Rating: 
Summary: Essential contradiction
Review: Do not be put off by my mediocre rating or fellow reviewers intent on highlighting the horrors of war. This is a serious peace of work which deserves to grace anyone's collection. Quite simply such eloquence from such a master tactician is extremely rare and the author's prussian arrogance is more an institutionalised devotion to his men and his duty than todays understanding of humanity.
The book mirrors the advances of the German army with valuable insights into lightning advances through France and Barbarossa. Inevitably it becomes bogged down around Stalingrad but for me the key revelations centre around "what now after France?" with Von Mansteins scathing criticism of the BEF escape at Dunkirk and the lapdog role that OKH was reduced to. It certainly evaporated my generations view of the superhuman german machine in terms of planning, organisation and military structure.
This is a book which I know I will return to time and again.
Rating: 
Summary: What might have been...
Review: Had this man been given overall command of our eastern front armies, the end result in Russia would have been very different.
As germany's top if not it's only grand strategist, he had depth, perception and a natural sense for anticipating the enemy's next move.I find his memoirs shed a light on certain hitherto blurry events, like the Crimean campaign. Much has been made about how long it took us to take over the Crimea and about how swiftly the russians retook it from us. The odds facing an army without armor support, the terrain over which our comrades had to advance and the absolute superiority in numbers or their opponents seemed unsurmountable. What our 11 Army achieved in late 1941 and early 1942 is a sheer example of superb, unhindered command by a superb German officer. The author notes with a certain degree of longing that this was one of the few times he was allowed to command without interference from either Hitler or OKW. The book sheds away the myth of the German Supreme Command's vaunted infalible genius and shows us that the we if we endured
through almost 5 years of war, it was due to the endurance and ability of the ordinary German soldier and our junior NCO's and field commanders. The description of the battle of Stalingard is pricless. Even with the limited resources at his disposal Von Manstein would have prevented the debacle had he been given freedom of action.
Sadly 6th Army was commanded by a timid, unresolute, resourceless man who only precipitated the army's downfall. Had Von Reichenau been in command of 6th Army I seriously doubt he would have stood by idly and allowed events to deteriorate as they did. Von Manstein's opposal to breaking up 11 army after the Crimean campaign (he wanted to keep it as a tactical reserve, behind Army group) would prove prophetic. Von Manstein didn't like Hitler and it shows all over the book.
One of the few who would speak his mind in front of Hitler. The behind the scenes ordeal to have his concept for the 1940 campaign in the west approved is extremely absorbing. The rest is history. I find the editing could have been better, at times the text is repetitive. Apart from this I recommned the book to anyone interested in the eastern campaign, especially if you are in the military and might find yourself in command one day.
Rating: 
Summary: A must read for any military and warfare student.
Review: I, like many amateurs of military studies used to think that Rommel was Germany's greatest commander, and that men like Patton were the best generals, and models of military genus and leadership. That all changed when I took a much deeper look at the Second World War, and the strategy of the German leadership, which put its field commanders in positions of near impossible success. No other commander was as highly respected by either his comrades or for that matter his former enemies for his abilities and leadership than Field Marshal von Manstein. Heinz Guderian, and Gerd von Rundstedt were both close for other reasons, Guderian his tactical understanding of armor and blitzkrieg, and Rundstedt for his stedfast and effective method of decentralized and effective command of large theaters that sets the standard for the "non-micromanagement" model that commanders today are expected to follow. Mansteins book, captures his accounts without the extra fat and political attack on others that one would expect from a commander of his level, where careerism and ego are hallmarks (read Patton, and Mongromery). His accounts of the command of 11th Army and later Army Group Don are required reading for any aspiring senior commander of large formations. This is a man who effectively used every resources he had, and understood his enemy better than the enemy himself. Well, written, and translated, with a great forward by BH Liddell Hart, I have read this book, along with Guderian's Panzer Leader several times each and learned more and more every time. I would consider this book required reading for every Army officer of the combat arms branches.
Rating:
Summary: A must read for any military and warfare student.
