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Rating: 
Summary: A great book on what it means to be brave
Review: If before i wanted to be a Ranger after reading this Book i want to be it even more!! With out any question this is a Book that puts you inside the realaty of being a Ranger and fighting for it's Values.It provides you with long hours of excitement. Rangers leed the Way.
Rating: 
Summary: Review from a Ranger perspective
Review: It used to be that the U.S. military turned out officers who could write decently. Apparently this is either no longer the case -- or the Rangers tend to draw their officers from that portion of the corps which consists largely of people who can't even write a decent field manual. Major Lock is one of these officers, and TO FIGHT WITH INTREPIDITY suffers badly because the publisher of this book didn't assign someone to edit Major Lock's manuscript as thoroughly as it needed to be. This notwithstanding, Major Lock's book is an uniquely well-researched and enormously valuable source of information on the history of the Rangers in America and the Ranger units of the U.S. Army in the wars and other armed conflicts of the 20th Century. I find this book a valuable addition to my library despite the fact that it reads like a badly translated copy of a textbook from the Frunze Academy, and I would not hesitate to recommend it to anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Army's development and employment of light infantry forces.
Rating:
Summary: Valuable information, but a ghodawful prose style
Review: It used to be that the U.S. military turned out officers who could write decently. Apparently this is either no longer the case -- or the Rangers tend to draw their officers from that portion of the corps which consists largely of people who can't even write a decent field manual. Major Lock is one of these officers, and TO FIGHT WITH INTREPIDITY suffers badly because the publisher of this book didn't assign someone to edit Major Lock's manuscript as thoroughly as it needed to be. This notwithstanding, Major Lock's book is an uniquely well-researched and enormously valuable source of information on the history of the Rangers in America and the Ranger units of the U.S. Army in the wars and other armed conflicts of the 20th Century. I find this book a valuable addition to my library despite the fact that it reads like a badly translated copy of a textbook from the Frunze Academy, and I would not hesitate to recommend it to anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Army's development and employment of light infantry forces.
Rating:
Summary: LTC Lock reveals lessons for today's light infantry
Review: LTC Lock has done in a compact form a BDU pocket-sized complete history of the U.S. Army Rangers, this quantification is usually what we praise, but we forget the quality of his writing when he does this. We need to realize what is it that we want to learn from Army Ranger history other than the predictable HOOAH! stuff? LTC Lock in his book reveals an aspect of light infantry operations we simply do not understand today with our men turned into pack mules with "100 pounds of lightweight equipment". Read his accounts of Roger's Rangers and you will see a light infantry that could "fly" on its feet through the woods and outfight the Indians. The recent film, "Last of the Mohicans" best captures this capability. This was a Ranger infantry that was willing to use unusual mobility means, also---boats, ice skates, snow shoes, living off the land--all to get that mobility edge over the enemy. In WWII, Darby used speed-marches and carts to carry mortars/ammo to close on enemies rapidly to gain surprise/violence of action. Merrill's Marauders used mules to carry 75mm pack howitzers and supplies to penetrate deep into the jungles of Burma and take Myitkyina airfield from the jungle-seasoned Japanese. In Five major (WALAWBUM, SHADUZUP, INKANGAHTAWNG, NHPUM GA, & MYITKYINA) and thirty minor engagements, they defeated the veteran soldiers of the Japanese 18th Division (Conquerors of Singapore and Malaya) who vastly outnumbered the Marauders. Always moving to the rear of the main forces of the Japanese, the Marauders completely disrupted the enemy supply and communication lines, and climaxed their behind the lines operations with the capture of Myitkyina Airfield, the only all-weather airfield in Northern Burma. Theese lessons need to be applied to today's light infantry that is still over-looking the capability modern mountain bikes and carts with oversized tires could give an Airborne Ranger-type force to close on an enemy after insertion out of detection range by parachute/airlanding aircraft. My only fault with the book is that it doesn't clearly lay-out the roles/missions dilemma current Ranger infantry is in---it really has 2 types of missions: 1.) on one hand its America's shock troops storming defended high-value targets alone or as a spearhead for other troops (WWII Commando mindset), 2.)on the other, it has to be able to "Range" across the land as light infantry for days at a time to raid/recon (traditional Ranger missions). These two missions are different and require different mindsets and equipment---and this is why TF Ranger in Somalia did not have armored fighting vehicles--because it was not seen as appropriate for "Rangers to do mech" if one was defining the unit by traditional roles/missions. However, shock troops need shock action and that means Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and shielded men, which Rangers lead the U.S. military by employing for the first time rifle-caliber resstant body armor and having the physical conditioning and willingness to take Soldier's load risks to go into battle with it. AFVs are not popular in the minds of some Rangers, but its necessary to successfully perform shock action missions in urbanized terrain. Other elite units in the world can ride AFVs without their image suffering. Walking is not always the best way to "range" across the battlefield, as Ranger gun-jeeps, RSOVs (Land Rovers) and HMMWVs attest from combat in Iran (Desert 1), Grenada (airlanded from C-130s), Panama (parachute air-dropped) and Iraq (Desert Storm). But these are unarmored vehicles not up to the task of advancing in the face of concentrated enemies and their fire. LTC Lock in his superb chapter on the Mogadishu raid expertly outlines why Rangers should have had armored vehicles and that they would have prevented 1-18 men dying that day. His Somalia chapter is as good as Bowden's entire book, "Blackhawk Down!" and in some ways better---because it doesn't mince words and gets to the point that AFVs were needed in the force structure. If America's light infantry forces would look back via LTC Lock's fine book into its methodology of Roger's Rangers; it will find the mindset needed to make it the most mobile and hardest-hitting infantry on earth that can range across the terrain quick enough to defeat the stalemate sensors and optics will create against a slower moving force. If these forces will understand that as Col Daniel Bolger states in Death Ground: America's Infantry in battle: "Ranger tabs don't stop bullets", and accept a modest number of air-droppable and helicopter transportable light tracked AFVs into its force structure for its own organic shielded mobility and heavy firepower, it will have learned well from its Somalian ordeals and be ready to lead the way! into the 21st century.
