that occurred during the march to Berlin by the Russians. Also by minimizing the discussion of the desert war Mosier again avoids discussion of what was in most cases mobile tank battles alternating with attemps of armor and infantry to breakthough defensive stances. By picking and chosing examples where the breakthrough theory is not the clear and sole determinant of the battle outcome Mosier provides support for his thesis. Is this not in all intent and purpose what Mosier said the Blitz proponents have done for decades? So what is the correct spin? Was the Blitz a real tactical product or theoritical dream? As most things in life go it is probably fair to say "a little of both, depending upon where you look". If one takes isolated examples, as both Mosier and those he criticizes have done the extreme viewpoints win out. But what's the real answer? Here's how this book get's 4 stars instead of 2 - the answer is still out there waiting for an unbiased thorough study, taking into account all of the available historical data but using Mosier's criteria for whether or not a breakthrough theory is applicable. This means looking more boradly at the war as a whole - the entire European and Middle Eastern theatres, and addressing not pierced defensive weaknesses, as Mosier is correct to point out have generally been done previously, but to look at both defensive and offensive realities of both combatants. Thus, the interesting thesis still exists I think and for that reason my interest in the question is still high and I can give "The Blitzkrieg Myth" four stars for making me think. Disclaimer: serious students of history should be aware before they read this book that a lot of historical fact is omitted or shoved aside in the "testing" of the thesis.
Rating:
Summary: Causes One to Think
Review: The Blitzkrieg Myth, by Mosier, is an excellent book, fun to read and does cause one to think about the thesis. I think the thesis is wrong, and I think the author supports his thesis with carefully chosen battles (excluding battles that do not support the thesis). None the less, the book deserves 4 stars because the ideas are clear and concisely presented, and because the ideas cause one to think about what happened in World War II from a different perspective. Mr. Mosier makes the argument that blitzkrieg really means breakthrough as the concept is espoused by Fuller and others. Breakthrough means getting behind the enemy lines and running amok in his rear areas destroying command and control centers, reserve formations, supplies and the like. This breakthrough would then cause the collapse of the opposing army and end a war rather soon. He then argues that the fall of France and other famous panzer battles do not fit the breakthrough description and argues that the "new" warfare wasn't so new after all. The author has a lot of facts to back up his position. The German army really was not mechanized but relied mainly on horses to do the work. The breakthrough really never occurred unless someone make a huge mistake, and the armored advances could always be met with a swift retreat by the enemy therein negating the "breakthrough". Mosier makes it clear that he thinks the advances that worked were made on a broad front where the entire enemy army breaks down. The largest problem is the lack of analysis of the eastern front. The Soviet destruction of Army Group Center (German forces) was a breakthrough in the classic sense and did cause a real shortening of the war. The same can be said for the Stalingrad encirclement. These are not analyzed. The other problem is the analysis of the covered actions seems to overlook a very obvious fact. The entire point of armored warfare was to avoid the gridlocked stalemate of World War I where the defenses overpowered the offense to the point that no real offense was possible for years. In WW II it is obvious that no such stalemate took hold. The rush of armored vehicles negated the trench warfare or stalemated combat of WW I. That WAS the point of Fuller and the other advocates of armored war. And it worked. The lines were not static, the defense did not overpower the offense and movement was the key to victory. Did fortifications work? Yes, they did stop attacks in many instances; however, they did not determine the outcome of the war. The Atlantic Wall was one example of how fixed fortifications failed that Mosier did not examine. Other instances of fixed fortifications (Rommel's "Devil's Gardens) doing some good are not deeply examined, but it is clear that movement is what won the day in WW II, not digging in. Thus, the advocates of armored warfare were correct. While the defense did adapt to the new war, it adapted with movement of its own, not fixed fortifications. Even though I disagree with the author I like books that cause me to think, and this one does.
Rating:
Summary: Strategic military historians and spin
Review: The need to defend the military strategy of western powers when it failed has been a consistent theme in the twentieth century, and continues today. Moreover, many of those glorious victories were more often than not the result of poor decisions on the part of the vanquished, not the victors, and were certainly not the "brilliantly conceived campaigns" trumpeted by the military and their enthusiastic encomiasts. Thus it is no surprise that John Mosier's book should elicit squeals of protest from the purists. The premise that the "armored breakthrough" is a myth is well supported by Mosier's thesis and examples from World War II, and it is interesting to note that even NATO, during its many studies of potential Russian armored thrusts pouring through the Fulda gap into West Germany during the Cold War nearly always maintained that a vigorous defense would buy enough time for relief from the USA. One can argue that the strategic bombing campaigns of WW2 are possibly not an appropriate subject for the book, since their faulty premises have already been successfully demolished in the literature, and I would have liked to have seen more discussion of action on the eastern front, but Mosier, in my opinion, encapsulates many arguments and aspects of military actions that have been traditionally dismissed as irrelevant. For example, the horrible timings in MARKET GARDEN, are often relegated to a few sentences in many accounts. If the British had managed to break out of their sloth, and coordinate ground/air elements more effectively, who knows what might have happened. Instead, I have read accounts of MARKET GARDEN being accorded a "modest success" instead of the ill-conceived operation it was. One needs only to read personal accounts of American paratroopers involved in the operation to learn of their disgust at the lackadaisical thrust of British armor. (Divide the miles by the hours of the operation; there's speed for you.) My father was captured at the rearguard action in Calais, and as a result incarcerated for the duration of the war with terrible results--he still suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome 60-odd years later--and I have never seen any accountability from the armchair generals or the politicians for the failure of the BEF to engage the enemy. Instead, we had the "miracle" of Dunkirk. Mosier clearly lays the blame rightly so at the top where it belongs. The BEF soldiers weren't cowards; their superiors and the French government were. However, it's simply not politically expedient to say that in this day and age. As Mosier intimates, this was never Blitzkrieg; merely the wind rushing in to fill a vacuum.
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