Review: I, like many amateurs of military studies used to think that Rommel was Germany's greatest commander, and that men like Patton were the best generals, and models of military genus and leadership. That all changed when I took a much deeper look at the Second World War, and the strategy of the German leadership, which put its field commanders in positions of near impossible success. No other commander was as highly respected by either his comrades or for that matter his former enemies for his abilities and leadership than Field Marshal von Manstein. Heinz Guderian, and Gerd von Rundstedt were both close for other reasons, Guderian his tactical understanding of armor and blitzkrieg, and Rundstedt for his stedfast and effective method of decentralized and effective command of large theaters that sets the standard for the "non-micromanagement" model that commanders today are expected to follow. Mansteins book, captures his accounts without the extra fat and political attack on others that one would expect from a commander of his level, where careerism and ego are hallmarks (read Patton, and Mongromery). His accounts of the command of 11th Army and later Army Group Don are required reading for any aspiring senior commander of large formations. This is a man who effectively used every resources he had, and understood his enemy better than the enemy himself. Well, written, and translated, with a great forward by BH Liddell Hart, I have read this book, along with Guderian's Panzer Leader several times each and learned more and more every time. I would consider this book required reading for every Army officer of the combat arms branches.
Rating: 
Summary: Manstein and Rommel
Review: Manstein never joined the plot to replace Hitler even after the conspirators requested him. Unlike Manstein, Rommel took the risk of rebelling when he realized that the war was lost. If the rebellion had succeeded millions fewer would have died.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting, but re-written history
Review: Manstein's "Lost Victories" in many respects remains the definitive German post-war memoir. Without a doubt Manstein was probably one of the Wermacht's most brilliant military tacticians during WWII. At the war's conclusion Allied military personnel subjected Manstein to hundreds of hours of interviews and interrogations. What befuddled the Allies the most was how the German military machine, a fraction the size of the combined Allied forces, could wage and sustain a near-successful war for almost 5 years? Manstein was the logical person to ask! Manstein helped orchestrate some of the German Wermacht's most stunning victories, from the early blitzkrieg triumphs in Poland and France, to the latter-stage Kharkov battle in Russia, where 3 weakened SS divisions completely annihilated 4 Soviet armies. In "Lost Victories" Manstein writes compellingly about the dozens of campaigns, battles and operations he was involved in throughout the course of the war. Many of the battles Manstein describes have long since faded into history, existing only as unpronounceable names in dusty US military archives. One of the most striking things the reader walks away with having read "Lost Victories", is just how ferocious and all consuming the German war against the Soviet Union really was. 10's of millions of German and Russian soldiers were involved in far-reaching, tragic campaigns coolly orchestrated by men like Manstein far from the front. Whole divisions and even entire armies disappeared off the face of the map as the war reached its fever pitch. The death toll of some of these battles eclipsed the entire American casualty count for the entire war!
Manstein approaches his subject matter as a military tactician. He remains eerily detached and the reader is never given a glimpse into his personal views concerning his actions, the war and its consequences. In almost all respects Manstein mimics his post-war contemporaries. ALL military failures are blamed on the "tyrannical" Adolf Hitler, while every single victory is attributed to the discipline and perseverance of the rest of the German high command. Manstein forgot that it was Hitler's generous flexibility and "dynamic new approach" to waging war that allowed men like Manstein to develop unorthodox battle strategies, employ them, and climb the ranks when they were successful. Manstein was one of Hitler's favorites and was given almost carte blanche when it came to planning his own military campaigns. That "Hitler's favorite general" saw fit to engage in post-war character assassination of Hitler is one of histories (and this books) greatest ironies. Despite Manstein's constant and consistent attempt to shift blame off of himself and onto Hitler, "Lost Victories" provides a good glimpse into the mindset of one of the last centuries greatest military tacticians, AND illuminates the types of personalities that made the Third Reich's war machine as brutally efficient as it was.
