Russia's War

Rating:
Summary: Eye-Opening Account For Non-Russians
Review: About a year ago I read an excellent book by Mr. Overy, entitled "Why The Allies Won." I was very impressed by that book so I decided to take a chance on this one as well. I was not disappointed. Whereas the earlier book stepped back and gave a broader view of the European conflict, "Russia's War" zooms in on the life and death struggle between Germany and Russia. If you have already read a few books on the Eastern Front, this book is probably not for you....it is meant only to provide a general outline of the war in eastern Europe. However, if you haven't read much about WWII, or if your reading up until now has concentrated on the Western Front, you might just find this book to be an eye-opener. I consider myself to be a fairly well-read person, but I am a bit ashamed to admit I didn't know much about the 1941 attack on Leningrad. I knew there was a siege that lasted about 2 1/2 years, but I didn't know much else. Mr. Overy explains Hitler's intent wasn't something as mundane as just getting Leningrad to surrender. He wanted to wipe Leningrad from the face of the Earth. Peter The Great had made it his capital, and so it had great importance to the Russian people and also to Hitler. The start of the siege in 1941 is horrible to read about and not for the squeamish. The city was surrounded and, besides being pounded by German artillery several times a day, for all intents and purposes was cut off from the outside world. What the population of Leningrad went through in the winter of 1941-1942 is unbelievable. Many people starved or froze to death or became so weak that they succumbed to sicknesses that, in normal times, would not have been fatal. But the survivors carried on and finally managed to get supplies thru by finding a gap in the siege lines that involved crossing a large lake. Leningrad managed to hold on until Russian advances in 1944 finally broke the siege. Mr. Overy also tells about how the Russians dismantled entire factories in the western part of the country right after the German invasion in June 1941 and moved everything by rail to the east. Factories were reassembled and workers constructed crude huts to live in, or sometimes just dug holes in the ground and lived in those. With the tradeoff of pretty much not producing any consumer goods, the Russian workers under these conditions managed to outproduce the Germans militarily....numbers of planes, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. As difficult as this was to accomplish, it was essential if the Russians were going to survive as tremendous amounts of military hardware were destroyed during the initial German assault in 1941. The author also gives credit to the lend-lease program. Stalin gave this short shrift in public, but in private he admitted that Russia could not have survived without the large quantities of trucks, jeeps, fuel, telephones and telephone wire, etc. provided by her allies. The Russian military also learned from their early mistakes. They adapted strategy and tactics to fight a modern, mechanized war...with concentrated firepower and improved communications. Mr. Overy also gives the Devil his due. At the beginning of the conflict, Stalin thought he could run the show. He thought he knew more than his military leaders. When he was told in early 1941 that if the Germans attacked the attack would likely be aimed to capture Moscow, Stalin refused to believe it. He was sure the Germans would go for the economic jugular....the southwestern part of Russia where the oil was produced. Russian defenses were therefore skewed to fit Stalin's thinking. Of course, Stalin was wrong......and his error was almost catastrophic. Stalin made other mistakes, such as ordering massive counter-offensives when the Russian army, both organizationally and militarily, was unprepared to undertake such actions. These attacks caused many unneccesary deaths and loss of equipment that the army could ill-afford. But the author shows that Stalin learned from his mistakes. He worked long hours and familiarized himself with all the strategic aspects of the conflict. He was man enough to admit, at least to himself, that he was making mistakes. He listened to advice and criticism and he often let the military men have the final say, once he had people in place that he felt he could trust. Of course, after the war, what he did to these same people is a whole other story! But that's another book... Mr. Overy writes well, and is always evenhanded and judicious in coming to his conclusions. I don't think you could find a better book concerning an introductory history of the war on the Eastern Front.

Rating:
Summary: All There, but Something's Missing
Review: In his introduction to Russia's War the author notes: "In twenty years' time it may be possible at last to write something approaching a definitive history. Current writing has a provisional air to it, and this book is no exception." Therein lies the problem for the reader wishing to devote one books worth of reading time to arguably one of the most important historical events of the last hundred years. Where should one start?

