The Eleven Days of Christmas: America's Last Vietnam Battle

Rating:
Summary: Excellent
Review: "The Eleven Days of Christmas" gives an excellent overall view of Linebacker II. The pilots who participated not only faced formidable enemy defenses, but had to overcome the incompetence of senior officers to achieve the objective of bringing the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. In reading "The Eleven Days of Christmas", one therefore has greater appreciation of these pilots. Yes-they succeeded, but no thanks to the senior officers who planned the mission. Unfortunately, this seems to have been all too typical of the Vietnam War, even before Linebacker II. In a word-excellent!

Rating:
Summary: It doesnt get any better than this
Review: As a Navy pilot I spent two tours, 67 -69 in the Tonkin Gulf. The fustration of having targets picked by Johnson, McNamara and his wiz kids three-thousands miles apart is impossible to describe, I thought, until I read "The eleven days of Christmas." The author does a detailed account with dilegent research, quotes, interviews, military communication, and records from the U.S. and North Vietnam veterans. I could not put this book down. Fantastic job.

Rating:
Summary: SHAME ON SAC
Review: By nature a bureaucracy is rule-oriented, intransigent, and usually impenetrable. This describes the Strategic Air Command during Operation Linebacker II. Richard Nixon's audacious campaign to return the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, end US involvement in South Vietnam, and get our POWs back. General John Meyer, top honcho at SAC, was originally a fighter pilot in WWII. As a tactical fighter pilot, Meyer was one of the best. However, as chief decision maker during the operation, Meyer proved himself to be in over his head, completely ignoring feedback from the pilots after the disastrous first three days of the operation. SAC picked targets and planned routes of entry and exit from halfway around the world at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska. Ordering aircraft commanders to make post-bombing turns over heavily defended terrain allowed the communists to shoot down an alarming number of aircraft. These turns not only blanked out the BUFF's radar jamming, but also forced the big bombers to turn into a headwind, slowing them down and making them big juicy targets for the Hanoi Air Defense Command. The guy that saved the day for Linebacker II was General Glenn Sullivan, stationed at Utapao. On day four, Sullivan sent a message simultaneously to General Johnson (his superior) at Eighth Air Force on Guam, as well as to SAC, suggesting a revision of the colossally stupid SAC attack plans. (General Sullivan was subsequently "punished" for this message, never receiving credit for his snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, and never rising above the rank of Brigadier General). An interesting sidebar is how the Air Force savaged Dana A. Drenkowski for an article he wrote in the Armed Forces Journal, charging that "SAC's mistakes had caused most of the losses in the early days of Linebacker II." Do not believe official Air Force histories of this titanic struggle in the skies. (The North Vietnamese to this day tout their "victory" as the "Dien Bien Phu of the skies"). Michel documents his sources carefully and shows that US Air Force higher-ups engaged in revisionism when they wrote their official history of Linebacker II. In any case, and in spite of SAC's subterfuge to undermine Nixon's orders, the North Vietnamese returned to the bargaining table in Paris and signed a "peace" agreement. We disengaged from Vietnam and got our POWs back, something Nixon was determined to accomplish. In my view, President Nixon ordered the two most successful campaigns of the war: Linebacker II and the spring, 1970, Cambodian incursion. With this kind of determination and aggressiveness, Vietnam could have been won. Sullivan takes you inside the White House, inside SAC, inside the briefing rooms on Guam and at Utapao, and most grippingly, inside the planes as they carried out their dangerous missions. Through lengthy and meticulous research, Michel has written a book that can't be put down. Highly recommended.

Rating:
Summary: Best book about LB II that I have EVER read!!!
Review: I could not put this down!! The way Mr. Michel explained the battle almost made me feel as if I was there. I especially liked the way he places the reader behind the SA-2 missle controls of the North Vietnamese Communist gunners. I am an infantryman in the US Army and I am very intrested to know how our future (and past) enemies have fought and what they think as our bombs fall all around them. "Know your enemy" is a phrase all US servicemen and women should strive to master.
In "The 11 Days of Christmas",, Mr. Michel talks about a new book which is tentatively titled "The Christmas Bombing:The View From Hanoi." I will buy this book the second it comes out.