Rating:
Summary: Grand Strategy
Review: The plan executed by the Germans during the invasion of France (WW2) was the brainchild of Erich Von Manstein; he convinced OKH to abandon their plan-i.e., Schlieffen Redux-in favor of his. After the war, experts agreed that if the Germans had not adopted v. Manstein's plan, the German invasion of France would have resulted in a repulse in Belgium. Von Manstein planned to invade France through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes Mountains; however, this was just the first encounter beyond which he needed to be infinitely more circumspect regarding their ultimate goal. Consequently, his plan offered total victory over `the entire European mainland'. To cite Lidell Hart, `it was the indirect approach', which was the least expected route because of the difficult terrain, but natural obstacles are easier to overcome than those posed by armed forces. Therefore, Heinz Guderian drove his Panzers unopposed through the Ardennes into the allied rear in the Somme estuary. It is through the penetrating eyes of Erich Von Manstein that we see and experience Germany's agonizing and ill begotten war with Communist Russia-Operation Barberosa-a subject often veiled from western eyes.
We see the conquest of the Crimea, culminated by the capitulation of the fortress of Sevastopol off the coast of the Black Sea. After taking the Kersh peninsula, the Germans advanced and began to lay siege to Sevastopol, however, the Russians landed in strength to threaten the German's rear; therefore, v. Manstein was forced to raise the siege. The Russians were able to exploit their interior lines as they had complete control of the sea to replenish the Kersh peninsula and Sevastapol with fresh troops and supplies. Von Manstein exhorts that he must be fighting troops personally commanded by Stalin, `who else would expend troops so ruthlessly', when he must recapture the Kersh Peninsula. With Kersh cleared, the Germans resume their siege of Sevastopol. They transport a vast array of artillery by railway to the front, and aim them at selected targets. These attacks were extremely well coordinated with the Luftwaffe commanded by v. Richtoven to soften up the fortress. However, it was the queen of military forces (i.e., the infantry) who must assault and penetrate the network of insidiously echeloned fortress defenses, step by step, but eventually Sevastopol is conquered and v. Manstein is promoted to Field Marshal.
When the Russians surrounded the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, OKH summons v. Manstein to stem the Russian advance and attempt to save Sixth Army from doom. We see the great task of improvisation as he reorganizes the shattered remnants of Don Army Group. He faces a great dilemma because by attempting to save Stalingrad he is simultaneously risking the potential loss of the entire German southern wing including troops in the Caucasus.
After assuming command, Von Manstein began by planning the relief operation for the besieged Sixth Army, "Winter Tempest". He ordered Fourth Panzer Army-commanded by the redoubtable Austrian, General Hoth-to fight their way through to Stalingrad; however, they could not sustain their éelan, and they fell short of their objective by just a few miles (30 miles), however, this was within the operational envelope. Therefore, v. Paulus, from within Stalingrad must give the order for Sixth Army to break out to meet Fourth Panzer half way. According to v. Manstein this breakout operation-known as "Thunderclap"-would have enabled, `Sixth Army to join hands with Fourth Panzer'. This plan envisaged that Fourth Panzer would draw off some of the Reds away from Sixth Army as they approached the siege front; thereby, weakening the front in the south west sector sufficiently enough for Sixth Army to break out in that direction. Then with the proper timing-hence, the code name ThunderClap-Sixth Army by their advance would draw Reds away from Fourth Panzer, thus enabling Fourth Panzer to get closer to Sixth Army. It was crucial for Fourth Panzer to get closer because Sixth Army had only enough fuel for 20 miles (100 tanks).
Although v. Manstein gave the order to break out over the radio, it was v. Paulus who refused, thus sealing his own fate and that of Sixth Army's with doom. In the meantime, Sixth Army would serve the purpose of tying down the Russians (over 134 formations). With Stalingrad lost v. Manstein's disillusionment with his superiors is complete. He believed that commanders at all levels should be self-sufficient and allowed to take the initiative. Manstein believed that the German's must resume their former strategy of "Mobile Operations". He explains it simply enough, however, later one realizes the true profundity of his statement. This was roughly analogous to the response of the Athenians when confronted with the invasion of Greece and Athens by the Persians. The Athenians completely abandoned Athens and took to their ships, and so become a nation of sailors at sea (See Herodotus, The Histories). Similarly, v. Manstein proposed to completely abandon all fixed territories and so become a nation of nomadic battle groups that swarmed at will over the Russians. Only after neutralizing the military forces (a priori) can the holding of fixed territories be possible. Von Manstein truly understood the use of mobile operations as Grand Strategy.