Rating:
Summary: LTC Lock reveals lessons for today's light infantry
Review: LTC Lock has done in a compact form a BDU pocket-sized complete history of the U.S. Army Rangers, this quantification is usually what we praise, but we forget the quality of his writing when he does this. We need to realize what is it that we want to learn from Army Ranger history other than the predictable HOOAH! stuff? LTC Lock in his book reveals an aspect of light infantry operations we simply do not understand today with our men turned into pack mules with "100 pounds of lightweight equipment". Read his accounts of Roger's Rangers and you will see a light infantry that could "fly" on its feet through the woods and outfight the Indians. The recent film, "Last of the Mohicans" best captures this capability. This was a Ranger infantry that was willing to use unusual mobility means, also---boats, ice skates, snow shoes, living off the land--all to get that mobility edge over the enemy. In WWII, Darby used speed-marches and carts to carry mortars/ammo to close on enemies rapidly to gain surprise/violence of action. Merrill's Marauders used mules to carry 75mm pack howitzers and supplies to penetrate deep into the jungles of Burma and take Myitkyina airfield from the jungle-seasoned Japanese. In Five major (WALAWBUM, SHADUZUP, INKANGAHTAWNG, NHPUM GA, & MYITKYINA) and thirty minor engagements, they defeated the veteran soldiers of the Japanese 18th Division (Conquerors of Singapore and Malaya) who vastly outnumbered the Marauders. Always moving to the rear of the main forces of the Japanese, the Marauders completely disrupted the enemy supply and communication lines, and climaxed their behind the lines operations with the capture of Myitkyina Airfield, the only all-weather airfield in Northern Burma. Theese lessons need to be applied to today's light infantry that is still over-looking the capability modern mountain bikes and carts with oversized tires could give an Airborne Ranger-type force to close on an enemy after insertion out of detection range by parachute/airlanding aircraft. My only fault with the book is that it doesn't clearly lay-out the roles/missions dilemma current Ranger infantry is in---it really has 2 types of missions: 1.) on one hand its America's shock troops storming defended high-value targets alone or as a spearhead for other troops (WWII Commando mindset), 2.)on the other, it has to be able to "Range" across the land as light infantry for days at a time to raid/recon (traditional Ranger missions). These two missions are different and require different mindsets and equipment---and this is why TF Ranger in Somalia did not have armored fighting vehicles--because it was not seen as appropriate for "Rangers to do mech" if one was defining the unit by traditional roles/missions. However, shock troops need shock action and that means Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and shielded men, which Rangers lead the U.S. military by employing for the first time rifle-caliber resstant body armor and having the physical conditioning and willingness to take Soldier's load risks to go into battle with it. AFVs are not popular in the minds of some Rangers, but its necessary to successfully perform shock action missions in urbanized terrain. Other elite units in the world can ride AFVs without their image suffering. Walking is not always the best way to "range" across the battlefield, as Ranger gun-jeeps, RSOVs (Land Rovers) and HMMWVs attest from combat in Iran (Desert 1), Grenada (airlanded from C-130s), Panama (parachute air-dropped) and Iraq (Desert Storm). But these are unarmored vehicles not up to the task of advancing in the face of concentrated enemies and their fire. LTC Lock in his superb chapter on the Mogadishu raid expertly outlines why Rangers should have had armored vehicles and that they would have prevented 1-18 men dying that day. His Somalia chapter is as good as Bowden's entire book, "Blackhawk Down!" and in some ways better---because it doesn't mince words and gets to the point that AFVs were needed in the force structure. If America's light infantry forces would look back via LTC Lock's fine book into its methodology of Roger's Rangers; it will find the mindset needed to make it the most mobile and hardest-hitting infantry on earth that can range across the terrain quick enough to defeat the stalemate sensors and optics will create against a slower moving force. If these forces will understand that as Col Daniel Bolger states in Death Ground: America's Infantry in battle: "Ranger tabs don't stop bullets", and accept a modest number of air-droppable and helicopter transportable light tracked AFVs into its force structure for its own organic shielded mobility and heavy firepower, it will have learned well from its Somalian ordeals and be ready to lead the way! into the 21st century.
Rating:
Summary: Review from a Ranger perspective
Review: Ranger units have always put tremendous emphasis on history and tradition as an aspect of pride in duty, and that's where this work has real value. Academic critique from recreational readers won't reflect this --it's just another book; however; Rangers and men in the Special Ops business out there will see much deeper meaning in it. If you want to take pride in wearing the beret a step further (whether today or years ago), read Lock's book. There are nearly four centuries of tradition behind the Ranger Creed and Roger's Standing Orders: Learn the history.
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