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Rating: 
Summary: A Promising but Weak Hybrid Product
Review: Osprey's new Battle Orders series attempts to blend features from the campaign, elite and order of battle series into a hybrid. Unfortunately, this type of hybrid is far too complex for a 96-page format and results in a promising but ultimately flawed product. Bruce Quarrie, a journalist well-known for writing on the German military in the Second World War, attempts in Battle Orders #4 to summarize the command, organization, evolution, doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of the German airborne forces in 1940-1941 (actually, there was only one true airborne division in this period). This is a worthy task, but far beyond the structural restraints of this format and the reader will sense that the author was squeezed on every page. It is particularly obvious in the author's shallow treatment of the well-known operations at Fort Eban Emael and Crete. While this volume is a handy reference on this subject, it cannot stand alone. After a short introduction on the background of the airborne forces concept, Quarrie lays out the primary missions established by the Germans for their nascent airborne arm: capturing key objectives such as bridges, seizure of enemy airfields and to create a new front unexpected by the enemy. Actually, this "combat mission" section is one of the better elements in the Battle Orders series and while succinct, is useful for military professionals. Surprisingly, the section on doctrine and training is only 3 pages, but the section on command, control & intelligence is 8 pages. Quarrie notes that the German airborne branch was often let down by Abwehr intelligence, resulting in stronger-than-expected resistance. Nearly half the volume is occupied with a very detailed analysis of the two German airborne divisions: the army's 22nd "Luftland" (air-portable) and the Luftwafe's 7th Flieger Division (7FJ). Military professionals will particularly enjoy the numerous line and block order of battle charts in this section, which detail sub-units down to company and even platoon level. Quarrie's description of how the 7FJ was formed under Reich Marshal Goering's direction is particularly interesting; rather than a homogenous force, Germany's first airborne division was glued together from "a pot-pourri of disparate units," including Luftwaffe, army, SA and even police detachments. At the start of the war, 7FJ numbered only 4,000 men and had virtually no artillery or support units. Hitler decided to keep the airborne under wraps until they could be used decisively against the Anglo-French (a smart decision), so they were not used in Poland and only two battalions were used in Denmark-Norway. It is interesting that of the three airborne companies used in the initial invasion of Norway, one was overwhelmed and forced to surrender. By May 1940, the 7FJ was still a weak division that consisted primarily of airborne infantry without support weapons and even the division staff was amazingly junior (the operations officer was only a captain and the intelligence officer was a lieutenant). Furthermore, there was a serious shortage of senior officers even in the line battalions, which were normally led by captains. Lacking organic artillery, 7FJ was almost totally dependent upon air support. By the invasion of Crete in May 1941, 7FJ had grown to a reinforced division with 13 infantry battalions but still very weak in supporting weapons. Quarrie's treatment of Fort Eban Emael, the landings in Holland and particularly Crete, are extremely shallow. While this is not a campaign title and the author asserts that these actions are well known, that does not absolve him of providing readers with the essential details of these actions. Quarrie provides good detail on the assault landings of the Koch detachment in Belgium in May 1940, but virtually ignores the capture of Fort Eban Emael. Indeed, nowhere in the volume does Quarrie mention the use of hollow charges at Fort Eban Emael - an important oversight. Furthermore, Quarrie spends over 20 pages detailing the organization of the 22nd Luftlande division, then spends only a few sentences discussing the division's operations in Holland (it's one and only air-landing operation of the war). The Luftlande division's specific objectives and casualties are noticeably absent. While Quarrie's OB data for Crete is very good, he really only concerns himself with the operations around Máleme and virtually ignores the rest. Given the fact that the Germans made so few airborne drops in this period, ignoring regimental-size drops at Retimo and Heraklion seems to hurt the content of this volume. It is also disappointing, given the heavy German airborne losses on Crete, that Quarrie makes no effort to discuss losses by each regiment or battalion, or how the division was structured immediately after Crete. The volume includes six tactical maps: Waalhaven/Rotterdam landings; Dordrecht/Moerdijk landings; a plan of Fort Eban Emael; the Koch detachment landings around Maastricht; the Corinth canal operation; and the Máleme landings on Crete. Unfortunately, Quarrie does not include any operational-level maps, depicting the layout of all German airborne landings in Holland or Crete, so it will be difficult for readers to get a comprehensive understanding of the operational use of German airborne troops or how they supported the campaign plan. Quarrie also includes a section on tactics, which notes that the Germans were initially restricted by a parachute that could only handle about 190 pounds (thus German paratroops could not drop with weapons). Poor navigational equipment also restricted the Germans to daylight-only airborne operations. The author also includes sections on weapons and equipment, as well as lessons learned. Essentially, this volume shows that the Germans glued together an airborne force for their early Blitzkrieg campaigns but the force had many of the weaknesses inherent in an experimental unit: small numbers, first-generation equipment, incomplete MTOE, inexperienced leadership, inadequate logistics, etc. Quarrie's volume whets the appetite of military specialists for a single volume that packs a wealth of information on historic formations such as these, but the defects of this hybrid format will ultimately leave most readers unsatisfied.