Overy himself recognizes the contributions of John Erickson and David Glantz, "who have done more than any other Western scholars to communicate to the non-Russian world the fruits of Soviet and post-Soviet research". Knowing this I assembled the following list of candidates: Russia's War (1997) by Overy, When Titans Clashed (1995) by Glantz and House, The Road to Stalingrad (1975) and The Road to Berlin (1983) by Erickson, and the classic Russia at War 1941-1945 (1964) by Alexander Werth (who was a correspondent in the Soviet Union from 1941-1948). While I was considering my decision I encountered an exchange of letters in the New York Review of Books between Anthony Beevor, author of Stalingrad, and a reviewer over the accuracy of his book in light of recent work by Glantz. In the end I chose Russia's War. If there was no definitive work at least I wanted the book that had access to the latest sources.

First the positive. Overy is very good at bringing recent evidence to controversial and muddied (often by Stalinist and Soviet propaganda) issues. An example is the effect of Lend Lease. For years its importance was denied. Overy notes a bugged conversation of Marshall Zhukov recorded in 1963 but released in 1993. Here, according to Overy, Zhukov "endorsed" the view that without Lend Lease the Soviet Union 'could not have continued the war'. He is also good at identifying where there are holes in the evidence, making possible only tentative conclusions or future mysteries to be solved.

Another strength is the scope of the book. The coverage is vast. He literally seems to deal with everything. Particularly valuable are the last chapter, The Cult of Personality: Stalin and the Legacy of the War, and the epilogue, Russia's War: Myth and Reality. By continuing the story past 1945, after having started the story during Civil War, Overy situates Russia's War in the middle of our historical consciousness and it is here that I begin to have a problem.

One of the reason I would recommend that everyone study this war is its shear horror and the magnitude of that horror. There are certainly heroic actions and temporary heroes but in the end everyone is doomed: the fascists and the communists, the losers and the winners, the guilty and the innocent. Most of all it is the ordinary people: the Poles, the Jews, the Ukrainians, the other Nationalities, the Germans. the Russians. There was no place to hide. After the war, Stalin actually purged the generals who won the war.

All this is included. But I can't help feeling that something is missing. The wealth of information often seems like it is being presented by an accountant. The human element seems lost. Perhaps it's unfair to ask this of the author when he's done so much. Perhaps I've just become numb. Secondly, there was one survivor: Stalin. Though detailing many of individual events of his reign of terror, Overy refuses to connect the dots. Stalin's presence looms so large that the book could have been called Stalin's War or Stalin's Russia, yet we are left to draw our own conclusions, search for our own meaning.

Overall this is a good book. I don't know if there is a better one available. I will certainly use its fine notes and bibliography as a reference. But I will continue to look at the other candidates on my list for greater understanding and to see if it's possible for a non-fiction work on this subject to do what I have asked it to do. I will also turn to Life and Fate by Vasily Grossman. Written by 1960 and finally published in the Soviet Union in 1988, Overy calls it "one of the greatest novels on war in any language". Maybe here I will find what seems to be missing.

Rating:
Summary: Highly uneven
Review: One can't help but compare this book with David Glantz's and Jonathan House's "When Titans Clashed". Both of these works are fairly new, based on newly available material, and attepmpt to capture the Soviet experience in WW2 in one volume (which is hopeless, the conflict was too large for that). The main difference is that where Glantz's book focuses on the military aspects, Overy spends more time on the political and human side of the story.

Apparently, Overy did not spend any time in the archives. You will not find any documents or references to them in this book. It's based mostly on secondary sources. The entire narrative seems to rely too much on various memoirs and biographies, which makes the point of view rather skewed in favor of those players whose memoirs Overy had read.

The resulting quality of the work is uneven. Overy does use new research extensively and dispels many myths. For example, Soviet casualty figures and the number of GULAG's prisoners come from reliable sources based on declassified archival data. On the other hand, Overy puts too much stock in works of dubious revisionists like Boris Sokolov, who provided an alternative view on Soviet casualties and significance of Lend Lease. Where Overy's sources pre-date the opening of Russian archives, old incorrect stereotypes abound.

The books is full of minor and not so minor errors. At first glance it seems there is a mistake every 3-4 pages. For example, Overy claimed that the main attack in Op. Bagration was to come from the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, when in fact the main blow was delivered by the 1st Belorussian front. There are numerous other military mistakes. There are also many errors related to politics. For some reason he assumed that there was no Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine because the nationalist partisans did not let them penetrate (p. 150). In fact, nationalist guerillas controlled only a small portion of the Western Ukraine, the rest was controlled by Soviet partisans. Then there is also a matter of him consistently calling Lvov a Polish city -- I don't think Ukrainians will appreciate that.