Rating:
Summary: Finally Nixon gets serious...
Review: I doubt if I could ever be as unbiased and methodical as Michel in approaching this shamefully long overdue air campaign, which was the only truly unrestricted heavy strategic air campaign of the entire 10,000 day war, going beyond even Linebacker I, which effectively ended the NVA spring offensive.

Though not without its losses (15 of the 26 aircraft lost were B-52s) the results were such that by the end of Linebacker II (which paused on Christmas Day) the USAF had effectively run out of major targets.

In the light of so many good overall reviews, I will just focus briefly on the actual bombing ops. It is both disturbing and intriguing to discover the reasons for those losses. While some of the downings were almost 'chance' hits, where the Enemy had fired volleys of SAM-2s ballistically i.e. unguided (due to the ECW assets being employed), many occurred due to precision hits.

Where this was the case, it was sometimes due to 'burnthrough', where the Enemy ground radar signal nullified or overwhelmed the ECM cell being generated by the BUFFs. This sometimes occurred due to onboard E/F generator failures (all too common), due to an aircraft straying outside the cell during a maneuver, or in the case of the B-52Gs, simply not having enough ECM power to cope with the signal strength from the SAM site radar emmitters.

Six B-52Gs were shot down while making high banking turns at the end of the bombing run, which created an acquirable radar cross section (the plane's ECM was no longer pointing straight downwards, opening up a chink in the electronic armor). After this, the Gs were re-assigned to ARC Light Missions (standard B-52 bombing support missions). Ironically, the older D models had more powerful ECM capabilities. The defense package that they carried included all manner of ECW countermeasures plus onboard chaff dispensers.

The external chaff dispensing was also problematic as the high winds were causing the chaff (foil strips) to disperse prematurely and provide too narrow a corridor for the following bombers. Additonal chaffing aircraft (who also flew forward CAP) were allocated and altitude adjustments were made to compensate.

At least two MIG 21s were shot down by tail gunners, with their radar directed .50 cal quad packs, as the MIGs were believed to be spotting altitudes and attack vectors for the ground radars. Not too hard when you could see a sea of upper rotating (anti-collision) beacons ahead of you.

While the B-52 losses were heavy, the success rate of the SAM-2 in terms of aircraft downed per number of missiles fired was extremely low - perhaps 3 or 4% at the most. The Enemy had basically used up their entire supply of SAM-2s by the end of the campaign, and the last two missions were flown without any losses whatsoever.

A great campaign, carried out with tremendous courage and skill by hundreds of B-52 and bomber support crews, (the tankers, the fighter escort, the EW jammer aircraft etc.)and one that actually achieved something in short order. The final Peace accord was signed just a few weeks later.

Rating:
Summary: Some things never change
Review: I found the book so facinating that I read it in 12 hrs. Part of my interest is that I flew on G's as an RN for 5 yrs in the 80's. I heard the urban legends, myths, and other stories surround the Linebacker II operation. This book rings true on many levels.

The author introduces the subject with a bit of history on the USAF and Strategic Air Command. He did gloss over some details, like LeMay taking a rag tag outfit of cobbled together units and forging SAC in his own image. But this is a minor point. The author is setting up the cultural conflict in SAC that is evident in the events of Linebacker II. And this rings so true, many of the cultural artifacts were still in existence in 1989.

There is the discussion on how SAC developed and was involved in the conflicts of Korea and Viet Nam. How the culture of zero mistakes and top down decision making, thought necessary for a nuclear excahnge where it is likely you are going with what you have, doesn't fit the conventional battlefield. In the conventional battel field, you go back day after day.

The author then takes you to the policitcal decision making that lead up to the battle of Linebacker II, and the squawbling of the generals. It was faciniating, that the bottomline to the battle and the return to the peace table had less to do with the destruction on the ground than the political wills of the leaders, manifested in the battle itself. The fact that Nixon held the line and forced the bombing to continue, even after the NV signaled their desire to go back, signaled that Nixon was one to be dealt with and that the NV need to work with him to get a deal.

