To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864

Rating:
Summary: Overland Campaign "calm before the storm"...
Review: An intriguing interlude in the Overland Campaign of 1864 between the battles of Spotsylvania Courthouse and Cold Harbor, Gordon Rhea continues his impressive study of this period with "To the North Anna River". Manuever, as opposed to carnage, dominate this work and shows Rhea's continued evolvement as a writer as well as an historian.

We start where "The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse" left off with both armies entrenched before the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. Rhea discusses the thinking of both Generals Lee and Grant as each labors to decide what to do next. Another unsuccessful attack at the salient is orchestrated by Grant before he makes the first move by deciding to disengage and manuever Lee out of his trenches. He advances Winfield Hancock to the southeast with the idea of using him as bait to get Lee to follow. This strategy works as Lee starts his army southward toward the North Anna river. Troop movements and lost opportunities dominate this portion of the book as Grant and Lee engage on the next portion of the campaign. Cavalry battles also are covered at this point as Union General Philip Sheridan drives the Federal cavalry on a threatening movement towards the Confederate capital at Richmond. Rhea then discusses how this movement, although somewhat successful, ultimately hurt the Union cause.

Lee then wins the race to the North Anna by taking advantage of Grant's lack of intelligence that Sheridan's cavalry would have provided. He (Lee) then entrenches south of the river as he waits to see what Grant will do. The battles at Henagan's Redoubt and Jericho Mills (both Union victories in the maneuver to the North Anna) set the stage for the highlight of the book which is the defensive posture that Lee now incorporates. Rhea shows how Confederate chief field engineer Martin Smith "proposes an ingenious solution" that results in the famous inverted "V" entrenchment below the river. This fortification has the added advantage of splitting Grant's army below the river and (if Grant attacks) would give Lee a stunning victory. Grant initiates offensive probes and becomes increasingly concerned that his troops are trapped. The little known battle at Ox Ford on the North Anna is the final proof that he needs. Lee meanwhile becomes ill and fails to delegate to his subordinates his instinctive thought to attack and the opportunity is lost. Rhea ties all this together with some of his best writing to date: "Lee had slept little in the twenty harrowing days since Grant had crossed the Rapidan. He often worked after midnight and was generally awake by 3:00 A.M. Dysentery was endemic in the Army of Norhtern Virginia, and Lee had contracted the illness by the time he had reached the North Anna. Normally even-tempered and robust, he was now irritable and rode in a carriage. On the afternoon of May 24 Lee was seized with violent intestinal distress and his aide pronounced him 'quite unwell'. The Confederate commander lay confined to his tent, 'prostrated by his sickness' with a single thought dominating his mind 'We must strike a blow'. But the Army of Northern Virginia could not strike a blow. It required a firm hand to coordinate so complex an undertaking. In better times, when Jackson and Longstreet commanded the wings of the Confederate army, Lee had liberally delegated responsibility. But Jackson was dead and Longstreet disabled and Lee lacked confidence in their successors." Grant then realizes the danger of his position and extricates his forces to the Northern side of the river. His decision to maneuver again "by the left flank" to the southeast closes out the text portion of the book.

Rhea then ends the book with an excellent Epilogue section in which he discusses the heretofore unknown battle at Wilson's Wharf on the James River showing for the first time the fighting tenacity of the Federal's black troops and also whereby he draws conclusions that differ somewhat with the contemporary standard: "Historians have considered Lee's inability to attack on the afternoon of May 24 a lost opportunity of major proportions. In retrospect, it is doubtful that even a healthy Lee could have dealt a decisive blow. He would most certainly have wrecked much of Hancock's corps, but he would have lacked the strength and time to exploit the localized victory. Nightfall would likely have prevented him from crossing the North Anna. Grant could take severe casualties in stride. Terrible subtractions in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House did not deter him, nor did severe losses at Cold Harbor in the coming weeks. It is difficult to imagine Hancock's defeat inducing him to abandon his campaign. Sickness doubtless cost Lee a superb opportunity to damage an isolated portion of Grant's army at the North Anna River, but the lost opportunity should not be exaggerated. Judging from Grant's reaction to earlier and later setbacks, he likely would have treated defeat at the North Anna as a tactical reverse and gone on with his campaign."