Overy also allows himself to theorize about the differences between Russian and Western societies. His conclusions are too simplistic.

Other minor details: Maps are too few and with some errors. Photos are of low quality (too dark) and with errors in their captions (e.g. a procession of supposed Ukrainians with a banner written in Belorussian). Many Russian last names are misspelled.

In short, if you're interested in military aspects of history, this book is not for you. "When Titans Clashed" is a lot better than this. I'm giving it 3 stars only because it does contain some new and valuable information not available to regular readers of military periodicals.

Rating:
Summary: Recommendable Introduction to the USSR at War
Review: Overy's work in this text version of a TV documentary series resides as a truly worthwhile introductory book on the USSR war effort against Germany and the mindset and comprehensions of the Soviet leadership (Stalin especially). Though too brief to provide an in depth analysis of the war, the overview presented does do justice the incredible magnitude and complexity of the conflict and provides valuable insight into the common feeling and mindset of the people entangled in the middle of the turmoil. There are valuable discussions of all of the figures important in the conflict and the events that came to define it. Perhaps more important than the discussions of the war itself, sections at the beginning of the book discussing the evolution of the Soviet military and foreign policy through the 1930's and at the end discussing the ramifications of the war and the legacy of Stalin are truly the highlights of the book. These sections provide a uniqueness about this selection that make it truly worthy of being labelled a fine history selection.

Rating:
Summary: Balanced and readable account of the Soviet WWII experience
Review: Richard Overy is a professor of modern history at King's College, London. His "Russia's War" is to my (limited) knowledge the first account of the second world war from a Soviet perspecive after the opening of Russian archives. The book is notable for three reasons:

1. Overy's history finely balances detail and overview. He neither clutters the story with endless tales of carnage and missery nor is the brutal horror, unleashed by the Nazi aggressors as well as the Soviets' own regime, missing from the book. On the strategic level, Richard Overy manages to make the reader grasp the few really decisive campaigns in this long and complicated conflict.

2. The key Soviet players come to live. It's not just Stalin (on whom he offers insights, which were new to me) or Georgi Zhukov but also the second tier of national and military leaders. The human side of the Soviet key players and the psychological climate in the Soviet Union comes back to life. He shows what Stalin, Zhukov and the others did to reverse the odds within 18 months.

3. The book doesn't start on 22 June, 1941 and ends on 9 May, 1945. Richard Overy devotes a substantial part of the book to the civil war and the period leading up to the war in Europe. He dicusses to early problems of the regime in the Soviet Union, the foreign aggression against them (e.g. Poland's invasion of Soviet territory in 1920) and the terror of the Stalinist regime before the war which consumed the lives of many millions of Russians, Ukrainians and other nationalities. Also, he describes the immediate period after the war, when Ukrainian rebels continued a bloody campaign into the Fifties.

Last but not least I would like to mention the moderate price. It's imperative reading for the professional historian as well as anybody interested in the subject. Very recommendable indeed!

Rating:
Summary: Readable but superficial
Review: Richard Overy is the author of the interesting and provocative work "Why the allies won". Which is an examination of the broader issues around the comparative strength of the Germans and the Allies at critical points in the Second World War. He is thus no fool a deep thinker and a person with an encyclopedic grasp of the period.

This book is however a companion to a series of film documentaries which were produced by British Television to dramatize the course of the war on the Eastern Front. The book as such reflects this and it has a strongly narrative structure rather than an analytical structure. The illustrations in the book interestingly enough are freeze frames from newsreel footage.

The books promotional material suggests that the book is the first full length portrayal of the war from the Soviet side. This in fact is not the case Erickson's "The Road to Stalingrad" came out in 1985 and Glantz's "When Titans Clashed" came out in 1995. Both are superior works using extensive Russian material. The promotional claim is odd as both these books are cited in the bibliography.

The main focus of the book is on three main battles, Barbarossa, Stalingrad and Kursk. Backhand Blow, Operation Mars are not really discussed and the battles from 1944 on are discussed in a summary way. The book is about the same length as Glantz's but were as Glantz uses words in a sparing way this books use of description means that it has far less content.

