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Rating: 
Summary: Classic for Understanding Naval Policy
Review: Despite the other reviews of this book offered above, with which I must disagree, for the serious student of naval history and tactics, this is a classic, and required reading if for no other reason than to understand the influential thinking of the naval tacticians and strategists of the early 20th century. Mahan was to naval warfare as Von Clauswitz was to land warfare. While the reading is not easy for a late 20th century casual reader expecting thrilling tales of Hornblower, it is true grist for the mill of the serious student of naval history. I disagree that the work is outdated because it deals with pre-steam naval warfare. The fundamental concepts are as applicable as Sun Tzu to land warfare. Mahan is not the end of the analysis, but was a tremendously important influence.
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Summary: The influence of History on Sea Power
Review: In reading Mahan, I felt his exposition overreached the applicability of his theory. His selection of evidence seems motivated by a hidden agenda. The meaning he asserts seems to go beyond what that evidence can support. But I have to be forgiving. History isn't science.
We rely on the experience, knowledge and intuition of a grand expert of naval strategy. We haven't the opportunity to replay Trafalgar a hundred times to harvest its truths. We can't really know whether the French had the intrinsically superior strategy and the English dominated merely by favorable throws of fortune's dice. Did Mahan really see the British navy would have an American successor?
I note the Prime Ministers, Presidents and Princes of the First and Second World Wars relied on this expert. Thus Mahan's book itself is a subject of history, an event that shaped the great saga of nations. For this reason, one can't understand naval history without reading Mahan.
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Summary: von Clausewitz of the Sea
Review: In this book, U.S. Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan presents what he considers the six key elements of sea power and shows the impact their application or misapplication has had on history. Citing numerous historical examples, he shows how nations have prospered or suffered through use or misuse of their naval assets. His book is rightfully considered essential reading for any historian of naval warfare. However, its impact does not stop there. Mahan shows how nations thrived or declined during the 17th and 18th centuries through prudent or imprudent application of naval power. He contends France, Holland, Spain, et al. prospered until they allowed their naval power to dissipate. Meanwhile, Britain became mistress of the seas. British colonies provided raw materials for her industries, while her armed fleet insured uninterrupted commerce. He equates Britain's loss of her American colonies with inappropriate deployment of her fleet, contrasted with France's skilled strategic use of her own. This section will interest readers of American history schooled only on Washington's land campaign at Yorktown. Mahan's book has had a tremendous impact on history. It unquestionably shaped the imperialistic policies of pre-World War I and pre-World War II Germany and Japan respectively. Students trying to ascertain why leaders of those nations acted as they did should read this work. The elements of sea power are the same today as in 1900 when this book was first published. With a world economy as interdependent as today's, Mahan's principles are as valid as they were in the 1600's and 1700's, perhaps even more so. German war philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise, "On War," is considered a must read for every Army officer. Mahan's work is to the sea-battle as von Clausewitz's is to the land. Historians, military strategists, and architects of America's foreign, economic and national security policies should read this important work to gain insights on the necessity of protecting vital and vulnerable sea lines of communications worldwide.
Rating:
Summary: von Clausewitz of the Sea
Review: In this book, U.S. Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan presents what he considers the six key elements of sea power and shows the impact their application or misapplication has had on history. Citing numerous historical examples, he shows how nations have prospered or suffered through use or misuse of their naval assets. His book is rightfully considered essential reading for any historian of naval warfare. However, its impact does not stop there. Mahan shows how nations thrived or declined during the 17th and 18th centuries through prudent or imprudent application of naval power. He contends France, Holland, Spain, et al. prospered until they allowed their naval power to dissipate. Meanwhile, Britain became mistress of the seas. British colonies provided raw materials for her industries, while her armed fleet insured uninterrupted commerce. He equates Britain's loss of her American colonies with inappropriate deployment of her fleet, contrasted with France's skilled strategic use of her own. This section will interest readers of American history schooled only on Washington's land campaign at Yorktown. Mahan's book has had a tremendous impact on history. It unquestionably shaped the imperialistic policies of pre-World War I and pre-World War II Germany and Japan respectively. Students trying to ascertain why leaders of those nations acted as they did should read this work. The elements of sea power are the same today as in 1900 when this book was first published. With a world economy as interdependent as today's, Mahan's principles are as valid as they were in the 1600's and 1700's, perhaps even more so. German war philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise, "On War," is considered a must read for every Army officer. Mahan's work is to the sea-battle as von Clausewitz's is to the land. Historians, military strategists, and architects of America's foreign, economic and national security policies should read this important work to gain insights on the necessity of protecting vital and vulnerable sea lines of communications worldwide.
Rating: 
Summary: An old book, but still useful
Review: Influence of Sea Power may be old, and written in the nineteenth century, but it is still a useful book. Mahan outlines six principles of what makes a strong seapower: geographic position; physical features; territorial extent; population size and character; and finally, the government's policy. The basic strategic principles are still valid: the seapower has the ability to drive his enemies flag from the ocean, and oceanic wars are won by decisive battles between capital ships at sea. But Mahan also warned his readers that seapower was not the only driving force behind historical events; it was but one element. An aspect of Mahan's work that is often forgotten by his extremist followers. Mahan's work covers the period in good detail, and is a must read for anyone starting out in naval history. But one must remember, it is a history, and Mahan was looking to the past for laws of human behavior; a popular style of history in the late-nineteenth century.
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Summary: A interesting Thesis on how to become a world power
Review: Mahan uses how the British Empire fought with its navy and withs its econmic navy how it rose to become the empire that is was in the 18th-19th century. He uses various battles how the british defeated thier enemies afloat and how that often affected the battles ashore in Europe. A recommended read on how the British rose to power. Also on why we need to maintain a large navy. Only one down side, a hard and long read. Not a weekend or month book more like a 2-3 month book
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Summary: Excellent Navy Book, Good History book in general
Review: Mahan uses some detail and technical language to demonstrate particular naval engagements from 1660-1783, but apart from being just a lecturer on naval warfare and an analyst on tactics, he demonstrates how the use of the general navies, or the strategy of using a strong navy to protect the fleet of an aggressive merchant marine, is the single most important root cause of advancing economic and therefore military prosperity in any nation. Using Great Britain as his main example, he also details the Dutch fleets to demonstrate their reason for becoming a European superpower in their own right. Later he identifies the presence of the French navy, apart from any material success in its engagements, as one of the determining reasons why America had a chance to win its independence. Finally, as he hints of the supreme commercial and military importance of the proposed (Panama) canal, against the declining state of the American navy and the paltry condition of its merchant fleet, he urges that America's prosperity if not survival depends on the powerful revival of its sea power. An excellent read, a great general history book, and very lucid explanations, easy for the layman. If you enjoy history you'll enjoy this.
Rating:
Summary: A Good Thesis, but Unproven
Review: Mahan, in this book, puts forward a broad thesis, that a nation, in order to be a great power, must be a great sea power, both militarily and commerically. Unfortunately, he fails to provide any evidence that supports, instead supplying his reader with blow-by-blow recaps of naval battles from the age of sailing ships. Mahan fails to convince me that the era of the sailing ship has any relevance to our era of self-propelled sea power. Nothing about Mahan's work disproves his thesis, he merely failed to prove it.
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