Rating:
Summary: A Promising but Weak Hybrid Product
Review: Osprey's new Battle Orders series attempts to blend features from the campaign, elite and order of battle series into a hybrid. Unfortunately, this type of hybrid is far too complex for a 96-page format and results in a promising but ultimately flawed product. Bruce Quarrie, a journalist well-known for writing on the German military in the Second World War, attempts in Battle Orders #4 to summarize the command, organization, evolution, doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of the German airborne forces in 1940-1941 (actually, there was only one true airborne division in this period). This is a worthy task, but far beyond the structural restraints of this format and the reader will sense that the author was squeezed on every page. It is particularly obvious in the author's shallow treatment of the well-known operations at Fort Eban Emael and Crete. While this volume is a handy reference on this subject, it cannot stand alone. After a short introduction on the background of the airborne forces concept, Quarrie lays out the primary missions established by the Germans for their nascent airborne arm: capturing key objectives such as bridges, seizure of enemy airfields and to create a new front unexpected by the enemy. Actually, this "combat mission" section is one of the better elements in the Battle Orders series and while succinct, is useful for military professionals. Surprisingly, the section on doctrine and training is only 3 pages, but the section on command, control & intelligence is 8 pages. Quarrie notes that the German airborne branch was often let down by Abwehr intelligence, resulting in stronger-than-expected resistance. Nearly half the volume is occupied with a very detailed analysis of the two German airborne divisions: the army's 22nd "Luftland" (air-portable) and the Luftwafe's 7th Flieger Division (7FJ). Military professionals will particularly enjoy the numerous line and block order of battle charts in this section, which detail sub-units down to company and even platoon level. Quarrie's description of how the 7FJ was formed under Reich Marshal Goering's direction is particularly interesting; rather than a homogenous force, Germany's first airborne division was glued together from "a pot-pourri of disparate units," including Luftwaffe, army, SA and even police detachments. At the start of the war, 7FJ numbered only 4,000 men and had virtually no artillery or support units. Hitler decided to keep the airborne under wraps until they could be used decisively against the Anglo-French (a smart decision), so they were not used in Poland and only two battalions were used in Denmark-Norway. It is interesting that of the three airborne companies used in the initial invasion of Norway, one was overwhelmed and forced to surrender. By May 1940, the 7FJ was still a weak division that consisted primarily of airborne infantry without support weapons and even the division staff was amazingly junior (the operations officer was only a captain and the intelligence officer was a lieutenant). Furthermore, there was a serious shortage of senior officers even in the line battalions, which were normally led by captains. Lacking organic artillery, 7FJ was almost totally dependent upon air support. By the invasion of Crete in May 1941, 7FJ had grown to a reinforced division with 13 infantry battalions but still very weak in supporting weapons. Quarrie's treatment of Fort Eban Emael, the landings in Holland and particularly Crete, are extremely shallow. While this is not a campaign title and the author asserts that these actions are well known, that does not absolve him of providing readers with the essential details of these actions. Quarrie provides good detail on the assault landings of the Koch detachment in Belgium in May 1940, but virtually ignores the capture of Fort Eban Emael. Indeed, nowhere in the volume does Quarrie mention the use of hollow charges at Fort Eban Emael - an important oversight. Furthermore, Quarrie spends over 20 pages detailing the organization of the 22nd Luftlande division, then spends only a few sentences discussing the division's operations in Holland (it's one and only air-landing operation of the war). The Luftlande division's specific objectives and casualties are noticeably absent. While Quarrie's OB data for Crete is very good, he really only concerns himself with the operations around Máleme and virtually ignores the rest. Given the fact that the Germans made so few airborne drops in this period, ignoring regimental-size drops at Retimo and Heraklion seems to hurt the content of this volume. It is also disappointing, given the heavy German airborne losses on Crete, that Quarrie makes no effort to discuss losses by each regiment or battalion, or how the division was structured immediately after Crete. The volume includes six tactical maps: Waalhaven/Rotterdam landings; Dordrecht/Moerdijk landings; a plan of Fort Eban Emael; the Koch detachment landings around Maastricht; the Corinth canal operation; and the Máleme landings on Crete. Unfortunately, Quarrie does not include any operational-level maps, depicting the layout of all German airborne landings in Holland or Crete, so it will be difficult for readers to get a comprehensive understanding of the operational use of German airborne troops or how they supported the campaign plan. Quarrie also includes a section on tactics, which notes that the Germans were initially restricted by a parachute that could only handle about 190 pounds (thus German paratroops could not drop with weapons). Poor navigational equipment also restricted the Germans to daylight-only airborne operations. The author also includes sections on weapons and equipment, as well as lessons learned. Essentially, this volume shows that the Germans glued together an airborne force for their early Blitzkrieg campaigns but the force had many of the weaknesses inherent in an experimental unit: small numbers, first-generation equipment, incomplete MTOE, inexperienced leadership, inadequate logistics, etc. Quarrie's volume whets the appetite of military specialists for a single volume that packs a wealth of information on historic formations such as these, but the defects of this hybrid format will ultimately leave most readers unsatisfied.
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