The narrative structure tends to state points simply and to try to say things in a dramatic way. This may contribute to its readability for some. All in all a readable book but in reality it is a film companion and nothing much more.

Rating:
Summary: Refreshing
Review: Russia won the II World War. It engaged 80% of German military and inflicted 80% of casualties on the overall German force. It significantly expanded its territory. It surrounded itself with the Eastern Block. Most importantly, it came a long way from an isolated international pariah and emerged a major military force. For decades ahead it secured a high moral ground in the histories of the war.

Its success is especially impressive since it came unexpected to all. By the beginning of the war with Germany, Russia had an inexperienced, recently purged army, where ideology played much greater role than professionalism. Its extensive military did not achieve in quality what it did in quantity. Its economy was considered backward and incapable to adjust quickly. A significant part of its population hated Moscow and later collaborated with the Axis.

Yet above the victory, for the Russian people the war was a tragedy. The author stays with the conservative estimate of 25 million Russians dead. For generations of Russian people, the War was a sacred topic, the symbol of righteous sacrifice. For them, accepting the recently publicized conclusions that some aspects of the war were much less than heroic and many Russian deaths might have been unjustified, is a tall order. The central character of the book's drama, Stalin, for all his ability to master detail, was a terrible military strategist. His main desire for a military campaign was to be on the offensive. Against military advice, he ordered numerous attacks in the first year of the war, which led to numerous "bayonet charges" against German machine guns. In the spring of '42, he ordered an attack on Kharkov, which led to the encirclement of 3 armies. All this perhaps cost Russians hundreds of thousands of lives. Stalin misjudged Hitler's resolve to strike. In 1941 he mistakenly thought Hitler would direct his main forces towards the Russian South, when in fact the main strike was towards Moscow. In the spring of 1942, Stalin guessed that Hitler would try to reach Moscow, whereas now the German generals were after the oil- and grain- rich Russian South. Stalin appears most insightful when, starting with the battle of Stalingrad, he abstained from imposing his will and let the professional military commanders be in charge. Given all this, the author's conclusion of the important positive role Stalin played in the war is surprising.

The undisputed mass heroism of Soviet people during the war is tainted by the government's methods of pushing its people into the battle. A Russian commander knew that unless he clearly stayed in front of his troops on the battlefield, according to the Order 270 of August 1941, issued just 2 months after the start of the conflict, he could be demoted to a private or shot on the spot. This led to a mass loss of commanding officers, who were easily spotted and taken out by the enemy. According to the same order, prisoners of war were equated to "malevolent deserters", to be killed on the spot, their families subject to arrest (for commanders) or to be taken off the state assistance programs (for lower ranks). The NKVD troops, terrorizing the military, were joined briefly in the second half of 1942 by zagradotryady (created to shoot anyone who failed to go forward). One can only guess at how many instances of desperate heroism were provoked by these measures.

The author clearly disputes position of such researchers as Victor Suvorov, who maintained that Russia was planning its own war of aggression, and Hitler just beat it to the start. And yet he shows Russia's position in the conflict as much more than clear-cut. Russia started military collaboration with Germany in 1921 and helped it remilitarize. It served as Germany's accomplice in breaking the Treaty of Versailles. It chose to align itself with Germany in 1939 and was helping it with significant commodity shipments up until the German attack on Russian border. Without a doubt, the major Western powers, especially Britain and France, have to bear their part of responsibility for letting Germany blatantly break the Treaty of Versailles and remilitarize, for Rhineland, Anschluss and Sudetenland. But no country in the world has more actively helped Germany to build up its military might than Russia itself.

Up until the beginning of the conflict between the two countries, Russia was Germany's ally. It supplied refueling bases for German ships, its icebreakers to clear arctic waters for German merchant raiders, its weather reports for German air force during the Battle of Britain. What's more, Stalin's position even back in 1939 was to let Germany fight the "capitalists" and then, maybe use Red Army to "help" the local socialist revolutions in Europe. Stalin's regime was by far bloodier than Hitler's. On the other hand, millions of Soviet people were dying in the war. Western, especially Churchill's, aversion of lending a helping hand to Stalin, by opening the second front in Europe, in this complex circumstance should have been given more light.

The book is opinionated and well written. A pleasure.