Von Manstein saw an opportunity for a brilliant counter stroke. He envisaged that while the Germans withdrew to the Dnieper crossings, the Russians would pursue them in an attempt to cut them off from their supply lines, however, mobile German troops would attack the Russian's long exposed flank as it extended evermore to the west. The Russian's next move was precisely what v. Manstein predicted, therefore, Fourth and Fist Panzer meted out a severe blow to the Popov group. Fourth Panzer must have been quite a surprise for the Russians because they came all the way from Rostov from the southeast. In addition, the SS Panzer divisions, back from a refit, attacked from the northwest.
Rating:
Summary: Infalible technique - disgraceful hypocrisy...
Review: This book by Manstein is horrible. How can someone say it is good? That he was a master general ? THis book is another one of those books written by German generals and field marshalls that, since Hitler was dead, took full advantage of the fact to place the blame of all bloody bath caused by the German armed forces (and their posterior defeat) into Hitler's shoulder, why everything good (victories, etc) was their responsibility. In reading this book, it becomes clear how German generals succumbed to Hitler and did and they could to give victory to the mad man, and after the war they said that they could not have anything different, that their "oath'" prevented them to get Hitler ouf of power. Come on!!! Do you think we are so naive?!!!! The general received bribbery all the war long, it is a proved fact. THey were aristocratic people who didn't give a damn to their soldiers, as long as the Fueherer kept them well fed..
Rating:
Summary: Good work and must-read
Review: This is a very important work that introduced readers to the lesser known battles of Eastern Front. The book is also important for it is an autobio of one of the most talented and important German commander. However the book has serious drawbacks in terms of accuracy of information. This is nothing unusual in comparison to other memoirs of German and Soviet generals. 1) First of all there many mistakes describing soviet forces which are misidentified and overestimated in number of places. 2)Second, an interesting omission about Manstein involvement with the atrocities committed by the forces under his command. Manstein maight have been agianst shooting Commissars but had no problem when it came to Jewish members of Red Army. But these ommisions are understandable-nobody wants to be a bad guy and soviet generals also avoid the discussion of soviet atrocities. 3) An almost endless string of what-if scenarios that sometimes spin out of control and don't really belong in the historical context of the book. Granted some what-ifs are welcomed but not in these numbers. Unlike Guderian's work Manstein doesn't keep it simple. Seems like Manstein is trying to find excuses for his setbacks. 4). So-called standing up to Hitler. Let me ask you this - What is a point of arguing with Hitler and then going ahead and executed his faulty orders? I mean Paulus is critised for following orders eventhough he knew it would lead to disaster yet Manstein is given benefit of the doubt? So yes, this book is a must read just don't stop reading other works and memoirs from both sides of the frontlines. "Lost Victories" is not a WWII / Eastern Front bible.
Rating:
Summary: must read... manstein's take and reflections on stuff
Review: this is clearly a must read for people who study wwii or military history itself. his insight into the situations of his forces... his reflections on actions that took place... his input into his own thinking in planning and the issues that disrupted plans... all these are jewels to look for in this account. this is a memoir so manstein has the benefits of hindsight in putting down his account, but still it is quite clear of his great understaning and insight into situations and even into people {look for his accessment of .... Especially of value is the campaigns in the southern parts of the russion front. he goes into great detail about the situations, movements and other operational details without overwhelming the reader. one thing to remember is that this is not a detailed study of the battles, so, for the most part {especially in regards to the southern russian front where he was commanding at the army group level}, if you are looking for detailed accounts of divisional level and lower look elsewhere, but you'll want to have this as a reference regardless... a must have!
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