1815 The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras

Rating:
Summary: Vorwarts, Deutschland!
Review: All authors, historians, and enthusiasts have their bias, prejudices, and favorite subjects. This is no secret, but it does not stop the conscientious researcher/historian from printing both 'good' and 'bad' information in a study, paper, or book.

Let me pause here to say, in all fairness, that the author and I have corresponded obliquely on different Napoleonic topics, and we neither agree nor do we get along. That, however, has nothing to do with the merits of this volume.

This book does concentrate on the Prussians, and other Germans, but it does so warts and all. Perhaps it is high time somebody does, for if the Prussians hadn't arrived on the field, Wellington would have been beaten, he as much as admitted it later. The author has no problem discussing unpleasant topics, such as the Saxon mutiny against the Prussians before the 1815 campaign began. His research is meticulous, he presents his subject very well, and he is enthusiastic about it, shcih to me is very important.

I was somewhat disturbed by the vehemence and prejudice that some of the reviews here have expressed. This book, and its sequel, have much to say, have been well-researched, and belong in every Napoleonic enthusiast's bookcase. This isn't 'revisionist history' in the sense that it is trying to change results or that it is making something up. It is a valiant attempt at deeper research that has succeeded, and succeeded quite well. This book, and its companion, have set a benchmark that all subsequent works on the subject will have to meet.

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Summary: Looking at history - fact or Sharpe?
Review: I have to admit to knowing Peter Hofschroer for about 20 years,but then we all have our crosses to bear! Seriously, in all the timeI have known him, Peter has been a stickler for accuracy and sourcing. I also have little interest in Waterloo per se, but that probably qualified me to look over the drafts. Peter took on board what was said by myself and others. The end result - and it came as no surprise to anyone who has looked at the Continental material on any Napoleonic campaign - is that a few porkies have been told, things have been distorted and many stories have turned up, which transpire to be based even on documents and stories which first surface years after the event. Closer examination of the regularly repeated tales then shows the clear inconsistencies. So, back we have to go to the original documentation in so far as it exists (and obviously some has gone missing). This was the task Peter set about in the wake of the Hamilton-Williams fiasco. Given HW, I was surprised that one ardent reviewer from Raleigh (who doesn't give his name) describes Peter's book as "amateur historiography that is sadly common in Napoleonic period: long on "data" and short on meaningful synthesis." I suggest he looks at much of the current output on the period. There any reader will find in fact a lot of books that are extremely short on data and long on meaningful synthesis - ie: copying out the more colourful accounts from one side with little hard, checked evidence, the vacuous gaps being filled with something owing its origins more to Sharpe than historical work. It never ceases to amaze me how, 200 years on, there is so much material that hasn't made it into English. Above all, Peter's contribution is to show the Prussian angle, which doesn't appear much anywhere else in English! Only when we have meaningful data can we draw any conclusions. I agree that it is time we had the full French view of these events (Bernard Coppens is giving us plenty on Waterloo itself, but I am sure there is plenty more). Inevitably, in what is an analytical work, the detail can get rather complex and even tedious, but if it wasn't there, wouldn't the criticism be that the author had failed to make his case? You are on a no-win with this. Peter was actually advised by myself and others that getting too bogged in the political run-up would overcomplicate his case and perhaps put off the Sharpe-battle narrative readers, Peter has made his case and like all theories, it must be tested and examined as it makes its way forward. Given the huge numbers of books that appear on Waterloo, it will be interesting to see what follows. Even if you disagree with the conclusions, it should be read if only so that the reader is aware that there is more than the "received wisdom". However, for all those who say Peter is too pro-German , doesn't Wellington come out of rather well, as he was clever enough to put a few over on those daft Prussians and then fool the British too! I'll give it 4-stars to show I am not Peter. END

Rating:
Summary: A Refreshing viewpoint
Review: This book along with the second volume " The German Victory" seems to have touched a nerve ending among many readers.

The book covers the overall situation in Europe before Waterloo, the fragile coalition between the Allies, the fighting around Carleroi, Franses and of course the dual batlles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. Peter Hofschroer writes almost entirely from a Prussian perspective which is refreshing but at times a little frustrating (as I would have liked a bit more French input). He tries to convince the reader that the Waterloo Campaign was more of a German/Prussian victory than a British one based on the make up and numbers of the Allied forces that actually fought in the campaign. He also pulls no punches on the Duke of Wellington's performance in the opening rounds of the campaign and concludes from the evidence of his research that the Duke deceived his Prussian Allies into fighting at Ligny when he knew he could not offer any support.

I enjoyed reading this book which I found to be thoroughly researched and thought provoking and also made good use of maps. Peter Hofschroer has certainly come up with an interesting alternative view point which may polarize the way many people view how the Waterloo Campaign was won.

Rating:
Summary: A Refreshing viewpoint
Review: This book along with the second volume " The German Victory" seems to have touched a nerve ending among many readers.

The book covers the overall situation in Europe before Waterloo, the fragile coalition between the Allies, the fighting around Carleroi, Franses and of course the dual batlles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. Peter Hofschroer writes almost entirely from a Prussian perspective which is refreshing but at times a little frustrating (as I would have liked a bit more French input). He tries to convince the reader that the Waterloo Campaign was more of a German/Prussian victory than a British one based on the make up and numbers of the Allied forces that actually fought in the campaign. He also pulls no punches on the Duke of Wellington's performance in the opening rounds of the campaign and concludes from the evidence of his research that the Duke deceived his Prussian Allies into fighting at Ligny when he knew he could not offer any support.