Rating:
Summary: The Forgotten Front
Review: The Soviet defeat of the Nazi war machine was a vital element in the outcome of World War II. In fact, the Eastern front might have been the factor in the destruction of Nazi Germany. The majority of the German Army was deployed against the Soviets not the western allies.

The Soviets, however, have not received the credit they deserve. German Generals blamed the defeat on Hitler's strategic mistakes. This claim amounts to assertion that the Soviets did not win this war as much as Germany lost it. In the West historians adopted this argument as their own and claimed that the Soviets overwhelmed the Germans with sheer numbers. The Soviets were unwilling to refute this view since they might use tactics and strategies in a war with NATO similar to the ones they used against the Germans. They had no reason to share their secrets with the enemy.

Much has changed since the end of the Cold War. Historians have gotten access in part to Soviet records. Richard Overy, one of the leading historians of World War II, has written an impressive summary of the new findings of the last ten years. Overy gives his readers a well-written account that manages to cover its broad subject in clear fashion. One of the strengths of this text is that the author is able to give the reader an understanding of the savage nature of combat in this theater without being overwhelming.

The Russians won this war and the Communist system and its leader, Josef Stalin, were vital elements in the victory. The Soviet Union survived the Nazi invasion and went on to win because the USSR kept control of its industrial resources, kept factories in operation, found competent military leaders and reformed its armed services. Overy is on solid ground when he notes that had the Communists failed in these endeavors, there would have been no way for it to resist the Nazis. The Red Army became a competent, professional military during this war. The prewar purges hurt the Soviet military, but under the strains of repeated defeat, Stalin reduced his own involvement in military affairs and the command authority of political officers. Stalin was also smart enough to invoke traditional Russian values during the crisis of war. Religion flourished. Propaganda rarely mentioned Communism but instead called on the people to defend Mother Russia. The army brought back old military honors and decorations from the days of the Czars.

Overy has some interesting new points to make. Stalingrad was not the turning point in the war that so many others have seen. The Germans were able to make good the loss of men, and launch new offensives after this defeat. The Russians used their own weapons, but needed U.S. items like telephone wires, trucks, and radio equipment to fight their war. These items are hardly sexy or exciting, but they allowed the Red Army to become a mechanized force that could use firepower and mobility to destroy its enemy.

People interested in learning more about an important aspect of World War II will really like this book.

Rating:
Summary: Another excellent history of World War 11
Review: The trouble with being a fan of Richard Overy's is that his books go out of print so rapidly. This book on Russia's war is a keeper, a wonderful book to read aloud (which is what I do, for my father), and one from which I learned something new. It includes a lot of newly available information from KGB files. I am not an expert on this subject, but it is refreshing to read something where Stalin is not simply an Evil spirit, and neither is Hitler. I had not understood how truly awful was the suffering of the Russian people, under both these terrible men. The sheer bravery of the common Russian person, the talent and energy shown by such great people as Zhukov, especially as the political totalitarians lost their grip during the war, is truly impressive.

Rating:
Summary: Total-itarian warfare
Review: The value of this study is that it puts RUSSIA'S WAR in a political and social setting. The military campaigns are all here starting with Barbarossa which commenced on June 21st, through the battles of Moscow, Leningrad, and the siege of Stalingrad. The tank battle of Kursk in 1943 is appropriately the mid-point of the book as it marked the turning point in the war. From here on the story is one of Russian resolve culminating with the eventual drive on Berlin in the spring of 1945. Overy's emphasis throughout is his recurring theme that these battles, the societies at large, their armies, and the reaction of the people (particularly the Russian peasant), can not be fully understood without reference to the political systems that governed all. The totalitarian nature of the two beligerent states had a significant say in how the war was conducted. This was especially so as the states so closely reflected the respective leaders. Overy's chapter "The Cult of Personality: Stalin and the Legacy of War" is a fine exposition on the Russian manifestation of this.

The book is useful in another context. In Antony Beevor's recent book THE FALL OF BERLIN 1945 readers engage the Red Army in 1945, just before the attack on the German capital. Beevor does not deal with the build up to that epic battle. Here Overy provides an excellent historical background to the final denouement of the Third Reich. He provides a framework for understanding why, from the Russian perspective, Berlin was such an epic and emotional event and remains shrouded in the myth of the "Great Patriotic War".