Inside Hitler's High Command

Rating:
Summary: WARNING! This book is hardly objective.
Review:

The entire book is an assault on the competence of the German military organization. While the OKH and OKW organizations certainly suffered deficiencies, this book is hardly an objective view. The book is filled with statements such as, "Most members of the officer corps wanted no part of such plans. Because their military culture lacked a strong appreciation for the subtleties of strategy, they could not properly evaluate international power relationships and, hence German opportunities." Another is, "The problem with German intelligence was not really structural but attitudinal..." These are statements about the opinions and mindset of the officers that require some documentation before a historian can claim it as fact. Yet Geoffrey P. Megargee seems to have skipped this step, except for things such as figures, organizational structures, and direct quotes. This is very surprising since the author is trying to counter the general belief that the German military was very effective and Hitler's interference contributed to disaster.

The author is, according to the cover, an applied research scholar at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. I suspect that he has more of an axe to grind than an interest in uncovering the facts behind Hitler and the German General Staff.

If you enjoy political books that attack high personalities, and if you have strong negative feelings against the Germans during WWII, you will enjoy this book. But if you are looking for objective history, I recommend looking elsewhere.



Rating:
Summary: Excellent Academic Look At Hitler's General Staff!
Review: Conventional wisdom regarding the fate of the Wehrmacht in World War Two has always been that it was Adolph Hitler's maniacal meddling in the day to day affairs of the armed forces that created the catastrophic defeats along the eastern front that lost the war. Indeed, many of the first hand post-war memoirs of those German generals and other staff officials supported this point of view, giving one the idea that if only the generals had had their way, Germany would have been victorious. There is much to commend such a view; certainly Hitler's decisions were often counter-intuitive and counter-productive, and he often seemed to change his mind and the tactics associated with a campaign in mid-stream. The results of these actions were indeed often disastrous. Yet, as the author of this scholarly investigation into the machinations of the General Staff and its decision making process brilliantly argues in this fascinating and informative book, the evidence supporting such a theory that Hitler single-handedly lost the war through his incompetence simply does not exist.

In fact, this book is quite well written; it is authoritative, informative, and extremely well documented. The author has managed to turn what could have been a historical curiosity for the amusement of other academic historians into a terrific reading experience for a more general audience. He approaches the subject with verve and a plethora of telling examples of how the general staff were involved and complicit in the day to day decisions that were so disastrous for the Wehrmacht; far from being helpless factotums who merely carried out Hitler's demands, they initiated debates and discussions in which Hitler often played the provocateur, attempting to gain a better idea of what each of the participants in the discussions really thought regarding a particular course of action. Also, in employing the kinds of primary evidence used here, he illustrates how involved and enthusiastic many of the generals were in making fateful decisions. As the author maintains, there is no credible evidence that they did in fact take any serious issue with Operation Barbarossa or with its conduct until things began to go awry.

The simple truth of the matter seems to be that they shared Hitler's myopic faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, and seriously underestimated the capabilities, endurance, and determination of the Soviet forces. The fateful decision was the first one, the effort to invade the Soviet Union without recognizing the serious logistical and tactical problems that were ensue when prosecuting a fight over such a vast distance and with a front that was thousands of miles long. Likewise, the decision by Hitler and General Staff to declare war against the Americans seemed more the result of an arrogant disregard for facts in favor of self-serving ideology. Of course, to argue that the general staff itself was complicit is not to deny the degree of sloth and banality associated with Hitler's command and control of the armed forces. He brashly demoted men who had failed him and his wildly unrealistic expectations while promoting incompetent sycophants based solely on their loyalty. Such policies compounded the difficulties associated with attempting to execute a war that had turned into a much wider and more complex effort than Hitler or the General Staff had ever envisioned.

This is a wonderful book, one that gives fresh evidence of the dangers inherent in consensus management. Hitler's fateful problem was that by demanding the outrageous and the unrealistic, he increasingly gathered around him the worst liars, game-players, and toadies in the history of modern warfare. He consistently winnowed out anyone who told him the unvarnished truth, especially if it was negative. By doing so he guaranteed the desperate failure of his most audacious and precarious adventures into the realm of war, and brought the heavy weight of ruin and destruction upon himself, the General Staff, the Wehrmacht, and the German people. Of course, along the way, he managed to ruin most of Europe and kill tens of millions of people, as well. This is an excellent book, and is one I heartily recommend. Enjoy!

