The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh

Rating:
Summary: Westmoreland's foiled strategy
Review: End of the Line. The Siege of Khe Sanh, Robert Pisor


1/3 of the Marines were draftees. Sf had moved there in 1962. Westmoreland visited when he came in country in 1964. He planned to use it as a jumping off point to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in 1964. In Dec 1966, he formally requested a raid into Laos to cut the North Vietnamese supply lines, using the 26th Marine regiment, 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne., with Khe Sanh as the jumping off point. When he got word that the North Vietnamese were surrounding the camp, Westmoreland decided to use Khe Sanh as a killing ground instead. Westmoreland never did get permission to attack into Laos and cut off the North Vietnamese supply line, so after the battle, bulldozed the base.

Westmoreland replace Paul Harkins in June 1964. Harkins thought the war would be over in 6 months. Westmoreland knew he would not even get the concrete he needed for ports and airbases in 6 months. Harkins was spending ½ a billion dollars. Westmoreland , 30 billion dollars.

The plantation at Khe Sanh was a coffee plantation. The Poilane's ran it, and I would guess, still do. The 2 oldest Poilane's got killed, one in an assassination by the VC in 1964, the other, Felix, in a plane crash at Khe Sanh during the siege. He was coming back at Easter, and the plane blew a tire.
The father, Eugenie Poilane, divorced his wife, and married a local girl. They had 5 kids. His wife, Madame Bordeauducq also had 5 kids by him and set up her own coffee plantation next door.
There were also oranges and apples. The Bru did the work.
You mentioned that the runway was now a coffee plantation too. I guess that it is the Poilane's too.

During the hill fights, months earlier, Felix Poilane expressed sorrow to the Marines about the casualties, and suggested they use the Bru who knew the country, and knew where the artillery was coming from, but the Marines were suspicious and he was not believed. A Bru leader also tried to tell the Marines about the tunnel where the North Vietnamese artillery was, but was thought to be a Vietnamese and not to be trusted.


At Lang Vei, they had 100 LAWS. They hit one tank 9 times, with no effect.

The logbook of the 1st battalion, 26th Marines for Feb 1968 does not even mention the battle of Lang Vei.
The Summary of 1968 actions published in Saigon by USMACV describes Lang Vei, ... the defenders were compelled to withdraw from the camp under pressure. The North Vietnamese forces used several tanks in the attack... The is the first enemy employment of armor in the war and was a failure.

Amazing. Wonder what the SF folks would say about that.

For body counts, the official number is 205. This includes only Marines, and only those Marines killed between Nov 1 67 to April 1 1968. No SF, no other Army, air, Navy, Vietnamese, ARVN Rangers, Bru, the Laotian army folks at Lang Vei, etc.
One Chaplain, Rev Ray W. Stubbe, estimates that 475 Marines were zipped into green plastic body bags. He personally has the names, rank, serial number of 441 Marines he offered final prayers for. He was at Khe Sanh. Chaplain Stubbe estimates 5,000 Bru were killed.

The 204 does not include the Easter Sunday hill 881 fight. 49 Americans were killed in a plane crash that took off from Khe Sanh, but made it outside the siege boundary, so are not included. Nor are any of the 51 Marines, 46 Army, or 33 ARVN killed during Operation Pegasus.

Rating:
Summary: Unfocused, generalized, and pointless was this book
Review: Having known little to nothing of the Khe Sanh siege, I went looking for a book that could inform me in great detail of what happened. This was not found in this book. Don't get me wrong, you get the general idea of what happened. And Pisor even, from time to time, takes the book like a narrative and walks you through a battle. But there are several problems. One of the biggest is he starts focusing on things that really had nothing to do with the battle or he is very vague in his information.

For a whole chapter he builds up Westmoreland to be the greatest general the world has ever seen. Which is fine I guess, but I really don't need to know Westmoreland's biography when I'm trying to read about the battle. I don't see how him getting hit in the face and almost dying in his early years helps me understand/know about Khe Sanh any better. Another few "characters" that I thought weren't really needed were the farmers and naitives around Khe Sanh. I don't mean to sound crass, but war affects everyone. I really don't care to learn about the hardships of a farmer around Khe Sanh. Just as I wouldn't care to learn about the farmers around Russia when the Nazi's invaded. War destroys stuff, I already know that. I want to know about Khe Sanh's battle.

Quite possibly the worst thing about this book though is it's "structure" (sorry don't know what else to call it). When telling of accounts, he references "related" events, one example is Dien Bien Phu. But it's not until 3-4 chapters later where you actually find out exactly what he's talking about. You're left in the dark until he finds a most inopportune spot to fill in the blanks (like in the middle of a fire fight). To me, this is just bad story telling. You reference something? You immediately explain what you're talking about. Not have your reader continue reading in hopes you'll eventually tell them.

For those looking for an good introductory book into Khe Sanh, look elsewhere. For those that basically want a generalized look at the battle with focuses on things that aren't important, here ya go. To be honest, I was hoping for something closer to Black Hawk Down. Something that walked you almost hour by hour through the battle and almost putting you on the base. This book just ended up being too generalized and focused more on Westmoreland.

I will give it at 2 stars because it did at least tell me what happened at Khe Sanh

Rating:
Summary: Good explaination of events during seige.
Review: I was at Khe Sanh for about two to three weeks in Jan, 1968. I was one of 28 Army personnel on base on Jan. 20, 1968. I never really knew what happened or why on those fateful days until I was wounded on Jan. 26, 1968. By reading the day to day account of that time and after I know now what and how but no one will ever really know why.

Rating:
Summary: Impressive and valuable work regarding a watershed event
Review: Unlike the usual Vietnam paperback, filled with one soldier's memoirs of his time spent in war, Pisor created a truly historical work. Not only is Pisor documenting one of the longest battles of the Vietnam War, but also delving into the repercussions of Khe Sanh. Do to his journalistic objectivity, Pisor is able to separate the governmental propaganda, and the rhetoric of the political Left, and form an accurate description of an event that shaped America.

Although the Tet Offensive is credited with breaking American resolve for the war, Pisor adds that the siege at Khe Sanh is tantamount to the de-escalation of the war. After impressive words from General Westmorland and Lyndon Johnson regarding the importance of a hold at Khe Sanh, numerous American's became disillusioned when the whole base was bulldozed into the earth. For what reason were all those American lives spent? Why should men die for land that will simply be reverted to barren waste? As Pisor points out, Khe Sanh serves as a watershed for the end of the Vietnam War much like Dien Bien Phu proved a watershed for the French withdrawal in 1954.

However, Pisor does not limit his work to strictly academic postulations. He does weave the foot soldiers' account of the siege with his study of the global ramifications. He describes the ferocity of the North Vietnamese and their frightening, suicidal charges in such a way that I am most thankful to be born a few years after the fall of Saigon.

In conclusion, this journalist from Detroit produced a most impressive and valuable work on the history of Vietnam, and the results of one of its most famous battles.