The book then goes to the day by day activities of the battle, from both the aircrew and and NVA side. From the aircrew side, the author did his homework and though not loosing the audience in the detail and minutia of the cockpit, his descriptions ring true. I never had the opportunity to work the ASQ-38 offensive system, (I was one of the first to be totaly trained on the replacement OAS system), I worked with many who had and the details are there.

In the day to day activities, the author describes the problems created by the command structure, the lower commands reactions and attempts to compensate and correct, and how that interaction played out. He also provides vivid descriptions of the actual engagements and tactics used, how the tactics faired, and the response on both sides to gain advantage.

I thought the book was superb example of military history focused on a pivital battle in the war. It provides enough detail for people familar with the military and the systems, but doesn't get bogged down to lose the uninitiated. It provides great insight in the thought process and cultural history of the services and the different commands with the USAF. Many of these issues exist even today.

I especially like the discussion of the urban legend of the mutiny within the crew force. In my day, the story became that the crews mutined during a CINCSAC vist to Andersen AFB Guam, during the Linebacker II operation. This mutiny forced CINCSAC to hurriedly leave the base to save his skin. Having read the book, I could see the grains of truth in the legend, and how it merged over time, coupled with the modern crew force twisting it to meet their personal desires. Having been a "Crewdog", I can see how the U-Tapo story got twisted in to a mutiny, and the consequent disregard of orders that were blatantly stupid in combat, and the blending of the cold reception of the CINCSAC after the battle into the modern legend.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Story
Review: Marshall L. Michel's new book covering America's last great air battle in Vietnam, 'The 11 Days of Christmas' is an excellent and gripping book telling the story of 'Linebacker II'. I started reading this book on a Saturday and finished it by Sunday, the next day. The narrative was spellbinding; I was glued to the book and found it hard to put down.

The author offers a nice mix of in-depth research intermixed with first hand accounts of those involved, at every level and on both sides. This is a great book, easy to read and hard not to enjoy. I have read only a few books on the air war in Vietnam, 'The Ravens' by Christopher Robbins, 'The Rescue of BAT-21' by Darrel Whitcomb and 'One Day in a Long War by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price'. However I still have no hesitation in recommending this book to any one who enjoys a well-written historical account of air warfare.

The author takes the reader through the background and events leading to the decision to carry out America's Linebacker II campaign. Covering points both from the political and military aspects of this campaign he shows the faults uncovered during the bombing campaign both with SAC and their political masters. It is surprising to read of the inadequacies uncovered and the stupidity behind some decisions.

By the time you get to the end of the book you come away with nothing but praise for the air crews involved in this battle regardless if you agree with the strategy of this bombing campaign or not. Further, the author offers you a rare insight into the North Vietnamese crews defending Hanoi and Haiphong during the bombing.

Not only does Michel offer you an excellent historical account of this campaign but you really get drawn into the story as you follow the crews of the B-52's as they make their way to their targets during the dark nights of December 1972. This is a great book that offers excellent story telling backed by in-depth research and numerous first-hand accounts from the participants of the campaign. Well done to the author.

Rating:
Summary: So riveting, I found myself unable to put the book down.
Review: Michel provides a solid, nuanced coverage of the December 1972 Lineback II air campaign against North Vietnam. Accessing extensive US Air Force operational files, previously unpublished North Vietnamese Air Defense histories and files, and numerous live and email interviews with air crews, planners and North Vietnamese air defense officers, Michel provides the best "both sides" perspective of not just this air campaign, but any air campaign that I have read.

Items I found interesting, of note:
-- After the Pentagon argued for years that it need to go "all the way" to take the war to Hanoi, when President Nixon asked for an all out air campaign on North Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voted in secret against the campaign, the SecDef opposed it, as did Strategic Air Command (SAC).