Rating:
Summary: Crap!
Review: One wonders if the much vaunted Generalstab of Germany was as disorganized, shortsighted, shortchanged, incompetent, incredulous as described by Megargee, then how come Germany single handedly took on the whole industrialised world in the 2 world wars? That it gets stronger despite losing the wars, with their consequent ceding of territories, looting, enforced occupation, indemnities snd partitions?

Rating:
Summary: Not all Hitler's fault after all.
Review: The author's intention to analyse a complex subject, whilst at the same time entertaining the general reader, has succeeded in this excellent book. His view that the generals and OKW shared willingly in Hitler's military blunders - post war memoirs tend to be disingenious - is not in itself new. However, Megargee has assembled the primary evidence in a convincing and comprehensive form. As he argues, there is no significant evidence that the High Command seriously opposed the Fuhrer's declaration of war on Russia or America in 1941. Indeed, they took a most simplistic view of Russia's strength and America's likely impact over time. Detailed here too are Hitler's poor attention to strategic planning and military intelligence. In the Gotterdammerung phase of the war, the author has an excellent chapter on Hitler's insistence on promoting men wildly above their ability just because they were loyal. Himmler's dismal showing as a military commander is the best example of this. The book is a most readable insight into the mind set of those who led Germany to defeat in a flawed system.

Rating:
Summary: Shatters some old myths
Review: This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans.

Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.

One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.

Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.

Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.

Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.

This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

Rating:
Summary: High Command? What high command?
Review: This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

Rating:
Summary: High Command? What high command?
Review: This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

Rating:
Summary: Hitler's Willing Executives: General Disarray and Decline
Review: Within months of Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, his former military "advisors" tried to distance themselves from his over-reaching grand strategy. Beginning with Halder's self-exculpatory _Hitler as Warlord_ in 1949 and continuing through the highly popular memoirs of Guderian, Manstein, Warlimont, Mellenthin and Bock, the dead Hitler was put in the docket and found guilty of strategical naivite.

Post-war propaganda depicted a German High Command which "knew better" than Hitler but were intimidated and brutalized into submitting, or being replaced and disgraced.

This myth has been unravelling piecemeal of late with respect to certain "fatal decisions" (Invasion of Russia, Battle of Britain, Declaration of War on the US, the North African Campaign). However, until Megargee's well-written study, none have presented a dissection of how the High Command collectively shared responsibility with the Little Corporal for confusing phase lines on a planning map with logistical, mechanical and manpower realities.

This is most likely because "organizational history" tends to be boring. It's much more interesting to read about behind-the-scenes feuds among monocled martinets than the precise way in which orders and intelligence were processed and disseminated. Megargee manages to envigorate his descriptions of the "system", such as it was, with the constant reminder of the clash of egos that diffused what little "opposition" there was to Hitler's conceptions.

Throughout it all, Megargee shows how the once powerful vaunted "General Staff" became a mere cog in the awkward_Army High Command_(OKH)structure working alongside, but hardly in synch with Hitler's personal war cabinet, the _Armed Forces High Command_ (OKW).

The High Command at work is the heart of this illuminating expose. The most detailed case study is that of _Operation Barbarossa_, often described as Hitler's leap into the dark.

Megargee shows how, in spite of the reservations that many of the senior commanders expressed at the time, they were brought along by the seeming precision and foresight of detailed operational staff studies. Megargee illuminates the Wehrmacht's poor use of and regard for intelligence staffs and their work.

Paricularly illuminating is Chapter 8 "The System at Work: A Week in the Life of the High Command". The week for display was well chosen: December 15-22, 1941, when the first signs of Operation Barbarossa's failure SHOULD HAVE become apparent. The clear exposition of decision-making and breaking demonstrates exactly how and why Hitler's "professionals" came to share his delusions. Throughout, the illusion of controlling the situation hundreds of miles away by dint of modern instantaneous communications was reinforced by the misuse of raw information filtering back from the beleaguered field commands.

Megargee's clear exposition and lively prose should dump the final shovel of dirt on the grave of the lame lament:" If only Hitler had not interfered, his generals would have won the war".