I enjoyed reading this book which I found to be thoroughly researched and thought provoking and also made good use of maps. Peter Hofschroer has certainly come up with an interesting alternative view point which may polarize the way many people view how the Waterloo Campaign was won.

Rating:
Summary: An Insightful Read
Review: This book is a detailed investigation into the events leading up to the great confrontation at Waterloo; specifically the lesser known battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny. In this aspect, the book excels and gives a remarkably clear history of how it all came together.

The other aspect of this book, which dominates the last few chapters, is Mr. Hofschroer's assertation that the Duke of Wellington deceived Prince Blucher and the Prussian Command about his intentions to assist the Prussians in the defense of Ligny. Mr. Hofschroer has received much flak for this attack on the beloved Duke, a hero in British history.

As a new amateur scholar to this historical period, I think that my mind is a little less inclined to lean one way or another and this too despite my British heritage. Mr. Hofschroer lays out his evidence in convincing and painstaking detail using much German archival material that was not available or was ignored by Anglo-historians.

While he makes convincing arguments towards the Duke's deceptions, one can't help feel that the author has an axe to grind with the Anglo supporters. This is reasonable to a degree as it certainly balances the point of view from the Prussian side. At times however, I grew a little weary of his attacks. It is human nature to take sides and Hofschroer is as guilty as anyone.

However, all that aside, the evidence he presents in his book is convincing enough to raise questions, if not of the Duke's guilt than certainly of his integrity. Though I am not convinced that the Duke of Wellington deliberately left his allies hanging in the wind, there is something rotten in the state of Belgium. Even to my amateur eyes it is plain that the Duke could not make good on his promises with the actions that he took. No one really knows what his motives were, but it is plain to see, when the evidence is examined through this book, that the Duke of Wellington was not playing with all his cards on the table.

I enjoyed the book thoroughly. The evidence was laid out carefully and even the most jaded of readers has to ask themselves questions of the Duke of Wellington and his machinations.

I wished the author had provided a bit more detail and insight from the French perspective as well as from others of the Allied cause. This book is not the bible of Quatre Bras/Ligny but in expounding the point of view of the Prussian Army it excels and at the very least raises many intriguing questions as to the Duke of Wellington's motives and intentions. Did he deliberately leave the Prussians to their fate, or did he cover up his strategic mistakes and follies? Read the book, it's a remarkable story.

Rating:
Summary: A nice change but to one sided to be an all rounder
Review: This book is strong in its detailing of Prussian action, strong in investigating any mistakes that the British may have made but like most axe-grinders weak in describing anything that upsets his theory.
I can name countless examples of minor 'attitude' mistakes which include such delights as Prussia mistaken for Germany ( it is not a foregone conclusion that a greater Germany would form at this point and a lot of the Germans appear to hate Prussia anyhow but of course if the forces were split by country then the author would not be able to produce his tabloid headline to sell his book tsk tsk )

A complete refusal to view Prussian attitudes for what they were - example Prussia starts mobilising for war AGAINST Britain,Autstria and France ( because Britain still invlolved against america) 2 days AFTER these 3 make a secret defensive alliance and the author states how horrified Prussia was at this terrible action????? bizarre attitude.

French aggression is frequently mentioned yet Napoleon only actually started 2 wars ( however many he 'helped' ) and Prussian eagerness to avenge the 'Sufferings' on their nation are even more frequently mentioned yet its fairly clear that revenge for the embarrasment of losing was more of a motivating factor.

The most obvious and regretable part of the book lies in his ignoring of any evidence that counters his claim. A major example lies in his statement that Bourmonts defection made no difference to the campaign as the Prussians knew all Napoleons plans anyway. No mention is made of the fact ( bar a sentance later commenting on Gerards late arrival ) that he commanded the advance division of Gerards corps and his disappearance delayed Gerard almost half a day and that had this defection not occured the early engagement at Gilly would have been lost and Ligny would have started earlier and hence the campaign would probably have been lost. I know Historians should avoid what ifs but this statement is obviously ignored because it removes glory from the magnificent Prussian rear guard action.

On a positive note his description of the battles themselves are superb and well written and his destruction of Wellingtons attempts to cover his early mistakes in the campaign that caused the Prussian defeat are well documented and eye-opening ( Wellington shows himself to be almost a good a propagandist as Napoleon ) it is just a shame that his lack of accuracy whenever anything might tarnish the glory of Prussian arms and to quote his own book (replace de Ros with the author ;) )"if de Ros's account is inaccurate regarding this final comment, can it be trusted at all"

Rating:
Summary: Thought provoking study from the Prussian perspective
Review: This is a very thought provoking account of the first half of the Waterloo campaign. Its focus is the Prussian contribution (as well as the overall German contribution) and as such it succeeds admirably. Hopefully the vehement responses this book has provoked will lead to modern, similarly thorough studies of the campaign from the point of view of the English, French and even Dutch/Belgian participants.

A note of caution: this is definitely for readers who have a serious interest in the campaign. The author's writing style and storytelling ability aren't the liveliest, while at certain times he seems to meander into excessive detail without tying the facts to his points coherently.