-- The first three nights of the campaign were planned (if that is the appropriate word) at the HQ of SAC in Nebraska, primarily by officers who had never been in the skys of North Vietnam. This was despite the fact that the USAF had been flying missions "downtown" since 1965. The advice and feed back of the B-52 crews in Guam and Thailand was ignored, as were inputs from the 7th Air Force in Saigon. Michel explains the former as a result of the top down decision making culture at SAC instigated by General Curtis LeMay. He explains the later as SAC arrogance that they had anything to learn from Tactical Air Command (TAC)

-- Despite being the primary strategic weapons for penetrated Soviet air space in the event of a US-USSR nuclear war, SAC had never flown the B-52 against captured SA-2 surface-to-air missile radars. The SA-2 was one of the primary elements of the Soviet Air Defense network, and the back bone of the NVA air defense. But SAC had never tested the radar signature of the B-52 with its bomb-bay doors open or in different flight profiles.

-- Between the first and third night of raids, the technical and tactical staff of the Vietnamese air defense forces effectively out thought,out innovated the tactics of the SAC planners and the USAF. On night 3 the NVA downed or severely damaged 6 B-52s over Hanoi.

-- The officer who ultimately challenged SAC's tactics, and who was most responsible for the change in tactics beginning on night 4, General Sullivan -- who commanded the B-52 wing flying out of Thailand -- was passed over soon after for promotion by SAC and asked retire.

-- The commander of the three engaged B-52 wings who showed the most tactical inflexibility and flew missions on only 3 of the raids north was one of only two officers awarded the Air Force Cross (the highest USAF award for valor) during the campaign. In contrast, the other recipient successfully recovered heavily damaged B-52s twice and on a third missions flew his crippled aircraft across the Thai border, enabling all his crew to successfully bailout prior to it crashing. The wing commander with the Air Force Cross was promoted to General, served much longer in SAC than General Sullivan, and later wrote the "SACimized," official whitewash USAF version of the campaign.

Impressive. Highly encourage any serious amateur or professional historian of air combat, the Vietnam war, or combat decision making to pick it up.

Rating:
Summary: Operation Linebacker II: A Damn Close Run Thing
Review: The story of the Vietnam war is so long and complex that by the time readers reach the 1972 Christmas bombing, they are usually squarely in two camps: the doves (for whom the entire Nixon-era prosecution is a continuous, unmitigated travesty) and the hawks (many of whom think the South Vietnamese could still have been salvaged as late as 1974). The story of the 1972 Christmas bombing is thus: incensed at the North Vietnamese side's intransigence at the Paris peace talks, Nixon ordered several days' worth of continuous B-52 raids on Hanoi; soon thereafter, the North Vietnamese returned to the negotiating table and accepted the peace deal then under discussion. The "hawk" version of Vietnam history hails this as a neglected triumph of American arms; the "dove" version derides it as an irrelevance, holding that Saigon's fall (in April 1975) was inevitable and that the peace deal was a figleaf for American disengagement. Mitchel's book gently trends towards the hawk version, but is really not concerned with geopolitics: this is the fascinating story of how the raids were actually conducted (and by whom), and carries the astonishing revelation that the raids were almost a total failure. The first days saw heavy losses from SAM missiles, due to defects in the radar jamming strategy, and it was only after intense effort that the jamming systems were rendered effective. Mitchel also describes the experiences of singer Joan Baez and war crime expert Telford Taylor, two American observers who were visiting Hanoi prison camps at the time. To re-quote Arthur, Duke of Wellington for the umpteenth time, this battle was a damn close-run thing.

Rating:
Summary: Michel Hits the Mark Again
Review: This book is indeed a worthy sucessor to Michel's "Clashes" which I consider the definitive source on Vietnam counter-air operations.

Marshall Michel scores a "shack" (fighter parlance for hitting the bullseye) with this latest offering. His carefully researched and documented material provides an in-depth insight into Linebacker II operations that are just coming to light 30 year later.

This book is a must read for all Vietnam War fighter and bomber crews plus any other history buffs who want to know the "hows and whys" of the 11 day war."