The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region

Rating:
Summary: Don't bother
Review: The Publisher's Weekly review is spot on. The actual discussion of the Taliban doesn't show until the middle of the book! This book appears to be a poorly written and overly-detailed college essay that publishers decided to inflict on the unsuspecting public during a time when they knew it would sell. Don't bother.

Rating:
Summary: Good overview of the rise of forces leading to Bin Laden.
Review: This slim volume gives a theory, which ultimately let the likes of Osama/Usama Bin Laden, and the leadership of the Taliban, take over in Afghanistan, and their relationship to the 11 September, 2001 (9/11) attacks and the aftermath (in the Epilogue). Gives a theory of mass revolt + mass participation + mass organisation (organization) = mass mobilisation (mobilization) in which the author provides a framework for groups, like Al-Qaeda, operate. Further, the book gives a historical perspective on how the competition between "secular" and "religious" forces have shaped the rise of groups, like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, in Afghanistan. The author proffers a theory to limit the effects of terrorism, and the increasing numbers of disaffected Afghans, for example, or as in Iraq, Iraqis; who join militant Islamic groups, due to a lack of stabilisation (stabilization) in the country, to provide for a stabilised [stabilized] country and to work to support a more stable government, in particular, the United States in its foreign policy and not just to (as in Iraq) "bomb the people into submission" (n)or "to support a 'puppet' regime, either of which leads to the sort of militancy which the U.S. forces are now facing in Afghanistan and in Iraq [as part of a failed foreign policy, continuing through many administrations; especially the (newly)"reelected" one in the U.S.]. Worth a look.