Judiciously written and masterfully researched (Rhea discloses in the Introduction that little of any substance has been written on this period due to the confusing state of exisiting material), Gordon Rhea has created (in my opinion) another masterpiece, further fortifying his standing as one of the outstanding contemporary Civil War historians. I give this book a very high recommendation.

Rating:
Summary: To The North Anna River, Grant and Lee May 13-25, 1864
Review: Gordon C. Rhea's account of the Civil War in Northern Virginia covering the period after the Wilderness Battle through the fighting south of the North Anna River in late May 1864 is well written. During this period, Lee and Grant took measure of each other. Grant had only experienced Confederate generals in the West and probably had limited respect for Lee's generalship. The general officers of the Army of the Potomac, having fought Lee since June 1862, had few reservations regarding Lee's ability prompting Grant to remark to his staff on May 6 to "Think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." Lee lacked direct experience with Grant but there is no indication that he questioned Grant's ability. Lee's problem was he didn't know how Grant thinks, reacts, etc. In many respects this book is an account of how Grant and Lee got to know each others abilities.

Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.

The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.

The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours."

Finally, Rhea stated that this campaign suggests the two generals had "suprisingly similar military temperaments. Both were aggressive and willing to try unorthodox maneuvers." In essence both generals came out about equal. Grant's great strength laid in his firm support of the strategy to destroy Lee's army which was Lincoln's strategy. While Lee's true strength was his ability to turn unfavorable situations to his advantage.

Rating:
Summary: To The North Anna River, Grant and Lee May 13-25, 1864
Review: Gordon C. Rhea's account of the Civil War in Northern Virginia covering the period after the Wilderness Battle through the fighting south of the North Anna River in late May 1864 is well written. During this period, Lee and Grant took measure of each other. Grant had only experienced Confederate generals in the West and probably had limited respect for Lee's generalship. The general officers of the Army of the Potomac, having fought Lee since June 1862, had few reservations regarding Lee's ability prompting Grant to remark to his staff on May 6 to "Think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." Lee lacked direct experience with Grant but there is no indication that he questioned Grant's ability. Lee's problem was he didn't know how Grant thinks, reacts, etc. In many respects this book is an account of how Grant and Lee got to know each others abilities.

Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.

The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.

The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours."

Finally, Rhea stated that this campaign suggests the two generals had "suprisingly similar military temperaments. Both were aggressive and willing to try unorthodox maneuvers." In essence both generals came out about equal. Grant's great strength laid in his firm support of the strategy to destroy Lee's army which was Lincoln's strategy. While Lee's true strength was his ability to turn unfavorable situations to his advantage.

Rating:
Summary: To the North Anna River: A Necessary Bridge
Review: Gordon Rhea continues his study of Ulysses S. Grant's grinding Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The third volume continues where his the first two volumes left off. Like the first two books, the tone is lively and interesting. Rhea does an excellent job conveying the thought process and difficulties involved in the major decisions made by both Lee and Grant. Rhea makes clear the reasons Lee was losing faith in Hill and Ewell. He continues an excellent analysis of the fractured Union command structure from the first two volumes expanding on the rift between Meade and Grant and the lack of talent among the corps commanders.

Rhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern.

For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.

Rating:
Summary: To the North Anna River: A Necessary Bridge
Review: Gordon Rhea continues his study of Ulysses S. Grant's grinding Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The third volume continues where his the first two volumes left off. Like the first two books, the tone is lively and interesting. Rhea does an excellent job conveying the thought process and difficulties involved in the major decisions made by both Lee and Grant. Rhea makes clear the reasons Lee was losing faith in Hill and Ewell. He continues an excellent analysis of the fractured Union command structure from the first two volumes expanding on the rift between Meade and Grant and the lack of talent among the corps commanders.

Rhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern.

For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.

Rating:
Summary: Solid military history of a little-studied campaign
Review: Gordon Rhea's "To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864" is his latest installment in his on-going series of military histories about the great Overland Campaign, following his earlier volumes on the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battles. "To the North Anna River" differs from the previous two books in that the focus here is not upon full-scale fighting between massed armies, but instead examines an extended interval of maneuvers and probes which always fell short of the assaults planned. Mistakes and misperceptions by both armies abounded, balanced by unfaltering determination and moments of genuine brilliance. This period has in the past attracted relatively little attention from military historians, probably due in large part to its lack of "big battle" drama. Yet, the story told by Rhea is one full of suspense and tension, as Grant vigorously sought a weak point where he could finally overwhelm his foe, while Lee scrambled to block each move. Ultimately, it is a story with neither clear-cut winner or loser. Certainly Lee managed to preserve his army, yet the North Anna portion of the Overland Campaign ended with an undeterred Grant sending his army even deeper into Virginia to ultimately pin the Army of Northern Virginia in place, defending Richmond and slowly bleeding to death.

Rhea's concentration is upon Grant and Lee and their chief deputies, the corps commanders, and he provides incisive analyses of the leaders for each step of the campaign. He thoroughly demolishes the tired old myth that Lee foresaw each of Grant's moves, but bestows strong acclaim upon the Confederate commanding general for his ability to find a way out of every scrape. Grant receives high marks from Rhea for his unwavering resolve in carrying out his strategic aims, but is sharply faulted for repeated failure in tactical preparation. Both Lee and Grant, Rhea amply demonstrates, were guilty of errors and oversights. In the end, the two generals seem to have been unusually well matched. Corps commanders on both sides receive little praise, with only Hancock in the Army of the Potomac evidencing sufficient judgment and initiative to be trusted off a short leash.

Although each maneuver and clash is described in sufficient detail to understand what happened, "To the North Anna River" is not primarily concerned with recounting the experiences of individual soldiers. Edwin Coddington's classic study of Gettysburg was subtitled "A Study in Command" and that is a label which could be appropriately applied to Rhea's books. The question of "why" (or "why not") is always central, not just "what" and "how".

"To the North Anna River" is a strong continuation of an admirable work in progress and I already look forward to the next volume in the series which should bring the armies of Grant and Lee to the fields of Cold Harbor.

Rating:
Summary: Lee and Grant at their best
Review: Once again Gordon Rhea has produced another fabulous and insightful account to follow on from his books on Spotsylvania Court House and Yellow Tavern. This is a well-presented and detailed account of the maneuvers and fighting between Lee and Grant during May 13th-25th, 1864. As one previous reviewer noted this is not a period of high drama involving great battles and massive charges but you would not notice that while reading this book.

The narrative moved along at a quick pace and you eagerly follow the story to see what is going to happen next and by whom. The maps supplied, 29 in all, were well presented and easy to read. The story followed each General's movements in attempting to outfox each other, from the 'Mule Shoe' to the North Anna River with a number of engagements in between.

I think the author offered some very interesting points in regards to each General's command decisions and why things happened or did not happen as intended. Overall this is a very enjoyable account of this forgotten period of Civil War history and I am keenly looking forward to Rhea's next book, which I hope will cover the fighting around Cold Harbor.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent look at Grant and Lee
Review: Rhea delivers again with a taut, well-written appraisal of Grant and Lee grappling in Virginia. I found this more enjoyable than his earlier two works on the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. His examination of the resources alloted to Grant and Lee and the decisions each made made was insighful.

Though Rhea sometimes appears to tilt his hat in favor of Robert E. Lee, the bias is minimal at best and never detracts from the flow of the narrative. For anyone interested in the Virginia campaign of '64, this is a must read.

Rating:
Summary: Same Quality As Rhea's Previous Books
Review: To the North Anna R. is no worse than Rhea's previous books on the Overland Campaign, which means this is a fantastic book.

Rhea meticulously covers the movements of the two armies to the south as well as the skirmishes and cavalry battles. He leaves no stone unturned, including Fitz Lee's cavalry being repulsed at Wilson's Wharf against black troops, and the subsequent denial of the nature of the repulse by embarassed Southerners.

The story of the campaign itself is more of the same. Grant's maneuvers are skillfully stalemated by Lee's defense, with the inverted V being perhaps his most ingenius line of the entire series.

Ultimately the two armies face the same problems that had been troubling them since the Wilderness. The Union command is not focused enough to properly reconnoiter, and Grant continues aggressive warfare without knowing the strength of Lee's lines. The Confederates continue to lose high ranking officers and do not have the manpower to seize the initiative from Grant. When Grant divides the army across the North Anna River, Lee's sickness keeps him from taking more direct command over his forces.

And of course, the two armies disengage from the North Anna and continue toward Cold Harbor. Thankfully, Gordon Rhea follows them there to write about that campaign as well.